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Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. July 1920.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(11562)

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PART II.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

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1919.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
1	Sir R. Rodd (Rome)	429	Dec. 28, 1918	Constantinople. Italy claims right to share in international occupation of Anatolia. Italy resents her independent action being deprecated. Asia Minor and Adriatic. Tirade against French proceedings. Interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs	1
2	M. de Fleuriau (Communiqué)	...	Jan. 2, 1919	Note from French Minister for Foreign Affairs to King of the Hedjaz offering hospitality to Emir Feisal on his return from London	3
3	M. Cambon (Communiqué)	...	Dec. 27, 1918	Juridical reform in Turkey. Mr. Waugh and M. Cilliére might exchange views on...	3
4	" "	...	Jan. 6, 1919	Juridical reform in Turkey. Note on necessity for. Adoption of French model seems to be appropriate	3
5	Sir R. Rodd (Rome)	10	7,	Asia Minor. Orders given to suspend military preparations for a landing in	7
6	M. de Fleuriau (Communiqué)	...	13,	Mesopotamia. Protest against action of British military authorities in requesting the French officer attached to the British forces to leave Mesopotamia	7
7	To War Office	...	16,	Armistice with Turkey. Does responsibility for securing fulfilment of terms rest solely upon British Government, particularly in Asiatic Turkey?	8
8	Earl of Derby (Paris)	155 Tel.	23,	Syria. French Government hope British officers will be instructed not to encourage anti-French intrigues	8
9	M. de Fleuriau (Communiqué)	...	25,	Constantinople. Instructions issued to assistants to French High Commissioner. Hopes instructions to British officials will be on similar lines	9
10	M. Cambon	...	30,	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. Note by manager of the company to General Allenby respecting present state of line and changes which are desirable	13
11	War Office	...	Feb. 2,	Armistice with Turkey. Replies to No. 7. Consider French Government should be consulted as regards military action in Turkey in Europe but not in Turkey in Asia	15
12	Earl of Derby (Paris)	144	7,	Asia Minor. Transmits note from French Government detailing alleged unfriendly attitude and acts of British authorities in Syria and Mesopotamia	16
13	Sir A. Calthorpe (Constantinople)	288 Tel.	9,	Asia Minor. Conditions imposed on Turkey by General Allenby on 7th February	19
14	To Earl of Derby	283	12,	Conversation with French Ambassador. Topics: Dilatory proceedings of Peace Conference; proposed meeting with representatives of all Russian parties; continuance of blockade of Germany; complaints of French at British attitude in Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Constantinople; Emir Feisal's visit to Europe	20
15	Mr. Balfour (Peace Delegation, Paris)	64	12,	Turkey in Asia. Italian interests in. Transmits notes from and to Italian Peace Delegation	23

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

iii

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
16	Earl of Derby (Paris)	321 Tel.	Feb. 14, 1919	Constantinople. French object to proceedings of British authorities, and suggest meeting of a commission in Paris to arrange matters	24
17	To Mr. Balfour	794	21,	Mesopotamia and Syria. French Ambassador complains of attitude of British military authorities towards the French	25
18	To Earl of Derby	340	25,	Constantinople. Memorandum on various points at issue with the French. C.I.G.S. will discuss matter in Paris	26
19	Earl of Derby (Paris)	204	24,	Syria. Transmits notes from French Government respecting alleged refusal of Sherrefian authorities to recognise position of French Financial Adviser at Damascus	29
20	To Earl of Derby	408	Mar. 5,	Conversation with French Ambassador. Topics: Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway; Financial Adviser to Persia; future of Constantinople	30
21	M. Cambon	...	5,	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. Draws attention to interests of French company, which are involved	32
22	Mr. Balfour (Peace Delegation, Paris)	216	12,	Turkey in Asia. Refers to No. 12. Further memorandum on complaints of French at proceedings of the British authorities. Would like to be informed of British reply to allegations	32
23	Memorandum	...	18,	Mecca pilgrimage, 1919. Arrangements in connection with minutes of meeting at Foreign Office	38
24	M. Cambon	...	18,	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. Refers to No. 21. Company again protest against military working of	42
25	To M. Cambon	...	19,	Syria and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 12. His Majesty's Government resent tone and matter of French complaints. Sykes-Picot Agreement is inoperative while military occupation continues, and must be submitted to Peace Conference	42
26	India Office	...	21,	Mesopotamia. Refers to No 12. Unable to attach any credence to the French charges against British officers, who have been instructed to respect French rights	44
27	Director of Military Operations	...	21,	Constantinople and Syria. French comments on enclosure in No. 18. Questions in abeyance pending General Allenby's visit to Paris	46
28	To Mr. Balfour	1523	24,	The Papacy. Conversation between Archbishop Corretti and Sir R. Graham. Topics: Protection of Holy Places; German Franciscans in Palestine; the Pope in Rome	51
29	To M. Cambon	...	24,	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. Refers to No. 24. Report has been called for	52
30	Earl Curzon (Memorandum)	...	25,	Middle East. Note of warning on present state of affairs in Turkey and possibility of fresh military operations	52
31	To Earl of Derby	623	Apr. 2,	Conversation with French Ambassador. Topics: Aliens Bill in relation to Frenchmen in United Kingdom; French claims vis-à-vis Germany; friction at Constantinople between British and French authorities	54

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
32	To Sir R. Rodd ...	194	Apr. 5, 1919	Asia Minor. Italian Chargé d'Affaires asks that His Majesty's Government may prevent Greek landing at Smyrna. Was informed that Italian landing at Adalia was likely to provoke Greek suspicion ...	56
33	Earl of Derby ... (Paris)	611 Tel.	9,	Constantinople and Asia Minor. French Government urge early meeting of Commission to settle points in dispute ...	56
34	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	453	3,	Turkey. Conversation with Grand Vizier, who submitted statement of terms offered by the Sultan regulating future status of Turkey. Offers submission to England. Potential dangers of Pan-Islamism ...	57
35	To India Office	17,	Arabia. Transmits report by Captain Lee-Warner on recent visit to the Hadramaut. Would like opinion on proposed instructions to Sir E. Allenby ...	61
36	To Earl of Derby ...	771 Tel.	18,	Constantinople and Asia Minor. Refers to No. 33. Commission appears to be a cumbersome method, prefers meeting of two representatives. Will accept any plan for speedy settlement of disputes ...	81
37	Earl Curzon ... (Memorandum)	...	22,	Middle East. Note sent to Mr. Balfour at Paris. Summary of present position. Suggestions as to settlement of Turkish Treaty. Despatch of Eastern Commission appears to be inopportune ...	81
38	Mr. Balfour ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	628	30,	Syria. Correspondence between M. Clemenceau and Emir Feisal. Form of independence which France is prepared to recognise for Syria ...	89
39	M. Cambon	May 5,	Syria. That orders may be sent to General Allenby to allow certain movements of French troops ...	91
40	To Earl of Derby ...	749	8,	Syria. Conversation with French Ambassador respecting No. 39. Has promised to refer matter to General Allenby ...	91
41	Mr. Balfour ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	678	7,	Engineering works at Jaffa. No definite commercial policy can be adopted until the future control of Palestine has been settled ...	93
42	To M. Cambon	13,	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. Refers to No. 29. Control by military authorities must be retained during military occupation of the country. Requests of French company cannot be entertained ...	94
43	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	695	6,	Turkey. Interview between military attaché and newspaper editor, who urged immediate arrest of members of Committee of Union and Progress. Intrigues of French ...	95
44	To Earl of Derby ...	785	19,	Constantinople. Interview between French Ambassador and Sir R. Graham respecting differences between British and French at ...	97
45	M. Cambon	18,	Syria. French Government ask that position of French Financial Adviser at Damascus may be recognised by General Allenby ...	98
46	To Mr. Balfour ...	3475	26,	Syria. French Ambassador states that the note from M. Clemenceau enclosed in No. 38 was never sent to Emir Feisal ...	98
47	Rear-Admiral Webb ... (Constantinople)	760	16,	Smyrna. Grand Vizier protests against occupation of town by Hellenic troops ...	99

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
48	To M. Cambon	May 27, 1919	Syria. Refers to No. 45. In view of early departure of Inter-Allied Commission to the East, His Majesty Government consider it would be premature to alter existing arrangements ...	100
49	To Earl of Derby ...	842	30,	Conversation with French Ambassador. Topics: Agreement respecting division of military commands in Turkey in Europe and Turkey in Asia; control of Heraclea port and coal mines; Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway ...	101
50	To Mr. Balfour ...	3482	31,	Arabia. Conversation with the Resident at Aden respecting: Proposed Treaty with the Imam; boundary and administration of Aden protectorate; the Idrisi ...	102
51	M. Cambon	27,	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. French Government consider the company should be indemnified for the seizure as soon as peace has been signed. Also that manager of the company may be received by the British authorities ...	103
52	To Earl of Derby ...	876	June 11,	Conversation with French Ambassador. Topics: Differences between Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain in regard to terms of German Peace Treaty; proposal to appoint French officials in service of Persian Government; attendance of Grand Vizier at Paris Peace Conference; telegram from French Government to Turkish Crown Prince; speech of M. Picot at Beirut ...	103
53	M. Cambon	13,	Syria. Refers to No. 48. Again refers to position of French Financial Adviser at Damascus ...	107
54	General Clayton ... (Egyptian Expeditionary Force)	...	5,	Arabia. Report by British Liaison Officer on political situation. Emir Feisal's agitation ...	107
55	Sir E. Allenby ... (Cairo)	269	11,	Arabia. Transmits memorandum on Khurma dispute between King Hussein and Ibn Saud ...	113
56	Mr. Balfour ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	1007	18,	Smyrna. Transmits reports of atrocities perpetrated by Greek troops on occupation of ...	117
57	To Mr. Balfour ...	4009	20,	Asia Minor. Italian and Greek military penetration. Have any limits been placed on? ...	129
58	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	970	6,	Turkey. French intrigues to carry favour openly increasing. Incident of visit of Turkish delegates to Paris Peace Conference. Internal unrest is rapidly increasing ...	131
59	To M. Cambon	25,	Syria. Refers to No. 53. Time is inopportune for discussing modification of existing arrangement as to Financial Adviser ...	134
60	Sir E. Allenby ... (Cairo)	278	15,	Arabia. Refers to No. 55. Present position of Khurma dispute ...	134
61	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	1047	18,	Turkey. Interim Cabinet appointments made during absence of Ministers at Paris Peace Conference ...	136
62	" " ...	1060	22,	Turkey. Growth of national defence movement under Kemal Pasha. Transmits memorandum ...	137

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
63	General Clayton ... (Egyptian Expeditionary Force)	311	June 23, 1919	Syria. Report on situation. Emir Feisal's opposition to any form of French intervention. Lebanese opposition to Pan-Arab State ...	139
64	Mr. Balfour ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	1148	July 2,	Palestine. Transmits correspondence respecting proposed Zionist activities. Particulars of concessions desired by Zionist organisation ...	145
65	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	1091	June 27,	Turkey. Attention of Acting Grand Vizier has been called to serious nature of agitation conducted by Kemal Pasha. Transmits memorandum ...	148
66	" " ...	1152	July 5,	Asia Minor. Creation of Italian naval base in the Dodecanese. Instructions given to British naval authorities to continue visits to ports concerned ...	149
67	Mr. Balfour ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	1350	19,	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. Refers to No. 51. His Majesty's Government cannot admit claim of French company. Question must be settled by the mandatory ...	150
68	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	1127	June 30,	Turkey. Circular issued by Minister of the Interior prohibiting agitation has led to his resignation ...	151
69	" " ...	1129	July 1,	Armenia. Reports continue to arrive of atrocities committed on Christian communities ...	152
70	To Mr. Wardrop	22,	Trans-Caucasia. Appointment as Chief British Commissioner. Instructions for guidance ...	155
71	To Mr. Balfour ...	4970	23,	Caucasus and the Caspian. Italian Ambassador has been asked whether his Government have decided not to take charge of ...	156
72	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	1230	17,	Turkey. Turkish Government have been asked to dismiss Kemal Pasha and Djemal Pasha who are organising resistance to the interests of the Allies ...	156
73	" " ...	1232	17,	Smyrna. Report on recent events at Pergama. Trouble originated in action of Turkish irregulars ...	158
74	" " ...	1246	20,	Smyrna. Question of Greek evacuation of Aidin ...	159
75	" " ...	1247	20,	Smyrna. Turks ask that limits of Greek occupation may be clearly defined ...	159
76	Colonel French ... (Egyptian Expeditionary Force)	...	19,	Syria and Palestine. Conclusions formed by American Commission of Enquiry ...	161
77	To Sir G. Grahame ...	1041	Aug. 8,	Syria. Sir R. Graham has complained to M. de Fleuriau of anti-British campaign in French press. To make representations to French Government on similar lines ...	161
78	To Mr. Lindsay ...	459	11,	Caucasus. Conversation with United States Ambassador respecting withdrawal of British forces. Mr. Davis is of opinion that the United States will not accept mandate for Armenia or Constantinople ...	162
79	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	1328	1,	Turkey. Hostility of all parties to present Government. Chauvinism in the ascendant ...	163

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
80	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	1353	July 31, 1919	Turkey. If necessary, proposes to ensure safety of the Sultan and the Grand Vizier. All power now appears to be in hands of Committee of Union and Progress ...	166
81	To Sir G. Grahame ...	1061	Aug. 13,	Persia. Has complained to M. de Fleuriau of impending despatch of French Judicial Mission to Tebran. Attention called to growing tendency of French press to foment ill-feeling against England ...	169
82	Sir G. Grahame ... (Paris)	791	12,	Syria. Refers to No. 77. Has complained to M. Pichon of French press attacks. M. Pichon declares inability of Government to control the press, but reiterates complaints against British officers of anti-French propaganda ...	170
83	To Mr. Balfour ...	5363	14,	Constantinople. Military spheres. Exception taken to French view of agreement in regard to General Milne's authority ...	172
84	Sir A. Calthorpe ... (Constantinople)	1368	5,	Turkey. Refers to No. 80. Note concerning delimitation of Italian and Greek zones in Asia Minor handed to Grand Vizier. Has urged strong measures against members of Committee of Union and Progress. Kemal Pasha is organising an army at Erzeroum ...	172
85	Rear-Admiral Webb... (Constantinople)	1412	9,	Asia Minor. Transmits report on atrocities in Aidin Vilayet ...	174
86	" " ...	1417	9,	Turkey. Refers to No. 84. Interview between Crown Prince and Mr. Ryan. Former denied being implicated in Kemal Pasha's agitation ...	179
87	Colonel French ... (Egyptian Expeditionary Force)	...	11,	Palestine. Transmits copy of letter from General Allenby to War Office reporting on Mr. Justice Brandeis' tour in Palestine with the Zionist Commission ...	182
88	Colonel Wilson	23,	Arabia. Ownership of Khurma. Transmits memorandum supporting King Hussein's claim ...	184
89	To Rear-Admiral Webb	1416 Tel.	27,	Turkey. Refers to No. 86. To discourage project of sending Turkish agitators to Italy ...	186
90	Rear-Admiral Webb... (Constantinople)	1457	17,	Asia Minor. Massacre of Christians. Turkish Government are devoid of all authority in Anatolia. Suggests withdrawal of Greek and Italian forces ...	187
91	To Mr. Lindsay ...	497	29,	Caucasus. Refers to No. 78. American Ambassador states that his Government are unable to defray expense of British forces in Armenia; they are unable to help, and appeal to His Majesty's Government not to withdraw forces as responsibility will be placed on England ...	188
92	Rear-Admiral Webb... (Constantinople)	1745 Tel.	29,	Turkey. Grand Vizier has asked Peace Conference to hasten conclusion of peace...	189
93	To M. Cambon	Sept. 1,	Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. Refers to No. 51. Line is now in a better condition than when taken over by British military authorities. His Majesty's Government can admit no claim ...	190
94	Rear-Admiral Webb... (Constantinople)	1525	Aug. 25,	Turkey. Grand Vizier asks that a telegram may be sent to the Peace Conference pointing out effects of delay in conclusion of peace ...	191

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
95	M. de Fleuriau ... (Communiqué)	...	Sept. 9, 1919	Red Sea lights. Asks that control may be transferred to the Lights Company as soon as possible ...	193
96	Rear-Admiral Webb... (Constantinople)	1535	Aug. 27,	Turkey. Summary of political situation since reconstruction of Cabinet ...	193
97	To Mr. Balfour ...	5984	Sept. 11,	Caucasus. Summary of events leading up to British occupation. Consternation aroused at news of British withdrawal and proposed substitution of Italian forces. American unwillingness to share in task. British held responsible in event of massacre of Armenians. French willingness to send troops ...	196
98	Colonel French ... (Egyptian Expeditionary Force)	...	Aug. 30,	Syria and Palestine. Summary of situation. American Commission have finished their enquiry. Political pressure and propaganda of French. Relations of Zionist Commission and the British authorities not very satisfactory. Zionists inclined to ignore practical difficulties in way of agreeing to their requests ...	199
99	Rear-Admiral Webb... (Constantinople)	1601	Sept. 3,	Turkey. Transmits report of conversation between Governor of Samsoun and a British relief officer. Provincial governors are powerless against the National Defence movement ...	201
100	" " ...	1624	7,	Asia Minor. Transmits reports on present situation in Anatolia. Hostility to Greek occupation continuing. Mandate under England or the United States would be accepted ...	202
101	" " ...	1629	8,	Asia Minor. Transmits report on trial by court-martial of Greek officer in command of garrison at Aidin. Report drawn up by Pan-Hellenist propagandist ...	208
102	" " ...	1630	8,	Asia Minor. Transmits report on events at Aidin from an English eye-witness ...	210
103	" " ...	1633	8,	Turkey. Grand Vizier has suggested the conclusion of a secret understanding with Great Britain. Has negatived the proposal ...	212
104	Aide-mémoire, Paris...	...	13,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Allocation of territories between British, French and Arabs. Railway and pipe lines. Withdrawal of British troops. Despatch of French troops ...	213
105	Rear-Admiral Webb... (Constantinople)	1645	7,	Turkish prisons. Owing to unsatisfactory conditions prevailing, an Inter-Allied Commission for Prisons has been constituted ...	214
106	Mr. Balfour ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	1847	19,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Memorandum (August 11) on existing conflicting agreements. Outline of scheme which might satisfy aspirations of all parties ...	216
107	Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George	...	21,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Protests against arrangements in No. 104. Asks for cancellation and continuance of <i>status quo</i> pending conclusion of peace with Turkey ...	222
108	To Sir R. Crowe ...	6206	24,	Syria. Lord Hardinge has complained to French Ambassador of French press attacks on action of British officers, and also of French action in Tehran ...	224

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
109	Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George	...	Sept. 23, 1919	Syria. Refers to No. 107. Has declined to discuss question of evacuation of British forces. That Arabs may be allowed to reoccupy Beirut, or maintenance of <i>status quo</i> ...	225
110	Rear-Admiral Webb... (Constantinople)	1676	11,	Armenia. Transmits report by a relief officer on tour along south coast of Black Sea. Conditions in the interior are deplorable. There will be no improvement till a mandate has been given ...	225
111	Mr. Balfour ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	1902	Oct. 3,	Constantinople. Transmits letter from Vienna Bank protesting against restrictions imposed on them by the Inter-Allied Financial Control, for transmission to Constantinople ...	229
112	To Emir Feisal	9,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 107. Points out that No. 104 is not an agreement, but only contains proposals for collaboration. His contentions are based on misunderstandings. Reasons for withdrawal of British troops and necessity for substitution of other European troops. Military resistance would be fatal to Arab aspirations ...	231
112*	Sir M. Cheetham ... (Cairo)	457	Sept. 22,	Arabia. Transmits report by Arab Bureau on capture of Colonel Jacob's Mission to the Imam Yahya ...	234a
113	Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George	...	Oct. 3,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 107. Repeats request for cancellation or suspension of Paris arrangement ...	234
114	To Emir Feisal ... (From Mr. Lloyd George)	...	10,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 113. Reasons prompting action of His Majesty's Government are explained in No. 112. Unable to alter decision to withdraw British troops. Ready to arrange meeting of representatives to adjust differences ...	235
115	M. Clemenceau ... (Communiqué)	...	10,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 104. Criticisms on proposed arrangement ...	235
116	Colonel Cornwallis	11,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Report on meeting between Emir Feisal and two French officers in London. Suggests meeting between British and French military representatives and Emir Feisal ...	237
117	To Earl of Derby ...	1160 Tel.	13,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Message from Mr. Lloyd George to M. Clemenceau. Urges meeting in London between Emir Feisal, Lord Allenby and General Gouraud. Emir Feisal would like an American representative also to be present ...	238
118	To Sir R. Rodd ...	619	14,	Egypt. Lord Hardinge has asked the Italian Ambassador why Italy delays to recognise the British protectorate ...	239
119	M. Clemenceau to Earl of Derby	...	14,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 117. Unable to agree to proposed meeting. Recognises difficult position of His Majesty's Government <i>vis-à-vis</i> the Arabs and France. Emir Feisal should be told he must negotiate direct with France ...	240
120	To Earl of Derby ...	1170 Tel.	16,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Emir Feisal will leave for Paris on 20th October, and accepts M. Clemenceau's invitation ...	241

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
121	Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George	...	Oct. 11, 1919	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 114. If His Majesty's Government cannot alter the decision to withdraw British forces, he will agree to meeting of British, French and American representatives to consider the matters involved ...	241
122	Earl of Derby ... (Paris)	1109 Tel.	19,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 120. M. Clemenceau will receive Emir Feisal on 21st October ...	242
123	Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George	...	19,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Will go to Paris and endeavour to persuade French to maintain the <i>status quo</i> ...	242
124	Mr. Lloyd George to M. Clemenceau	...	18,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 119. Resents implied charge of duplicity. Traces course of negotiations leading up to Anglo-French Agreement of 1916. Reasons for understanding come to in December 1918. His Majesty's Government have endeavoured to bring about a Franco-Arab understanding in spite of Syrian opposition. Having declined to accept mandate for Syria, His Majesty's Government put forward proposals in No. 104, and have tried to induce Emir Feisal to accept them. Regrets that proposal to hold meeting between English, French and Arab representatives has been rejected. Fears a high-handed policy will drive Arabs into hostility. His Majesty's Government cannot divest themselves of their responsibilities to the Arabs. Denies charge of increasing the armament of the Arabs. If the French press attacks are continued His Majesty's Government will have to consider the question of publication of the papers ...	243
125	To Earl Granville ...	258	21,	Thrace. M. Venizelos has urged the claims of Greece. Constantinople. His views as to future of ...	250
126	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	1836	10,	Turkey. Present political situation consequent on change of Government. Delay in conclusion of peace has enabled Nationalist movement to strengthen its position, and will involve difficulty in enforcement of peace terms ...	251
127	" "	1858	6,	Turkey. Government hope to arrange matters with Mustapha Kemal ...	257
128	" "	1885	10,	Turkey. Threats of Mustapha Kemal against members of the late Government ...	258
129	To Earl of Derby ...	1266	22,	Syria. Has again complained to French Ambassador of tone and matter of French official notes and press articles ...	259
130	To Mr. Kennard ...	658	22,	Asia Minor. Italian Ambassador complains of British opposition at Paris to inclusion of Italian troops in forces of occupation at Aidin. Fiume. Italian Ambassador also asked for British support of Italian aspirations ...	260
131	M. Venizelos ... (Communiqué)	...	16,	Smyrna. Complaints of lack of impartiality of Commission appointed by the Supreme Council to enquire into recent occurrences ...	261

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
132	Mr. P. Kerr ... (10, Downing Street)	...	Oct. 21, 1919	Syria. Telegrams exchanged between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau on September 11 respecting discussion of matters with Emir Feisal ...	265
133	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Rome)	674 Tel.	26,	Egypt. Italy promises to recognise British protectorate, but wishes to call attention to certain matters ...	266
134	To M. Canbon	27,	Red Sea lights. Refers to No. 95. As the lights belong to the Ottoman Government their disposal will have to be settled by the Treaty of Peace ...	267
135	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	1910	18,	Turkish prisons. Refers to No. 105. Transmits reports on inspections made by the Inter-Allied Prisons Commission ...	268
136	" "	1915	18,	Turkey. Refers to No. 126. Present position is one of unstable equilibrium between Constantinople and the provinces ...	274
137	" "	1918	18,	Smyrna. Report of Inter-Allied Commission of Enquiry. Greeks and Turks are both held responsible for occurrences ...	280
138	" "	1935	20,	Smyrna. Italian activities in and around. Greek and Italian troops should both be withdrawn ...	289
139	" "	1938	18,	Anatolia. Conditions prevailing in Samsoun area ...	291
140	" "	1939	18,	Turkey. American sympathies are encouraging Turkish Nationalist agitation ...	293
141	To Viscount Grey ...	681	30,	Oil. American Ambassador has complained of British refusal to allow representatives of Standard Oil Company to make investigations in Palestine. Turkey. Attention of American Ambassador has been called to unfriendly attitude of American Admiral at Constantinople ...	299
142	Viscount Allenby ... (Cairo)	508	16,	Arabia. Possibility of resignation of King Hussein. Emir Abdullah would be the most suitable successor. He will probably ask for maintenance of a senior British official at Jeddah ...	301
143	Mr. Davis	31,	Oil. Asks that representatives of Standard Oil Company may be allowed to make investigations in Mesopotamia. Representative of the Shell group has been allowed facilities ...	301
144	To Sir E. Crowe ...	7338	Nov. 3,	Smyrna. M. Venizelos asks for a fresh Commission of Enquiry at which a Greek representative may be present ...	302
145	Sir M. Cheetham ... (Cairo)	526	Oct. 27,	Arabia. Refers to No. 112*. Transmits further report on detention at Bajil of Colonel Jacob's Mission to the Imam Yahya ...	303
146	Sir G. Buchanan ... (Rome)	243 Commercial	Nov. 3,	Georgia. Commercial negotiations between Georgians and Italians ...	308
147	Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George	...	6,	Syria. Unable to induce the French to arrange a meeting to arrange for the withdrawal of British troops. Refers matter to the Supreme Council ...	309
148	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	2001	Oct. 28,	Turkey. Notes on the Nationalist movement in the Samsoun area ...	315

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
149	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	2013	Oct. 30, 1919	Turkey. Has called attention of United States High Commissioner to mendacious and harmful statements disseminated by the "United States Naval Radio Press" ...	318
150	"	2014	30,	Turkey. Returns showing present military situation and resources of the Turkish Empire ...	319
151	Sir E. Crowe ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	2123	Nov. 10,	Smyrna. Supreme Council will urge Greeks to exercise restraint, and will point out that Greek occupation is provisional pending final decisions of the Peace Conference ...	323
152	Earl Curzon ... (Memorandum)	...	12,	Syria. Interview with M. Pichot, who gave a very optimistic account of French negotiations with Emir Feisal. Lord Curzon mentioned matters connected with British evacuation requiring consideration, and urged early resumption of Peace Conference in London to settle the whole Eastern question ...	325
153	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	2045	2,	Turkey. Political situation in the Samsoun area. Position of Christians in the interior is dependent on goodwill of the Turks ...	327
154	"	2066	4,	Turkey. Question of new Parliament meeting at Broussa has been raised. Transmits memorandum on question of expulsion of Turks from Constantinople ...	328
155	"	2067	4,	Trans-Caucasia. Transmits report on situation in the provinces of ...	330
156	India Office	...	14,	Arabia. Statement made by Nejd Mission on behalf of Ibn Saud in connection with recent disturbances ...	337
157	Colonel Wilson	...	9,	Arabia. Refers to No. 142. Every effort should be made to prevent King Hussein's abdication ...	338
158	Correspondence	Arabia. Boundaries of the Arab State. Correspondence between Sherif of Mecca and Sir H. McMahon, 14th July, 1915, to 25th January, 1916... ..	340
159	Sir E. Crowe ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	2155	17,	Syria. Transmits note from Emir Feisal to the Supreme Council asking permission to present his case and note from French Delegation maintaining that Syrian portion cannot be considered apart from whole question of Turkey ...	348
160	Admiralty...	...	20,	Black Sea. Transmits notes by Admiral de Robeck on a recent cruise and visits to Samsoun, Trebizond, Tiflis, Novorossisk and Sevastopol. Potentialities of Georgia. Appreciation of General Denikin ...	352
161	To Mr. Davis	...	21,	Oil. Refers to No. 143. Explains policy in regard to surveys, &c. Representative of the Shell group has been recalled ...	359
162	Mr. Wardrop ... (Tiflis)	59	Oct. 23,	Armenia. Report on journey in. Conditions are deplorable ...	359
163	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	2085	Nov. 6,	Smyrna. Refers to No. 138. Italian propaganda continues ...	363
164	"	2052-Tel.	10,	Turkey. Emphasises abnormal conditions consequent on prolongation of armistice. Asks for recall of French generalissimo ...	363

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
165	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	2110	Nov. 11, 1919	Turkey. Question of relief of the native Christian population is becoming very serious. Urges that England should assume the responsibility ...	366
166	To M. Cambon	...	22,	Syria. Evacuation of the coastal areas by British troops is without prejudice to future determination of the boundaries of Palestine ...	368
167	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	2114	12,	Turkey. Elections to the new Chamber are being conducted under pressure of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Nationalists ...	368
168	To Earl of Derby	1391	25,	Conversation with French Ambassador. Topics: Renewal of Belgian Guarantee Treaty of 1839; French apprehension of British negotiations with Russian Soviet representative in Copenhagen; French disinclination to transfer of Peace Conference to London; attitude of United States Senate to League of Nations Covenant ...	372
169	M. Clemenceau to Mr. Lloyd George	...	9,	Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. Refers to No. 124. Has never doubted sentiments of His Majesty's Government. Attributes divergencies to subordinate officers. Cannot altogether accept point as to Mosul. Still hopes to convert Emir Feisal to an agreement ...	374
170	Emir Feisal to Earl of Derby	...	21,	Syria. Transmits letter to Mr. Lloyd George stating that French occupation of certain districts evacuated by British troops will be considered an act of aggression by the Arabs, and copy of letter to M. Clemenceau in reply to enclosure 2 in No. 159, suggesting appointment of an Anglo-Franco-Arab Commission to arrange matters ...	373
171	Foreign Office Memo- randum	...	26,	Arabia. Refers to enclosure in No. 156. Notes of conversation with Nejd Mission. Hostilities between King Hussein and Ibn Saud must cease. A meeting must be arranged to settle differences. Failing this, His Majesty's Government are prepared to appoint an arbitrator ...	377
172	Sir E. Crowe ... (Peace Delegation, Paris)	2199	26,	Smyrna. Refers to No. 151. M. Venizelos takes exception to statement that Greeks were warned of provisional nature of occupation entrusted to them. Supports M. Venizelos' contention ...	379
173	Colonel Meinertzhagen (Egyptian Ex- peditionary Force)	311	10,	Syria and Palestine. Report on present situation in. Pan-Islamic feeling is growing in Syria. Suggests that Zionists should be allowed to start measures for building up their national home ...	383
174	Sir J. de Robeck ... (Constantinople)	2143	16,	Turkey. Government are negotiating with the leaders of the Nationalist movement ...	386
175	"	2166	19,	Cilicia. French occupation of Aintab, Marash and Ourfa has caused violent outburst by Nationalist leaders ...	389
176	To Colonel Wilson	...	Dec. 1,	Arabia. To induce King Hussein to meet Ibn Saud in order to settle differences. Arguments to be used. Ibn Saud will also be informed. After agreement visit of King Hussein to England will be welcomed ...	391

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
177	War Office...	...	Dec. 2, 1919	Turkey. Military force may be necessary to enforce the peace terms, it is therefore essential that the military authorities should be made aware of the terms in advance ...	393
178	To British officer on Supreme Economic Council	...	3,	Turkey. Transmits copy of No. 165. To call attention of Supreme Economic Council to state of destitution prevailing in Turkey, with a view to adoption of relief measures by the Allied Powers ...	394
179	Sir E. Crowe (Peace Delegation, Paris)	2248	3,	Turkey. Refers to No. 168. M. Clemenceau will not agree to Peace Conference meeting in London to draw up Turkish Treaty. This attitude is due to desire to preserve what remains of French prestige in the Near East. Suggests that negotiations might be conducted in London, but signature of treaty to take place in Paris ...	395
180	Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)	2194	Nov. 23,	Turkey. Nationalist movement is now unpopular in Samsoun district ...	396
181	" "	2203	24,	Armenia. Refers to No. 110. State of security is deteriorating. Christian refugees are leaving in increasing numbers...	396
182	War Office...	...	Dec. 8,	Palestine. Question of northern boundary should be settled at once. Possibility of friction between English and French commanders ...	400
183	Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)	2213	Nov. 27,	Asia Minor. Reports from British Advance Headquarters. Greek activities. Situation in Western Anatolia. Economic situation in Aidin vilayet ...	402
184	Viscount Allenby (Cairo)	571	22,	Arabia. Letter received from King Hussein for transmission to Emir Feisal, which has been returned to Jeddah to be given back to the King ...	407
185	Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)	2249	28,	Asia Minor. Report by British Relief Officer on conditions in vilayet of Brusa and sanjak of Balikesir ...	408
186	" "	2252	Dec. 2,	Turkey. Opposition to Nationalist movement is spreading in Anatolia ...	411
187	" "	...	2,	Turkey. Opposition to Nationalist movement in Ismid district ...	412
188	Mr. Wardrop (Tiflis)	195 Tel.	10,	Azerbaijan. Prime Minister has asked whether His Majesty's Government support proposal to federate with Persia ...	413
189	To Earl of Derby	1479	17,	Palestine. Transmits copy of No. 182. His Majesty's Government have decided to make a concession to Arab feelings, and hope French Government will agree to existing boundary between British and French spheres of occupation ...	414
190	Colonel Meinertzhagen (Egyptian Expeditionary Force)	74	5,	Syria and Palestine. Indirect evidence warrants conclusion that Banca di Roma is acting prejudicially to British interests ...	415
191	" "	92	2,	Syria. Feeling in favour of French mandate is growing. Turkish propaganda is increasing. Sherifian family are losing influence ...	415

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page
192	Sir J. de Robeck (Constantinople)	2271	Dec. 4, 1919	Kurdistan. Conversation between Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Mr. Ryan, who stated that His Majesty's Government maintain an attitude of reserve as regards Kurdish question ...	419
193	" "	2286	4,	Turkey. Armenian and Greek Patriarchates complain of growing want of public security. Increasing need of relief to prevent starvation ...	421
194	" "	2311	9,	Kurdistan. Conversation between Mr. Hohler and Kurdish chief. Latter stated that Turkish Government have offered autonomy to Kurds; he asked for advice. Was informed Kurdish aspirations would be dealt with in the Turkish Peace Treaty ...	424
195	" "	2317	11,	Turkey. Turkish Government have telegraphed to Supreme Council asking for early settlement of Peace Treaty ...	428
196	" "	2321	12,	Cilicia. Refers to No. 175. Mustapha Kemal complains of proceedings of French at Adana ...	429
197	" "	2336	13,	Kurdistan and Armenia. Refers to No. 194. Armenian Patriarch confirms statement of agreement between Kurds and Armenians	430
198	" "	2341	15,	Turkey. List of economic concessions held by foreigners (other than British) in late Turkish Empire ...	431
199	" "	2344	16,	Smyrna. Note to Greek High Commissioner from Allied High Commissioners stating that enquiry is to be held into question of Greek interference in administration of ...	432
200	" "	2353	16,	Turkey. Notes from Armenian and Greek Patriarchates appealing for advance of funds from Allied Governments for relief of Christian populations. Italian High Commission urges claims of Moslem refugees also ...	433
201	" "	2354	16,	Turkey. Further appeals of Greek and Armenian Patriarchates on behalf of Christians ...	435
202	Earl of Derby (Paris)	1235	27,	Palestine. Refers to No. 189. French Government cannot accept boundary suggested. French Commander must carry out decision of the Supreme Council	439

SUBJECT INDEX.

[The figures denote the serial numbers of documents.]

ADEN	50	OIL	141, 143, 161
ARABIA	54, 142, 157	PALESTINE—	
Khurma dispute ...	55, 60, 88, 156, 171, 176	American Commission ...	76, 87, 98
King Hussein ...	158, 171, 176, 184	Anglo-French friction ...	14, 22, 182, 189
Seizure of Colonel Jacob's Mission ...	112*, 145	Banca di Roma ...	190
Visit to the Hadramaut ...	35	German Franciscans in ...	28
ARMENIA—		Holy Places ...	28
Atrocities, &c. ...	69, 90, 100, 110, 165, 178, 181, 193	Zionist activities ...	64, 98, 173
British withdrawal ...	78, 91, 97, 132	RED SEA LIGHTS ...	95, 134
ARMISTICE WITH TURKEY... ..	7, 11, 13, 30, 37, 150, 164, 177	SMYRNA. Greek occupation ...	47, 56, 62, 73, 74, 75, 84, 85, 100, 101, 102, 131, 137, 144, 151, 172, 183, 184, 199
ASIA MINOR—		SYRIA. Anglo-French friction ...	8, 12, 14, 17, 19, 22, 25, 27, 39, 40, 45, 53, 59, 82, 224
French in ...	174, 175, 182, 196	SYRIA AND FRANCE ...	25, 38, 39, 40, 46, 52, 63, 77, 81, 82, 98, 104, 106, 107, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 129, 132, 147, 152, 159, 166, 169, 170, 173, 182, 189, 191, 202
Greeks in ...	1, 32, 47, 56, 57	SYRIA, PALESTINE AND MESOPOTAMIA. Allocation scheme ...	104, 106, 107, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 132
Italians in ...	1, 5, 15, 32, 57, 66, 71, 84, 130, 138, 163, 183	THRACE. Greek claims ...	125
ASIATIC TURKEY. Military control ...	7, 11, 33, 36, 49	TURKEY—	
AZERBAIJAN	155, 188	American sympathies ...	140, 149
CERRETTI, ARCHBISHOP	28	Economic concessions in ...	198
CILICIA	175, 196	Future status of ...	20, 34, 37, 43, 58, 84, 92, 94, 103, 132, 152, 154, 179, 195
CONSTANTINOPLE. International occupation of ...	1, 9, 14, 16, 18, 20, 27, 31, 33, 36, 44, 52, 83, 111	Juridical reform ...	3, 4, 9
EGYPT. British protectorate and Italy ...	118, 133	Nationalist movement ...	43, 58, 62, 65, 68, 72, 79, 80, 84, 86, 89, 96, 99, 100, 126, 127, 128, 136, 139, 140, 148, 153, 167, 174, 175, 177, 180, 186, 187
FEISAL, EMIR	2, 14, 38, 46, 54, 63, 107, 109, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 132, 147, 152, 159, 170	Prisons in ...	105, 135
GEORGIA	70, 146, 155, 160	TURKEY-IN-EUROPE. Military control ...	11, 33, 49, 83
HERACLEA. Port and coal mines ...	49, 83		
JAFFA. Engineering works at... ..	41		
JAFFA-JERUSALEM RAILWAY	10, 20, 21, 24, 29, 42, 49, 51, 67, 93		
KURDISTAN	192, 194, 197		
MECCA PILGRIMAGE	23		
MESOPOTAMIA. Anglo-French friction ...	6, 12, 14, 17, 22, 25, 26, 27, 48		

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART II.

[1105]

No. 1.

Sir R. Rodd to Mr. Balfour.—(Received January 2, 1919.)

(No. 429 Confidential.)

Rome, December 28, 1918.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 968 of yesterday's date I have the honour to report that I took the first available opportunity after his return from Paris to remind the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he had not yet answered my question as to the meaning of a passage in the memorandum which he had communicated to you while in London, referring to an eventual despatch of a contingent from the 35th Italian division to Constantinople under an agreement for international occupation. Such an agreement was, I added, unknown to us, nor was it provided for under terms of armistice.

I understood from him that the reference to such an agreement was based on the fact that before Turkey's surrender and the armistice a march of the Allies upon Constantinople had been contemplated, under General Milne, in which Italian troops would also have taken part. Such an expedition, had Turkey not asked for a suspension of hostilities, would, no doubt, have led to the occupation of the city. Meanwhile, he said, as there were now British and French troops in Constantinople, he claimed that Italian troops should also be sent there. He did not insist necessarily on parity of numbers, but Italy, as one of the great Allied Powers, must not be left out.

I asked him whether he was only speaking on a presumption or whether he had direct information regarding the presence of British and French troops in Constantinople as I had heard nothing to confirm such a presumption, and understood that the Allies were only represented there by naval forces. Baron Sonnino replied that he had been informed that troops were there also. If this information was incorrect the question dropped of itself, but if it were correct he expected equal treatment. I told him I would enquire by telegraph whether any troops had been sent, but that I believed he was mistaken.

He then availed himself of the opportunity to speak with that tone of asperity which he sometimes assumes of the manner in which Italy was, as he alleged, being treated by the Allies. He was evidently considerably nettled by the contention that any independent action of Italy in Anatolia to enforce the observation of the terms of the armistice was deprecated on the ground that Greece would follow suit. He suggested that Italy was one of the Great Powers, she had fought throughout this great war with the Allies to the utmost extent of her resources and capacity, and had rendered undoubted service to the general cause. Greece had created a difficult situation for the Powers through a great part of the war, and had only come in towards the end in the campaign against Bulgaria. The argument of what Greece might contemplate was not one which should affect the action of the Great Powers. I said that what we had to consider was not the relative position of Greece with the other Powers, but the practical one of preventing that Government from taking advantage of the actual state of Turkey to cause us grave embarrassment, which there was every possibility of their doing if the example were given by one of the Great Powers. Baron Sonnino said that Greece would not venture to do anything contrary to the wishes of Great Britain and France.

[1356]

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He then returned to the question of the agreement regarding Asia Minor, working himself up into one of those phases of excitement under the influence of which he for the time becomes impervious to arguments and recalcitrant to reasonable discussion. He repeated once more the history of the agreements of 1916 which had been concluded between Great Britain and France without the knowledge of Italy, who had been put off when she asked for information. He had protested, and after long and continuous protests his view had so far prevailed that a further agreement was concluded defining Italian interests. It was true that it had been stipulated that the consent of Russia, who had not been able to take part in the negotiations, must be obtained to this agreement, and he had pressed that it should be obtained without delay. He was told the moment was inopportune owing to the revolutionary movement, and it continued to be so till the outbreak of Bolshevism carried Russia out of the Alliance. To maintain that when Russia had ceased to be an Ally the fact that her consent had not been obtained made that agreement no longer binding on the other contracting parties was going dangerously near the "scrap of paper" view of international agreements. He did not think it was quite fair on himself or on his country. Nor were the Allies treating Italy with great consideration elsewhere. In the Adriatic, for instance, obviously and admittedly an Italian interest, the French were taking charge. French war-ships went from island to island and were received as the champions of the anti-Italian interest, and were thus encouraging the Jugo-Slav populations. This was not the attitude of an Ally. He had no such complaints to make against British officers, who did not follow the French lead in this respect. But there was no disposition on our part to contest the French determination to take charge of the situation. He should have thought it would have been in our interests to see Italy strong and independent, and not to shut our eyes to the gradual extension of French influence, at the expense of Italy, over South-Eastern Europe, and he was disappointed that she did not receive our support. The ambition of France was unlimited, and we should realise some day the results of encouraging her to take so free a hand.

Up to this point he had hardly paused to draw breath, but, by the time he had reached the Adriatic conditions were less stormy than they had been on the coast of Asia Minor, and I was able to interrupt here and ask whether, during his recent visit to Paris, where the King had been received with so much apparent enthusiasm, it had not been possible to discuss these questions without heat. He said that the general attitude of the French Government was friendly enough to all appearances, but their agents abroad appeared to act with great independence, and interpret the policy of the Government in their own way. It was Admiral Gauchet who seemed to have the direction of affairs in the Adriatic in his hand, and his action was not in accordance with the friendly professions of the French Government.

I have no definite information as to the general line of policy adopted with regard to the Adriatic questions which would have enabled me to contest any of the assertions made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. But I understand that the instructions given to Admiral Kiddle were generally to conform to the French Delegates' view in the Naval Council, and I have had opportunity of seeing a confidential telegram from General Mola, forwarded to the Ministry of Marine by General Cagni, who is in command of Pola, in which he says, "I can assure you that at the present time all the Allies are against us, and I am of opinion that their representatives must have had concordant instructions from their Governments of a nature to prejudice our political and military situation at Fiume. It would be of great value if the line of demarcation of spheres of action between the Italian supreme command and the Armée d'Orient, as indicated in the memorandum of the "Comando Supremo," could at once be approved by the Allied Governments, and communicated to the delegates here."

The complaints of the Minister for Foreign Affairs were almost exclusively against French action in the Adriatic, but I may add that, while I see from your despatch No. 43 of the 16th instant to Sir C. des Graz that the Serbian Minister complained at the Foreign Office of the behaviour of the Italians to the Slav inhabitants of the coast towns, the Italian papers are full of reports of the persecution of the Italian population by the Slav and Croatian element, especially at Spalato, while vessels are said to be prevented from approaching the quays, flags are torn down and so on. The probability is that each of the two local groups, Slav and Italian, in these towns lose no opportunity of making complaint of the behaviour of the other, and that their sympathisers on either side make the most of such incidents for political purposes. I have not reported the constant repetition of the grievances of the Italian population, put forward in the

Italian press, as it did not seem to me that much value could be attached to such tendentious charges, but as the Serbian Minister has formally complained of persecution by the Italians in the Dalmatian coast towns it is only fair to mention that similar complaints of the persecution of Italians by the Slavs are repeatedly circulated here.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

[1382]

No. 2.

M. Pichon to the King of the Hedjaz. (Communicated to Foreign Office by M. de Fleuriau, January 2, 1919.)

JE tiens à affirmer à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement français a été très heureux et sera encore très heureux d'offrir l'hospitalité à S.A.R. l'Emir Feysal comme à un ami et au fils d'un Souverain indépendant et allié. Il a regretté de n'être pas informé à temps des intentions de S.M. le Roi Houssein. S'il eût été prévenu directement et en temps voulu, il n'eût pas manqué de lui faire connaître, d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique, qu'aucune décision définitive n'a encore été prise quant à la représentation au Congrès de la Paix des États qui, ainsi que le Royaume du Hedjaz, se sont formés au cours de la présente guerre. Leur participation à ce Congrès ne pourra être déterminée qu'une fois leur reconnaissance par tous les États alliés devenue définitive.

S.M. Houssein peut être assurée que le Gouvernement français recommandera à ses Alliés la reconnaissance du Royaume indépendant du Hedjaz. Il est donc disposé à accueillir le Prince Feysal à son retour de Londres et à lui offrir l'hospitalité la plus amicale jusqu'au moment où il sera possible de le faire reconnaître comme le représentant officiel du Royaume du Hedjaz.

[3006]

No. 3.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, January 6, 1919.

EN attendant l'établissement d'un nouveau régime juridique en Turquie, le Gouvernement français estime qu'il y aurait avantage à ce que, à Constantinople même, Mr. Waugh et M. Cilliére puissent échanger leurs vues sur cette question, de façon à apporter à leurs Gouvernements respectifs les éclaircissements nécessaires.

En se référant à sa note du 18 de ce mois, l'Ambassadeur de France a l'honneur de demander au Gouvernement britannique de vouloir bien, s'il est du même avis, donner à Mr. Waugh des instructions dans ce sens.

M. Paul Cambon saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 27 décembre, 1918.*

[3007]

No. 4.

Note on the Necessity for Judicial Reform in Turkey. (Communicated by M. Cambon January 6, 1919.)

AU moment où la soumission de la Turquie nous ouvre de nouveau les portes de l'Orient, il y a lieu de nous préoccuper d'établir dans ce pays, où l'influence de la France fut si longtemps prépondérante et doit le redevenir, les conditions les plus favorables à la protection et au développement de nos intérêts.

Parmi ces conditions, la première est l'établissement d'une bonne justice. Pour que les entreprises que nous avons créées et que nous créerons à l'avenir en Turquie puissent prospérer, pour que les capitaux si considérables que nous y avons engagés et ceux que nous serons amenés à y engager encore puissent fructifier, il faut qu'ils soient assurés de trouver dans ce pays ce qui leur a fait jusqu'ici complètement défaut—une justice qui soit une justice.

On a déploré souvent la décadence de notre commerce en Orient; c'est un fait qui

[1356]

B 2

à des causes diverses. Une des premières, le principal peut-être, est le manque de sécurité judiciaire et la conviction que nos commerçants avaient de voir leurs intérêts toujours sacrifiés en cas de contestation, avec leurs correspondants indigènes; ils voyaient, par exemple, les faillites ottomanes se terminer régulièrement par des concordats dans des conditions scandaleuses. Ils préféraient s'abstenir, dans ces conditions, et en fait ils se désintéressaient de plus en plus d'un marché où les garanties les plus nécessaires leur faisaient défaut. Les maisons françaises les plus importantes ne voulaient plus faire d'affaires en Turquie. Si notre commerce était assuré d'y trouver une justice saine et impartiale, il y a tout lieu d'espérer qu'il reprendrait en Orient la place très importante qui doit tout naturellement lui appartenir.

Il faut donc créer en Turquie un nouveau régime judiciaire. Que doit-il être? et tout d'abord dans quelle mesure y a-t-il lieu de rétablir les Capitulations?

Le Gouvernement jeune-turc, à la veille du jour où il allait se lancer dans la guerre à la remorque de l'Allemagne, a décrété solennellement la dénonciation des Capitulations. Cette décision, unilatérale et arbitraire, proclamée avec emphase et appuyée par la violence, a pu entrer en vigueur par suite des circonstances, malgré les protestations des Puissances intéressées. En droit, elle est nulle et non avenue, et rien ne nous empêche de rétablir purement et simplement les Capitulations si nous le voulons. Mais est-ce vraiment utile, et dans quelle mesure y avons-nous intérêt?

L'Allemagne et l'Autriche ont protesté quand le Gouvernement ottoman a décrété l'abolition des Capitulations. Protestation de pure forme et sans sincérité. Plus tard, elles ont, au moins tacitement, adhéré à un ordre de choses dont elles comptaient, au fond, être les bénéficiaires, les Capitulations ne pouvant qu'être une gêne pour ceux qui se considéraient comme les futurs maîtres de la Turquie. L'Allemagne et l'Autriche ont ainsi perdu tout droit à réclamer le retour de l'ancien état de choses. Serait-il possible, cependant, si on rétablissait purement et simplement les Capitulations, de leur en refuser le bénéfice? Ne risquerions-nous pas ainsi de faire le jeu de nos ennemis? C'est l'influence des Alliés qui doit être dominante maintenant en Orient; elle doit être affranchie de toute gêne. En dehors même de ces considérations, le retour pur et simple à l'ancien état de choses est-il souhaitable?

Examinons quel était dans ses grandes lignes, avant la prétendue abolition des Capitulations par les Jeunes-Turcs, le régime judiciaire de l'étranger en Turquie au triple point de vue de ses rapports avec ses co-nationaux, avec les autres étrangers et enfin avec les sujets ottomans.

Dans ses rapports avec ses co-nationaux, l'étranger relevait exclusivement de son tribunal consulaire, tant en matière civile et commerciale qu'en matière pénale. C'est là pour nous un privilège d'une importance capitale qu'il ne saurait être question d'abandonner. Sur ce point les Capitulations doivent être maintenues strictement.

Les tribunaux consulaires étaient également compétents, dans les mêmes matières pour toutes les contestations entre étrangers de nationalités différentes. Leur compétence était de règle absolue, tant qu'il n'y avait pas d'Ottomans en causes. L'affaire, dans ce cas, conformément à la règle de droit *actor sequitur forum rei*, était portée devant le tribunal du défendeur. Celui-ci était donc assuré d'être jugé par ses juges naturels et conformément à ses lois.

Cette procédure, qui a succédé à celle des Commissions mixtes instituées au début et qui a fonctionné régulièrement pendant trois quarts de siècle environ, a rendu les plus grands services aux étrangers de toutes nationalités établis en Turquie ou y faisant des opérations commerciales. C'était la solution la plus heureuse qu'il fût possible d'imaginer sous l'empire des Capitulations. Mais ce régime n'était pas sans inconvénients. Nos compatriotes, obligés d'actionner leurs adversaires devant les tribunaux consulaires dont ceux-ci relevaient, ne trouvaient pas toujours auprès de certains de ces tribunaux toutes les garanties désirables, tant au point de vue du savoir que de l'impartialité des juges. Ceux-ci, même quand ils avaient, comme c'était heureusement le cas le plus souvent, la conscience et le respect de leurs devoirs de magistrats, ne pouvaient pas toujours se défendre de certaines indulgences pour leurs nationaux.

D'autre part, l'exécution des décisions des tribunaux consulaires n'étant admise qu'à l'égard de leurs nationaux, l'introduction d'une demande reconventionnelle n'était pas possible devant le tribunal saisi de la demande principale quand le demandeur était étranger. Cette action devait être portée devant le tribunal du demandeur principal, ou de chacun d'entre eux s'il y avait plusieurs demandeurs de nationalités différentes. De là, dans certains cas, des lenteurs et des frais excessifs, et cette conséquence fâcheuse quelquefois, que des actions résultant d'une même affaire pouvaient être résolues de façon très différente par chacun des tribunaux saisis, jugeant chacun d'après une loi

différente. Le système n'était donc pas parfait. Il est possible d'en trouver un plus heureux.

Mais, c'est surtout dans les différends entre étrangers et indigènes que le régime qui fonctionnait en Turquie avant la guerre laissait à désirer. Dès qu'il y avait un intérêt ottoman en cause, les tribunaux ottomans étaient seuls compétents, soit que l'étranger fût demandeur, soit qu'il fût défendeur. Certaines garanties étaient seulement assurées à l'étranger devant les tribunaux ottomans. Ces garanties étaient de deux sortes: une garantie générale, d'abord l'assistance du drogman devant les tribunaux mixtes de commerce et devant les tribunaux de répression pénale; une autre, spéciale aux tribunaux mixtes de commerce, l'adjonction dans chaque affaire où un étranger était partie, de deux assesseurs de sa nationalité, garantie illusoire en réalité, car à côté de ces deux assesseurs pris dans la colonie de l'étranger, juges d'occasion, désignés par le consul et acceptant quelquefois cette mission à contrecoeur ignorant souvent la loi ottomane, la langue et les usages turcs, se trouvaient toujours trois juges ottomans de carrière, dont le président, qui avait seul réellement la direction des débats et la décision de l'affaire. On peut dire que les prétendus tribunaux mixtes de commerce, tels qu'ils existaient en Turquie avant la guerre, n'étaient mixtes qu'en apparence. Pour qui connaît la mentalité des indigènes, musulmans ou rayas, et les influences qui s'exerçaient dans les prétoires ottomans, il est facile de comprendre combien les jugements rendus dans ces conditions offraient et offriront toujours peu de garanties de justice et de moralité.

L'assistance du drogman et l'étendue très large que les missions étrangères, avec raison, ont donnée à son droit de contrôle, apportaient un certain correctif à ces inconvénients, mais dans un cas seulement: quand l'étranger était défendeur. Dans ce cas, la garantie était complète, l'exécution des décisions judiciaires rendues par les tribunaux ottomans contre un étranger n'étant possible que par l'intermédiaire de son consulat. Si le drogman avait refusé de signer le *qarar*, l'exécution était refusée et le jugement restait lettre morte—solution très avantageuse évidemment pour l'étranger, mais qui n'était pas sans inconvénient en droit pur, car l'indigène lésé protestait contre ce qu'il considérait, avec raison, comme un délit de justice. Un conflit diplomatique se greffait sur un différend d'ordre judiciaire. Le mal entendu s'aggravait ainsi chaque jour entre les Ambassades et la Porte, et l'idée de justice était continuellement violée.

Par contre, quand l'étranger était demandeur, ce qui est de beaucoup le cas le plus fréquent, le contrôle du drogman était purement illusoire. S'il refusait de signer la *qarar*, sa décision ne pouvait avoir en effet aucune sanction, l'affaire étant jugée à l'égard de la partie ottomane, qui ne pouvait plus être poursuivie pour la même cause par le même demandeur. Combien de débiteurs ottomans ont bénéficié ainsi de décisions iniques, malgré les prétendues garanties accordées aux étrangers devant les tribunaux du Tidjaret. Nos compatriotes, en particulier, ont souffert de cet état de choses. Respectueux observateurs des lois du pays, exerçant honnêtement leur commerce ou leur profession, ils ont rarement l'occasion d'être poursuivis par des Ottomans en matière commerciale. Il est encore plus rare qu'ils soient l'objet de poursuites pénales, à part quelques individus très peu nombreux, fort peu intéressants et qui, par un singulier effet des Capitulations, se trouvent bénéficier en fait très souvent d'une scandaleuse impunité. Il peut arriver, d'autre part, en matière pénale, qu'un français honorable arrêté en cas de flagrant délit, et retenu alors en détention préventive dans les prisons ottomanes, ait à subir les effets d'une condamnation excessive ou même inique. Les Français, le plus souvent étant demandeurs ou plaignants, et l'assistance du drogman étant, dans ce cas dépourvue de sanction pratique, il en résulte que nos compatriotes étaient à peu près privés en fait de toute garantie réelle de justice devant les tribunaux ottomans.

Ces état de choses ne saurait durer. Il est indispensable de créer en Turquie une nouvelle organisation judiciaire et jamais les circonstances n'ont été plus favorables à cette réforme. Celle-ci devrait être conçue d'après le modèle des tribunaux mixtes qui fonctionnent en Égypte depuis près d'un demi-siècle et dont l'institution a rendu de si grands services à la fois aux intérêts européens et à ce pays.

La réforme judiciaire en Égypte est due à l'initiative du Gouvernement Khédivial. Elle n'a abouti qu'à la suite de longues et laborieuses négociations. Poursuivie avec ténacité par Nubar Pacha elle s'est heurtée longtemps aux résistances des Puissances. La France, en particulier, hésita jusqu'en 1875 à y adhérer. Cette réforme qui, dans l'esprit de Nubar Pacha, avait surtout pour objet de délivrer l'Égypte des entraves les plus gênantes des Capitulations a eu, cependant, les plus heureux effets pour les intérêts européens en instituant en Égypte une justice éclairée et impartiale qui est un véritable bienfait pour ce pays.

Sans entrer dans le détail de cette organisation, il suffit de rappeler ici que les tribunaux mixtes d'Égypte sont composés de juges indigènes et de juges étrangers nommés par le Gouvernement égyptien, et que la majorité dans chaque tribunal et pour chaque affaire ont toujours assurée à l'élément étranger. Les juges étrangers sont présentés au Gouvernement égyptien par le Gouvernement du pays auquel ils appartiennent. C'est là la base du système et sa garantie capitale. C'est dans ces mêmes conditions qu'il y aurait lieu d'instituer en Turquie les nouveaux tribunaux.

A la majorité de juges ottomans, en toute matière, dans toute cause où des étrangers seraient parties, et à tous les degrés de juridiction, doit être substituée une majorité de juges étrangers. On pourrait également envisager une réforme qui s'étendrait non seulement aux tribunaux appelés à connaître des procès où des étrangers sont intéressés, mais aux tribunaux spéciaux aux indigènes, eux-mêmes par l'introduction sous une forme à déterminer d'un haut contrôle étranger dans l'intérêt supérieur de la justice. Certes, une pareille innovation rencontrerait des résistances de la part des Gouvernements ottomans, mais ce serait le plus grand service à rendre aux indigènes. La révolution jeune-turque a adopté notre belle devise : *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*, à laquelle elle a ajouté le mot *Justice*. Cette adjonction, dans l'esprit de la plupart des Jeunes-Turcs, était en réalité une sorte de protestation contre les privilèges assurés aux étrangers par les Capitulations. Mais, prise à la lettre, jamais revendication ne fût plus justifiée. Jamais, on peut le dire en effet, la véritable justice n'a existé en Turquie, et cela plus encore pour les indigènes que pour les étrangers protégés en somme par les Capitulations et par l'action de leurs Ambassadeurs et de leurs consuls. Ce serait rendre au pays tout entier un service éminent que de la doter, par une sorte de tutelle étrangère, d'une justice digne de ce nom. Les circonstances actuelles permettraient sans doute d'imposer au Gouvernement ottoman cette réforme et le principe en est admis par nous et par nos Alliés.

Quoi qu'il en soit réduite aux affaires dans lesquelles les étrangers sont intéressés ou étendus aux intérêts indigènes, une réforme judiciaire est indispensable en Turquie. Pour cela, un accord entre les Puissances alliées est nécessaire et il doit suffire. L'Allemagne et l'Autriche ont perdu tout droit à réclamer le maintien des Capitulations. Quant aux autres États intéressés, ils souffrent des mêmes maux que nous, et ne refuseraient certainement pas d'accepter une réforme dont leurs nationaux profiteraient comme les nôtres. Ils ne devraient, cependant, pas intervenir dans la préparation et la mise en œuvre de la défense, dont la direction ne peut revenir qu'à la France. C'est notre droit, en effet, qui a servi de base à la première réforme d'où sont sortis les tribunaux ou Tidjaret. Les codes ottomans sont calqués sur les codes français. C'est notre jurisprudence qui, pendant de longues années, a servi de base unique à celle des tribunaux mixtes de commerce ottoman. C'est à nos codes que recouraient toujours les magistrats du Tidjaret avant la promulgation de Medjellé, pour combler les lacunes des codes ottomans. Si cette situation s'est quelque peu modifiée depuis cette promulgation (de la façon la plus désavantageuse d'ailleurs aux droits de tous les étrangers) il n'en est pas moins vrai que le droit français est le seul droit admis devant les tribunaux de la réforme en Turquie dont il est la loi principale. Enfin, la langue française est la seule langue étrangère admise à côté de la langue turque devant ces mêmes tribunaux. C'est presque toujours en français qu'ont lieu les plaidoiries, les avocats ottomans eux-mêmes plaident le plus souvent en français. C'est donc sous notre influence et notre direction spéciale que la nouvelle réforme judiciaire devrait être faite. Elle ne serait en réalité que le développement logique et nécessaire de la réforme inaugurée sous le règne d'Abdul-Aziz et poursuivie par le Gouvernement ottoman avec plus d'apparence que de réalité, mais toujours dans le même sens.

Tous ces étrangers résidant en Turquie et les Ottomans eux-mêmes au bout de quelques temps applaudiraient à une réforme qui assurerait le bien-être et la fortune du pays, en lui donnant cette chose inappréciable et nouvelle en Turquie : la justice. Nous trouverons, de notre côté, dans la nouvelle organisation un puissant et très légitime instrument d'influence, car il serait naturel que les juges étrangers fussent adjoints en majorité parmi les magistrats français, car notre langue, même si une langue étrangère est admise plus tard dans les plaidoiries ottomanes, serait toujours en fait la véritable langue judiciaire ; notre droit enfin sera de plus en plus la loi de nouveaux tribunaux, les codes existants devront être révisés et complétés d'après nos codes, en tenant compte seulement de certains usages locaux.

[6861]

No. 5.

Sir R. Rodd to Mr. Balfour.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 10.)

Sir,

Rome, January 7, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 11 of yesterday's date, announcing that orders had been given to suspend the military preparations for a landing in Asia Minor, it may be as well, in view of the importance of the question, that I should transmit to you translations of the two private communications in which this decision was conveyed to me by the President of the Council and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The letter of the President of the Council is as follows :—

"Dear Ambassador,

"In accordance with my promise I have conferred this evening with Sonnino, and I am happy to inform you that he had spontaneously adopted the point of view which I spontaneously also expressed to you, that is to say, that we were bound to defer amicably to the desire expressed by the British Government, which was based on reasons carrying undeniable weight. Sonnino assured me that he had written to you in this sense, and his letter will have already reached you, or is no doubt about to do so."

The letter from Baron Sonnino is to the following effect :—

"Dear Ambassador,

"In reply to your letter, and in deference to the urgent representations which you have made in the name of the British Government, as well as to give time for the necessary understanding, I have begged our military authorities to suspend operations in Asia Minor."

I have, &c,

RENNELL RODD.

[7179]

No. 6.

Note communicated by M. de Fleuriau, January 14.

LE Chef de l'État-Major de l'Armée de Mésopotamie a remis à l'officier français attaché à cette armée une note, dont voici le principal passage :

"Il n'y a plus de chances de vous donner l'occasion de suivre des opérations militaires. Aussi le Général Marshall pense que vous seriez heureux de quitter la Mésopotamie et de retourner en France ; et il a télégraphié au War Office que, comme votre maintien ici vous fait seulement perdre un temps précieux, il propose de vous renvoyer en France aussitôt que l'occasion favorable d'un bateau se présentera."

Aussitôt après cette communication, et sans attendre la réponse du War Office, des dispositions ont été prises par les autorités militaires de Mésopotamie afin d'assurer le départ du Commandant Sciard.

M. de Fleuriau est chargé de protester auprès du Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères contre le procédé véritablement peu amical des autorités militaires de Bagdad vis-à-vis d'un officier français, attaché à l'armée britannique de Mésopotamie. Ce n'est pas le premier procédé de ce genre que l'Ambassade est obligée de relever et il rappelle notamment la note de M. Paul Cambon à Mr. Balfour, en date du 1^{er} décembre dernier. Parce qu'il est fermement résolu à ne pas entraver l'action de ses Alliés dans la zone qui leur est réservée par les accords existants et à seconder au besoin cette action, le Gouvernement français ressent très vivement l'effet de procédés et d'intrigues qui prennent à l'égard de ses agents un caractère désobligeant. M. Pichon est bien convaincu que les fonctionnaires britanniques en Mésopotamie n'agissent pas ainsi sur des instructions de Londres, et il demande que ces fonctionnaires soient contraints à s'inspirer dans leurs rapports avec les agents et officiers français d'un esprit conforme aux devoirs de l'Alliance.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 13 janvier, 1919.

[213617]

No. 7.

Foreign Office to War Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 16, 1919.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state, for the information of the Army Council, that recent correspondence on the subject of retaliatory measures to be adopted in the event of the surrender of Medina being further delayed has emphasised the necessity for arriving at a more definite understanding than has hitherto, so far as Lord Curzon is aware, been reached, as to the division of responsibility among the Allied Governments for the enforcement of the armistice with Turkey, and as to our position in those districts of Asiatic Turkey which are not in our actual military occupation. The former point has already been raised casually by Baron Sonnino in conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome, while the latter is likely to assume practical importance in the near future owing to the intention of the French to send consular officers and Red Cross units to Smyrna and Trebizond and to the imminent arrival of a large American Relief Mission in Asiatic Turkey.

2. In these circumstances Lord Curzon would be glad to be informed whether, in the opinion of the Army Council:—

(a.) The responsibility for securing the fulfilment of the terms of the armistice with Turkey devolves solely upon His Majesty's Government; and, if so, whether His Majesty's Government are entitled to take such military action as may be necessary for this purpose without consulting their Allies in each instance.

(b.) Whether there is any foundation for the belief which appears to be current that while the supreme command in European Turkey is vested in General Franchet d'Esperey, British commanders enjoy full independence on the other side of the Straits and throughout Asiatic Turkey, including the districts which are not yet in Allied military occupation, such as Smyrna, Trebizond, &c. Can it be assumed, for instance, that our military position in Asiatic Turkey entitles us to claim to be consulted before any expedition or mission is despatched by another Power to the unoccupied regions of that area?

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY.

[13762]

No. 8.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 155.)

[By Bag.]

Paris, January 23, 1919.(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

I HAVE received a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs stating that, according to information which has reached that Department, General Officer Commanding Allied Forces in the Levant is opposed to despatch of reinforcements which French Government had decided to send to the Levant, and that this opposition would appear to be due to the fear lest the arrival in Syria of fresh French troops should arouse feelings of uneasiness and discontent among the Mussulmans. Note observes that His Majesty's Government is aware of the expressions of attachment which all the inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon, whether Christian or Mussulman, have lavishly expressed to France since beginning of Allied advance in the Levant. Should there have been, or should there be in the future, manifestations of another nature in certain points of the zone reserved to French interim according to the Agreement of May, 1916, respecting Asia Minor, such manifestations can only be considered as due to single individuals, coming, for the most part, from districts outside that zone, and acting at the instigation of Pan-Arab groups or of Xenophobe elements.

Such demonstrations, continues the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, can only have importance if their authors believe themselves in a position to benefit from the support, or at least the friendly tolerance, of all, or a part, of the elements of occupation, and in this connection Ministry states that it considers it its duty to point out to the Embassy that according to information which it has received, certain British officers in the Levant appear to be animated by a spirit which is little in accord with the Anglo-French Agreement respecting Asia Minor, and with the instructions which His Majesty's

Government have no doubt sent to them in regard to the manner in which these arrangements are to be carried out.

In conclusion, note states that the French Government has no doubt that His Majesty's Government will make a point of drawing the attention of these officers to the necessity of taking care that their attitude can in no way be considered as encouraging the intrigues mentioned above. French Government consequently are of opinion that no weight should be attached to the considerations which may have been put forward with a view to postponing the despatch of reinforcements which they have decided to send to Syria with a view to undertaking for themselves, at least to a great extent, the administration of the territorial zone attributed to the French sphere of influence in Asia Minor.

(Communicated to peace delegation.)

[3008]

No. 9.

Papers communicated by M. de Fleuriau, January 26.)

(1.)

L'AGENT du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à Constantinople estime que, pour vaincre la résistance des autorités turques, il est nécessaire d'enlever à la Porte tout espoir de recommencer l'ancienne politique ottomane de bascule entre les Puissances, et pour cela, de manifester une entente complète entre les représentants français et britanniques. M. Forynes Duparc a constaté que les instructions des représentants français étaient plus larges que celles des représentants britanniques, et il a exprimé l'espoir que ses collègues anglais reçoivent des instructions les autorisant à envisager des questions autres que l'exécution pure et simple de l'armistice. M. Pichon partage le sentiment de M. Forynes Duparc et il a autorisé M. de Fleuriau à communiquer, à titre confidentiel et avec prière de restitution, les instructions qu'il a données aux collaborateurs civils de l'Amiral Amet.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 6 janvier, 1919.*

(2.)

Pour faire suite à la communication de M. de Fleuriau en date du 6 de ce mois, et en réponse à la demande faite le 24 courant par téléphone, l'Ambassade de France a l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-joint au Foreign Office les lettres de services et instructions adressées par le Gouvernement français à divers de ses agents à Constantinople.

L'Ambassade de France serait très reconnaissante au Foreign Office de vouloir bien lui renvoyer ces documents lorsqu'ils auront cessé d'être utiles.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 25 janvier, 1919.*

(3.)

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, à M. le Lieutenant-Colonel Weyl, Paris.

(Lettre de service.)

Le Gouvernement a décidé de nommer le Vice-Amiral Amet Haut-Commissaire de la République à Constantinople jusqu'au moment où la période d'armistice prendra fin. Un certain nombre de conseillers civils lui sont adjoints pour assister dans sa mission. Vous avez été désigné pour remplir les fonctions de conseiller pour les questions industrielles et commerciales.

Votre rôle consistera, en premier lieu, à fournir au Haut-Commissaire tous avis sur les problèmes d'ordre industriel et économique qui se poseront; en second lieu, à favoriser la reprise de l'activité des sociétés et établissements français, à les grouper de façon à maintenir entre eux une bonne entente et l'union nécessaire à la restauration de l'influence française. J'ai confiance que votre haute compétence, votre profonde connaissance des questions d'Orient, le crédit moral dont vous jouissiez à Constantinople,

[1356]

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faciliteront grandement la tâche de l'Amiral Haut-Commissaire, et que réunis autour de vous les chefs d'entreprises et de sociétés françaises sauront rétablir et développer, même pendant la période d'armistice le prestige de notre industrie et de notre commerce.

(4.)

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à M. le Colonel Foulon, chargé de la Réorganisation de la Police et de la Gendarmerie en Turquie.

(Lettre de service.)

Le Gouvernement a décidé de nommer le Vice-Amiral Amet Haut-Commissaire de la République à Constantinople jusqu'au moment où la période de l'armistice prendra fin. Un certain nombre de conseillers lui sont adjoints. Vous avez été désigné pour l'assister dans toutes les questions de sûreté générale et de surveillance des relations avec la France et les pays alliés. Vous aurez en outre à étudier les réformes qui vous paraîtront souhaitables dans l'organisation de la police et de la gendarmerie en Turquie.

Vous recevrez à ce titre une indemnité mensuelle de 2,000 fr. sur le chapitre G du budget de mon Département en plus de votre solde.

Je me réserve de vous faire adjoindre ultérieurement M. le Lieutenant Feuillet, qui a été attaché, pendant la plus grande partie des hostilités, au service de renseignements de l'Ambassade de France à Berne pour les questions concernant les orientaux.

(5.)

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à M. Cillière, Ministre plénipotentiaire de la République française, Paris.

(Lettre de service.)

Le Gouvernement a décidé de nommer le Vice-Amiral Amet, Haut-Commissaire de la République française à Constantinople, jusqu'au moment où la période d'armistice prendra fin. Un certain nombre de conseillers civils lui sont adjoints. Vous avez été désigné pour remplir les fonctions de conseiller en matière administrative et judiciaire. Vous recevrez à ce titre une indemnité mensuelle de 6,000 fr. sur le chapitre G du budget de mon Département.

Votre rôle consistera à donner au Haut-Commissaire tous avis sur les questions administratives et judiciaires qui se poseront et à l'assister dans le règlement de ces questions, soit avec les autorités locales, soit avec les autorités alliées. En outre, vous aurez à étudier les réformes qui vous paraîtront souhaitables dans l'administration judiciaire en Turquie, et à envoyer à mon Département des propositions précises et d'ordre pratique pouvant servir aux négociations des traités de paix à préparer.

Dans la période d'armistice il me paraît nécessaire de se placer sur le terrain des Capitulations. Elles ont été abolies par un acte unilatéral des Turcs, contre lequel les Alliés et les États-Unis ont protesté. Il y aurait donc lieu pour les Hauts-Commissaires alliés d'exiger pour les nationaux alliés, et les neutres le rétablissement immédiat des garanties que leur assuraient le régime dit des Capitulations. On ne saurait étudier le régime qui peut être appelé à les remplacer qu'après cette restitution, et d'autre part les tribunaux ottomans et les fonctionnaires ottomans actuels n'ont pas, au cours de la guerre, fait preuve des qualités nécessaires pour leur confier sans inconvénients les intérêts de nos nationaux. Vous appellerez dès votre arrivée l'attention du Haut-Commissaire sur ce point important de façon à provoquer une démarche commune des Hauts-Commissaires alliés.

Enfin, la parfaite connaissance que vous avez de la Colonie française de Constantinople me fait souhaiter que M. du Gardier, qui sera particulièrement chargé des intérêts de cette colonie, prenne auprès de vous ses directions.

(6.)

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à M. Picard, ingénieur en chef des Travaux publics.

(Lettre de service.)

Le Gouvernement a décidé de nommer le Vice-Amiral Amet, Haut-Commissaire de la République à Constantinople, jusqu'au moment où la période de l'armistice

prendra fin. Un certain nombre de conseillers civils lui sont adjoints. Vous avez été désigné pour remplir les fonctions de conseiller technique en matière de travaux publics. Vous recevrez à ce titre une indemnité mensuelle de 6,000 fr. sur le chapitre G du budget de mon Département.

Votre rôle consistera à donner au Haut-Commissaire tous avis techniques sur les questions qui se poseront au point de vue des travaux publics en Turquie et à l'assister dans le règlement de ces questions, soit avec les autorités locales, soit avec les autorités alliées. En outre, vous aurez à étudier les réformes qui vous paraîtront souhaitables dans l'organisation générale des services des travaux publics en Turquie et à envoyer à mon Département des propositions précises et d'ordre pratique pouvant servir aux négociations des traités de paix à préparer.

Paris, le 25 novembre, 1918.

(7.)

Questions à étudier.

1. *Rétablissement d'une monnaie saine dans le pays.*

Il semble que la solution du problème monétaire pourrait être trouvée dans la combinaison suivante :

En supposant que les billets émis par l'entremise de la Dette publique valent un cinquième des anciens billets de la Banque ottomane, on remettrait au porteur de 5 livres turques en papier d'État, 1 livre turque émise par la Banque ottomane, et un certificat de créance contre l'Empire allemand de 4 livres turques remboursables ultérieurement.

L'émission de billets faite par la Banque ottomane en vue de cet échange serait pour compte du Trésor turc. Celui-ci devrait affecter comme garantie des revenus libres suffisants pour amortir cette dette en vingt-cinq ou trente ans au plus. Les revenus ainsi effectués seraient gérés par la Dette publique ottomane prévue pour l'amortissement contre une somme égale de billets annulés.

Questions à examiner.

(a.) Quel est le montant exact du papier-monnaie émis par l'entremise de la Dette publique? Quel est le montant des billets garantis par l'or déposé auprès des Banques d'Allemagne et d'Autriche? Quel est le montant des billets garantis par les bons du Trésor allemand? Est-ce que la totalité des billets garantis par l'or est encore en circulation? Quelle a été la valeur moyenne de tous ces billets par rapport à l'or? Quelle est la valeur actuelle?

(b.) Quels sont les arrangements passés avec le Gouvernement allemand au sujet de ces émissions?

(c.) Le projet envisagé ci-dessus et consistant à échanger le papier-monnaie contre des billets de banque représentant la valeur moyenne de ce papier et la remise pour la différence de bons spéciaux remboursables, lorsque le Gouvernement allemand paiera les bons du Trésor, est-il praticable?

Si ce projet paraît équitable au point de vue des intérêts des détenteurs du papier-monnaie, quelle est cependant la répercussion que son application pourrait avoir sur les conditions économiques du pays; cherté de vie, salaires, &c.

(d.) Si le projet en question est praticable, dans l'intérêt général, s'il peut avoir une répercussion avantageuse pour les différents intérêts français au point de vue de recouvrement en une monnaie saine tant des revenus affectés au service des emprunts, que des recettes des sociétés de chemins de fer et autres, quels sont, d'autre part, les intérêts qui seraient lésés par son application (Banque Impériale ottomane, Régie des Tabacs, Banque de Salonique ou autres sociétés, particuliers).

(e.) Pour le remboursement des dépôts en banque et l'exécution des contrats, quelles dates seraient à considérer pour déterminer la monnaie exigible? Un dépôt reçu en billets dépréciés ne devrait être remboursé après la réforme que pour un cinquième en billets de la Banque ottomane.

(f.) Si le projet doit être appliqué et que la Banque Impériale ottomane doive obtenir une prolongation de concession; quels sont les droits et avantages qui devraient lui être conférés et quelles seraient les garanties qu'on devrait prendre pour assurer l'amortissement annuel des billets de banque à émettre?

(g.) Quel serait le sentiment du Gouvernement sur ce programme et s'il n'est pas praticable, quels autres moyens suggère-t-il pour la restauration monétaire ?

2. Emprunt du Gouvernement ottoman—Coupons restés en souffrance.

(a.) Quel est le montant des coupons laissés en souffrance pendant la guerre, des titres appartenant à des Français ? Distinguer entre la Dette unifiée et les Emprunts gérés par l'Administration de la Dette publique, d'une part, et les autres. Même question pour les titres amortis.

(b.) Quel est le montant approximatif des coupons restés en souffrance et appartenant aux ressortissants des États alliés ? Même distinction qu'au paragraphe (a) ; même question pour les titres amortis.

(c.) Quelles sont les sommes dont le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette dispose pour le paiement des coupons et titres amortis, tant pour les titres de la Dette unifiée que pour les titres dont les gages sont gérés par la Dette ?

En quelle monnaie et où ces disponibilités sont-elles placées ?

(d.) Montant et composition des réserves de la Dette où sont-elles déposées ?

(e.) Pour les coupons et titres amortis des emprunts non gérés par la Dette, peut-on demander au Gouvernement ottoman de verser immédiatement les fonds nécessaires ?

(f.) En répondant à ces questions, considérer que le paiement des coupons et titres amortis en question doit être assuré de toute nécessité, puisque les ressortissants des États ennemis et des pays neutres ont été régulièrement payés.

N.B.—Dans la suggestion à faire il faudra, *autant que possible*, tenir compte de l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à ce que les revenus futurs qui constituent la garantie des emprunts soient utilisés (s'ils doivent l'être) sans compromettre le service de ces emprunts dans l'avenir.

3. Garantie kilométrique des Chemins de Fer :

(a.) Quelles sont les sommes dues aux compagnies à capitaux français du chef de ces garanties pour la période pendant laquelle le Gouvernement a pris possession des chemins de fer jusqu'à la date où les compagnies seront en mesure de reprendre l'exploitation ?

(b.) Y a-t-il dans les caisses de la Dette publique des sommes disponibles pour faire face au paiement, même partiel, des sommes dues aux compagnies ? En quelle monnaie et où se trouvent ces disponibilités ?

(c.) En tout cas, quels sont les moyens qu'on peut suggérer pour le règlement des garanties laissées en souffrance ? Ne pas perdre de vue qu'il y a intérêt à laisser libres les revenus futurs, du moins en tant qu'ils sont nécessaires au service de la garantie.

(d.) Dans cet ordre d'idées, examiner s'il ne conviendrait pas pour les compagnies d'obtenir une prolongation et des améliorations de concession, qui compenseraient le paiement des sommes arriérées majorées des intérêts et cela afin que les revenus affectés puissent assurer dans l'avenir de service des titres des chemins de fer sans nouveau retard.

(e.) Quelles sont les sommes qui seraient approximativement nécessaires aux compagnies pour remettre leurs réseaux en bon état et en reprendre l'exploitation au plus tôt ?

Quels sont les moyens proposés pour faire constater au plus tôt les sommes dues par le Gouvernement de ce chef ?

(f.) A supposer que le recouvrement à opérer sur le Gouvernement soit retardé, quels sont les arrangements qu'on pourrait faire avec les établissements financiers pour se procurer ces sommes et avec quelles garanties. Convviendrait-il provisoirement de faire moratoires en Turquie les dettes des compagnies ?

(g.) Y a-t-il d'autres compagnies, appartenant à des ressortissants alliés, qui soient dans le cas des compagnies françaises, quelle est leur situation ?

Ajouter tous renseignements relatifs aux compagnies ressortissant à des États ennemis.

4. Autres sociétés financières et industrielles dont la reprise d'exploitation est en souffrance.

Quelle est leur situation vis-à-vis du Gouvernement ? Quelle est leur créance ? Quels sont les moyens propres à leur permettre de reprendre : 1° leur exploitation, 2° le service de leurs titres ?

5. Concessions nuisibles aux intérêts français.

(a.) Quelles sont les concessions accordées à des sujets ennemis ou à des sujets du pays et qui sont nuisibles aux intérêts français ? Leur date, leur importance et leur valeur.

(b.) Y a-t-il des entreprises communes aux Français et Allemands (en dehors de Bagdad, qui fera l'objet d'une étude spéciale) que la France pourrait racheter, quelle est l'importance de ces entreprises au point de vue de l'influence et des intérêts français—quel est leur capital, leur rendement et l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à les racheter ?

(c.) Quelles sont les sommes que la Turquie (État, sociétés financières ou autres) doit à l'Allemagne et à l'Autriche ?

6. Situation financière générale de la Turquie.

(a.) Quelle était la dette de l'État avant la guerre et comment était-elle répartie à l'étranger ?

(b.) Quelles sont les dettes contractées pendant la guerre envers les États alliés de la Turquie ?

(c.) Quelles sont les dettes contractées dans le pays ?

(d.) Quel est le budget actuel de la Turquie ?

(e.) Quels étaient les revenus de l'Empire avant la guerre de 1914 ?

(f.) Quelle est la diminution des revenus de l'Empire qu'on prévoit du chef de la séparation de la Mésopotamie, de la Syrie, de l'Arabie et, éventuellement de l'Arménie ?

(g.) Quelle serait éventuellement la part de la Dette publique qui reviendrait aux territoires séparés de la Turquie tant après la guerre balkanique, qu'après la guerre de 1914, en faisant une répartition sur la base des dettes existantes avant chacune de ces guerres ?

Établir ces calculs en tenant compte que la répartition des dettes pourrait être proportionnelle aux revenus de l'État turc retirait des provinces démembrées par rapport à ses revenus totaux.

(h.) Quels sont les nouveaux impôts créés dans l'Empire pendant la guerre, quel sont leur rendement, l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à les maintenir ou à les supprimer, quels autres pourraient être créés ?

(i.) Quelle économie représenterait la suppression du budget de la marine et la réduction de celui de la guerre à l'entretien de forces de police ?

(j.) Peut-on équilibrer rapidement le budget de la Nouvelle Turquie ?

(k.) Convient-il d'établir un contrôle financier et sous quelle forme ?

7. Dette publique.

Fournir tous renseignements sur la question de la Dette pendant la guerre. En quoi le Conseil a-t-il dépassé ses attributions ou négligé l'exercice de ses droits ?

Convient-il d'élargir les attributions de la Dette ? Dans quelle mesure ? Quelles modifications faut-il apporter à la composition du Conseil ? Les membres du Conseil devront-ils rester simplement mandataires des porteurs ? Ne conviendrait-il pas que leur Gouvernement confirmât leur nomination ?

Paris, le 20 novembre, 1918.

[17306]

No. 10.

M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 31.)

LE Gouvernement français vient de faire savoir à M. Paul Cambon que le directeur de la Société du Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem avait par deux notes, en date du 23 décembre dernier, attiré l'attention du Général Allenby et du Colonel Stors sur les modifications intervenues par suite de la guerre dans l'exploitation de la voie ferrée en question et sur les problèmes que la compagnie aurait à résoudre le jour où il lui faudrait reprendre une exploitation normale.

L'Ambassadeur de France a l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-joint à sa Seigneurie le

Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Etrangères copie de la note adressée par M. Pavie au Général Allenby.

M. Pichon a invité M. Paul Cambon à signaler à toute l'attention du Gouvernement britannique les considérations exposées dans ce document.

M. Paul Cambon saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 30 janvier 1919.

Enclosure in No. 10.

Note communicated to General Allenby by M. Pavie respecting Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway.

LE Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem, qui s'est trouvé pendant trois années aux mains des Turcs et pendant plus d'un an aux mains des Alliés pour les besoins de la guerre, a subi les pires dégâts.

Amalgamé aux autres lignes par les Turcs, il fut en partie démoli et saccagé pendant les opérations et surtout au moment de la retraite des armées ottomanes.

Les Alliés, pour la poursuite de leurs succès, ont achevé de faire disparaître tout ce qui restait encore des installations primitives, pour mettre à la place des voies et du matériel spécialement destinés à la guerre.

Il en résulte :

Que la voie de 1 mètre d'écartement n'existe plus entre Jaffa et Lydda, et qu'elle a été mise à voie large de 1 m. 44 centim. par les Alliés entre Lydda et Jérusalem ;

Que la gare principale de Jaffa n'a plus d'atelier de réparations, plus de magasins de matières et de pièces de rechange, plus de bureaux, &c. ;

Que les gares intermédiaires sont ou démolies ou déplacées ;

Que le matériel roulant et moteur est disparu ; il ne reste ni une locomotive, ni une voiture à voyageurs, ni un wagon ;

Qu'enfin les archives, plans, dossiers, &c., sont ou détruits ou éparpillés à Damas ou ailleurs.

Le personnel lui-même est à reconstituer, des agents sont morts, d'autres partis pour ne plus revenir.

Il résulte de cette situation déplorable que la remise en route de l'exploitation dans sa forme primitive sera très difficile et demandera sans doute de longs mois, étant donnée la pénurie des matières premières, la difficulté de trouver du matériel en Europe ou ailleurs, et la presque impossibilité de se trouver actuellement une main-d'œuvre appropriée.

Cependant, il semble bien qu'un moyen est actuellement à disposition pour arriver très rapidement à un meilleur résultat.

L'armée anglaise exploite pour ses besoins la ligne à voie élargie entre Lydda et Jérusalem ; elle possède une main-d'œuvre considérable et du matériel de voie, ainsi que du matériel roulant et moteur en quantité ; elle possède également en abondance des approvisionnements de matières de consommation et d'entretien, fer, cuivre, acier, bois, charbon, huiles, &c.

Il serait donc aisé de reconstruire, d'accord avec la société du chemin de fer, la partie de voie Lydda-Jaffa avec ses ateliers, magasins et bureaux ; il serait de même possible de fournir à la société des locomotives, des voitures à voyageurs et des wagons et fourgons, pendant qu'il y en a des quantités dans la région.

Le chemin de fer pourrait, si l'on procédait ainsi, être rapidement remis à même de fonctionner, et la société pourrait reprendre un service régulier et assurer en même temps et dans des conditions à déterminer les services de l'armée anglaise.

De cette façon, aucune interruption n'aurait lieu entre la cessation de l'exploitation par les militaires et la reprise par les civils, et la Palestine n'aurait pas à subir après quatre années de service les privations de tout moyen de transport entre Jaffa, son port naturel, et Jérusalem, sa capitale.

Les fournitures et dépenses de toutes sortes, qui seraient ainsi faites par l'armée anglaise pour remettre en état le chemin de fer, seraient facturées au prix actuel, et l'ensemble formerait un chapitre des dépenses à rembourser par les Turcs.

Il y a là, croyons-nous, un moyen facile et rapide de redonner à la Palestine la

jouissance d'un organisme qui est grandement nécessaire pour le rétablissement de la vie normale, et même pour la liquidation des affaires militaires.

Cette solution offrirait l'avantage d'être facile à réaliser et il suffirait d'un peu de bonne volonté pour faire l'accord désirable entre les intéressés.

La Société du Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem est prête, en ce qui la concerne, à se mettre à l'œuvre dès maintenant pour cela.

A. PAVIE.

Jaffa, le 23 décembre 1918.

[8609]

No. 11.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received February 3.)

Sir,

War Office, February 2, 1919.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 16th January relative to the responsibility for securing the fulfilment by the Turks of the terms of the armistice concluded with her, and the position of British commanders vis-à-vis General Franchet d'Esperey.

As regards the former question, I am to state that the responsibility for enforcing compliance with the armistice terms has never been laid definitely upon any single Power and the appointment by the French, Italian, and Greek Governments of High Commissioners at Constantinople, shows that these Governments consider that they too, to some extent, share the responsibility for securing the fulfilment of the terms. The sphere of responsibility was more or less definitely defined at a meeting of Allied representatives at 10, Downing Street, on the 3rd December, 1918, at which the following resolution was passed :—

"The British, French, and Italian Governments agreed that while the British troops garrisoning any part of European Turkey and the General in Command of them should remain under General Franchet d'Esperey, the rest of General Milne's army might be transferred to the Caucasus and elsewhere, and in that case should cease to be under the command of General Franchet d'Esperey. The transfer should be agreed to in each case by the Government concerned."

From this it would appear that the French are responsible for Turkey in Europe, while it might be inferred that Turkey in Asia has been placed under British commanders.

The Army Council do not consider His Majesty's Government are entitled to take military action in Turkey in Europe without consultation with the French Government. As regards Turkey in Asia, the Council are of opinion that should the question of taking military action arise, His Majesty's Government would be entitled to take such action, if necessary, without consulting their Allies. In the latter connection I am to say that the fact that the terms of the armistice were discussed and concluded by representatives of Turkey and Great Britain only, and that the war with Turkey, except the Gallipoli campaign, has been carried out almost entirely by British troops, while any future military action to ensure the fulfilment of the terms of the armistice as regards Turkey in Asia would devolve mainly on British troops, strengthens the claim that we can take such action.

As regards the second question in paragraph 2 B of your letter, the Army Council are of opinion that it can be safely assumed that any expedition or mission which other Powers may at any time desire to despatch to the unoccupied regions in Asiatic Turkey should certainly not be sent without consultation with His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

R. H. BRADE.

[21940]

No. 12.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 144.)

My Lord,

Paris, February 7, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 271 of this morning, copy of the French Government's note of yesterday complaining of the attitude of British officers and officials in Asia Minor.

I have, &c.

DERBY.

Enclosure in No. 12.

Note.

LE Gouvernement de la République se voit, à son vif regret, dans la nécessité de signaler de nouveau à la plus sérieuse attention du Gouvernement de Londres l'attitude inamicale adoptée à l'égard des intérêts français par certains officiers des armées britanniques de Syrie et de Mésopotamie et par nombre de fonctionnaires de l'administration britannique en Egypte, attitude révélatrice d'une mentalité tout opposée à celle qu'on serait en droit d'attendre de représentants instruits des devoirs que l'alliance leur impose. Fidèle à une ligne de conduite dont il ne cesse, pour sa part, d'exiger de ses agents la plus scrupuleuse application, le Gouvernement français considère qu'une telle politique ne peut se prolonger sans de graves inconvénients. Il ne doute pas que le Gouvernement britannique, dont les intentions et les ordres ont été si souvent mal interprétés par certains de ses fonctionnaires, ne pense comme lui qu'il est nécessaire de rappeler tous ces fonctionnaires et officiers à une juste appréciation du respect réciproque dû aux intérêts et aux aspirations respectifs des deux Puissances alliées.

Les faits de cet ordre se sont multipliés, depuis deux ou trois mois particulièrement, sur tous les points des territoires occupés en Asie-Mineure par les contingents alliés, au point que leur nombre même leur donne, aux yeux des populations indigènes, l'apparence d'ordres méthodiquement exécutés en application d'instructions générales. L'intérêt direct que possède le Gouvernement britannique à voir ses agents s'inspirer plus docilement des vues que le Cabinet de Londres ne peut manquer d'avoir sur l'étroite coopération franco-anglaise en Asie-Mineure, oblige le Gouvernement de la République à signaler brièvement les manifestations les plus marquées de cet état d'esprit.

En Mésopotamie, ce sont les déclarations réitérées de l'état-major anglais, se refusant à reconnaître les droits traditionnels, confirmés à notre pays par les accords de 1916, sur le vilayet de Mossoul, proclamant même leur ignorance de ces accords dont notre attaché militaire se voit contraint de leur prouver l'existence. Ce sont les bruits de la création d'un futur Empire arabe s'étendant jusqu'aux frontières persanes, d'un Kurdistan autonome protégé par l'Angleterre, d'un morcellement éventuel de la Mésopotamie entre deux ou trois Puissances rivales, bruits semés à profusion par les centres de propagande créés par l'état-major dès son entrée en zone française. De telles rumeurs, propres à semer le trouble et l'inquiétude dans l'esprit des indigènes, permettent d'exploiter à son tour cet énervement factice et de le transformer en manifestations de la volonté populaire, cette agitation, œuvre d'une minorité turbulente, étant d'ailleurs toujours au préjudice de l'influence française. Les avanies aux écoles françaises, aux protégés français, aux chefs religieux animés de sentiments favorables à la France, les insultes infligées par le Colonel Leachman aux indigènes parlant notre langue ne se comptent plus. Il semble que certains officiers anglais aient pris à tâche de prouver de toute manière à la population que la France n'est qu'une Puissance inférieure qu'il est même inutile de mentionner son nom dans les déclarations officielles relatives aux opérations militaires; qu'elle se désintéresse du sort de la Mésopotamie et qu'au surplus le rôle déjà bien effacé qu'elle y joue en ce moment est essentiellement éphémère; les propos tenus en ce sens à plusieurs reprises par le Général Marshall et le Colonel Wilson trouvent un regrettable écho dans le Capitaine Salmon, de l'Intelligence Office de Bagdad, lorsqu'il se permet d'y ajouter que "la France sera bien assez payée avec l'Alsace-Lorraine."

Et non seulement on affecte d'ignorer et nos agents et les droits formels qu'ils

représentent, mais on les empêche d'accomplir les missions officielles dont ils sont chargés par ordre de leur Gouvernement. Pendant deux mois, les autorités anglaises refusent obstinément à notre consul à Bassorah l'autorisation de se rendre à Mossoul afin d'y répartir entre les indigents au nom de la France la somme qui lui a été envoyée à cet effet. Aux représentations faites à Londres par M. Paul Cambon, le Foreign Office objecte qu'à son grand regret il ne peut s'immiscer dans une affaire d'ordre purement militaire, et aux réclamations du consul au High Civil Commissioner, on répond qu'il n'est pas désirable que la France soit admise à suppléer à la bienfaisance anglaise, tandis que M. Roux, consul français, est mis finalement dans l'impossibilité de s'acquitter lui-même de sa mission, un agent américain porteur de sommes considérables s'est vu ouvrir sans délai l'accès de Mossoul, après tant d'autres.

Tout récemment enfin, c'est le propre chef de notre Mission militaire que le commandement anglais prend sur lui de congédier de la manière la plus offensante, ne pouvant supporter qu'il remplisse son devoir avec la plus entière correction, en désirant, conformément à ses instructions, faciliter la tâche des officiers anglais dans la zone d'influence reconnue à la Grande-Bretagne par des accords portant la signature des deux Gouvernements.

Si nous passons maintenant à la Syrie, il nous est impossible de ne pas constater que ce même esprit y règne dans une large mesure parmi les fonctionnaires ou les militaires. La tactique est identique: donner aux populations l'impression que, dans la zone même où doit s'exercer leur influence, les agents français ne sont en tout que les seconds dociles et effacés de leurs collègues anglais: vis-à-vis du Haut-Commissaire de la République ou de son adjoint, certains membres de l'état-major du Général Allenby manifestent une attitude agressive. On prétend limiter dans des bornes arbitrairement fixées l'activité et les fonctions des représentants français, et lorsque M. G. Picot objecte qu'une telle attitude est évidemment contraire aux vœux des Gouvernements intéressés, son interlocuteur lui répond qu'il ignore les Gouvernements et ne connaît que les ordres du War Office.

Certains officiers semblent prendre à tâche d'aggraver encore l'effet de cette attitude, en déclarant en toute occasion, comme leurs collègues de Mésopotamie, que l'action de la France en Syrie est appelée à disparaître à bref délai. C'est Djemil Bey, accrédité à Beyrouth par le G.H.Q., allant chaque matin prendre les ordres de l'Intelligence Office et réunissant ensuite les éléments les plus antifrançais de la capitale du littoral syrien. C'est un major anglais d'origine syrienne, Haddad Bey, qui va répétant dans les milieux politiques de Beyrouth et de Damas que "la seule solution possible pour la Syrie est la domination chérifienne avec collaboration britannique," opinion à laquelle sa situation d'ancien chef des Affaires indigènes adjoint au Gouverneur de Jerusalem en 1917, donne une singulière autorité. C'est le Général Money, cherchant à provoquer chez les musulmans de Palestine un mouvement hostile à l'influence française qu'il déclare soumise, pour la zone syrienne, à la ratification ultérieure des Puissances et de la population elle-même. C'est, enfin, le Général Allenby lui-même entraîné par son entourage à donner en octobre 1918 sa parole à l'Emir Feysal "que les mesures prises pour confier certains territoires occupés à l'administration française, ne sauraient en aucune façon engager l'avenir."

Le Général Bulfin colporte publiquement cette thèse et répète aux indigènes que les agents du Haut Commissariat français n'engagent que leur propre responsabilité en prétendant fixer l'avenir du pays; c'est le même qui refusait naguère, malgré les instructions explicites du G.H.Q., d'amener le pavillon chérifien, et de relever de leurs fonctions les autorités chérifiennes à Beyrouth et dans les villes de la côte syrienne ou même, singulière prétention de sa part, d'autoriser les troupes françaises à effectuer leurs déplacements sur des navires français. Le Général Bulfin, dont l'attitude à l'égard de nos représentants est souvent à peine correcte, constitue pour nos officiers l'obstacle le plus sérieux à l'exercice normal de leur mission.

En présence de pareils faits, le Gouvernement français ne peut que renouveler de la manière la plus pressante les observations qu'il a déjà faites en si grand nombre. Il est regrettable qu'au mépris évident des ordres du Gouvernement de Londres, ces officiers continuent par tous les moyens une propagande qui va s'accroissant chaque jour et dont le but avoué est de faire mépriser et haïr la France par les populations indigènes, au risque de susciter des mouvements aussi contraires à leurs propres intérêts qu'aux nôtres. Il ne manque déjà pas de voix en Syrie pour réclamer contre l'"impérialisme anglais," et l'on ne s'aurait s'en étonner en présence d'une multitude de faits aussi offensants pour les droits des Syriens que pour

ceux de la Puissance protectrice. Depuis le jour où les émissaires chérifiens, avec la bienveillante tolérance d'officiers britanniques, devancèrent les troupes alliées pour planter sur toute la côte syrienne le drapeau du Roi du Hedjaz, jusqu'à la mesure prise récemment à la requête de l'Emir Feysal par le Général Allenby, pour soustraire à l'administration française quatre districts; Hasbeya, Rasbeia, Baalbeck et Safed, formellement compris dans la région dévolue à notre action directe par les accords de 1916, rien n'a été épargné par certains officiers et fonctionnaires de ce qui pouvait humilier ou blesser la France en la personne de ses agents. L'emploi obligatoire de timbres-poste anglais, la création de journaux, la publication de tracts renfermant les accusations les moins fondées contre nous (par exemple, notre intention prétendue de supprimer l'usage de la langue arabe!), ne sont que des épisodes de cette campagne si peu conforme à l'esprit de conciliation que la France ne cesse, pour sa part, de faire observer par ses officiers.

A la propagande active pour le régime anglo-chérifien correspond, si l'on peut dire, une propagande passive contre tout ce qui peut contribuer à donner aux populations une juste idée de la France. Interdiction d'embarquer signifiée aux délégations syriennes ou libanaises à destination de Paris, interdiction de débarquer opposée avec entêtement aux demandes réitérées des religieux français de Terre-Sainte, difficultés créées en Egypte aux commerçants français qui veulent reprendre leurs affaires en Palestine ou en Syrie, refus d'accueillir, pour le contingent français, des renforts réclamés d'urgence par les autorités françaises responsables de l'ordre public dans les territoires confiés à leurs soins, refus d'autoriser ces mêmes autorités à créer à Beyrouth, un organisme facilitant le ravitaillement de nos troupes.

Il n'est pas jusqu'à la censure égyptienne qui ne concoure à cette politique, en ordonnant la suppression, dans les journaux, de toute "définition exacte de l'action française en Syrie"; c'est cette même censure qui n'a pas craint d'appliquer ses prescriptions au discours prononcé le 29 décembre, au Parlement français, par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères.

Il est remarquable que le zèle déployé en Syrie par ces agents britanniques le soit, le plus souvent, au profit de la souveraineté du Malik du Hedjaz. Grâce à l'évidente complicité de ces agents, l'Emir Feysal, chef de nomades transformé en mandataire de tous les peuples de langue arabe, terrorise une population que sa culture et ses traditions historiques devaient opposer à une domination des Bédouins. Ses émissaires installent partout des fonctionnaires en son nom, arborent son drapeau envers et contre toutes les remontrances justifiées à ce sujet, organisent à leur chef, grâce à la complicité des éléments les plus suspects, des réceptions triomphales dans les villes où il lui plaît d'affirmer prématurément son triomphe.

Doté par le Gouvernement anglais, l'Emir Feysal dépense la plus grande partie de ses revenus en dons en espèces ou en nature, le plus souvent assez considérables, connaissant la valeur d'arguments de cette espèce auprès des populations orientales. A Alep, à Beyrouth, à Damas où son frère lui succède durant son absence actuelle, il tranche du Souverain, maintient ses garnisons et ses fonctionnaires en face des nôtres, prétend constituer la Syrie en royaume indépendant au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi Husséin et déclare que le Liban, "cette perle de l'Empire arabe," étant "un bien sans maître," il est aussi fondé que quiconque à s'en rendre possesseur.

Il fait entrer ses troupes à Antioche au lendemain même du jour où l'accès de la ville, zone française, a été interdit aux détachements français. Partout reçu et fêté par les officiers britanniques, surtout par le Général Bulfin, auquel il cède les chevaux qui servent à ce général à récompenser toutes les personnalités anti-françaises, l'Emir Feysal encourage ouvertement ses partisans et réussit à inquiéter jusqu'aux Druses et à inquiéter la population musulmane désireuse de se soustraire à l'autorité d'une "théocratie fanatique."

L'attitude de certains agents anglais s'est encore affirmée, lorsque, non contents de décliner la proposition d'un contrôle financier commun limitant les largesses intéressées de l'Emir, ils ont envoyé celui-ci en France à l'insu du Gouvernement français, qui ne fut officiellement prévenu qu'après l'embarquement de l'Emir à Beyrouth. Il y a eu là, au simple point de vue de la correction diplomatique, une faute grave de la part de ceux qui ont pris l'initiative de ce voyage, sans même se préoccuper de ménager la dignité du pays allié dans lequel devait se rendre ce chef arabe.

Le but de toutes ces intrigues, non moins que leur résultat trop évident, a été de mettre chaque fois la France en présence d'un fait accompli. Hier encore, le Haut-Commissaire français se voyait obligé de signaler au Département une marque nouvelle de la désinvolture avec laquelle on traite les engagements signés par la Grande-Bretagne; de sa propre initiative, l'état-major des forces alliées en Palestine-

Syrie s'est permis de modifier d'une manière essentiellement arbitraire la limite des circonscriptions territoriales soumises à l'influence française dans la région d'Alep et en Cilicie.

Le Gouvernement de la République, confiant dans l'esprit amical qui anime le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, et persuadé qu'il ne peut couvrir les manœuvres de subordonnés mal éclairés, se devait de les relever, afin qu'on ne puisse un jour lui reprocher d'avoir laissé se développer une action de nature à nuire à la complète confiance et intimité qui doit régner entre deux nations unies par des sacrifices et un idéal communs.

Paris, le 6 février, 1919.

S. P.

[23473]

No. 13.

Vice-Admiral Sir S. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 288.) R.

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 9, 1919.

FOLLOWING from General Allenby, dated the 8th February, which he requests may be communicated to War Office:—

"I arrived at Constantinople morning of 7th February and made an official entry at 10 A.M. In afternoon I received Turkish Ministers of Foreign Affairs and War in presence of High Commissioner, and informed them that conditions given below were to be carried out at once in area under the command of my force. I allowed no argument or discussion of these conditions by them. Conditions were as follows:—

- "1. Ali Ishan, G.O.C. 6th Army, to be removed.
- "2. 6th Army to be disarmed, and its guns, machine-guns, and rifles to be handed to me at appointed place.
- "3. Inhabitants will be disarmed when ordered by me.
- "4. Such Turkish gendarmerie in areas under my control as are not required by me will be disarmed and demobilised under my orders.
- "5. Turkish gendarmerie in areas under my control to be directly demobilised under my orders.
- "6. Such Turkish officials as are reported unsatisfactory will be removed by my orders. The names of officials to replace these are to be submitted to me for my approval.
- "7. Armenians will be repatriated by me when this is desirable. Their houses, lands, and property are to be restored now.
- "8. Facilities shall be given for my officers to visit any places to assist in repatriation and to estimate cost of damage done to property of Armenians.
- "9. At my discretion I shall arrest any persons charged with crimes, and any persons charged with conduct likely to cause agitation and disquiet.
- "10. I shall control all railways east of Konia.
- "11. I shall control all telegraphs and telephones in area under my control. No Turkish cipher telegrams will be accepted.
- "12. I propose to repatriate troops of the disbanded 6th Army at the rate of 900 a week, commencing on (date to be arranged later).
- "13. Turkish authorities are to surrender all deserters, including those of our Indian army.
- "14. It must be understood that I have the power to occupy any place I wish."

"Note.—The word 'continue' in paragraph 8 means: the Egyptian Expeditionary Force shall have power to extend Bagdad railways to effect any kind of transport by rail, whether military or civil traffic, in such a manner and at such times as Egyptian Expeditionary Force may direct; similarly the Egyptian Expeditionary Force shall have power to prevent Bagdad railways from carrying any kind of traffic at any time.

"To-day Saturday I paid official visit to General Franchet d'Esperey and French and Italian High Commissioners. I informed them of my reasons for visiting Constantinople. I leave for Haifa this evening, Saturday."

[25211]

No. 14.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 283.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 12, 1919.

THE French Ambassador came to see me this afternoon for one of those friendly and personal, rather than official, conversations, in which he excels, but which not infrequently develop into discussions of a serious and strictly official character. On the present occasion he discoursed for considerably more than an hour upon several aspects of the situation.

To the first of these, namely, the proceedings of the Peace Conference in Paris, the apparent slowness and delay in concluding peace with the enemy, and the proposal to meet the Bolsheviks at Prinkipo, I need not specifically allude, because the Ambassador did little more than repeat the views which he had urged on a previous occasion, and which I have already placed on record.

I did, however, on this occasion state with much greater fulness than before the opposite side of the case.

In reply to his reminder that the preliminary peace negotiations between France and Germany in 1871 had occupied but a few weeks before the signature of peace, while the territorial and other details had been left to be thrashed out afterwards and had occupied a period of fifteen months, I urged that there was no analogy between that case and this. The fate of Alsace-Lorraine was then determined by the completeness of the German victory, the only two parties to the negotiations were France and Germany, and the determination of the actual frontier was a small matter which could with safety be postponed. Now, in the case of Germany, we were dealing not with one frontier or with one State alone. The whole of Europe was interested in the settlement, the greater part of it was directly involved, the frontiers of Germany could not be determined without in the first place settling the frontiers of various other States, and the solution of these matters, of which I gave Poland as an illustration, was an indispensable preliminary to the drawing up of peace terms and their ultimate dictation to the enemy.

I also explained to the Ambassador the point of view from which the British representatives in Paris had advocated the Prinkipo suggestion. With a view to ascertaining the French attitude, I asked him to tell me quite clearly, if he were disposed to do so, which of the possible alternative policies towards Russia his Government would favour. It was possible, I said, on the one hand, to pursue a military and forward policy, to declare war against the Bolsheviks, to invade Russia and destroy the Bolshevik Government. But this policy required large armies, which, as I gathered, none of the great Allies were willing to provide, and an enormous expenditure, which none would accept.

M. Cambon agreed that this policy was out of the question.

A middle course might, I pointed out, be pursued by continuing to support the various Russian political groups or quasi-Governments by such means as lay in our power, without actually assisting them with troops or invading Russia.

This policy, the Ambassador thought, had already been rendered futile by its almost complete lack of success. All the various Governments or groups to which I referred were crumbling: the Ukraine had collapsed, Krasnof had disappeared, Denikin could not be trusted to do anything effective, and Omsk seemed to be on the verge of failure. He could not think that any good would result from a continuation of these futile efforts.

M. Cambon accordingly favoured the third alternative, which was to abandon these efforts, to leave the country, and allow Russia to determine her own fate. He admitted the extreme undesirability and danger of a triumphant Bolshevism which would probably combine with Germany to crush Poland and the other States on that side, and which might easily become a menace to the world. But he saw no other solution, and, if in saying this he represented the views of his Government, I imagine that any such conclusion, if arrived at and advocated by ourselves, would meet with support in Paris.

In urging the rapid settlement of peace with Germany, the Ambassador said that he contemplated with genuine alarm the situation in which, after months had been spent upon conversations and Commissions, an arrangement should be placed before the German Government which the latter would absolutely decline to accept. In such circumstances, he asked, what would be done?

I replied that the principal weapon which would remain in the hands of the Allies

then would be their military strength, and I hoped that as little as possible would be done to impair it; another weapon would be the military occupation of German territory; a third would be the influence that could still be exercised by the British fleet; and the fourth, and probably most effective, would be the continuance of the blockade.

This led M. Cambon to urge, with great emphasis, the policy of not yielding to the pressure of President Wilson and the Americans for the relaxation or raising of the blockade, but resolutely adhering to it until the conclusion of peace.

I informed him that, in a discussion at the War Cabinet that morning, the same view had been expressed and had met with unanimous approval; that I believed it was equally the view of our representatives in Paris; and that, for my own part, I hoped most strongly that we should keep intact what I considered to be the most powerful of the offensive weapons that remained in our hands.

From these subjects the Ambassador passed on to discuss that which was his real preoccupation, namely, the uncomfortable condition of affairs that had arisen between the French and ourselves out of many incidents in the Middle East. He brought forward, one after another, the numerous cases in which the French Government complained that their officials or sympathisers or subjects had been treated in the most arbitrary way by the British civil or military authorities in those regions. He said that an atmosphere was being engendered in which, although the individual incidents might sometimes be small, in their totality they could not fail to be injurious to harmonious relations between the two peoples in those countries, while they produced a situation at home which was not without its dangerous features. He mentioned in turn the refusal by the British military authorities to numerous French subjects and Syrian merchants under French protection of permission to return to Syria; the refusal of the Mesopotamian authorities to allow the French consul to take relief to French subjects in Mosul; the refusal of the same authorities to allow the French consul at Bagdad to move from Basra to Bagdad; and the attempt of the British military authorities in Mesopotamia to turn the French military attaché out of the country. He attributed the greater part of these incidents to the temper and tone of young officers of the Indian army, who came to Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine impregnated with the autocratic ideas and manners which they had acquired in dealing with the natives in India, and who showed an unconcealed hostility to the French. He could only regard these incidents as a deliberate plot to deprive the French of the legitimate objects of their ambition in the East. He further instanced a number of recent incidents in Constantinople, notably the seizure, by the orders of General Milne, of the Ottoman banks. He said that this step, which had been under friendly discussion between the Allied Powers in that city, was taken by General Milne without notice to anyone, even the British High Commissioner (Admiral Calthorpe), and that it was an abuse of the powers entrusted to the British general officer in command. The Ambassador did not, however, mention the taking over of the police and sanitary administration of Constantinople by the British High Commissioner a few weeks ago.

In reply, I seized the opportunity to tell the Ambassador that there was another side to the case, which I was quite prepared to place before him, which threw a very different complexion on several of the incidents to which he referred, and the main features of which, speaking from memory, I proceeded to outline. I said that General Allenby seemed throughout not only to have taken up an attitude of rigid impartiality, but to have shown wherever he could not only reasonable, but exceptional, consideration to French claims.

To this the Ambassador did not demur.

I went on to say that, before I accepted the charge against the young officers of the Indian army, I should wish to know whether it was these officers who were at fault; and that, even if the Ambassador were correct in assuming that military service in India led to an autocratic manner towards natives, I did not see why a British officer of Indian experience should be any more unfriendly to the French than one who had served in Europe. I said that I should be able to place before M. Cambon a series of cases in which French officers had acted with extreme impetuosity and indiscretion, and had in some cases required the protection and assistance of the British military authorities, because of the unwisdom of their conduct. As regards French action in Syria, I should like him to know that, whereas the French had arranged for a special deputation from the Lebanon, whose impartiality and representative character were open to grave doubt, to proceed from Beirut to Paris to advocate the claims of France, the British authorities had consistently deprecated, and even refused permission for the

embarkation of, many other bodies who had wished to go to Paris in order to state the anti-French side of the case. I said that I thought the Ambassador was mistaken in thinking that the French were everywhere welcomed in the regions to which he was referring, and that, had our attitude been really what he supposed, things might have been made much less pleasant for them than had actually been the case.

As regards the particular incidents in Mesopotamia: I replied that the French consul had not been encouraged to go to Mosul, because relief arrangements were already adequately provided for by the military authorities in that region. I was not familiar with the case of the French consul at Basra. I did, however, deprecate the action which had been proposed by our military authorities with regard to the French military attaché in Bagdad.

In regard to Constantinople, I believed that the action of General Milne in respect of the banks was justified by him on military grounds, and as such fell within his jurisdiction as the general officer in supreme military command. The Committee of Union and Progress in Constantinople was in close touch with these banks, which were also engaged in transactions with German institutions. The prompt suspension of the banks therefore became a matter of military necessity. So little had it been intended to affront the French and Italians, that controllers of those nationalities had been placed in charge on the succeeding day.

When M. Cambon mentioned the subject of the unannounced arrival of the Emir Feisal at Marseilles, I answered that I believed this had been due to a delay in the arrival or decyphering of a telegram, and that really it was too absurd to suppose that we could possibly wish to spring upon the French Government a surprise which, inasmuch as the Emir was going first to their country, they had so many means of meeting. But as regards the Emir Feisal, I said that the boot appeared to me to be upon the other leg, and that I had noted with equal surprise and regret the line which had been taken by leading French newspapers, even those supposed to be in close connection with the French Government, with regard to the statement of his claims which had been made by the Emir at a meeting of the Peace Conference last week. It seemed to me almost an outrage that this Arab potentate, who had been deputed to Paris to represent the views of his father—a monarch who had fought bravely on our side and assisted us to win the war—should, because he stated the claims of his family and race in an extreme form (a form for which we had no responsibility, and one which contained proposals with which I did not in every instance agree), therefore be denounced as a British puppet in receipt of British pay.

I further said that I did not think that an amicable solution of these difficulties was likely to be facilitated by the publication of carefully prepared schemes of French administration, French acquisition, and even French annexation in the entire group of territories from Palestine on the south to the Black Sea on the north, which were being promulgated in France. It was not surprising that claims of this description should excite suspicion, and I agreed with the Ambassador in thinking that it was high time that the air should be cleared.

I also asked leave to tell him quite frankly that, in my view, the main ground of the irritation which existed, if it did exist, in Syria and Mesopotamia was the belief that the French were disposed to take undue advantage of the conditions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and to insist upon adherence not merely to the spirit but to the letter of an arrangement which had been shown by the progress of events to be both obsolete and impracticable; which both Governments knew must be superseded by some other and better plan; and which indeed had already been to a large extent cancelled by the Self-Determination Agreement of the French and British Governments in November last. I asked why it should not be possible to admit at once that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was impossible and out of date; and thus to put an end to pretensions based upon it, which were evidently the source of increasing friction between the two countries. It was, I thought, the utmost pity that these petty incidents should be allowed to occur, and that anything of such a nature should be allowed to cloud the atmosphere of Anglo-French relations at a time when the closest co-operation and harmony was in the widest interests essential.

The Ambassador said, in reply, that he would like nothing better than an opportunity of discussing the larger question; that, though he had spoken to me without official inspiration, there was nothing that he would welcome more than official authority to pursue the matter without delay; and that, whether this were accorded to him or not, whether the matter was to be discussed in Paris or elsewhere (and in Paris he seemed to think that an excess of emotion was not balanced by a corresponding excess of knowledge), he thought that nothing but good could result from an interchange of views here.

I gathered from what he said, both on this and previous occasions, that he has in his mind a scheme for the entire settlement of the Syrian question, and that he seeks an opportunity of placing it before the British Government. Whether such a policy would be that of the Quai d'Orsay in Paris or not, I have no means of knowing. But he confessed to a grave feeling of dismay lest, in the absence of President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and Signor Orlando, and the alleged illness of Mr. Balfour, the matter should be slurred over or forgotten in Paris, while incidents continue to occur in the Eastern parts of the world which would make an amicable solution more and more difficult. He declared to me his intention of informing M. Pichon of the general character of our conversation and the advice with which he had ended it. I undertook to write to Mr. Balfour and ascertain from him what action was being taken in Paris, and whether any steps should be taken here.

My own position would, I feel, be rendered easier by a clear understanding on this point, for it is more than embarrassing to listen every week to long statements of French grievances, coupled with urgent appeals for an early consideration of the matter in its widest aspect, and to find myself in a position where I can say so little in reply.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[24702]

No. 15.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 64.)

MR. BALFOUR presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith notes respecting Italian interests in Turkey in Asia.

*British Delegation, Paris,
February 12, 1919.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 15.

M. de Martino to Lord Hardinge.

*Délégation italienne à la Conférence de la Paix,
Paris, le 6 février, 1919.*

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

CONFORMÉMENT au désir que vous avez bien voulu m'exprimer à l'occasion de notre conversation d'hier, je m'empresse de vous fournir quelques indications concernant la situation actuelle de l'Italie par rapport aux questions de la Turquie d'Asie:—

1. Les demandes de M. Vénizélos concernant l'Asie Mineure s'étendent sur une partie considérable de la zone qui a été reconnue aux intérêts italiens par suite des accords avec les Alliés. Une commission technique va se réunir incessamment pour examiner ces demandes. Il semble opportun qu'une entente s'établisse entre les Alliés avant de discuter les aspirations grecques.

2. Les accords entre les Alliés sont les suivants:

Convention de mai 1914, entre les sociétés anglaise et italienne, conclue sous les auspices des deux Gouvernements, pour déterminer la zone des intérêts italiens au sud du Chemin de fer Smyrne-Aïdin et prolongement.

Article 9 du Traité de Londres du 26 avril, 1915.

Entente de Saint-Jean de Maurienne (avril 1917).

Accord anglo-franco-italien du 18 août, 1917.

3. Nous ne pouvons pas nous ranger à la thèse que ce dernier accord n'est plus valable parce qu'il manque de l'assentiment du Gouvernement russe, mais nous pourrions tout au plus accepter une discussion sur la base de l'article 8 de cet accord. En tout cas, tant que de nouveaux accords ne soient intervenus, l'accord de 1917 lie les parties contractantes.

4. Nous ne faisons pas d'objection, pour ce qui nous concerne, au point de vue exposé dans la déclaration anglo-française de novembre dernier, qui concerne simplement les principes d'administration des territoires envisagés, mais ne touche pas le fond de la question, c'est-à-dire le principe de proportionnalité et d'équité. Du reste,

la note du Marquis Impériali du 6 novembre, 1918, contient une déclaration analogue à celle des deux Gouvernements alliés.

5. Le Gouvernement italien, pour démontrer son attitude conciliante et pour tenir compte du désir à maintes reprises exprimé par le Gouvernement britannique, ne se refuserait pas à faire des concessions à la Grèce, à condition d'être assuré que le restant de la zone reconnue d'intérêts italiens soit mis hors de contestation, et qu'il soit admis que les renonciations éventuelles en faveur de la Grèce comportent des compensations en Asie Mineure en faveur de l'Italie.

6. Le Gouvernement français nous a récemment déclaré qu'il considère pleinement valables les accords de août 1917, qu'il admet que le restant de la zone italienne, après des concessions éventuelles à la Grèce, soit assuré à l'Italie et qu'il admet en principe que ces concessions à la Grèce comportent des compensations lesquelles devraient être négociées amicalement entre les Alliés.

Je suis à votre disposition pour tout éclaircissement ultérieur, et je saisis, &c.

G. DE MARTINO.

Enclosure 2 in No. 15.

Lord Hardinge to M. de Martino.

Dear M. de Martino,

February 11, 1919.

I WISH to thank you for the note which you were good enough to address to me on the 6th February, concerning the views of the Italian Government with regard to the question of Asiatic Turkey.

These views have been laid by me before Mr. Balfour, but having regard to the fact that the agreement of 1915 and the arrangements contemplated in 1917, so far as they relate to Asia Minor, are already under discussion by the plenipotentiaries at the Peace Conference, he doubts whether it would be desirable to make new arrangements pending the final decision of the Conference. Note has, however, been taken of the attitude of the Italian Government as regards the questions in dispute between Greece and Italy.

As regards the agreement of 1917, I am instructed to draw the attention of the Italian Government to Mr. Balfour's note to Marquis Imperiali of the 26th November, a copy of which is enclosed herein for convenience of reference."

Believe me, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

[25904]

No. 16.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 17.)

[By Bag.]

(No. 321.)

(Telegraphic. *En clair*.)

Paris, February 14, 1919.

MY telegram No. 192 of 28th January and Sir G. Grahame's telegram No. 262 of 5th February.

Further note from French Government states that in view of certain measures taken during past few weeks at Constantinople French Government consider it expedient to draw attention of His Majesty's Government to the unilateral nature of decisions carried out by British authorities without concurrence of French General and Admiral entrusted respectively with chief command of Allied forces on land and sea there.

It is observed that fact of French Government having agreed to allow British Admiral to sign Turkish armistice alone in name of Allies does not imply any abandonment of rights of French General officers in question, which were confirmed afresh at London on 2nd December last.

French Government consider that these separate initiatives on part of British authorities (see telegrams above referred to) render an agreement and a revision necessary, more especially as regards measures taken in respect of control of (1) police, (2) banks, and (3) railways.

As regards (1) French Government express surprise that step affecting safety of

* See Part I, No. 37.

troops could have been taken without consulting in any way General Franchet d'Esperey, Commander-in-chief of Allied Armies.

As regards (2) French Government point out that note by which French representative was informed of occupation of enemy banks, stated that detachments of British troops employed for this purpose had no need of assistance of French troops, and that British officer had already been instructed to assume general control of occupied offices. In opinion of French Government these two points are irreconcilable both with equality of rights of occupying Powers and with predominance of French interests in banks at Constantinople.

As regards (3) French Government state that they learn that General Milne proposes to set up an exclusively British control of railways in Turkey in Asia, but that in view of importance of French interests invested in these enterprises French Government cannot admit that administration should be taken out of their hands and handed over to foreign control.

French Government add that reports as to attitude adopted towards French interests by British High Commissioner and military authorities have already been spread abroad, and have much disturbed French public opinion, which takes special interest in Mediterranean questions, and would not understand that the hereditary influence exercised for many ages in the Turkish Empire should be ruined by the very Ally in whom she placed her fullest confidence.

French Government being anxious to avoid any discussion among Allies before the Turks, but rightly anxious to safeguard interests of her nationals in the East, suggest that a Commission composed of British and French representatives should meet immediately at Paris to settle conditions for rigorous execution in Turkey of agreements concluded by Allies concerning conduct of war and application of clauses of armistice. They propose to appoint following representatives on this Commission: M. Sergent, Under-Secretary of State at Ministry of Finance, M. Gout, who is a Minister Plenipotentiary, a General officer, and M. Kammerer, who has rank of consul-general.

Pending appointment of British delegates, French Government hope that, in accordance with wish expressed by M. Pichon in his note of the 5th February (see Sir G. Grahame's telegram No. 262) His Majesty's Government will at once request British representatives at Constantinople to refrain from taking any initiative calculated to provoke disagreement among Allies, and to act only after concertation with their French colleagues.

(Copy sent Peace Delegation.)

[17673]

No. 17.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

(No. 794.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 21, 1919.

THE French Ambassador called upon Sir R. Graham on the 30th January and spoke with regard to the proposals for British and French co-operation in the oil industry. His Excellency left a paper which is being dealt with separately.

M. Cambon then said, that, although speaking without authority from the French Government, he desired to call Sir R. Graham's serious attention to the attitude of the British military authorities in the Middle and Near East towards the French, and the series of small but disagreeable incidents which were continually arising between the British and French in that part of the world. He recognised that nothing of this kind could seriously affect the good relations which existed, and must continue to exist, between the British and French Governments. At the same time they were calculated to produce a very real feeling of irritation and mistrust. His Excellency referred to the treatment of the French consul at Bagdad, and the French military attaché by the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia, and complained further that, although under the agreement of 1916 the control of Mosul has been allotted to France, the British military authorities were refusing permission to any French agents or officers to proceed there. He realised perfectly well that there were important oil deposits at Mosul of which the British desired to obtain control. French interests at Mosul were not vital, and although they held to the agreement come to, the French Government would probably be very ready to surrender their rights in Mosul in return for participation in the development of the oil industry in the district. There was, however, another locality in which no compromise was possible. This was

[1356]

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Syria. His Excellency recognised that French interests in the country were possibly rather sentimental than material, and that French feeling in regard to them was exaggerated. At the same time the feeling that existed was very strong indeed. Yet in spite of the agreement, which gave France a predominant rôle in Syria, the British military authorities were doing everything in their power not only to prevent the French local representatives from playing their proper part, but to damage French influence and prestige. When the French Government made complaints on the subject, the Foreign Office sheltered behind the War Office, and the War Office behind the forceful personality of the British general officer commanding. His Excellency then cited one or two cases in which General Allenby or his subordinates had, he alleged, behaved with scant consideration to French officers. He accused our subordinate officers of encouraging a local campaign against the French and a future French Syria. General Allenby was now objecting to a small French force being despatched to Beirut. It was, however, absolutely necessary for French authority and prestige that there should be a greater display of French military force in Syria. At present the inhabitants only saw, or believed in, the British Army. M. Cambon concluded by urging that both the letter and spirit of the Agreement of 1916 should be carried into effect, and he expressed his conviction that no serious imputation would ever be cast on British good faith in the matter.

Sir R. Graham replied to his Excellency that, speaking with even less authority but equal frankness, he felt bound to say that we had received certain recent communications from the French Government on this and kindred matters with surprise. Their tone was quite unwarranted by the facts of the situation. Peace had not yet been established, and the future settlement in the Middle East had not yet been decided by the Peace Conference. General Allenby was responsible not only for military safety, but also for order and good government in the occupied districts. If, as Sir R. Graham believed, he considered that the arrival of fresh French troops would be a danger, he was perfectly right to insist upon his point. The General had acted with perfect loyalty throughout, and had appointed French officers to administer the French area whenever this was possible. But we had heard through General Clayton how ineffective and unsatisfactory the young officers appointed had been. General Allenby had pressed for the despatch of competent French administrative officials, but instead of that only an increase of military forces was contemplated.

M. Cambon said that what was now wanted was rather a display of French military force, but that he noted with interest the suggestion regarding administrative officials, and would like to have it made to him officially in order that it might be considered by his Government. He enquired whether, if such officials arrived, they would have to take their orders from General Allenby or would have a certain degree of independence. Colonel Picot's experiences were not encouraging. Sir R. Graham replied that it seemed to him evident that so long as General Allenby was commanding in the district all officials would have to take orders from him.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[30046]

No. 18.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 340)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 25, 1919.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 387 of the 24th instant, relative to the Anglo-French difficulty in Constantinople, I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a memorandum prepared by my direction in this Department setting forth the various points at issue, together with a further memorandum drawn up at the War Office,* making certain additions to these points.

These memoranda will, I think, make the present position quite clear to your Excellency.

Meanwhile it is proposed that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff should proceed to Paris on the 26th instant to take up the matter with the French Government and, if circumstances permit, with the President of the Council himself.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 18.

Memorandum respecting Anglo-French Difficulties at Constantinople.

General.

1. WE must insist that the situation in Syria is on an entirely different footing from that at Constantinople and that no possible parallel exists between them.

Syria is in the military occupation of a victorious army, and no Government or authority exists there save that which the General in command may consider it advisable to impose.

Constantinople is not in military occupation at all; it is the seat of the Turkish Government, and the proper channel for all communications with that Government is the Allied High Commissioners, who have been appointed for that purpose.

2. A state of war still exists between the Allies and Turkey, and no measures incompatible with the existence of a state of war should be taken.

3. The view of the British military authorities is that General Franchet d'Esperey's command is confined to the territories of those countries against which he has conducted military operations and to such other territories as may fall within his sphere as a direct result of such operations. His sphere, therefore, is the Balkans, and the establishment of his general headquarters at Constantinople was intended solely to facilitate his communications with the Balkans via Constanza.

By analogy and in accordance with the arrangement reached at Versailles on the 23rd December, 1917, the spheres of Generals Allenby, Milne, and Marshall extend over the whole of Turkey in Asia, and General Franchet d'Esperey possesses no more right of interference there than General Allenby would have, say, in Bulgaria.

4. The relations between General Franchet d'Esperey and General Milne in European Turkey are entirely a matter of military discipline, but neither General has any right, in areas which are not recognised as being in effective military occupation, to exercise civil authority, nor should he approach the Turkish Government direct on any save purely military matters affecting his command, direct communication with the Turkish Government on all other questions being reserved to the High Commissioners.

Particular.

1. *Taking over of Police and Sanitation of Constantinople.*

The French complain that this step was taken without previous consultation with General Franchet d'Esperey. It is apparently not disputed that the measure was desirable in itself, and our military authorities hold that General Milne, as senior officer in effective command at the time, was justified in taking this step on purely military grounds.

2. *Gendarmerie.*

General Franchet d'Esperey's intention, apparently, is to institute, in co-operation with the Turkish Government, a gendarmerie force under Colonel Foulon for the whole of Turkey, both European and Asiatic.

Such a scheme conflicts in three important respects with the general principles mentioned in the first part of this note—

- (a.) It ignores the state of war, the institution of a gendarmerie by a French officer in an enemy country being obviously incompatible with war conditions.
- (b.) It contemplates the exercise of authority in what is claimed to be an exclusively British military sphere.
- (c.) It is not a purely military matter, and therefore is outside General Franchet d'Esperey's competency.

It is as if General Milne were to approach the Government at Sophia with a scheme for instituting a gendarmerie for the whole of Bulgaria under British officers. On the other hand, the right of General d'Esperey to organise the police of Constantinople under a French officer is admitted.

[1356]

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3. *Banks.*

Here, too, it is agreed that action was desirable, and the Allied High Commissioners had just come to a resolution in the same sense.

The French grievance apparently is that action was taken without warning, and that the participation of French troops was refused. It might be pointed out to the French that secrecy was essential to the success of the operation in order to ensure against the removal of compromising books and the transfer of Committee of Union and Progress or enemy funds. But it would have been better if General Milne had acted in concert with the High Commissioners in the matter, and the refusal to employ French troops seems to have been an unfortunate mistake, and some regret might be expressed on this score.

4. *Railways.*

We had been given to understand by Admiral Calthorpe that a satisfactory arrangement had been reached locally on this question, and that the French were content that the control of the railways in European Turkey and Bulgaria should be handed over to them, while the control of those in Asiatic Turkey should be in British hands.

The whole intricate question of the ultimate disposal of the Turkish railway system must be decided by the Peace Conference, and, pending such decision and the resumption of peace conditions, the only workable and sensible arrangement seems to be that the control of the railways should be apportioned in accordance with the respective military spheres.

5. *The Osmanié Wireless Station.*

This question ought to be susceptible of arrangement locally, and is of a military rather than of a political character.

6. *Censorship.*

General Franchet d'Esperey has apparently made his own arrangements for censorship with the Turkish Government, and superseded the scheme arranged by the Allied High Commissioners with the Turkish authorities. It is not contended that General Franchet d'Esperey's arrangements are bad in themselves, but a serious question of principle is involved, and it is held that the General's action in ignoring the High Commissioners cannot but have a serious effect on the authority of the latter and on their position with the Turkish Government.

7. *Arrest and Punishment of Turkish Officers guilty of Atrocities, &c.*

General Franchet d'Esperey has interfered with the arrangements which we had made for the arrest and custody of Turkish offenders. He insists that guilty persons in unoccupied territory should be arrested and held by the Turks, and that preliminary proceedings against them should be taken in Turkish courts. Our contention is that the Turks cannot be trusted to keep these men in safe custody, as witness the recent escape of Rechid Bey, and that it is undesirable that preliminary proceedings should take place in Turkish courts against offenders who will ultimately be amenable to the court to be set up by the Peace Conference. The matter is under discussion with the French Government, to whom we have intimated that if they are unwilling to accept Malta as a place of detention we will gladly consent to any other safe place which they may select.

The question is only important in the present connexion as showing the universal character of General Franchet d'Esperey's propensity for interference.

8. *Proposed Visit of General Franchet d'Esperey to Black Sea Ports.*

General Franchet d'Esperey has announced his intention of visiting Black Sea ports, and it is apprehended that he desires to establish French posts there. The French have also offered military assistance to the American Relief Missions which are to proceed into the interior of Asia Minor. These measures are obviously calculated to bring up in an acute form the question of military responsibility in the areas in question, and to give evidence to the Turks of serious differences of opinion between the Allies, of which they will not be slow to take the fullest advantages.

No. 19.

[31750]

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 204.)

Paris, February 24, 1919.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith two notes from the French Government concerning the alleged refusal of the Shereefian authorities to recognise the position of the French Financial Adviser at Damascus, Paymaster Moulin.

The original note, dated the 14th February, never reached me. On receipt of the note, dated the 21st February, I asked the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to furnish me with a copy of the previous note, and I have only received it to-day.

I have, &c.

DERBY.

Enclosure in No. 19.

Notes respecting attitude of Shereefian Authorities.

(1.)

LE Gouvernement de la République vient d'être avisé par son Haut Commissaire en Palestine-Syrie d'un incident dont les suites seraient également sérieuses pour la France et pour la Grande-Bretagne.

Risa Pacha, après avoir persisté durant plusieurs jours à nier qu'un télégramme du commandant en chef eût été adressé à ce sujet un conseil du G.H.Q., mais qu'il reconnaît maintenant qu'il a en effet reçu à ce sujet un conseil du G.H.Q., mais qu'il ne se considère nullement comme lié par cette communication.

Le caractère de la situation ainsi créée au conseiller financier du Gouvernement français auprès de l'autorité locale à Damas ne saurait échapper au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique. Cette situation constitue en outre un précédent de nature à entraver dans sa mission le fonctionnaire délégué dans le même but par le Gouvernement anglais.

Il y aurait un péril évident et grave à laisser ainsi soustraire à toute surveillance, de la part des Alliés, les versements considérables qu'ils se consentent en vue d'assurer la marche régulière de l'administration locale.

Le malentendu qui s'est produit en l'espèce ne saurait être considéré que comme une nouvelle preuve de l'inaptitude actuelle des Syriens à gérer à eux seuls leurs destinées. Il importe à tous égards qu'il ne puisse ni se prolonger ni se renouveler, et il est urgent que des mesures précises fassent comprendre leur erreur à des fonctionnaires qui se croient assez soutenus par certaines autorités militaires britanniques pour se refuser à tout contrôle des fonds considérables qu'ils emploient à la propagande la plus active et toujours la plus hostile à l'influence française.

Paris, le 14 février, 1919.

(2.)

En se référant à sa note du 15 février, 1919, relative à l'attitude des autorités chérifiennes vis-à-vis du payeur principal Moulin, conseiller financier français, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères à l'honneur d'appeler à nouveau l'attention de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique sur l'urgence que présente la solution d'une question où les deux Gouvernements se trouvent également intéressés.

Le Haut Commissaire de la République en Syrie vient de communiquer au Département, sous la date du 14 février dernier, des renseignements d'où il ressort que le budget prévu pour 1919 par les fonctionnaires chérifiens de la zone de Damas comporte un déficit de 25,000,000 de francs. L'établissement de ce projet présente d'autre part plusieurs irrégularités révélant l'insuffisance technique des agents chargés de son élaboration. En dépit de cette situation, le Gouvernement chérifien persiste à refuser la collaboration du conseiller financier français, après avoir réduit à un simple rôle de transmission les fonctions du conseiller britannique.

Le Gouvernement de la République ne peut admettre qu'un état de choses aussi regrettable se prolonge au détriment de ses droits non moins que de ses intérêts. Il

serait donc très obligé à l'Ambassade de vouloir bien insister auprès du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté afin que le Commandement militaire anglais en Syrie reçoive les instructions nécessaires pour faire respecter par les fonctionnaires éhériens en accord avec le Haut Commissaire de la République le droit de contrôle que les Alliés se sont engagés à exercer à cet égard.

Paris, le 21 février, 1919.

[36361]

No. 20.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 408.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 5, 1919.

THE weekly visit of the French Ambassador to the Foreign Office provided him with an opportunity of raising several points of minor and one or two of major importance.

He was concerned with the present position of the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway, the French ownership and management of which had been completely set on one side since the commencement of the war in Palestine, but which he thought might now be safely reinstated in the general interest. He strongly urged that representations might be made to General Allenby to this effect.

The next question raised by the Ambassador related to the proposal to send a French financial adviser to Persia. This the French Government had been requested by the Persian Government to do, and, in view of their previous connection with the country, they were not unwilling to respond to the appeal. On the other hand, the French Government had no political interests or ambitions in Persia, which they frankly recognise falls within the British sphere of influence, and, if we desired that they should not comply with the request, they were quite willing to desist. The Ambassador informed me that he believed that the Persian Government had addressed a somewhat similar appeal for assistance to America. I replied that I was not in the least surprised at the information, because it was the fashion of every Oriental Government to have not merely two strings, but half a dozen strings to its bow, and that the first object of every Oriental diplomat was to employ one Power against the other. These various appeals seemed to me, however, to be incompatible both with the attitude which had been simultaneously taken up by the Persian Government towards His Majesty's Government and with the financial position in Persia itself. In view of the fact that Persia was being kept upon her financial legs exclusively by Great Britain; that we were paying for her army; to some extent for her Government; and even for the so-called Cossack brigade under Russian officers, it seemed to me that if a foreign financial adviser was to be appointed, there could be no question of his coming from any other country than Great Britain. If the French Government asked me, therefore, whether we thought it desirable that the French should accept the invitation which had been addressed to them I could only answer in the negative, and would gladly, in reply to a note which he handed to me, send him a communication to that effect.

His Excellency then proceeded to a discussion of the situation as regards Constantinople. He said he was not at all clear in his own mind as to what ought to be the fate of that city, whether the Turks should be expelled or not from Europe, whether an international administration should, in the former case, be set up in its place, or whether Constantinople should be handed over to the charge of some mandatory Power. He was not aware of the opinions of his own Government upon the matter, and, indeed, he had no information that any decision had been arrived at by them, but as I had devoted a good deal of my life to a study of the questions of the East, he would like to discuss the matter with me, and to hear my views with a view to forming his own. I replied that I could not speak officially on the part of His Majesty's Government, for two reasons. In the first place, although the matter had been occasionally discussed, no definite decision had been arrived at here owing, in the main, to the fact that the interests of so many other Powers were involved; and, secondly, the matter would be settled, not in London but in Paris, after discussions, the nature of which I should not be acquainted with until the reports came to hand. On the other hand, if the Ambassador desired my personal views, and did not attach to them any wider significance, I was quite prepared to give them.

I may say, in passing, that my particular reason for desiring to give them, and for seizing the opportunity thus afforded to me for doing so, was that I wished to divert the

French from the ambition, of which there have been so many recent indications, to be the future controlling power of Constantinople themselves. Differing opinions may be held as to the degree of advantage or peril resulting from such an arrangement, but it is one as to which I am profoundly convinced that it would not conduce either to the peace of the world or to the security of British interests in the East. I should not, however, attach any particular value to the remarks I made were it not that I found them to be in accord with the general opinions entertained by the Ambassador.

I commenced by saying that for my part I was a strong advocate of the complete expulsion of the Turks as a ruling power from Europe; and the reason, apart from many others, that seemed to me to be decisive was this: the power and prestige of the Sultan in all parts of the Mussulman world rested, in my judgment, in the main upon two bases; first, his possession of the Holy Places, and, secondly, his position at Constantinople. Of the former he had already been deprived; but as long as he remained at the historic capital of the Eastern world, with the halo of almost hieratic prestige that surrounds it, so long the majority of his religious adherents throughout the world would not only regard him as Caliph, but as unconquered, so long would he continue to be a disturbing force in the international situation in the future. Whether the future administration of Constantinople was international or was consigned to an individual Power, so long as the Turkish Government remained there, Stambul would be the centre and pivot to which all Mussulmans would turn, and the Turks would revel in the fresh opportunity presented to them of playing upon the rivalries and jealousies of Europe. Once he was expelled from Constantinople, he would become the Sovereign of an Asiatic State, much on the same footing as the Shah of Persia or the Ameer of Afghanistan, and the Turks would sink to a second or third place, if not lower, among the nations of the world. All the more would the Mahomedan world regard his remaining in Constantinople as a sign of victory, and his expulsion as the crowning evidence of defeat, because it was well known that his eviction from Europe had been one of the stated objects of the Allies since the commencement of the war, and that in the event of Allied victory Constantinople had actually at an early stage been promised by Great Britain and France to Russia.

Personally, I regarded this promise to Russia as one of the great mistakes of the war, fortunately nullified by the progress of events. I could not understand how the British and French Governments had ever agreed to such a concession—a point in which the Ambassador expressed his cordial agreement—and I added that, had I been a Russian myself, I should have regarded it as fatal to my own country to be drawn down the Bosphorus, and involved in all the dangers and intrigues of the Mediterranean and the Levant.

Similar considerations, in my view, applied to the other great European Powers, who, I thought, would act extremely unwisely in their own as well as in the public interest, were they attracted by such a lure. Were the invitation addressed to my own country, did the Powers of Europe, at Paris or elsewhere, come to me with the mandate for Constantinople in their hands, urging that, as Britain was the greatest Oriental Power in the world, and as all the countries between Europe and India fell more or less within the focus of our influence the gate of the East should therefore, naturally, be entrusted to our hands, I would yet, if the decision rested with me, decline to be tempted by such an offer and would unhesitatingly refuse it. I did not know what was the view entertained in France. I was aware that the French had considerable interests, financial and otherwise, in Constantinople, and their recent attitude seemed to show that these interests were being pushed with great activity. Whether France aspired to receive the mandate I had no knowledge; but if I were in her position I should resist the temptation and decline the spoil. Indeed, I went on to say that, as a warm friend of France, I was greatly surprised, and indeed somewhat alarmed, that at a moment, when although she had reached the zenith of her glory and earned the ungrudging admiration of the world, she was yet faced with such prospective dangers on her own frontier that she was about to invite the assent of Europe to the most momentous changes, in order to guarantee her security in the future, and when every man and every resource that she possessed might one day be called upon for the defence of her own central hearth, she should yet, in addition to the vast responsibility which she already possesses in so many parts of the world, be apparently anxious to extend the sphere of her influence so as to embrace Tangier on the one side, Syria, and possibly Cilicia, on the other; it might be Constantinople as well. It was for France to decide her own policy, and Great Britain could not fail to regard all that concerned her with a most sympathetic eye. But I was surprised at the eagerness with which European Powers, already burdened, were stretching their hands

out for fresh loads which would certainly be troublesome, and might even be crushing in the days to come. People in England were talking with enthusiasm about the prospect of this country receiving a mandate for Palestine. Such an appeal, if made to us, it might be impossible to resist; but I viewed myself with no small apprehension the future that it opened up and the responsibility which it might entail. If I held these views about Palestine, much more was I disposed to entertain them about Constantinople. Unattractive as the prospect of an international administration might be, I would myself prefer to see it set up on the Bosphorus rather than that any European Power should undertake the task. I did not see why, in the limited territorial area that might be left to such an administration in the event of the expulsion of the Turks, and of the restricted functions which it would be called upon to perform, an international body or commission might not be charged with the task. There could hardly be any misgovernment because there would be so little to govern. The questions concerned would be mainly those of commerce and navigation, and with the disappearance of the Turk the greater part of the opportunity for intrigue would disappear also.

These, in brief, were the views which my study of the question had led me to form, but I repeated in conclusion that they were only those of a student and traveller and carried no official authority. The Ambassador appeared to attach greater importance to my utterances than I was disposed to do myself, and said that they accorded in the main with the opinions he had himself formed.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[36425]

No. 21.

M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 7.)

PAR une note en date du 30 janvier dernier, l'Ambassadeur de France avait attiré l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur la situation de la Société française du Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem, telle qu'elle se trouvait exposée dans une communication de son directeur, M. Pavie, au Général Allenby, en date du 23 décembre dernier.

Le grand quartier général anglais en Asie Mineure a répondu à M. Pavie, le 16 janvier, qu'il n'était pas à présent en mesure de traiter ce qui touche la politique d'après-guerre des chemins de fer militaires.

Le Gouvernement français a pris connaissance de cette réponse de nature à menacer les intérêts exclusivement français engagés dans le Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem. M. Pichon estime que cette société doit bénéficier des droits reconnus à toutes les autres entreprises similaires dans les territoires occupés de la Turquie d'Asie.

Le Gouvernement français a invité M. Paul Cambon à demander au Gouvernement britannique de bien vouloir envoyer des instructions au grand quartier général du Général Allenby pour que la situation du chemin de fer en question ne soit plus l'objet du régime particulier qui lui est actuellement appliqué.

M. Paul Cambon, saisi, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 5 mars, 1919.

[40673]

No. 22.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 216.)

My Lord,

British Delegation, Paris, March 12, 1919.

I HAVE to refer to a note communicated to His Majesty's Ambassador here by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 6th February regarding Franco-British relations in the occupied territories of Turkey in Asia, which was transmitted to you officially by Lord Derby. I now transmit to you a copy of a further memorandum handed to Lord Milner by M. Pichon on the 8th March on the same subject.

I should be glad to be informed of the reply which has been, or may eventually be, sent to M. Pichon's memorandum of the 6th February, and at the same time to be

furnished with your Lordship's observations on the specific incidents referred to in the memorandum now enclosed, in so far as they are not already covered by the reply sent or to be sent by the Foreign Office to M. Pichon's previous communication.

I am, &c.

(For Mr. Balfour),

LOUIS MALLET.

Enclosure 1 in No. 22.

Memorandum communicated by M. Pichon to Lord Milner.

RELEVÉ DE QUELQUES-UNES DES MENÉES DIRIGÉES CONTRE L'INFLUENCE FRANÇAISE ET CONTRE LES ACCORDS FRANCO-BRITANNIQUES SUR L'ASIE-MINEURE.

(1.)

Territoires syriens soustraits à l'Influence française.

LE 27 octobre, 1918, le Haut-Commissaire français en Palestine informe le Département que les cazas de Hasbeya, Rascheya et Baalbeck sont soustraits de la zone bleue et rattachées à la zone anglaise.

Le 10 décembre, M. Picot télégraphie que le Général Allenby a soustrait le caza de Safed à l'administration française.

Le 22 janvier, M. Picot a été avisé par Sir Mark Sykes que le fait de la domination anglaise est accompli à Mossoul ainsi qu'à Deir-es-Zor, où un officier anglais est installé.

(2.)

Patriarche chaldéen.

Le 4 novembre, 1918, le consul de France à Bassora demande par l'entremise des autorités britanniques des nouvelles du Patriarche chaldéen du Mossoul.

Le 17 novembre, il avise le Département qu'il n'a pas encore la réponse.

Même communication le 23 novembre.

Le 29 novembre, le consul de France apprend par le chef de la Mission française que le Patriarche, faute de secours, se trouve dans une misère noire.

Le consul de France à Bassora télégraphie le 8 février, 1919, que le Colonel Leachman a ordonné au Patriarche de ne même pas répondre aux lettres annonçant les envois de fonds par le Gouvernement français.

Le consul de France à Bassora télégraphie le 12 janvier, 1919, qu'il ignore encore à cette date si le Patriarche a enfin reçu les fonds à lui destinés.

Le même avise le Département, le 24 janvier, 1919, que le Patriarche, arrivé la veille à Bagdad, a voyagé dans un wagon à bestiaux et que personne n'a été le saluer à la gare de la part des Anglais.

(3.)

Secours aux Indigents de Mossoul.

Le 6 novembre, 1918, le Département ouvre au consul de France à Bassora, M. Roux, un crédit de 100,000 fr. en faveur des nécessiteux de Mossoul, et prévient le Cabinet de Londres de ses intentions à cet égard.

Le 14 novembre, M. Roux, apprenant que plusieurs indigènes ont déjà pu rentrer dans cette ville, avise le Département qu'il sollicite des autorités anglaises la même permission.

Le 16 novembre, M. Balfour informe M. P. Cambon qu'il est obligé avant de consentir au voyage de nos représentants de prendre au préalable l'avis du Commandant en Chef anglais.

Le 17 novembre, M. Roux communique au Département la réponse qu'il a lui-même reçue du Civil Commissioner anglais de Bagdad. Il n'est pas jugé nécessaire ni désirable que plus d'une agence s'occupe de cette question.

Le 20 novembre, M. Roux fait savoir au Département que le Civil Commissioner

[1356]

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lui a répondu que les autorités militaires anglaises en voient pas le moyen de modifier les précédents ordres.

Le 23 novembre, M. Roux signale que l'argent recueilli par la Croix-Rouge de Bagdad est mis à la disposition des fonctionnaires britanniques de Mossoul pour secourir les misérables de la ville. Le même jour, M. Balfour répond à M. P. Cambon qu'il attend l'avis des autorités militaires britanniques pour autoriser nos agents à gagner Mossoul.

Le 30 décembre, 1918, M. Roux télégraphie qu'en vue d'obvier aux difficultés opposées par les Anglais à son voyage à Mossoul, il prend sur lui d'essayer de faire parvenir la somme dont il est chargé par des traités à son ordre.

Le 6 janvier, 1919, M. Roux et le Commandant Sciard, au bout de près de deux mois d'attente inutile, confient la distribution des secours à Mgr. Scropian.

(4.)

Colonel Leachman.

Le consul de France à Bassora télégraphie le 26 novembre, 1918, que le Lieutenant-Colonel Leachman a été désigné comme administrateur civil de la ville et du vilayet de Mossoul, dont le Gouvernement britannique a assumé la charge, par le Général Marshall.

Le même télégraphie le 25 décembre au Département que le Colonel Leachman a réuni les membres des communautés pour leur défendre de recevoir de l'argent français et de répondre aux instructions envoyées à ce sujet par le consul de France.

Le 8 février une dépêche de M. Roux confirme la précédente. Le Colonel Leachman a interdit les secours français sous peine de punition. En revanche, il en fait, distribuer au nom de l'Angleterre et autorise un missionnaire américain faisant de la propagande anglaise à circuler librement dans la région de Mossoul. Le Colonel Leachman a proféré devant le Patriarche chaldéen la menace de la déportation.

Le 10 janvier, M. Roux informe le Département que le Colonel Leachman refuse à l'archevêque arménien de Bagdad le droit de télégraphier ses vœux de nouvelle année au consul de France, et le force à restituer aux Turcs de petits esclaves arméniens qu'il a naguère retrouvés.

Le Commandant Sciard télégraphie que le Lieutenant-Colonel Leachman répand en Mésopotamie le bruit de violents mouvements antifrancs en Syrie ainsi qu'au Liban, et d'une révolte contre la garnison française de Beyrouth.

(5.)

Propagande anglaise.

Le 28 novembre, 1918, le consul de France à Bassora signale au Département l'intensité croissante de la propagande anglaise en Mésopotamie sur les notables et les chefs musulmans, pour les amener à réclamer le protectorat anglais.

Le 3 décembre, le même consul de France télégraphie en rendant compte de l'état d'esprit fâcheux à l'égard de la France créé par la propagande zélée des fonctionnaires britanniques.

Le 7 décembre, le même signale l'ouverture de bureaux de poste civile anglais en zone française de Mésopotamie.

Le 2 janvier, le consul de France à Bassora annonce l'ouverture d'une école anglaise à Mossoul, où les anglais cherchent à entretenir l'impression qu'ils doivent y rester.

Le 8 février, M. Roux annonce que le drapeau anglais a été officiellement hissé, en zone française.

(6.)

M. G. Picot signale le 3 décembre, 1918, à l'issue de sa tournée dans le Liban, la mauvaise humeur sensible des officiers anglais à l'égard des démonstrations en sa faveur. A Sgorta, ces officiers proclament l'annulation des accords de 1916.

(7.)

M. Picot signale le 4 décembre, 1918, qu'une garnison chérifienne est entrée à Antioche le lendemain du jour où on a refusé l'entrée de la ville aux contingents français.

(8.)

Le consul de France à Larnaca télégraphie en date du 9 décembre, 1918, que l'Intelligence Service de Famagouste travaille les Druses en faveur de l'Angleterre et envoie des émissaires recueillir des signatures en ce sens dans le Liban.

(9.)

M. G. Picot signale dans sa dépêche du 10 décembre que l'Émir Zeïd, dépense sans compter, à Damas, pour la propagande chérifienne, l'argent que l'Angleterre et la France lui avancent pour les besoins de l'administration.

(10.)

Officiers anglais en Syrie.

M. Coulondre, délégué du Haut-Commissaire français en Palestine-Syrie, déclare ce qui suit :

Le Général Allenby a donné à l'Émir Faysal sa parole que les mesures prises pour confier à l'administration française certains territoires occupés ne sauraient en aucune façon engager l'avenir.

Le Général Bulfin déclare aux Syriens que les représentants français n'engagent que leur responsabilité personnelle en procédant à l'organisation futur du pays.

Le Général Bulfin refuse d'amener le drapeau chérifien et de relever de leurs fonctions les autorités chérifiennes dans les villes de la zone d'action française ; il faut un ordre exprès du Commandant en Chef pour le forcer à reconnaître nos droits.

(11.)

Le Général Hemelin télégraphie en date du 27 décembre que le drapeau chérifien est arboré dans une partie de la zone française et que les soldats chérifiens s'y maintiennent, augmentant l'anarchie et la terreur dans le pays.

(12.)

Le Général Hemelin signale dans sa dépêche du 28 décembre, 1918, que les Chérifiens de l'Émir Faysal accentuent la violence de leur propagande antifrancs en zone française en maintenant leurs garnisons en face des nôtres, malgré les ordres mêmes du Général Allenby. Proclamations et manifestations antifrancs à Beyrouth et à Saïda provoquée par des appels séditionnels d'origine chérifienne.

(13.)

Le consul de France à Port-Saïd télégraphie le 31 décembre, 1918, que les délégués libanais arrêtés par la police égyptienne le 27 décembre n'ont pu repartir ; il faut attendre les ordres du Général Allenby ou du Haut-Commissaire britannique au Caire.

(14.)

Censure égyptienne.

M. Lefèvre-Pontalis signale au Département en date du 2 janvier, 1919, que la Censure égyptienne a reçu l'ordre de signaler au G.Q.G. anglais les pièces émanant de fonctionnaires français et faisant mention du refus opposé par les autorités britanniques au départ des délégués syriens.

Le 7 janvier, M. Pontalis, signale que la Censure a suspendu la totalité du discours de M. Pichon sur le rôle de la France en Syrie, afin, dit Sir R. Wingate, de faciliter la tâche du Général Allenby.

Le 9 janvier, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères télégraphie à Londres sa protestation très vive contre cette mesure.

Le 18 janvier, M. Pontalis informe le Département que le seul résultat de cette protestation a été de faire publier par les autorités britanniques un résumé du discours en question en y omettant toute allusion à la Palestine. La Censure continue à laisser à nos adversaires toute liberté de s'exprimer à leur gré.

(15.)

Commandant Sciard.

Le Commandant Sciard signale le 3 janvier, 1919, que l'on cherche à déchiffrer ses télégrammes de service.

Il télégraphie le 4 janvier que le Colonel Wilson, Civil Commissioner à Bagdad, a télégraphié à Londres pour réclamer le rappel du chef de la Mission militaire française et du chancelier honoraire du consulat français de Bagdad. Le Commandant Sciard et ses secrétaires sont surveillés.

Le Commandant Sciard informe par dépêche du 9 janvier le Ministre de la Guerre qu'il a reçu du chef d'État Major-général britannique une lettre l'invitant au nom du Général Marshall à quitter la Mésopotamie aussitôt. Le 11 janvier, l'État-Major britannique prend les dispositions destinées à assurer son départ avant d'avoir reçu les réponses de Londres et de Paris.

Le 14 janvier, le Chargé d'Affaires de France à Londres avise qu'il a protesté contre l'expulsion arbitrale et inamicale du Commandant Sciard par les autorités militaires anglaises.

(16.)

L'Amiral Cassard télégraphie le 8 janvier que les autorités britanniques poursuivent très nettement et par les moyens les moins recommandables une politique antifranaise en Syrie. Il signale notamment :

Le Général Bulfin, qui s'acharne en toute occasion à desservir la France.

Djemil Bey et Haddad Bey.

Le Général Bolo.

Le Général Mahney, qui a donné l'ordre de "faire du bruit en Syrie pour contre-casser l'action de la France."

Le Général Chaton, principal agent de la politique antifranaise.

Le Colonel Storrs, Gouverneur de Jérusalem (territoire international).

L'autorisation d'aller en Palestine, toujours accordée aux protégés anglais, est refusée aux nôtres et même à nos nationaux.

Le War Trade Department nous suscite partout de grandes difficultés.

(17.)

Le Commandant Sarrou signale dans son rapport en date du 13 janvier que lors de sa tournée au Caire et à Alexandrie, du 3 au 7 janvier, l'Alliance libanaise et l'Alliance syrienne continuaient avec acharnement leur campagne de press antifranaise. Le mouvement chérifien se poursuit avec activité contre la France. L'État-Major anglais soutient par tous les moyens à sa disposition la propagande intense menée contre notre action en Syrie ; à signaler le Colonel Lawrence et le Général Clayton.

(18.)

M. Picot signale dans sa dépêche du 14 janvier que la propagande chérifienne redouble d'intensité, les agents extorquent par la menace ou par l'or des signatures en faveur du Malik. Une coopérative d'officiers britanniques encourage cette propagande et déclare se refuser à quitter le pays, qu'elle apprécie pour son charme. Les faits se passent à Beyrouth et en zone d'action directe française.

(19.)

M. G. Picot signale au Département le 19 janvier, 1919, que le Commandant en Chef des forces britanniques en Syrie me fait savoir à l'attaché militaire français qu'il s'oppose à l'envoi des renforts pour le corps expéditionnaire français.

(20.)

L'Amiral du Cassard télégraphie le 22 janvier, 1919, que le retour à Jérusalem du Patriarche Damianos est exploité par les Anglais contre l'influence française et que le mouvement est dirigé par le Général Storrs, Gouverneur de Jérusalem.

(21.)

Le consul de France à Larnaca avise le Département par sa dépêche du 27 janvier qu'il a été informé des sommes considérables que les autorités anglaises dépensent en Syrie pour détruire l'influence française, contre laquelle ils subventionnent notamment le journaliste égyptien Kouri. L'action anglaise à Chypre est de jour en jour plus visible.

(22.)

Le consul de France à Larnaca télégraphie en date du 28 janvier que les agents britanniques poussant les réfugiés d'Alexandrette à signer une pétition demandant l'occupation anglaise et non française. Le mouvement est dirigé par le consul d'Angleterre à Alexandrette réfugié à Chypre. Quantité d'or anglaise entre à ce moment en Syrie.

(23.)

M. Georges Picot télégraphie au Département en date du 11 février, 1919 : Le Commandant en Chef des forces alliées en Syrie a fait notifier par le général commandant le XXI^e Corps britannique au Capitaine de vaisseau Duchemin, commandant la base navale de Beyrouth que ce port était sous son seul contrôle et sous l'autorité unique du délégué du G.H.Q., le rôle de l'officier français se bornant à la liaison avec les forces navales françaises.

(24.)

Le Capitaine de vaisseau Duchemin ne relevant, en vertu des instructions formelles qu'il a reçues, que de l'Amiral Namcy, il est inadmissible que l'État-Major britannique en Syrie veuille mettre à profit l'absence momentanée du Général Allenby pour tenter d'évincer de ses fonctions un officier français, auquel le commandant des forces navales alliées du Levant a confié le commandant de la base navale de Beyrouth.

(25.)

Le consul de France à Larnaca télégraphie au Département en date du 12 février que les autorités anglaises, après avoir dressé la liste des réfugiés d'Alexandrette désireux de retourner dans cette ville, prennent leurs dispositions pour rapatrier au plus tôt ces derniers, alors que les réfugiés de Latakiah, tous protégés français, se voient empêchés de retourner.

[45538]

No. 23.

Minutes of a Conference on the Pilgrimage, held at the Foreign Office on Tuesday, March 18, 1919.

Present:

Foreign Office	Mr. Kidston.
	Mr. Lovd.
	Major Young.
War Office	Captain Macindoe.
Treasury	Mr. Waterfield.
Ministry of Shipping	Mr. Alcorn.
	Mr. Leitch.
Colonial Office	Mr. Cowell.
Local Government Board	Dr. Low.
	Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkinson.
India Office	Mr. Wakely.

THE following points were discussed:—

- 1.—(a.) *Policy towards the Pilgrimage. Are His Majesty's Government to confine themselves, as in the past, to guarding the interests of British subjects, or are they to accept general responsibility for ensuring that King Hussein takes adequate precautions?*

The Meeting were of opinion that, in view of the political situation arising out of the Arab revolt and of the support given by His Majesty's Government to King Hussein during the war, His Majesty's Government could not confine themselves, as in the past, to guarding the interests of British pilgrims.

In view of the fact that His Majesty's Government will undoubtedly be blamed for any obvious falling off in the local pilgrimage arrangements in the Hedjaz, it was considered that, although no general responsibility could be accepted by His Majesty's Government for King Hussein's arrangements, it was, nevertheless, in the highest degree desirable, from the point of view of His Majesty's Government, that adequate precautions should be taken during the ensuing pilgrimage for the protection of pilgrims both from the point of view of defence and sanitation. While there was no reason to encourage a bumper pilgrimage, it was essential that it should be successful, and that no handle should be given to pro-Turkish and anti-Sherif propaganda.

- 1.—(b.) *In the latter case what financial support will be necessary for King Hussein, and on which Department of His Majesty's Government should the necessary expenditure be a charge?*

The Meeting were of opinion that for this year, at any rate, King Hussein would require financial support to enable him, among other things, to carry out the necessary measures to ensure that the pilgrimage should be a success, and they considered that this support should, in the first place, be a charge on Imperial funds. It was understood that the Treasury were averse from contributing directly towards the pilgrimage arrangements as such, but that they would accept the general principle that the expenditure involved in these arrangements should be taken into consideration when discussing the amount of the subsidy which His Majesty's Government should pay to King Hussein. This understanding was without prejudice to the discretion of the Treasury to suggest that the Indian and Egyptian Governments might be asked to bear some proportion of the expenditure involved in payments of the subsidy.

The expense of the necessary sanitary arrangements at Jeddah and Yembo was estimated at 6,000*l.* for this year. As regards the defence measures, it was suggested that the Foreign Office should telegraph to Sir M. Cheetham for an estimate of the normal expenditure under this head. It was realised that, in the event of hostile aggression on the part of Ibn Saud, it might become necessary to contemplate the provision of further financial support.

It was understood, however, that the Treasury were strongly of opinion that any expenses on account of military defence should be met by King Hussein from the

existing subsidy, which includes a very large sum for military purposes generally, and that pressure should be put upon him to take adequate precautions for the protection of the pilgrims by threat of reducing or discontinuing his subsidy.

2. *What shipping facilities can be made available, and what is the approximate number of pilgrims who will have to be dealt with?*

The Meeting, while recognising the desirability of reopening the pilgrimage to the full extent allowed by the shipping position, were of opinion that, generally speaking, special steps should not be taken to provide shipping facilities for pilgrims, but that the shipping companies concerned should be left to make their own arrangements for the disposal of such tonnage as would be free from control at the pilgrimage season. It was not anticipated that any very large quantity of shipping was likely to be available, though an accurate forecast would be difficult to obtain. It was agreed that it might be advisable that a general warning of the probable shortage of shipping should be issued, with a view to obviating as far as possible the necessity for providing special shipping facilities at the last moment. At the same time it was considered that, as far as possible, no step should be taken which might be interpreted as a discouragement to the pilgrimage on other grounds, and that every effort should be made to provide accommodation for such pilgrims as might present themselves at British ports in spite of the general warning that there was likely to be a shortage of shipping.

With regard to the Dutch East Indies, it was thought that the shipping situation would almost certainly admit of the small number of pilgrims anticipated by Captain Lee-Warner being conveyed to the Hedjaz.

3. *What facilities, if any, should be given to pilgrims from Syria and Palestine?*

The Meeting considered that this question could not be answered without previous reference to General Allenby. It was suggested that the War Office, in consultation with the Foreign Office, should obtain his general views on the number of pilgrims likely to proceed from Syria and Palestine, and should also inform him generally of the position as regards quarantine, at the same time making it clear that it was, from a political point of view, essential that he should take no step which might be interpreted as discouraging intending pilgrims except to their own advantage.

4. *What measures are desirable, from the purely sanitary point of view, for pilgrims proceeding (a) by sea, (b) by land?*

(a.) It was considered that pilgrims should be quarantined both on their inward and outward journey at Kamaran, Tor, and Suakim, and also at Jeddah and Yembo. It was agreed that the formation of a small inter-departmental committee consisting of one representative each from the Foreign Office, Egyptian Government, Government of India, and Local Government Board (Ministry of Health) was highly desirable for the purpose of working out in detail proposals as to sanitary arrangements. It was suggested that this committee should meet at an early date and, after hearing the views of Major C. P. Thomson, D.S.O., R.A.M.C., and possibly of Dr. Norman White, who is shortly expected from India, should make recommendations on the lines of Dr. Buchanan's proposals, of which a copy is attached, subject to the conclusions arrived at by the meeting in the course of their general discussion. It was agreed that this inter-departmental committee should not only consider the steps necessary for this year's pilgrimage, but should also prepare a draft scheme for the future control of the quarantine arrangements connected with the pilgrimage, for submission to the Peace Delegation at Paris. It was considered that some such arrangement was essential to ensure co-ordination of the steps taken by the various Departments of His Majesty's Government.

(b.) With regard to pilgrims proceeding by land, it was understood that the demolitions on the Hedjaz railway would in any case entail a road journey of about a month for pilgrims from Syria and Palestine. There was some difference of opinion as to whether this was in itself a sufficient safeguard, and it was foreseen that in the event of an outbreak of infectious disease at Mecca it might be necessary to impose quarantine for the return journey at some suitable station on the existing line. The alternative of encouraging pilgrims from Syria and Palestine to proceed by sea was considered undesirable from a shipping point of view. It was suggested that the position should be discussed in the proposed War Office telegram to General Allenby.

5. *By what administrative authorities should the various measures be applied?*

The Meeting were of opinion that quarantine arrangements in connection with this year's pilgrimage should be undertaken as follows:—

- (a.) Kameran: by the Government of India.
- (b.) Tor: by the Egyptian Government.
- (c.) Suakim: by the Sudan Government.
- (d.) Jeddah and Yembo: by King Hussein, under the supervision of the British Agent at Jeddah, acting under the orders of the High Commissioner, Cairo.

Each of these administrative authorities should conform to the requirements laid down by the International Sanitary Convention.

It was agreed that the measure of interference or control necessary to ensure that King Hussein should fulfil the conditions laid down by international quarantine regulations, was primarily a question for the High Commissioner at Cairo, and it was suggested that the Foreign Office should instruct Sir M. Cheetham to report as soon as possible whether, in his opinion, it would be possible or expedient to bring pressure to bear upon King Hussein through his subsidy, or whether it was inevitable that quarantine arrangements at Jeddah should be placed under direct British control.

6. *How should these measures be financed?*

After some discussion it was generally agreed that the respective administrative authorities mentioned under (a), (b), and (c) above should, in the first place, finance the measures adopted by them, and that they should levy such dues from pilgrims as were formerly levied by the Turkish Government, subject to any modifications which might be approved by His Majesty's Government. The question of the ultimate incidence of any expenditure in excess of these receipts was regarded as one which could not be decided until it was known what authority or authorities would in future be responsible in each case for the discharge of the duties formerly entrusted to the Constantinople Board of Health. It was, however, considered that, pending the final settlement of this question, the necessary expenditure should be met by the administrative authorities concerned on the understanding that it would ultimately be debited in each case to the authority becoming responsible in future for the sanitary arrangements in question, in anticipation of possible future recovery.

As regards the expenditure at Jeddah and Yembo, the Meeting were of opinion that this should be met by King Hussein, who should be encouraged to levy such dues as were formerly levied by the Turkish Government.

Annex.

Note by Dr. Buchanan, handed in by Dr. Low.

Mecca Pilgrimage.

ASSUMING that the Conference to-morrow takes the line that to meet 1919 conditions—

- (a.) Kameran should be made efficient (Indian Government);
- (b.) Tor should be fully re-established (Egyptian Government);
- (c.) A British quarantine station should be established at Jeddah (free of all expense to the King of the Hedjaz, but obligatory as regards all vessels bringing pilgrims);*
- The Jeddah station to deal with the direct African traffic, and to supplement Kameran and Tor;
- (d.) Co-ordination of the system at Kameran, Tor, and Jeddah is essential;
- (e.) For 1919 land pilgrimage via the Hedjaz Railway will not be allowed, so that the railway quarantine station is not of importance at the moment;

* If we control the ships, and the King wants the pilgrims, we ought to be able to make our own conditions about quarantine. I quite agree with Garner that the Jeddah station must be an effective one, and not "advisory" to the Arab doctors.

The following scheme might be considered:—

(A.) The Conference to appoint a small working Inter-Departmental Committee in London, say one member each representing:—

Foreign Office,
Egypt,
India,
Local Government Board (Ministry of Health).

(B.) The Committee to be arranged by the Foreign Office, and to report to the Foreign Office, which would apply to the Treasury, for sanction.

(C.) The Committee to be approved by the Treasury and have power to spend money (amount need not be large—see G below).

(D.) The duty of the Committee to be—

1. To secure a sufficient interim arrangement to safeguard the pilgrimage in 1919.
2. To report on measures which appear practicable for future pilgrimages, and which can be submitted as a British policy to the next International Conference.

(E.) The Committee would at once appoint a medical officer of experience to go to Egypt and the Red Sea and advise—

- (a.) What interim measures are practicable and necessary at Kameran.
- (b.) " " " at Tor.
- (c.) " " " at Jeddah.
- (d.) How, when the pilgrimage season is on, regular co-operation and systematic interchange of information can be secured at the different quarantine stations.

He should be empowered, within necessary limits, to take action on the spot for the above purposes.

(F.) The Committee to appoint this officer, or another officer, to act as director, of the Hedjaz quarantine service during the pilgrimage, to have authority (with the sanction of Indian and Egyptian Governments respectively) over Kameran and Tor *qua* the pilgrim arrangements.

(G.) It is anticipated that the Committee will not need much direct expenditure at Kameran or Tor. The whole arrangement is temporary, and the work of the Committee or its representative will lie mainly in laying down the essential minimal requirements which are practicable, and could be carried out, at Kameran, at the expense of the Italian Government, and at Tor, at the expense of the Egyptian Government.

At Jeddah, however, it may not be practicable for the quarantine station to be arranged and worked by the Indian or Egyptian authorities. In that case the Committee, through its representative, would have to arrange for the station and staff. For the short period in question it is probable that personnel, material, and transport could be obtained largely by arrangement with the military or naval authorities. The Committee, either direct or through the Foreign Office, would invite the assistance of the War Office, Admiralty, &c., in the matter.

(H.) The simplest plan would be to ask the Foreign Office to include a sum for the Committee in their estimates and consider afterwards its allocation between the Foreign Office, Ministry of Health, Egypt, and India Office if this is necessary. (Say, £6,000l., if the Committee is to be responsible for Jeddah.)

(J.) Representation:—

Sir H. Charles might perhaps act for the India Office; Dr. Goodman, late Assistant-Director Egyptian Public Health Service, now retired—address, the Union, Cambridge—would probably be approved by the Egyptian authorities, and be most useful; the Foreign Office would probably have a representative either of the Egyptian Department or of their Commercial and Quarantine Department; for the Local Government Board I could be a member if desired.

I think the Committee ought to get Dr. Thomson to meet them as soon as he comes over from Egypt (see the papers—he starts about the 15th); and also should see Dr. Norman White, who is to be over for the Inter-Allied Sanitary Conference at Paris.

These men could help in various ways, and in the selection of a representative medical officer to go and settle matters. If the Local Government Board is asked or pressed to send a man, I should be prepared to ask the Board to send Dr. Wilkinson if he agrees.

March 17, 1919.

G. S. B.

[43332]

No. 24.

M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 19.)

PAR une note en date du 5 de ce mois, l'Ambassadeur de France a attiré l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur la communication adressée, le 16 janvier, par le grand quartier général anglais en Asie Mineure au directeur de la Compagnie des Chemins de Fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem.

Cette même affaire a adressé, le 15 février dernier, une nouvelle protestation au Général Allenby contre :

1. L'engagement par les officiers de l'armée anglaise d'anciens agents de la société, à titre d'employés civils, sur la ligne de Jaffa à Jérusalem ;
2. L'exploitation commerciale de la ligne par les autorités militaires britanniques, qui effectueraient des transports de voyageurs civils et de marchandises privées avec tarifs spéciaux.

Le Gouvernement français estime justifiées ces protestations de la compagnie. Il serait heureux de recevoir aussi rapidement que possible, au sujet de ces affaires, une réponse du Gouvernement britannique.

M. Paul Cambon saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 18 mars 1919.*

[21940]

No. 25.

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, March 19, 1919.

I RECEIVED from His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris some time ago a copy of a note addressed to him by M. Pichon on the 6th February in which the French Government complained of the attitude adopted by certain British military officers and officials in the occupied territories of Syria and Mesopotamia. The text of this note was doubtless also communicated to your Excellency, but I have the honour to enclose a copy for convenience of reference.

His Majesty's Government were greatly surprised at both the tone and substance of this communication. They could not but regret that the French Government should have thought it necessary to make these accusations couched in so unusual and even unfriendly a form, at a time when the Peace Conference is engaged in the French capital in endeavouring to reach a lasting settlement of all international disputes. Indeed, I had hoped, particularly after my conversations with your Excellency, in which we have reviewed the entire situation in a very different spirit, that it might not have been necessary to take up the challenge so sharply thrown down at Paris. However, during the last few days there has arrived another long list of alleged grievances handed by M. Pichon in Paris to Lord Milner, reflecting the same frame of mind, and in some cases reiterating the same complaints. In these circumstances I have no alternative but to address to your Excellency the more sustained and serious reply from which I would gladly have abstained. I must, however, make this preliminary observation. Your Excellency will readily understand that the persons accused by a friendly and Allied Government of having so far forgotten their duty as to enter into intrigues of the nature indicated in M. Pichon's notes must be given the opportunity of defending themselves, and that it will, therefore, be impossible for me to deal in detail with the various accusations made until the Commanders-in-chief of the two armies have been consulted and have been able to question their subordinates. The fact that the French Government have made such an enquiry inevitable both by the nature of the charges and the form

in which they have considered it necessary to present them, is regrettable, since an enquiry on these lines can scarcely be conducive to that harmony and friendly feeling between the officers and members of the two nations which His Majesty's Government so earnestly desire to see established in every theatre of action.

But M. Pichon's two notes raise, besides the more personal questions, others of a more general character, on which I have more than once had the honour of expressing to your Excellency the views of His Majesty's Government. The atmosphere of mistrust which has engendered these accusations has arisen in my opinion in the first place from the conclusion of an agreement between our two Governments which a wider knowledge at the time would have shown to be impracticable, and which the progress of events has long since rendered obsolete; and in the second place from the attempt to apply its terms and conditions without modification to a position to which they are entirely unsuited.

There would appear, moreover, to exist fundamental differences of opinion between the two Governments as to the circumstances in which this Agreement of 1916 was intended to take effect, and as to the extent to which it has already been affected by subsequent declarations and arrangements. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, the whole text and spirit of the Agreement show that it was not meant to become operative save as a part of the final settlement of all matters arising out of the war. So long as a state of war continues—and I may point out in passing that it still exists—a military régime must be maintained in full force in enemy-occupied territory. Such is understood to be the considered view of the French Government with regard to the Western Front; and it is obvious that the principle, with which His Majesty's Government are in full agreement, must be held to apply with even greater force to semi-civilized territories such as those which are now under consideration. Such a régime is obviously incompatible with the full and immediate realization of the programme laid down in the 1916 Agreement, even were the full and textual validity of that document assumed; and if His Majesty's Government have so far relaxed the application of this principle as to allow, by the *modus vivendi* of the 30th September, 1918, their French Allies to anticipate some of the privileges accruing to them under the Agreement before they could legitimately be claimed, this concession must be held to have been due solely to the desire of His Majesty's Government to show their willingness to meet French wishes in a friendly spirit and not to any obligation imposed by the terms of the Agreement itself. The Commanders-in-chief of the Armies of Occupation, therefore, retain sole responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the areas of their military commands, and His Majesty's Government can admit no derogation from the rights of supreme authority which this responsibility implies.

From the above it will be seen that His Majesty's Government are of opinion that, whatever the intrinsic value of the Agreement may be, its application cannot be claimed so long as a state of war exists, and that the only powers which the French can claim to exercise by right in the occupied territories are those conceded to them by the *modus vivendi* of the 30th September, 1918.

The second point of difference between the two Governments relates to the validity of the Agreement itself, and this, in the light of the considerations set forth above, must be judged, not only by the fact that any effective operation which might eventually be given to it at the contemplated termination of the state of war has already been largely modified by the Anglo-French Declaration of the 18th November, 1918, but also by the fact that all arrangements and agreements made between the Allied Governments as a basis of the war settlement must necessarily come within the purview of the Peace Conference and be ratified, modified or rescinded by that body. Indeed that process has already been commenced in Paris, and may be expected before long to reach a final stage.

It is to a genuine misunderstanding on these fundamental questions rather than to any desire to create or to magnify points of local difference that I am inclined to attribute the unfortunate incidents and disagreements that have arisen, culminating as they have done in a series of grave personal charges which the French Government have thought fit to bring against British officers and even against the Generals in command of the British armies in the field. Upon this point I must speak with frankness.

Far from thwarting legitimate French aspirations, General Allenby has, to the knowledge of His Majesty's Government, urged the French Representative for many months past to give to him more efficient co-operation, and with this end in view to secure the appointment of French officers of standing with ripe administrative

tive experience to aid him in his difficult task. So far all his efforts in this direction have been in vain. He has seen with the greatest solicitude the danger of serious trouble with the Arabs which the failure to supply sufficient or efficient administrative French personnel has frequently caused, and in every case he has done his best to help and advise. The late Sir Mark Sykes was sent to Syria on a special mission by His Majesty's Government, with the sole object of endeavouring to compose differences between the Arabs and the French Administrators. General Allenby has already been informed in general terms of the charges brought in M. Pichon's note and has repudiated them indignantly both in his own name and in that of the officers under his command. This repudiation he will no doubt be in a position, if required, to confirm and substantiate in the course of his impending visit to Paris. To His Majesty's Government indeed the charge of undermining the popularity of the French in Syria is peculiarly galling and unjustified, since all the information in their possession tends to show that both General Allenby and his officers have throughout exerted themselves to combat the anti-French feeling which, in spite of the existence of many devoted and energetic French adherents, undoubtedly exists in that country, and which (as it would be easily within my power, were I so disposed, to prove), the action of French officers and officials has not invariably tended to allay.

The French Government in their note have also complained that the censorship is exercised to the detriment of their cause in Syria. To this accusation His Majesty's Government take particular exception, since they have been scrupulously careful throughout to suppress with vigour the many attempts which have been made to ventilate in the press manifestations of anti-French feeling. So loyally indeed has this policy been followed that it has roused grave popular discontent on many occasions, and has caused serious embarrassment to the local authorities. Similar difficulties have arisen in regard to the control of the Syrian press in Egypt.

I venture to hope that your Excellency, in bringing the views of His Majesty's Government to the notice of your Government, will inform M. Pichon that the tone of his Excellency's communication has provoked in their minds a feeling of equal surprise and regret, and that His Majesty's Government consider, from the information received by them, that the British commanders and officers in the occupied territories, far from working against French interests, have done their best to co-operate with their French Allies in the very difficult circumstances produced on the one hand by the antagonistic attitude of the Arabs towards the French, and on the other hand by the failure of the French Government to supply an administrative personnel possessing the experience and authority necessary to cope with so complex and delicate a situation.

The information contained in M. Pichon's latest note seems indeed to indicate that a number of these officials find an outlet for their activities in telegraphing home voluminous complaints as to incidents, many of which appear to be quite undeserving of serious consideration, and which in the large majority of cases, ought to admit of local solution.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[44986]

No. 26.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received March 22.)

Sir,

India Office, March 21, 1919.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th February, 1919, transmitting, for the observations of this Department, copy of a note from the French Government formulating a series of complaints against the attitude said to be adopted by local British officials towards French interests and officers in Syria and Mesopotamia.

Mr. Secretary Montagu proposes to confine his reply to the section of the note dealing with Mesopotamia, with which alone this Office is directly concerned. He notes that the specific complaints brought against the British authorities in Mesopotamia relate to two incidents only, viz. :—

1. The treatment of the French military attaché; and
2. The refusal to permit the French consul, M. Roux, to proceed to Mosul.

As regards 1, Mr. Montagu understands that the case of Commandant Sciard has been satisfactorily disposed of in communication with the military authorities (see correspondence enclosed in your letter of the 24th February). There seems nothing further to be said on this point. The circumstances in which it was thought necessary to discourage M. Roux's project of undertaking a charitable mission to Mosul were explained in the Civil Commissioner's telegram dated the 15th November, 1918, a copy of which is enclosed herewith for convenience of reference. It appears from Earl Curzon's despatch to the Earl of Derby of the 12th February, 1919, that oral explanations on this point have been conveyed by his Lordship to the French Ambassador. No further communication to the French Government would appear to be necessary.

It is more difficult to deal satisfactorily with complaints of a general character made in the note respecting the hostility alleged to have been shown by the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia, the Civil Commissioner and the British officers acting under their authority, to French rights and pretensions in Mesopotamia, their alleged discourtesy to representatives and supporters of the French Government, endeavours to discredit the French Government in the eyes of the native inhabitants, and activity in spreading rumours and in countenancing propaganda work detrimental to the repute of France as a great Power. In the absence of any evidence supporting these serious charges His Majesty's Government is entitled to meet them by an expression of disbelief in the possibility of British officers acting in a spirit so utterly contrary to the tradition of the services to which they belong and so opposed to the direct instructions of His Majesty's Government. Mr. Montagu has on more than one occasion (see the telegrams, copies of which are enclosed for facility of reference) impressed upon Colonel Wilson the necessity of scrupulously respecting French rights in those portions of the occupied territories which fall within the French sphere as defined by the agreement of 1916. He has no reason to suppose that his instructions have been disregarded; nor is it at all likely that Colonel Wilson, who has carried out the policy of His Majesty's Government in all other respects with such whole-hearted zeal and devotion, should, in this one particular, have neglected either the spirit or the letter of the orders conveyed to him from this Office.

Mr. Montagu would add that, if it were his desire (as is far from being the case) to treat the question in a controversial spirit, he could probably obtain with little difficulty material for counter-charges against French officials and others in Mesopotamia.

I have, &c.

T. W. HOLDERNESS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 26.

Civil Commissioner, Bagdad, to Viceroy of India.

(Telegraphic.)

Bagdad, November 15, 1918.

FRENCH consul at Basra telegraphs, 15th November :—

"Having received orders from my Government to undertake a charitable mission to Mosul to distribute relief in cash in order to relieve immediate need of poor, I should be much obliged if you would ask military authorities to give me the necessary facility to accomplish this mission."

With the approval of General Officer Commanding-in-chief, I have replied that poor relief is at present a responsibility which is being undertaken by military administration in Mosul, and that it is not considered necessary or desirable that more than one agency should deal with matter.

(Repeated to Delhi and Cairo.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 26.

Secretary of State for India to Civil Commissioner, Bagdad.

(Telegraphic.)

India Office, December 9, 1918.

YOUR telegram, dated 24th November: Political arrangements on Upper Euphrates.

My telegram of 5th November conveyed instructions of His Majesty's Government as to policy to be pursued in occupied districts falling within Area A as defined by

Sykes-Picot agreement. There is nothing in those instructions to preclude appointment of political officers in Area A wherever requirements of military administration necessitate, but they hardly cover despatch of political officer to spot so remote from zone of military occupation as Deir-ez-Zor. Unless there are strong reasons to contrary based on needs of military administration, Political Officer Abu Kemal should be instructed not to proceed further up Euphrates into Area A without specific instructions from His Majesty's Government. Similar considerations apply to political measures in northern districts of Mosul Vilayet, see your telegram dated 3rd December. Genuine needs of military administration must be criterion of political action.

(Very confidential.)

We are hopeful of inducing French Government to renounce claims in Mosul area, but in meantime it is most important to avoid giving them impression that we are acting in disregard of provisions of Sykes-Picot agreement. Only result would be to make them more tenacious of their claims.

(Repeated to Viceroy.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 26.

From Secretary of State for India to Civil Commissioner, Bagdad.

(Telegraphic.)

India Office, December 20, 1918.

YOUR telegram, dated 29th November: Railway construction.

His Majesty's Government fully appreciate your point. But as you have already been informed, French Government regard Sykes-Picot agreement as still valid. We hope to persuade them to withdraw their claim to Mosul, but until we have done so, any infringement of Sykes-Picot agreement will only make negotiations more difficult and thus tend to defeat our object. This must be governing consideration in dealing with all proposals for extending British influence in Area A, except in matters of vital necessity to military administration. There appears to be no such necessity for construction of earthworks beyond British sphere, which must accordingly be disallowed.

Similar considerations apply to railway surveys into Kurd country and extensions beyond Tekrit as discussed in your telegram dated 14th November. Up to limits of British sphere work may be undertaken, provided necessary personnel available and local officers satisfied there is no undue risk of disturbance. But it must not be extended into Area A.

(Repeated to Viceroy.)

[44835]

No. 27.

Director of Military Operations to Foreign Office.—(Received March 22.)

(Secret.)

THE Director of Military Operations presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and begs to forward for the information of Lord Curzon a copy of a French note handed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in Paris by M. Clemenceau. This note contains the French observations on the points raised by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in his conversations with M. Clemenceau on the subject of Franco-British relations in Constantinople and Syria.

Major-General Radcliffe understands that since the receipt of this note no action has been taken in Paris pending the arrival of General Allenby, in consultation with whom the whole matter was to be discussed.

Major-General Radcliffe also understands that General Franchet d'Esperey has now gone to Odessa, where the serious military situation may possibly require his presence for some time to come. In these circumstances it may be anticipated that no further action by the French authorities at Constantinople is probable for the present.

War Office, March 21, 1919.

Enclosure in No. 27.

French Observations respecting Franco-British Relations in Constantinople and Syria.

Observations.

Situation générale.

1. Il a été allégué que la situation en Syrie est d'une nature entièrement différente de celle qui existe à Constantinople et qu'il n'est pas possible d'établir entre elles un parallèle.

La Syrie est sous l'occupation militaire d'une armée victorieuse et il n'existe aucun autre Gouvernement ou autorité que celle jugée nécessaire d'imposer par le général commandant en chef.

Constantinople n'est aucunement soumise à une occupation militaire; c'est le siège du Gouvernement turc, et la voie naturelle de toutes les communications avec ce Gouvernement est celle des Hauts-Commissaires alliés qui ont été nommés dans ce but.

Situation générale.

1. Les Hauts-Commissaires à Constantinople ont été institués pour faire appliquer les clauses de l'Armistice du 31 octobre 1918 avec la Turquie.

Constantinople et les détroits sont soumis à l'occupation militaire par les Alliés, en fait et en droit (Article 1^{er} de l'Armistice).

Le commandement y a été toujours exercé, non par les Hauts-Commissaires, mais bien par le commandant des troupes alliées d'occupation (d'abord Général Wilson, puis Général Milne, enfin Général Franchet d'Esperey, commandant en chef les armées alliées d'Orient).

La preuve en est que le Général Milne tant qu'il a commandé à Constantinople au nom des Alliés—avant l'arrivée du Général d'Esperey—a pris une série de mesures: occupation de la T.S.F., des banques, police et hygiène de la ville, &c., qui sont nettement des actes de commandement et qui n'étaient pas en effet du ressort des Hauts-Commissaires.

Il était naturel que le Général d'Esperey, commandant en chef les armées alliées en Orient, transportant le siège de son commandement à Constantinople ait révisé et adapté à la situation nouvelle les mesures qui avaient été prises par le Général Milne.

A remarquer que le Général Milne, pendant le temps où il a commandé les forces alliées locales à Constantinople, n'a fait participer que les Anglais aux mesures qu'il a prises, tandis que le Général d'Esperey a appelé les Alliés à coopérer à celles qu'il a prescrites.

2. Il a été allégué que le commandement du Général Franchet d'Esperey est limité aux territoires des pays contre lesquels il a conduit les opérations militaires et tous autres territoires pouvant tomber dans sa sphère comme résultat direct de ses opérations. Sa sphère est donc les Balkans; l'établissement de son Quartier général à Constantinople n'a eu pour unique but que de faciliter ses communications avec les Balkans *via* Constantza.

Par analogie et conformément à l'accord de Versailles, les sphères des Généraux Allenby, Milne et Marshall s'étendent sur toute la Turquie d'Asie, et le Général Franchet d'Esperey n'a pas plus de droit d'y intervenir que le Général Allenby ne l'aurait, par exemple, en Bulgarie.

2. Le Général d'Esperey a conduit les opérations contre la Turquie au même titre que le Général Allenby.

Il est même probable que les succès de l'armée d'Orient et la menace d'une offensive directe et déjà commencée sur Constantinople, plus encore que l'entrée du Général Allenby à Damas, ont été la cause déterminante de la capitulation de la Turquie.

Le fait que le Général Milne avait, sous l'autorité du Général Franchet d'Esperey, le commandement de l'aile droite des armées d'Orient, comme le Voivode Michitch en commandait le centre et le Général Henrys l'aile gauche, ne signifie pas que la Turquie d'Europe ni d'Asie fût "zone anglaise."

A aucun moment, il n'a été convenu

que le commandement du Général d'Esperey en Turquie s'étendait seulement à la Turquie d'Europe et ne pouvait comprendre aucune portion de l'Anatolie. Cette dernière région n'a jamais été occupée par les troupes du Général Allenby; par suite, ces troupes n'ont pas plus de droits que celles du Général d'Esperey à s'étendre en Anatolie.

La seule convention connue est celle de Paris du 23 décembre 1917, relative à l'action en Russie méridionale et qui attribue à la zone anglaise le Caucase, la Géorgie et le Kurdistan; à la zone française, la Bessarabie, l'Ukraine et la Crimée.

La résolution 6 de l'accord de Londres du 3 décembre 1918, spécifie bien que les troupes anglaises de l'armée du Général Milne, qui passent d'Europe en Asie, sous la condition d'un accord préalable entre les Gouvernements alliés, cessent d'être sous les ordres du Général d'Esperey, mais ne signifie nullement que ce dernier ait besoin d'une autorisation desdits Gouvernements pour porter en Anatolie des troupes relevant de son autorité.

3. Ainsi qu'il a été dit plus haut, les Hauts-Commissaires sont chargés de l'application des clauses de l'Armistice avec la Turquie.

En ce qui concerne les mesures prises par le Général Franchet d'Esperey depuis son arrivée à Constantinople, il est remarqué que le Général Milne avait déjà (en tant que commandant en chef local, par suite de l'absence du Général d'Esperey) pris des mesures du même ordre et sans l'intervention des Hauts-Commissaires—voir ci-dessous "Banques."

Il était donc naturel qu'à son arrivée le Général Franchet d'Esperey reprenne ces mesures à son compte, les revise ou les adapte à la situation nouvelle.

Situation particulière.

1. Mesures de Police et d'Hygiène à Constantinople.

La France se plaint que ces mesures ont été prises sans consultation préalable du Général Franchet d'Esperey. Il ne semble pas contesté que cette mesure était désirable en elle-même et le Général Milne, comme officier le plus ancien commandant effectivement à ce moment, avait qualité pour prendre cette décision sur le terrain purement militaire.

2. Gendarmerie.

L'intention du Général Franchet d'Esperey semble être d'instituer en coopération avec le Gouvernement turc une force de gendarmerie sous les ordres du

Situation particulière.

1. Mesures de Police et d'Hygiène à Constantinople.

(Sans observations.)

(Voir IV ci-dessus.)

2. Organisation de la Gendarmerie.

Il est à remarquer :

(1.) Qu'en Turquie, c'est une mesure de sûreté générale qui intéresse directement

Colonel Foulon pour toute la Turquie, l'Europe et l'Asie.

Un tel plan ne s'accorde pas avec les principes généraux mentionnés précédemment, sur trois points différents :

(a.) Il ignore l'état de guerre, l'institution d'une gendarmerie par un officier français dans un pays ennemi étant évidemment incompatible avec les conditions de la guerre.

(b.) Il projette l'exercice de l'autorité dans une sphère revendiquée comme celle de l'autorité militaire britannique à l'exclusion de toute autre.

(c.) Il n'est pas d'ordre purement militaire; il n'est donc pas de la compétence du Général Franchet d'Esperey.

C'est comme si le Général Milne communiquait avec le Gouvernement de Sofia dans le but d'instituer une gendarmerie pour toute la Bulgarie sous les ordres d'officiers britanniques.

D'autre part le droit du Général d'Esperey d'organiser la police à Constantinople sous les ordres d'un officier français est reconnu.

3. Banques.

Ici aussi il est admis qu'une intervention était désirable et les Hauts-Commissaires alliés viennent de prendre une résolution dans le même sens.

Le grief de la France semble être que cette intervention a été faite sans en avoir été avertie, et que la participation des troupes françaises a été refusée. On pourrait faire remarquer à la France que le secret était essentiel pour le succès de l'opération dans le but d'empêcher l'enlèvement de livres compromettants et le transfert de Comité d'Union et Progrès ou de fonds ennemis. Mais il eût été préférable que le Général Milne agisse en cette occasion d'accord avec les Hauts-Commissaires, et le refus d'employer des troupes françaises semble avoir été une faute malheureuse, et des regrets peuvent être exprimés pour ce motif.

4. Chemins de fer.

On a cru comprendre par l'Amiral Calthorpe qu'un arrangement satisfaisant avait été obtenu localement sur cette question et que les Français avaient satisfaction en assumant le contrôle des chemins de fer en Turquie d'Europe et en Bulgarie, le contrôle des chemins de fer de Turquie d'Asie devant être entre les mains anglaises.

Toute la question compliquée du contrôle des chemins de fer turcs doit être décidée par la Conférence de la Paix; en attendant sa décision et la reprise de l'état de paix, le seul arrangement possible et utile semble

[1356]

les armées alliées, donc une mesure d'ordre militaire;

(2.) Que le Général d'Esperey a demandé aux armées alliées de participer à cette organisation en fournissant des officiers, &c.;

(3.) Qu'encore une fois, si l'autorité militaire britannique revendique comme la sienne une certaine zone (vraisemblablement l'Anatolie), aucun accord entre les Gouvernements n'a encore attribué de zone séparée sinon en Russie méridionale, Caucase ou Levant.

3. Banques.

(Sans observations.)

4. Chemins de fer.

Une Commission supérieure des chemins de fer turcs a été instituée à Constantinople sous la présidence du Colonel Delauney dans les conditions générales adoptées pour l'"affaire alliée" des chemins de fer de Macédoine. Cette Commission attribuait au contrôle français les chemins de fer de Turquie d'Europe, au contrôle anglais les chemins de fer de Turquie d'Asie. Ce *modus vivendi* paraît convenable, étant entendu que la question compliquée des chemins de fer turcs sera résolue à la Conférence de la Paix.

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être que le contrôle des chemins de fer soit réparti suivant les sphères militaires respectives.

5. *La station de T.S.F. d'Osmanie.*

Cette question semble être susceptible d'un arrangement local et est d'un caractère militaire plutôt que politique.

6. *Censure.*

Le Général Franchet d'Esperey semble avoir pris ses propres arrangements pour la censure avec le Gouvernement turc et écarté ainsi le plan arrangé par les Hauts-Commissaires alliés avec les autorités turques. La question n'est pas que les arrangements du Général Franchet d'Esperey soient bons ou mauvais en eux-mêmes, mais une sérieuse question de principe est intéressée, et le fait de l'intervention du Général ignorant les Hauts-Commissaires ne peut avoir qu'un effet sérieux sur l'autorité de ces derniers et sur leur situation auprès du Gouvernement turc.

7. *Arrestation et punition d'Officiers turcs coupables d'atrocités, &c.*

Le Général Franchet d'Esperey est intervenu dans les arrangements faits par les Anglais pour l'arrestation et la garde des Turcs coupables. Il insiste sur ce point que les délinquants en territoires non occupés doivent être arrêtés et gardés par les Turcs, et que les premières poursuites doivent être effectuées par les tribunaux turcs.

On ne peut faire confiance aux Turcs pour assurer la garde certaine de ces hommes, comme le prouve l'évasion récente de Rechid Bey, et qu'il n'est pas désirable que les poursuites préliminaires soient faites par les tribunaux turcs contre des criminels qui seront finalement jugés par le tribunal fixé par la Conférence de la Paix. Cette question est en cours de discussion avec le Gouvernement français, et il a été avisé qu'au cas où il n'accepterait pas Malte comme lieu de détention, tout autre endroit sûr qu'il voudrait choisir serait agréé.

Cette question n'a d'importance que parce qu'elle montre la tendance constante du caractère du Général Franchet d'Esperey à l'intervention.

8. *Projet de Visite du Général Franchet d'Esperey dans les Ports de la mer Noire.*

Le Général Franchet d'Esperey a annoncé son intention de visiter les ports

5. *T.S.F. d'Osmanie.*

(Sans observations.)

6. *Censure.*

C'est une question d'ordre essentiellement militaire, car elle intéresse directement la sécurité des armées placées sous le haut commandement du Général d'Esperey; c'est donc au général commandant en chef les armées alliées et non aux Hauts-Commissaires que revient cette intervention.

7. *Arrestation et punition des Officiers turcs, &c.*

Le Général d'Esperey a agi comme l'avait fait le Général Milne avant son arrivée, conformément à son pouvoir de commandant en chef. La question peut d'ailleurs être résolue par entente entre les deux Gouvernements.

Par contre, il n'est pas inutile de rappeler que le Général Liman von Sanders, interné aux îles des Princes, a pu s'embarquer pour l'Allemagne avant l'arrivée du Général d'Esperey à Constantinople et a dû être arrêté en cours de route à Malte.

Le Général Franchet d'Esperey a des responsabilités comme commandant en chef qui lui font une obligation stricte d'intervenir dans toutes les affaires qui intéressent les armées alliées, et on ne saurait lui faire une critique au sujet de sa manière d'agir dans cette situation.

8. *Projet de Visite du Général d'Esperey dans les Ports de la mer Noire.*

Le Général d'Esperey sait fort bien que les ports de Novorossisk, Batoum, &c.,

de la mer Noire, et l'on craint qu'il ne désire y établir des postes français.

sont dans la zone anglaise définie par la Convention du 23 décembre 1917, et il n'y installera certainement aucun poste.

Par contre, on ne voit pas pourquoi il ne pourrait visiter les ports d'Héraclée, Trébizone, &c., qui ne sont dans aucune zone séparée. On se souvient d'ailleurs que le Général Allenby est venu à Constantinople.

Les Français ont également offert l'assistance militaire à la Mission de Secours américaine, qui doit fonctionner dans l'intérieur de l'Asie Mineure. Ces mesures sont évidemment calculées pour porter à un point aigu la question de la responsabilité militaire dans les zones en question et pour montrer aux Turcs que de sérieuses différences d'opinion existent entre les Alliés, ce dont il ne tarderont pas à retirer les plus grands avantages.

Enfin, en ce qui concerne l'assistance militaire à la Mission de Secours américaine en Arménie, les Français n'ont fait que se conformer à ce que font déjà les Anglais à l'égard de cette mission: il ne paraît pas admissible qu'on puisse voir dans ce concours une intention quelconque de faire apparaître aux yeux des Turcs des divergences entre les Alliés. L'abstention de la France en Asie Mineure, où elle a depuis des siècles de solides relations, ne serait comprise par personne, alors que ces relations sont de nature à permettre de soutenir efficacement la Mission américaine en Arménie.

[42976]

No. 28.

*Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.**

(No. 1523.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 24, 1919.

ARCHBISHOP CERRETTI, whose visit to England was foreshadowed in a recent telegram from Washington, called upon Sir Ronald Graham on the 14th instant.

He was received with the utmost cordiality, and in accordance with his request immediate arrangements were made with the Passport Office and the Railway authorities for the continuance of his journey to Paris on the following day, as well as for that of the priest accompanying him.

Archbishop Cerretti stated that there were one or two subjects which he wished to discuss with Sir R. Graham.

In the first place, his Grace alluded to the Holy Places and to the anxiety the Pope felt in regard to them. For many years past their history had been one of bitter and continued struggle between his own Church and that of the Greeks, supported by the Russian Government.

The support which the French Government, as the protector of the Catholic Church in the East, should have afforded to the Church of Rome had not been and was not now forthcoming, and the Pope looked rather to His Majesty's Government than to any other to see that the rights and interests of his Church in the Holy Places were protected. It will be noted that no allusion was made to the Zionists.

Sir R. Graham assured the Archbishop that the one desire of His Majesty's Government was to see that justice was done to all branches of the Christian religion in the Holy Places and that their respective interests were protected. As the Archbishop declared that he had nothing more to say on this subject, Sir R. Graham reminded him of the question of the German Franciscans. The Archbishop replied that the Holy See was most anxious that the German Franciscans should not be expelled from Palestine until steps could be taken to substitute other brothers in their place. He only asked this in respect of those German Franciscans who had not, by their conduct, merited suspicion or reproach. On being asked how soon it could be expected that these substitutes would be available, his Grace said that this was the difficulty, as none were forthcoming at present and might not be for some time to come. Sir R. Graham replied that this fact did constitute a difficulty, as it was desired to expel the German Franciscans at an early date, but that his recommendations would be borne in mind.

* Also to Vatican, No. 30, and Washington, No. 135.

Archbishop Cerretti went on to say that he would like to state privately and confidentially that the Roman question would almost certainly be raised at the Peace Conference. It would not be brought forward by the Vatican, which held itself entirely aloof, but by some other Government or persons interested in its welfare, and he mentioned the Belgian Government as being a probable champion of the Holy See in this matter. He said that he believed that Mr. Balfour was fully informed on the question through Sir Eric Drummond and Sir William Tyrrell, and he trusted that when the moment came the British delegates would give their support to the Pope's desiderata. Sir R. Graham thanked him for his information and said that it would be interesting to have some knowledge of what these desiderata were. The Archbishop replied that all that the Pope asked for was "an estate of an English lord," a piece of territory, quite small, possibly not more than a few kilometres in extent, which his Holiness could regard as his own absolute property. The Archbishop thought that this was not much to ask and that it was a proposal which the British delegates might well support. He added that until some solution in this sense had been reached there would be no healing of the breach between the Vatican and the Italian Government, which was so detrimental to the interests of both, and to those of Italy also.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[43332]

No. 29.

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, March 24, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which you were so good as to address to me on the 18th instant with regard to the present situation of the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway, and to express my regret that it has not been possible up to the present to return a definite reply to your previous note of the 5th instant on this subject.

2. The military authorities have been requested to obtain a telegraphic report on the position of the railway and with regard to the complaints made by the company, and I trust to be in a position to reply to your Excellency's note at an early date.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[46887]

No. 30.

Memorandum by Earl Curzon.

A Note of Warning about the Middle East.

I WISH to express to my colleagues certain apprehensions which I cannot help entertaining about the progress of events in the Near and Middle East. They may turn out to be quite unfounded; but I think that we should be on our guard against certain eventualities which, if they occur, will probably come as a great shock to all those in this and other countries who are preparing for the conclusion and celebration of a speedy and glorious peace.

I say nothing about the prospect of Germany signing the sort of Peace Treaty which it appears will shortly be presented to her. It would, however, be unwise, in my opinion, to count implicitly upon her acceptance. The weakness of her Government, her menacing attitude on the Eastern frontier of Germany and in Poland, the growth of dissensions among the Allies in Paris, may all tempt her to risk refusal.

While, however, everyone is discussing the probable or possible attitude of Germany, no one appears to turn a thought to what may happen in Turkey. Ever since the conclusion of the armistice, it appears to have been taken for granted that Turkey, with our fleet at Constantinople, could be compelled to accept whatever terms we may dictate to her. I pleaded more than once at the time, but without success, that the terms of the armistice with Turkey should be made much more comprehensive and severe. They were not made so; and our position at Constantinople has since

rested more upon the calculating self-interest of the Turks on the one hand, and bluff on our part on the other, than it has done upon any confession of defeat on the part of the enemy, or convincing display of power by ourselves.

The city of Constantinople is in a state of very imperfect order, though disarmament is being slowly pursued. A Government is in power that alternately turns to the French and ourselves, and endeavours to flatter both into support of Turkish claims in the near future. Meanwhile, the Committee of Union and Progress so far from being dissolved, is everywhere active in the background. It is still the dominant force in the greater part of the Turkish Empire. Enver is still a national hero. The forts of the Dardanelles have never been destroyed, only occupied by weak Allied detachments. Allied forces are scarcely visible in Constantinople.

Now, let us see what is happening in that world which is the political environment of the Turkish capital. Everywhere are manifest symptoms of Allied weakness or disunion. The Bolsheviks have just turned the French and Greeks out of the Ukraine, and very nearly turned them out of Odessa. General Denikin, to whom we have widely advertised our assistance, is not doing particularly well on the Don and in the Caucasus. It is known that we are going to clear out of the Caucasus as soon as we can, leaving, I can assure my colleagues, a legacy of certain chaos and bloodshed behind us. We are already retiring from Transcaspia. Our flag will presently cease to fly on the Caspian.

If they look to another part of the horizon, the Turks cannot fail to see with a chuckle of deep satisfaction that there is a serious and widespread revolt against the British in Egypt, and that the Turkish flag has actually been raised again in the Valley of the Nile. The fate of Palestine is not yet decided. The French and British are squabbling over the future of Syria. Indeed, the entire fate of those regions, which an attempt ought to have been made to settle in the early days of the Conference, is once more to be postponed until a Commission has been sent out to examine and report. I need hardly point out what magnificent opportunities for intrigues this will present. Meanwhile, the Turks know well that an active controversy is going on as to whether the Greeks and Italians are to be allowed into Asia Minor, and if so to what extent, and in what capacity.

The above is the picture upon which the Old Turk, who still hopes to re-establish the former régime, and the young Turk, who means to cheat us if he can of the spoils of victory, look out from the crumbling watchtowers of Stambul. Both are probably aware that they cannot escape the loss of Mesopotamia, of Arabia, and the Holy Places (although I am far from thinking that the new Arab State has any guarantees for stable existence), of Palestine, and in Europe of Eastern Thrace. But when they realise that they are to be deprived altogether of Armenia, that they are to be turned out of Constantinople and of Europe, and that even their reduced patrimony in Asia Minor and Anatolia is either to be parcelled out between enemies (Greece, and Italy) whom they abhor, or is to be patronised by some foreign mandatory Power who will equally be anathema to them, I sometimes ask myself—what will they do? Will they once more bow to Kismet? Or will they think it worth while to strike another blow (even if it be a local and abortive blow) for Islam and the few remaining vestiges of their freedom?

I suggest to the military and naval authorities that they should not ignore these possibilities; and I pointed out to my colleagues, not as a prophecy but as a warning, that fresh trouble may even now be brewing in the East, which may disarrange some of our best-laid plans.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have seen an Admiralty telegram dated the 22nd March, from Admiral Calthorpe at Constantinople, which supplies a very significant confirmation of my argument. He strongly deprecates any reduction of British naval strength in the Eastern Mediterranean, or the Black Sea, on the very grounds which I have urged, viz. :—

1. The failure of the French in the Ukraine and the Crimea.
2. The situation in the Caucasus.
3. The position at Smyrna.
4. The unrest in Egypt.

All these events cause him to fear that he may be unable to cope with any serious crisis that may arise.

Foreign Office, March 25, 1919.

C. or K.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 623.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, April 2, 1919.

THE French Ambassador commenced his conversation with me this afternoon by producing an extract from "The Times," summarising the contents of the proposed Aliens Bill of the Government, which appeared to indicate that the contemplated legislation was to apply to aliens of every nationality, including, of course, the French, for a period of two years after the war. Representations had, he said, already been made to him by the French colony in London, who had expressed the greatest apprehension as to the restrictions to which they were to be submitted. The Bill, he presumed, was intended to be directed against enemy aliens, but its terms suggested no distinction between them and the subjects of friendly Powers. Frenchmen in England had already during the war been subjected to many inconveniences and restraints, which they had borne without murmuring; but that these should be continued under the new conditions appeared to him to be very hard. He suggested that, in the case of Frenchmen of good standing and of well-ascertained probity in this country, a system of special permits might be devised in order to relieve them from the necessity of frequent reports; and he expressed a hope that the Bill, when it became law, would be administered in a manner as conciliatory as possible to the citizens of a great and friendly country like his own.

I listened to his Excellency's representations with much sympathy, and promised to communicate with the Home Office, who were responsible for the Bill, at once.

After discussing a number of minor topics, which it is not necessary to mention, the Ambassador then passed on to speak at great length and with extreme gravity of the serious situation which he understood from his correspondence, official and private, was developing in France with regard to the attitude taken up by the British Government, and, it was alleged, by the Prime Minister in particular, towards the aspirations of France. What was actually passing in the Council of Four he did not pretend accurately to know; but information reached him from his brother, and from persons even more highly placed, which caused him no small alarm. Indeed, he regarded the Council of Four as by no means an ideal tribunal for dealing with great questions of political and territorial readjustment, such as those which now confronted it. None of the statesmen concerned, not even M. Clemenceau, had had training in foreign affairs; and many of the suggestions that the Council had made, or was believed to have made—he instanced the despatch of a wandering Commission to Asia Minor and Syria—seemed to him to have been conceived in ignorance of the facts.

When I asked him what were the grounds of his present apprehension, and what, in particular, led him to believe that our Prime Minister was in any way unsympathetic towards the claims of France—a charge for which, I said, I knew of no foundation whatever in his attitude or utterances as reported to me—his Excellency proceeded once again to state the claims of France as regards the two banks of the Rhine, the buffer State, and the Sarre coalfields. He urged that to his country, these were matters of life and death; that no one who had not shared the melancholy experience of France in the past could understand the way in which it impressed the national mind; and that any failure now to relieve his country of the perils by which it would continue to be threatened would produce a lasting soreness, to which he looked forward with the utmost alarm.

In reply, apart from my repudiation of what I truly believe to be a misjudgment on his part of the attitude of the British representatives in Paris, I urged the following considerations. I asked him to consider whether France, in her views about the Rhine frontier, was not a little too much affected by bygone memories. Was it likely that Germany, defeated, humiliated, and left with relatively inferior military forces, would once again make the great adventure that had so signally failed? Would not France, with Alsace-Lorraine in her secure possession, and with such arrangements made about the neutralisation of the Rhine territories as seemed to be not unlikely, be in a far better military position than she had ever before been? Was it not probable, and even certain, that the political and military ambitions of Germany, should they revive, would be directed to the East rather than to the West, and that the object of any future attack would not be her old enemy, but the congeries of small and feeble States whom we were trying to conjure into existence between Germany and Russia, but in whose continued

stability I personally did not feel any great confidence? Long before France had to fight any further battle for Paris, might we not all be engaged in a war for the recovery or the security of Eastern Europe?

The Ambassador did not contest these generalisations, but quoted a recent published statement of Baron Kühlmann, declaring that Germany would never give up the idea of revenge; that she was unchanged and unchangeable; and that whatever the lures of the East, she would never rest until she had attempted to win back what she had lost on the West. The interests not only of France, but of all the Allies, were involved in preventing such a consummation.

If these, I asked, were the convictions of the Ambassador about the future sentiments and action of Germany, would not France be creating a new Germania Irredenta if she insisted on having the coal-fields of the Sarre and the creation of a buffer State on the left bank of the Rhine?

As regards the Sarre, he replied that the German population were only 400,000 in number, and that they would have to accustom themselves to French rule. As regards the buffer State, he hoped that the arrangements to be made need not raise the ethnical question in a serious form.

Not knowing the exact position which our Prime Minister is taking up in the Council of Four, or the shape which the final decision on the French frontier is likely to assume, I was not able to deal in more than a general way with the warnings and lamentations of M. Cambon; but I could not help recognising the tone of extreme seriousness in which they were put forward, and I promised them the respectful consideration of His Majesty's Government.

I then turned the conversation to the East, and alluded to the difficult and unfortunate position which had grown up in Constantinople, arising out of the differences between the French and British military and naval representatives. These difficulties, I said, assumed in the main two forms: those which came from the absence of any clear understanding as to the line of division between the authority of the Military Commanders and that of the High Commissioners, and those which sprung from the absence of a similar understanding as to the line of demarcation between the military zones for which the French and the British were responsible in Turkey in Europe and Turkey in Asia. As regards the former, I called the attention of the Ambassador to an article from a Constantinople correspondent of "The Times," of the 31st March, which described the ridiculous and almost ignominious position in Constantinople, over which the old Turk, with his pipe in his mouth, must be smiling inwardly and rubbing his hands. Only a little while ago, the Ambassador had come to me with long lists of complaints of friction between British and French officers in Syria, Mosul, and Mesopotamia. I said that I had now lying on my table equally long lists of cases of similar and much greater indiscretions charged against French officers of higher rank in Constantinople. I did not, however, wish to adopt the French plan of sending in a rather bitterly worded despatch with a long list of individual charges at its tail. Such a procedure—and here M. Cambon cordially agreed with me—did not make either for a speedy or an amicable settlement. I wanted an agreement as to spheres of action and responsibility concluded between the highest authorities, laid down on paper, and adhered to in future on both sides. The same condition applied to the division of military commands in Asia and Europe. The British believed that all Turkey south of the Straits had been assigned to the British sphere. The French seemed to dispute this. Why could not a definite decision be made? When these matters had become acute a few weeks ago, we had sent General Wilson to Paris with a view to settling them by personal interviews on the spot. He had seen M. Clemenceau, who had expressed the utmost willingness to get rid of such minor causes of friction, and we had been led to believe that a solution was in sight. So far from this being the case, no settlement had been arrived at. The cases of disagreement continued to multiply, and I even had before me papers which showed that the French were trying to take over the control of the medical schools in Constantinople. If, I said, the British had disinterested themselves from the future of Constantinople and had no desire to be responsible for the ultimate administration of that city, why on earth should our respective representatives fight each other in the interval before the final solution was arrived at? It merely bred ill-feeling between the two nations: the very thing which, a few minutes earlier, in relation to the frontiers of France, the Ambassador had so earnestly deplored.

M. Cambon asked me if I had any proposal to make.

I replied that I should be prepared to authorise either General Wilson or some other representative to meet in Paris any officer or official deputed by the French

Government for the purpose, and that I would instruct our representative as to the views that we held. Alternately, if the French did not favour this proposal, and if they cared to send a French General or official over there, I should be willing to conduct the discussion here.

The Ambassador thought that, by means of one of these suggestions, a settlement might be found, and he undertook to submit them to his Government.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[53220]

No. 32.

Earl Curzon to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 194.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 5, 1919.

THE Italian Chargé d'Affaires called here on the 4th instant and read a telegram from the Italian Government to the effect that Greek troops were being massed at Mytilene, Samos, and Scio in order to make a descent upon Smyrna. He was instructed to urge that His Majesty's Government should take action to prevent any such Greek descent on Smyrna, as the Italian Government took a serious view of the projected Greek action.

Signor Preziosi was told that no information had reached His Majesty's Government as to any such proposed action on the part of the Greeks. It was, indeed, thought improbable that they would risk such a step, and thereby indispose the Peace Conference against their claims. Enquiries would, however, be made. At the same time, it was pointed out to Signor Preziosi that the Italian landing at Adalia, in contravention of the various assurances they had given on the subject, was a step likely to provoke Greek suspicion and misgivings, and to incline the Greeks to take corresponding action elsewhere.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[56108]

No. 33.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon. — (Received April 10.)

(No. 611.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Paris, April 9, 1919.

I HAVE received reply from Minister for Foreign Affairs to note addressed to that department in accordance with instructions in your telegram No. 700 of 27th March, drawing attention, in view of certain fiscal innovations recommended by French authorities at Constantinople, to the importance of Allied co-ordination in Turkish financial as well as political matters. M. Pichon points out that French Government, having received no reply to financial proposals put forward in French note of 9th January last, summary of which was telegraphed to you in my telegram No. 72 of 11th January, and in view of the urgency of the question, recently instructed their representative at Constantinople to instigate as soon as possible certain measures calculated both to prevent the bankruptcy of Turkey and to safeguard important French interests in that country. M. Pichon observes that French High Commissioner at Constantinople was requested to inform his Allied colleagues of steps which he was taking and to ask them to lend him their support. French Government had thus, his Excellency remarks, for their part in this as in all other cases done what was possible to avoid giving the Turkish Government the impression that Allies were acting without agreement among themselves.

M. Pichon trusts that British High Commissioner will be instructed to support his French colleague with a view to realisation of measures which French Government cannot abandon on account of the number and importance of French interests at stake, and which, moreover, Allied Powers, to all of whom Turkey is indebted, are interested in seeing adopted without delay. M. Pichon further states that his note of 13th February last, summary of which was telegraphed to you in my telegram No. 321 of 14th February, drawing attention to unilateral nature of certain decisions carried out by British authorities, and suggesting, with view to ensure Allied co-ordination in Turkey from military as well as political and economic point of view, the meeting at Paris of a Franco-British commission to settle questions arising out of armistice, has similarly remained without a reply.

His Excellency admits that it was suggested by Foreign Office to French Ambassador in London that Chief of Imperial General Staff should discuss this question in Paris with French military authorities, but he observes that such conversations cannot meet the requirements of the situation, which entails the examination of very diverse subjects, which in general are of a political and financial rather than military nature. French Government accordingly urge once more the necessity of arranging an early meeting of commission suggested in their note of 13th February last. They lay stress on desirability of that commission taking as a basis for its enquiry the arrangements concluded by the Allies in regard to the conduct of military operations in the East and the application of the Treaty of Armistice.

M. Pichon adds that, in accordance with information which he has received, General Milne has on his own authority organised distinct zones of command in Anatolia, and seems to consider the whole of Turkey in Asia exclusively reserved to British action. The command of the Allied forces in the East belonging to General Franchet d'Esperey by virtue more especially of London Agreement of 2nd December, 1918, French Government consider that no modification in that situation can be made except by agreement between two Governments, whereas measures taken by General Milne are not the result of any agreement, and French Government cannot admit the view which the British military authorities have endeavoured to impose.

French Government is convinced that early constitution of proposed commission will enable questions now pending in the East to be settled without delay, and in a most satisfactory manner. His Excellency concludes by stating that the precise guarantees which France and Great Britain have mutually given each other in regard to their territorial disinterestedness in respect of Constantinople are calculated to render it particularly easy to arrive at an agreement between the two Governments, and to put an end to the misunderstandings, which they do not desire to prolong.

(Copy sent to peace delegation.)

[60152]

No. 34.

Vice-Admiral Sir S. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon. — (Received April 17.)

(No. 453. Very Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 3, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Grand Vizier came to see me on the 30th March, and stated that he had been sent directly by the Sultan with whom he had been in prolonged discussion the previous day.

2. There were two sets of questions which His Imperial Majesty had been considering, viz., the external and internal situations of Turkey.

3. With regard to the former he could do nothing; it was in the hands of the Peace Conference and he could only await its decision. He could, however, occupy himself with the latter, and it was his duty to do so. The results of his reflections had been the message of a few days ago (which I had the honour to communicate to you in my telegram No. 603.)

4. His father, the Sultan Abdul Medjid, had brought him up to consider England and the English as his friends, and experience and observations had confirmed him in these principles. Very different principles had at various times been tried and had failed. Those who had recently usurped power had made war upon England, and the result was that Turkey was crushed and broken, and his present object was to make the complete submission of the Ottoman Power to His Majesty's Government. He saw no Power to whom he could turn for help except England; apart from any feelings of sentiment, cold policy alone would point out that as the only wise course.

5. As this was in great part a repetition of what His Highness had said on the previous occasion, I pressed him to be more precise and to indicate exactly what it was that the Sultan and he desired that His Majesty's Government should in a practical way do, for it was clear that he had some such object.

6. He replied that together with His Sovereign he had in fact worked out a scheme which he desired I would submit to you. Every other creed and party had been allowed to present an expression of their desires, and whilst the Turkish Government was debarred from sending delegates to Paris, it seemed at least only

just that the Sultan himself should also present to you his views, though in a strictly confidential way.

7. I said that in doing so in this way a different course would be followed from that adopted by the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Reshid Pasha, who had handed me a statement of the Turkish case for presentation to the Peace Conference; and while I was ready to forward to you any proposal in the manner he desired, he must quite clearly understand, firstly, that it could not have at all the same weight as any proposal openly laid before the Conference; secondly, that just as we had made war conjointly with our Allies, so we would make peace, also, conjointly with them; and, thirdly, that I would not encourage him in any illusive hopes; it was possible that the decision as regards the Turkish Empire had already been taken, or that, even if it had not, an unshakable intention had already been formed.

8. Ferid Pasha said that whilst Great Britain had certainly made war conjointly with her Allies, yet Turkey had only fought with England and only recognised defeat at her hands, and it was intolerably hard and bitter to be placed in subjection to others than the acknowledged victors. But he fully appreciated the bearing of my words, and, nevertheless, would submit through me his ideas.

9. He drew from his pocket a paper which he said was a hasty translation of a Turkish draft prepared by the Sultan and himself, and I have the honour to enclose copy of this paper herewith. He said, before handing it to me, that I should not be pleased with the first part though I should be with the end; but it was his belief, taking it as a whole, that it presented the best possible solution which could be devised, both for Turkey as well as for Great Britain, whether as a Great Moslem Power or as a country having great material interests. He himself was an entirer admirer of European civilisation, but there was the Oriental civilisation as well as he was equally well acquainted with that.

10. He ventured to think that Great Britain might commit a great error were she to be led by her Allies into taking any action which would create an unpassable chasm between the two. The dissolution of the Turkish Empire was not quite comparable to the effects that might be produced by the disappearance of the Spanish Monarchy or of the Austrian Empire, for a great religious issue was involved as well as, or more than, a great temporal stake.

11. Speaking again for the Sultan as Caliph and for himself as the highest functionary in the State, he reaffirmed the submission of Turkey to England, but to England alone, and supplicated British assistance, assuring me that His Majesty's Government should in return have every support and every exercise of good will which lay within the power of the Turkish Government.

12. In promising to report his words to you, Sir, which I did in accordance with the terms of your telegram No. 443 of the 11th March, I stated once more that at the same time I could hold out no sort of hope to him; that the fate of Turkey had been decided by the action of the Committee of Union and Progress, and that I was certain that His Majesty's Government would do nothing save in complete harmony and consultation with their Allies. This concluded a somewhat lengthy interview.

13. I desire to offer a few observations upon it as well as upon the document which I am forwarding to you.

14. I have no doubt of the sincerity of Ferid Pasha, and little, if any, more of that of the Sultan, whom, however, I have never seen, but I believe the Grand Vizier to reflect him very accurately. I feel certain that no similar advances have been or will be made to either of my colleagues, for it is not to the French or the Italians that Turkey has looked for aid in the past, almost as a matter of tradition; and there is much evidence that the desire for British help and guidance is widely spread throughout the country as a whole, and not only among the Turks. This feeling, I should add, has been considerably encouraged in any place where the British soldier happens to be stationed, as his conduct almost invariably produces a most favourable impression upon those among whom he lives, especially when it is compared with the demeanour of other foreign troops.

15. It cannot but be of real public utility that such impression should exist, as the Turks cannot fail to remain as a factor, and a very important one, which has to be reckoned with.

16. But despite this fact I cannot help thinking that our first duty—whatever our interest may be—lies towards the subject Christian races of this country whose infamous treatment must never be forgotten and cannot be condoned. Punishment absolutely must be inflicted on the Turks as a people, and upon individuals as examples.

The first will be achieved by the diminution of their empire; the second by the verdicts of the tribunal to be set up, as I understand, by the Peace Conference, to try those persons now almost daily being arrested.

17. But it is as useless to endeavour to reach all the guilty as it is, in a general way, to be vindictive, and it appears to me that once the two aims above mentioned have been achieved—and almost even sooner—it behoves us to look to the future rather than to the past, and to consider what régime is most likely to grant some tranquillity, some breathing space, not only to the Christians but also to the sorely pressed Moslems of this unfortunate empire.

18. It is our earnest hope in this High Commission that the rumours which reach us of an independent Armenia may be true, and that such a State will be established; once that is done I think every effort should be made to induce all Armenians to leave such territory as may be left to the Turks, and to seek new and safe homes in their own new country.

19. No less earnest is my hope, which I am venturing to express to you by telegraph, that the Hellenic Kingdom will not spread itself to the eastern shores of the Aegean; not because I have not the warmest sympathy with their aspirations for liberation from the tyranny of the past, but because I do not believe that this action would advance either the prosperity or the happiness of any of the parties concerned, but quite the reverse.

20. In a recent despatch you, Sir, concurred with an opinion expressed by the War Office that Mussulman Muhajirin in Christian houses should not be forced to leave in favour of their previous proprietors until some sort of provision had been made for the Moslems. This is the principle upon which I believe it is wise to act in the endeavour to settle the problem set before us in Asia Minor.

21. Whilst seeking to be just to the Christian, it is most necessary not to be unjust to the Moslem, and, further, to do this would be most unwise. As Ferid Pasha put the question, this is the borderland between East and West, and I can conceive no frontier which it is more important for us to define, so far as possible, on sound geographical lines; for it is obvious that there is no country, not excluding even a reconstructed Russia, which has an interest even comparable to that of His Majesty's Government on the Eastern side of the line.

22. In fact I find it very hard to believe that the true natural Western limits of the Indian Empire are not now the Eastern shores of the Aegean. It is equally hard to believe that the methods which were so successfully employed to control the savage instincts of the descendants of Aurungzeb cannot be used with like success towards those of Osman.

23. The memorandum which the Grand Vizier left with me deals first of all with the Holy Places, and it is evident from this and from other statements I have laid before you that the Sultan attaches more importance to his title as Caliph and Haram-el-Hararium than to anything else. To comment on this matter in any way is beyond my province, but it is my duty to point out its weight. The great traditions that have given majesty to the Sultan of Turkey and to the Caliphs of Islam are certainly not yet extinct, any more than are their connections with the shierifal families or with other great Arab chiefs; just as we shall have to live along with 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 of Turks, so shall we also have to live with the moral and religious influences which are concentrated in their Sovereign; and whilst on the one hand it appears to me a mistake to exaggerate the spiritual power of the Caliphate, so it is no less a mistake to underrate the potential dangers of Pan-Islamism, and I suggest that it is as important to have a friendly and dependent Sultan in the north, as it is to have a King of like disposition in the south, of Western Asia.

24. There would appear to be room for anxiety lest the Turks, not being represented at the Peace Conference, should be ignored and treated as a negligible quantity. This they certainly are not, and if the principle of self-determination is too entirely set aside in their case, there can be no lasting peace in the Near East, and as pointed out in my telegram No. 680 of this day's date, it seems only too probable that the task of quelling a sanguinary war and of re-establishing order will devolve as usual on Great Britain.

I have, &c.
(For the High Commissioner),
RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Memorandum.

Asie.

PAYS de la langue turque, ainsi que les provinces se trouvant entre l'Anatolie et l'Arabie peuplées de races différentes, sont soumis directement à la souveraineté du Sultan. Les pays de la langue arabe auront la plus large autonomie.

Le Hedjaz sera octroyé héréditairement à la famille d'Aon (famille actuelle). Indépendance absolue dans les affaires intérieures, mais un agent politique sera placé à côté de l'Émir (Prince) pour assurer l'harmonie de sa politique extérieure avec celle de l'Empire. L'agent ottoman aura à sa disposition un bataillon de 100 hommes. A Médine il y aura une garnison turque avec un général—symbole de l'unité religieuse.

Dans les pays gouvernés par Imam Yahia et Idris (Yémen) *statu quo ante*.

Les liens religieux des peuples musulmans avec le Khalif sont intégralement maintenus; tous les pays autonomes de l'Asie antérieure, depuis la Méditerranée jusqu'à la mer de l'Arabie au sud (Syrie, Mésopotamie, Irak, Hedjaz, Yémen) resteront soumis religieusement au Khalif de Constantinople.

Dans tous ces pays le droit de frapper la monnaie appartiendra au Sultan; c'est au nom du Khalif qu'on fera la prière de vendredi (Hutbé); le drapeau ottoman flottera partout.

L'Angleterre occupera en Europe et en Asie pendant quinze ans, soit dans les provinces directement soumises à la souveraineté du Sultan, soit dans celles jouissant de l'autonomie, les points qu'elle croira nécessaires, en vue d'assurer l'indépendance de la Turquie à l'égard de l'étranger, et d'assurer la tranquillité de l'intérieur.

L'Arménie sera constituée en République indépendante ou autonome, selon le désir de l'Angleterre, d'accord avec d'autres Puissances.

En Europe.

Les Emines Balkan, près de Bourgaz, sur la mer Noire, aboutissant à Samakow, et de là, à peu de distance à l'ouest d'Énos, sur la mer Égée, définiront les frontières de l'Empire en Europe. C'est la frontière naturelle du vilayet d'Andrinople que ces haïnes de montagnes entourent comme les murs d'une propriété Prince.

Les Détroits.

Dans les deux détroits de la mer Noire et des Dardanelles toutes les fortifications seront rasées, et ils seront occupés par l'Angleterre.

Intérieure.

L'Angleterre, par un sentiment d'amitié, voudra bien consentir à la nomination par le Sultan des Sous-Secrétaires d'État anglais dans les Ministères ottomans, où leur présence est nécessaire.

De plus, il sera nommé dans chaque vilayet un consul général anglais qui remplira, en même temps, la fonction de conseiller auprès du vali pendant quinze ans.

Les élections municipales aux conseils provinciaux et au Parlement se feront sous le contrôle des consuls anglais.

L'Angleterre aura le droit d'établir un contrôle sur les finances, soit à la capitale, soit en province.

La Constitution sera simplifiée conformément à l'aptitude et à la capacité politique des peuples de l'Orient. A ce sujet j'avais présenté au Sénat un rapport, il y a dix ans (le 15 février 1910).

Les Chambres seront appelées à voter le budget et à faire connaître au Gouvernement central les besoins locaux. Le Sultan sera absolument libre de diriger la politique extérieure de l'Empire.

[50699]

No. 35.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 17, 1919.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit herewith in original for early return a report from Captain Lee-Warner on his recent visit to the Hadramaut.

While realising that Kathiri emigration to the Dutch East Indies and the Malay Peninsula places the connection between the Hadramaut and the outside world on a different footing from that of other parts of Arabia proper, Lord Curzon is of opinion that the position in this part of Arabia is analogous to that in other areas where His Majesty's Government wish to exercise influence over the actions of hinterland tribes who are beyond the reach of their direct control.

His Lordship proposes to instruct Sir Edmund Allenby to put forward a suggestion for future policy, after consulting the Political Resident at Aden, on the lines that pressure should if possible be brought to bear upon the Kathiri through the Gaeiti Sultan without our necessarily interfering in the relations between the Kathiris and the Gaeitis. He considers that Captain Lee-Warner's suggestion, that some effort should be made to encourage the two rival factions to come to a more satisfactory understanding, is the only course consistent with the policy of non-interference which has always been adopted by His Majesty's Government, but at the same time he considers it inadvisable for us to enter into direct relations with hinterland rulers so long as the desired result can be obtained by working through the ruler of the coastal area.

As Mr. Secretary Montagu is doubtless aware, the contentment of the Kathiris is a matter of some concern to His Majesty's Government, in view of the powerful influence exercised by Kathiri immigrants over the Moslem population of the Dutch East Indies and the Malay Peninsula.

For this reason Lord Curzon considers it highly desirable, subject to the concurrence of the Colonial Office, that the existing embargoes on money remittances at Singapore and Aden should be removed as soon as possible, and that the Netherlands Government should be approached with a view to inducing them to reconsider their decision to stop immigration.

But before either of these steps can well be taken, it appears necessary that the internal politics of the Hadramaut should be placed on a more satisfactory footing, and his Lordship would be glad of Mr. Montagu's opinion on the instructions which the proposes to send to Sir Edmund Allenby.

I am, &c.
G. SPICER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 35.

Captain Lee-Warner to Political Resident, Aden.

(Secret.)

Sir,

Aden, March 3, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to report that I reached Makalla on the 15th January, 1919, where I presented to His Highness the Sultan the photograph of Makalla and the specimen box of oils sent by his Excellency Sir Reginald Wingate from Cairo.

2. His Highness was much pleased with both the presents, and has, I understand, written to his Excellency a letter of appreciation.

3. On the 16th I had a long interview with Sultan Ghalib, in the course of which I handed to him your letter. I informed him of the general position as regards the war, as regards Ali Said Pasha's surrender, and of the despatch of the Turkish prisoners from Aden to Egypt. His Highness evinced much curiosity about Hodaidah, the Yemen, and Imam Yahya.

4. We then turned to the more special objects of my visit. I explained the position of the Hadramaut Arabs in Java and Singapore; the folly of some of their number in meddling with Dutch colonial politics; and the dangers of restrictions on

their further emigration. I referred to Sarikat Islam, and pointed out that the majority of its Arab supporters were Kathiris.

5. I told His Highness of my desire to proceed inland in the hope of influencing the Kathiris in the required direction, and I informed him that such a journey could only be made with his "approval," and not merely with his "concurrence" (*vide* your instructions to me).

6. His Highness immediately concurred with the proposal for the journey; he held that it might serve a most useful purpose; and he sent a messenger to his Wazir, Syed Hussein-bin-Hamid-el-Mindar, at Wadi Doan.

7. In due course a reply came, suggesting that as influenza had been rampant in the Wadi I might prefer to meet the Wazir at Shibam.

8. I deemed it better, however, not to cause the Syed the trouble of this journey, and accordingly I proceeded (so soon as the necessary camels and escort had been obtained) to Wadi Doan, where I was hospitably entertained by the Wazir, and where we were able to discuss the Kathiri question from both sides.

9. Subsequently, accompanied by his son, Syed Abubakar, I went on to Shibam, and was able to meet the Kathiri Sultans, on the 8th February, just beyond that town, at a village called Hazm, a neutral Syed village, although situated in Kathiri territory.

10. Tantalising as it naturally was to have come almost within eyeshot of Sayyun, and within twelve hours of Terim, towns never visited by an Englishman, and only once entered by a European (Leo Hirsch, disguised as an Arab, reached the environs of Terim in 1893), it was obvious to me that not only the Wazir of the Kaaiti but also the Kathiri Sultans looked on a visit to these centres at the present time as injudicious; not merely were the Hamumis, the ancient allies of the Kathiris, in a ferment, but dissension was rampant in Sayyun. Your orders on the point were also explicit, and I accordingly returned by my former route, reaching Makalla via Qatan, Haurah, Hajarein, Sif, Koweirah, and Wadi Himmam on the 22nd February, 1919.

11. The accompanying report gives particulars on various points, but I would here state one or two items:—

(a.) The Wadi Himman route by which I travelled had not been covered by either the Bents or by Leo Hirsch, and by using this route I was enabled to enter Wadi Doan at its very beginning. It has thus been possible to present a full sketch map of this valley, which in the present political condition of the country has become the main Kaaiti line of communication. Some additions and corrections to route 67 ("Hand-book of Arabia," vol. ii) have also thus been obtained.

(b.) The presence of a British officer who could speak Malay seemed much appreciated by the common people, many of whom have been in Batavia, Sourabaya, Tegal, and a few of whom have been in the Malay Peninsula. As no rain had fallen in some places for fourteen, and in others for seven, months, and as the entire cultivation of Wadi Doan, Wadi-el-Aisar, and the other southern wadis relies on an annual "sel" (or spate caused by upland rain rushing into the wadis), it was a matter of considerable good fortune to my journey that on arrival at Koweirah clouds began to collect, while rain overtook us at Hajarein, and on my arrival at Shibam the "sel" was in Wadis Doan, El Aisar, Amd, and Ain. On my return to Doan planting was nearly completed all along the valley.

(c.) While the Sultan in Makalla and his Wazir in Wadi Doan not only did not discourage the idea of a personal interview with the Kathiri Sultans, the leading persons in Shibam, especially the Governor, Sjech Abdulkadir, were clearly not only incensed at any attempt to give friendly advice to the Kathiris, but they also somewhat resented the presence of a European in their town. The reasons for this attitude are more fully set out in the accompanying report.

12. On my return to Makalla I visited Shiheir and Ghail Ba Wazir, the latter being the site of the famous "humum" tobacco cultivation, the sale of the monopoly for the purchase of which brings in an annual sum of 105,000 dollars to His Highness.

13. On the 26th February native dances were held before several hundreds of people in Makalla; while on the 28th athletic sports, including foot races, jumping, tug-of-war, sack race, &c., were held outside the western gate. Over 1,000 spectators were enthusiastic over the display.

14. I left Makalla in H.M.S. "Diana" on the 2nd March, and arrived in Aden on the 3rd March, 1919.

15. In a separate letter—which is of interest only to the authorities in Egypt and Aden—I have set out certain requests formulated by His Highness Sultan Ghalib. I have, &c.

W. H. LEE-WARNER.

Enclosure in No. 35.

Report by Captain Lee-Warner on his recent Visit to the Hadhramaut.

Preliminary Quotations from an Expert.

"Hadhramaut is practically a closed country. It is for us to initiate and develop its resources under our aegis."

"Do not leave the hinterland without the pale."

"The intellect of an Arab lies in his eyes."

Introduction.

THE visit to Makalla and the journey to Wadi Doan and Shibam were undertaken partly with the object of reporting to the Foreign Office the conditions of the Kaaiti and Kathiri country, with especial reference to the question of the Kathiri administration and emigration, upon which latter the whole wealth of the Kathiris depends and the continuance of which is jeopardised by the Dutch Colonial Government's avowed intention of preventing further immigration. As Java is the business home of thousands of Kathiris, many of whom have amassed large fortunes there; and as father hands down his business to son and grandson, the matter of continued and free emigration is vital to the Kathiri.

The policy of the Foreign Office as regards the natives of the Dutch East Indies was directed in 1918 to a systematic effort to attract the Arabs, the intellectual leaders in many ways of the teeming millions of Java's Muslims. These Arabs were at the time anti-British and pro-German.

Unfortunately, while a great measure of success attended the effort to win over this Arab opinion to the British side, an extreme section, mainly located in Sourabaya, under German pressure, mixed in the more seditious part of the great society called Sarikat Islam, and thus incurred the anger of the Dutch Colonial Government, which apparently desires to classify all the Arabs as undesirables.

It was in the hope of warning the Kathiris of this danger that I visited the Wadi Hadhramaut.

Even in Wadi Doan I was approached on more than one occasion by Arabs who desired to return to Java, but who had heard from their friends there that "permissie" was now being refused by the Dutch authorities.

Examples increased as Kathiri territory was approached, and I was glad to see that at the interview which I was able to have with the Kathiri Sultans a large concourse of Kathiris was present, and overheard the whole of the address which I gave to those Sultans.

The Sultans appeared struck by the danger, and promised to write to the leading Kathiris all over Java and warn them not to meddle with Dutch colonial politics.

I went to Hadhramaut with a strong inclination towards the Kathiris as the rightful owners of the soil, as a virile and independent people, if anything rather harshly treated.

I left the Hadhramaut a convinced and confirmed supporter of the Kaaitis, as the only hope for a future happy, contented country.

The Kathiri Sultans have carried on a reign of extortion and robbery; their leading Syeds and Sjechs are openly hostile to them; and it is not too much to state that the early salvation for Seyyun, Ghurfah, Ghoraf, Teris, and Terim lies in being freed from the presence of the Kathiri royal family.

In spite of the Shibam authorities, I was able to meet various persons who spoke Malay, and thus I was in a position to hear first-hand evidence of the exact meaning, of which those who knew Arab only were unaware.

Unless the Kathiri Government gives stronger proof of its ability to carry out the terms of its treaty with the Kaaiti, and unless it reforms its own methods, it will be impossible for His Majesty's consular officers in Java to champion the cause of Kathiri emigrants with any honesty. And lack of such help will mean restriction on emigration

and consequent alienation from the British of the Arabs in Java and Singapore, with a corresponding hatred of the British in Kathiri territory.

Hence my suggestions, as set out in the paragraph headed "The future," in connection with which the three short quotations which commence this report cannot be too closely borne in mind.

While in Shibam I was struck by the absence of friendliness to my visit, a point which I was naturally desirous of elucidating, all the more so as from the moment I entered this last fortress of Kaaiti influence a watertight door was closed, silently and firmly, if, luckily, not wholly effectually, against any information being gained by me.

I feel measurably confident that three reasons existed for this attitude:—

There is a strong—in fact, an entirely predominant—commercial element in Shibam, consisting mainly of Sjechs and of several Syeds, who compose the trading portion of the population.

It is an undeniable fact that the Turkish forces received considerable supplies from the regions east of Lahej.

It is indisputable that Makalla is the chief port, in fact, the only considerable port east of Aden.

Makalla has other sources of import than Aden, i.e., Bombay, Oman, &c.

It is, I believe, overwhelmingly evident that the supplies in question must have originally entered south-east Arabia either at Shihr or Makalla, both ports under Kaaiti rule.

I am convinced—

(a.) That supplies reached the Turks which entered south-east Arabia either at Shihr or Makalla.

(b.) That these supplies could not have travelled west along the coast route for (1) the use of such a route would indubitably have been reported to Aden; (2) His Highness Sultan Ghalib of Makalla would equally indubitably have heard of any efforts to use such a route, and would at once have cut short such methods, for (i) his alertness is considerable; (ii) the only western coast route from Shihr and Makalla runs through his western gate within 10 yards of his residence; and (iii) his entire loyalty to His Majesty's Government is a matter for which I can unhesitatingly and absolutely vouch.

(c.) That these supplies were carried northward ostensibly for the Shibam, and thence for the eastern Wadi Hadhramaut trade (Seyyun-Teris-Terim, &c.).

(d.) That once in Shibam they were despatched along Wadi Hadhramaut westward (probably through Yeshbum—pro-Turkish tribes exist along this route), until by a south-west route they came to Ali Said's forces.

Shibam is extremely prosperous. The description later in this report of the town proves this in greater detail. The merchants of Shibam were the only persons who could obtain (and forward) considerable supplies inland. Not one merchant was permitted to come and speak with me alone, and not one word of the information could I obtain directly from this source.

And the main opponents to my obtaining any information were Sjech Abdulkadir (Governor of Shibam) and a Malay-speaking Sjech, Abubaker-bin-Mohamed Attuwi, whose original fortune was and is being made at Singapore, and who, while professing delight at meeting me, dogged my every movement, and more than once managed to prevent a conversation which he saw I was about to commence.

An Arab trader, with marketable commodities of which he holds the monopoly, will not let slip a unique opportunity for unusually large profits. Nor if, as in this case, it is essential to hide his actions, will he hesitate to put every conceivable obstacle in an investigator's path.

2. Many of these merchants, from a second (an additional) point of view desired to conceal their present prosperity. I found that they wished to keep up the fiction that, by restricting free and unlimited export of commodities from Aden during the war the British Government had seriously injured their trade, and hence that "impositions," such as the war tax, which many of them were having to pay in Singapore, were doubly hard.

3. Shibam has always—with other towns of Wadi Hadhramaut proper—boasted that it has kept free from any contamination engendered by the presence of an

"unbeliever." This somewhat fanatic pride has been strengthened by the fact that Hirsch and the Bents (the former a fluent Arabic scholar, travelling in Arab guise, and posing more as a Moslem than a Christian) have been the only Europeans known ever to have entered Shibam, and that as long ago as 1893.

4. Finally, both the Governor and others considered any attempt at giving to the Kathiri Sultans good advice a waste of effort and a mistake. Their contempt for these Sultans and their dislike of any possible rapprochement were clear.

Many of the details in the accompanying report, as for example the names and localities of certain families, are inserted on purpose to furnish a basis of information for His Britannic Majesty's Consulate-General in Java, for whom in some ways this report is mainly intended.

The following points are dealt with:—

Section 1. Kaaiti personalities—Government—taxation, &c.

" 2. Kathiri personalities—Government—taxation, &c.

" 3. The future—

(a.) Aden, Makalla, Hadhramaut;

(b.) Action in Java.

" 4. Wadi Doan, importance, inhabitants, &c.

" 5. Kaaiti military resources and garrisons.

" 6. The Hamumis.

" 7. Route outline, Makalla to Wadi Doan (and on to Shibam).

" 8. Himyar remains and ruins in Wadi Doan.

" 9. Corrigenda and addenda for "Handbook of Arabia."

A. Sketch map of Hadhramaut (main towns and wadis).

B. Tribal sketch map of Hadhramaut.

C. Sketch map of Wadi Doan (to Shibam).

Section 1.—KAAITI PERSONALITIES—GOVERNMENT—TAXATION, &c.

Sultan Sir Ghalib-bin-Awadh-bin-Omar-al-Kaaiti, K.C.I.E., Sultan of Makalla and Shihr. He has a son, Sultan Saleh-bin-Ghalib, who in turn has an infant son.

Both the Sultan and his son are warmly Anglophile: they are closely connected with Hyderabad, where, indeed, Sultan Saleh lives. Sultan Saleh speaks English, and Sultan Ghalib has a small knowledge of this language.

There were three brothers, Sultans Omar, Hussein, and Manassar-al-Kaaiti. With these Sultan Ghalib quarrelled. Previously Sultan Manassar (now deceased) ruled Ghail and Sultan Hussein Shihr, until the present ruler expelled them from the country. With his remaining brother, Sultan Omar-bin-Awadh, Sultan Ghalib appears now to be on good terms. Sultan Omar, who lives ordinarily in Hyderabad, visits Makalla for comparatively long periods every four or five years, and it is he who is engaged in building the huge mosque just inside the east gate of Makalla town.

There are some thirty-five members of the Kaaiti family in Hyderabad, but the succession to the Makalla and Shihr Sultanate is vested in and confined to the direct blood of Sultan Ghalib. Contrary to some reports, Sultan Ghalib is by no means an unenergetic ruler. He is far-sighted, and fully alive to the possibilities of agricultural development. But he sees that the first need is the final settlement of the Kathiri misgovernment. He is very popular with all his subjects.

Wazir.—Syed Hussein-bin-Hamid-bin-Ahmad-al-Mihdar. For the past fifteen years Wazir. The virtual ruler of the country, although recently the troubles with the Kathiris and Hamumis have called for his presence, over considerable intervals of time, in Wadi Doan and Shihr. A diplomat of much dexterity, who has, mainly by judicious largesses and private wire-pulling, seduced from the Kathiri allegiance many of the smaller tribes. More important successes have been the gaining over of the Nahdis, the powerful and numerous Manahil, and the importantly situated Tumimi interests. The tribal sketch map—(B) attached—shows the extent of his diplomatic energies.

As a result of the "treaty" of 1918 between Sultan Ghalib and the Kathiri Sultans, the latter are presumably debarred from extending help to the Hamumis, whose crushing disaster is described elsewhere in this report.

The "treaty," however, is otherwise of no practical political use. It possesses no sufficient guarantees, and from a perusal of the attached subheadings, "Kathiri

Personalities, &c.," and "The Future," it will be seen that what is needed is a much clearer and fuller agreement, whereby, *inter alia*, the Kathiri Sultans must be forced to ameliorate their internal Government. Otherwise Kathiri outbreaks cannot be guarded against, and the main object of the treaty policy, viz., a settled Hadhramaut, wherein the magnificent agricultural possibilities of the entire main "Wadi Hadhramaut" can be adequately and uniformly utilised to the advantage of both peoples, remains unguaranteed *in toto*. I venture to invite a reasoned consideration of this statement.

Governor of Shibam.—Sjech Abdulkadir-bin-Sjech Ali. A Yafa by descent, he made his fortune in the Straits and Java, realised it in species, invested the major part in house property in Singapore, and retired with the remainder to Shibam some fifteen years ago. He became Governor of the town, under the title of Moqaddam, about eight years ago.

A strong man and a bitter enemy to the Kathiris, whom he would desire to see deposed. An Arab of the old school, who—although he owes his fortune to the English, in whose hands he has left his money matters—at heart despises them as inferior to Arabs. He openly detests the presence of Europeans in his governance of Shibam. A dependable, if harsh, ruler in his own sphere. Not ready to show obedience even to the Wazir, and good-humouredly somewhat contemptuous of a Sultan whose habits are so Anglicized. Probably quite unscrupulous as to how he makes money, provided that money is made.

Governor of Haurah, Qatan (and Shibam).—Sultan Ali-bin-Salah, a nephew of Sultan Ghalib, lives in Qatan, with nominal powers of direction over Shibam. His father, Sultan Salah, brother of Sultan Awadh, had previously held this post of "Viceroy." Sultan Ali is a young man of 20 years of age, extremely prepossessing, intelligent (although he has never travelled overseas), quiet, and respected. His power is, however, nil. He is entirely under the dominance of the Wazir, and, more immediately, of the real Governor of Kaaiti Wadi Hadhramaut, Sjech Abdulkadir of Shibam.

The "Governors" of Makalla (Syed Abdulrahman-bin-Hamid, brother of the Wazir) and of Shihr (Naser Ahmad) are figureheads, the one a Syed and the other of the soldier (Askar) class, totally subordinate to Wazir Syed Hussein.

Finally, mention should be made of Omar-ba-Ahmed (Bassorah), paramount chief of the great Seiban tribe, and adjudicator in all Amudi disputes; a Bedouin, whose chief village is Owrah. Details about this man will be found in the sub-heading "Wadi Doan," but he is here mentioned because he is the greatest Bedouin chief in Kaaiti territory, and because his influence, which is great, is entirely on the Kaaiti and British side.

It is unnecessary to detail the various merchant leaders of Mekalla, they are known to the Aden authorities.

Mention, however, must be made to the leading traders in Shibam—

Sjech Abdulkadir-bin-Sjech Ali (Governor), connected with Singapore;
Sjech Hussin-bin-Salim, connection with Singapore;
Syed Mohamed-bin-Abdullah-bin-Jafar-al-Habshi, connected with Singapore;
Salim-bin-Omar-ba-Deep, connected with Makalla and Aden;
Awadh-bin-Abdullah-ba-Deep, connected with Makalla and Aden;
Mahomed-bin-Hussin-bin-Mohamed-bin-Gabr, connected with Java;
Awadh-bin-Abdulrahman-ba-Swaidan, connected with Singapore;
Abdullah-bin-Bakar Ma Asgir, connected with Singapore;
Ali-bin-Mohamed At Tuai, connected with Singapore;
Mohamed-bin-Awadh-ba-Deep, connected with Java; and
Omar-bin-Mohamed-ba-Yusuf, connected with Java.

And of the great Syed families of—

Al Mihdar from Wadi Doan (Koweirah);
Al Attas, mainly from Doan (Meshed); also Sedebah (near Haurah);
Al Idroes partly from neighbourhood of Shibam (Hazm and Haurah).

Revenue.

The Sultan (1919) obtains revenue amounting to 340,000 Maria Theresa dollars, arrived at as follows:—

- (a.) Import and export duties at Makalla are farmed by public auction. Abdullahbhooy and Joomabbhooy Laljee held these duties as their monopoly.

They pay to the Sultan a sum of 160,000 dollars. In return, they may charge 8 per cent. *ad valorem* export and import duty on all articles, foods, &c., leaving or entering Makalla. The sole exceptions are dates and twine, which pay 5 per cent. only.

- (b.) Similar duties for Shiheir and Shihr are farmed by Sjech Abdulkadir Basharaheel (combined at Shiheir (Ghail) with Abu Sabar).

- (c.) For general articles, as above, they pay a sum of 75,000 dollars, while in return for the sole right to be purchasers and exporters of the Chail-ba-Wazir tobacco crop they pay a sum of 105,000 dollars.

Import and export from other points are forbidden; and it seems that the method of farming is on the whole satisfactory, as it is stated that no trouble occurs over the collection of the 8 per cent. and 5 per cent. duties.

The townspeople incur no other taxation beyond the payment of the above duties.

Landowners pay no land tax to the Government. A tax of $\frac{1}{2}$ dollar per date tree to Government is paid.

(Inland, e.g., in Wadi Doan, the rate would seem to be $\frac{1}{4}$ dollar only, paid to the tribal chief.)

Note 1.—Kathiri merchants buying for Terim, Seyyun, Ghurfah, Teris, &c., from and through Shibam, pay to Sjech Abdulkadir, the Kaaiti Governor, "Ashur," 1 rupee per camel load.

Note 2.—Comparison with the Kathiri "taxation," as set out in the next subheading, "Kathiri personalities, &c.," will show in what fortunate circumstances the Kaaiti subject finds himself.

Note 3.—The Sultan frequently has to supplement this revenue by payments made from his private fortune; for this purpose he draws money from Hyderabad.

The general line of administration is exceeding benevolent. Taxation is limited to payment of import and export duties. In the towns (e.g., Makalla) a competent civil and criminal jurisdiction exists. Thus in Makalla the Mufti (Sjech Abdulrahman-ba-Sjech) with his Kazi (Sjech Abdullah-bin-Ahmad Arrawi) deals with civil, religious, and most of the criminal cases. The police under their "Shawoosh," an Indian named Naser, look adequately after internal order.

Supplies.

Fish and vegetable markets are held in the open space by the landing stage of Makalla and along the central street.

Water is plentiful, being supplied by iron pipes from an inland spring, and is sold exceedingly cheap, while the price of fish (of which the supply is inexhaustible), and fowls, and mutton is ridiculously small.

Reference may here be made to Sultan Ghalib's activity in the spheres of agriculture and road-making.

The Sultan is well aware of the excellent facilities existing in various localities such as Wadi Hadhramaut, Maifa, Fouwwah, &c., for extensive and extended cultivation, and on some of these points a special communication has been addressed to the resident at Aden.

At Ghail-ba-Wazir and in the line of villages El Gara, Wadi-ba-Baker, El Habyar, and Sedah running east-south-east, thence towards Shihr, is cultivated the famous "Hamumi" tobacco, the necessary water coming from five deep grottos whence exceedingly well-traced but very deeply cut water-channels lead the supply to the fields. Since the "farmers" pay 105,000 dollars annually for the purchase monopoly, some idea of the fertility of this spot may be gauged. There seems no reason why similarly prosperous "colonies" should not be established at other places.

In Wadi Hadhramaut exists an immense area of potential cultivation ground, hitherto but meagrely exploited. Wadi Hadhramaut (upper reaches), Wadi Hinan, Wadi Sirr, Wadi Amd, Wadi Ain, Wadi-el-Aisar, and Wadi Doan (to mention the main wadis) all experience on an average at least one annual "sel" or spate. The waters left over from these "sels" merge underground as they reach Wadi Hadhramaut, and there can be but little doubt that with properly dug wells worked by proper water-raising engines a complete water supply to enable practically the whole Wadi to be cultivated would be practicable.

The essentials are—

- (a.) A guaranteed treaty with the Kathiri, or a final solution of the Kathiri question, whereby not only lasting peace is assured for the Wadi, but also participation by the Kathiri Government in a Kaaiti scheme for such irrigation, and for the road communications which Sultan Ghalib has in mind.
- (b.) The seconding of a capable European engineer and of an agricultural expert to examine and report on the whole position. Were his report favourable it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this potential granary and date supply.

In road-making His Highness has already completed the following:—

- (a.) A well-traced carriage road from Makalla to Harshiyat, 8 miles.
- (b.) A well-traced road (with culverts where necessary) west from Makalla, past Ras Makalla, and thence, and skirting sea, for 10 miles; thence on the firm beach transport is easy for another 10 miles to Shiheir, whence a practicable road runs 9 miles north to Ghail Ba Wazir, the tobacco centre.

His Highness contemplates in due course a road from Mount Howairah to Shibam.

In conclusion, it may again be noted (from the attached tribal sketch map (B)) how far Kaaiti diplomacy has travelled along the path towards establishing Kaaiti influence throughout Hadhramaut. In all interests it is to be earnestly hoped that Kaaiti influence will shortly embrace the whole of Wadi Hadhramaut.

Section 2.—KATHIRI PERSONALITIES—GOVERNMENT—TAXATION, &c.

Sultans.—Sultan Mansur-bin-Ghalib-bin-Muhsin-bin-Ahmed-al-Kathiri; Sultan Mohsin-bin-Ghalib-bin-Muhsin-bin-Ahmad-al-Kathiri.
Eldest Sons.—Ali-bin-Mansur,* Abdullah-bin-Mohsin.
Minister.—Salim-bin-Aboud-bin-Salim-al-Kathiri.

Salim-bin-Aboud governs Terim. Terim is the property of Sultan Mansur; Seyyun that of Sultan Mohsin. But for many years both Sultans have lived in Seyyun, Mohsin visiting Terim at intervals.

Of the two Sultans Sultan Mansur, who suffers from a disease of the eyes, lacks initiative, and it is his brother Sultan Mohsin who is the vigorous intellect. Salim-bin-Aboud is Mohsin's evil genius. Sultan Mansur is afraid of his brother, whose harsh face and somewhat sinister appearance denote a virile but savage personality. Sultan Mohsin left Terim some twenty years ago in preference for Seyyun, owing to friction with the Syeds. In him Kaaiti have their most open and, most probably, their only capable opponent.

Salim-bin-Aboud, whose official position among the Kathiri corresponds with that held by Syed Hussein, the Sultan of Makalla's Wazir among the Kaaitis, is an unscrupulous and harsh ruler.

There appears to be but one system among the Kathiri rulers, and that is extortion from all the Syeds, with a few notable exceptions.

At Seyyun, it is stated, there are some thirty persons of whom the chief are Syed Abdulrahman-bin-Abdullah-bin-Mohsin Alsogoff, sometimes called Obeidullah (he was Ali Said Pasha's envoy to the Kathiris during the war), Syed Mohamed-bin-Hadi, and Syed Muhsin-bin-Abdullah Alsogoff, who with their families are exempt from taxation of any sort.

The above excepted, every well-to-do Syed and Sjech (i.e., the vast majority of the householders of Seyyun, Terim, Ghurfa, and Inat, whose ancestors for over two centuries had, like themselves, regularly emigrated, mainly to Java, and there traded and made money) is liable to domiciliary visits and exactions. Continued oppression of this type, mainly on the part of Sultan Mohsin and Salim-bin-Aboud, has led to a deep feeling of hatred for the two Sultans and their régime. It is stated that whenever a Syed or Sjech returns from Java he is expected to make a

* Sultan Mansur's children give evidence of promise. This is not the case with those of his brother.

handsome payment to the "Government." In the case of rich men this may run to a thousand dollars or more. Nor is this all: his house is liable to search, and any jewellery or valuable commodity may be taken away. Syed Mahomed Aidid-bin-Ahmat Aidid, for example, has paid over 10,000 dollars in the last twenty years, and the rich house of Alkaff much more. Should a rich man be about to marry, the occasion is taken for further extortion, and if the plain hint is ignored a domiciliary visit from Salim's "Abid" (or slave-soldiers) results.

On the other hand the Sultans (possibly from policy, probably also from inability) make no calls on the Bedouins of the Hadhramaut. So long as these latter observe peace when in the main wadi they are free to follow their inclinations.

Thus against the solid bulk of the industries and well-to-do Kathiri population (the townspeople of the four main towns above mentioned) are ranged the Sultans with their slave soldiers (who may perhaps number a thousand) and the unstable Bedouins, who receive doles when they come down to visit their nominal rulers.

The whole of the educated classes, with a few exceptions, is reported to be disgusted with the principles of the present Kathiri régime, and while it may be too strong a presumption to state that Kaaiti rule would be welcomed by the vast majority, it is correct to state that a change of régime would be welcomed by all, while, were that change to take the form of Kaaiti rule, it would be welcomed by many and tolerated by practically all.

The leading Kathiri opponents to the Kaaiti and to British influence are—

In Seyyun neighbourhood, the Abdat family (connected with Singapore), Salim-bin-Khalek, Omar-bin-Awadh-bin-Shamlam, Abdul Karim-bin-Karmus.

In Terim and neighbourhood, Syed Hussein-bin-Abdulla-al-Idroes, Omar-bin-Awadh Shatri, Syed Abdullah-bin-Awadh Shatri, the Al Djofri family (connected with Singapore, Java).

Among the leading Kathiris who are pro-British, and who are strongly discontented with the present Government of the Kathiris, are the following Terim inhabitants:—

The Alkaffs: Syed Abdulrahman-bin-Sjech Alkaff (connections in Singapore and Batavia), Syed Abdulrahman-bin-Abdullah Alkaff (relatives of late Syed Sjech Alkaff of Singapore).

The Al Junids: Syed Abdulrahman-bin-Ali-al-Junid (Singapore connections), Syed Alwi-bin-Sagaff-al-Junid.

The Bil Fagis: Syed Sjech-bin-Mohamed-bil-Fagi, Syed Abdulrahman-bil-Fagi (Singapore property), Sjech Mohamed-bin-Fadl-ba-Fadhil (property in Batavia), and Syed Omar-bin-Ahmed Ash Shatri (Singapore property).

And since it is of possible value, and certainly of practical utility, to know whence, geographically, the main families come, we may note further the Kathiri—

1. Ahl. Abdat. Leaders, Saleh Obeid and Omar-bin-Obeid Khalid-bin-Omar-al-Abdat; live at Bab Aker and Gol, near Sayyun, and are strongly anti-British; connected with Singapore.
2. Ahl. Ahmar. Leader, Abdullah-bin-Lahman-bin-Abdulaziz; come from Al Qara, near Shibam; with Java connections.
3. Ahl. el-Houtah. Leader, Syed Omar-bin-Abdullah-bin-Zain; connected with Java.
4. Ahl. Fakhayad. Leader, Mohamed Amar-bin-Senad; come from Dakkah, with Java connections.
5. Ahl. bin-Talib. Leader, Obeid Saleh; come from Karue, near Seyyun.
6. Ahl. Mari-bin-Talib. Leaders, Salim-bin-Jaffar-bin-Salim-bin-Talib; lives at Akdah; connected with Sourabaya. Talib-bin-Jaffar, Abdullah Mari, and Talib Mari live at Gifl; Salim-bin-Mohamed-bin-Yamani (anti-British) and Abdullah-bin-Mohamed-bin-Yamani live at Tabakul; all are connected prominently with Singapore and Java.
7. Ahl. Own. Leader, Syed Mohamed; come from Minabari, and are connected with Java.
8. Ahl. Sayyid. Leaders, Ali-bin-Jafar and Ali-bin-Mohamed; come from Madwarah and have Java connections.
9. Ahl. Tamimi. Leader, Ali-bin-Ahmad-bin-Jamami Attamini; live at Kasam, between Terim and Inat, and have connections at Batavia and Bogor.

While Seyyun members of the Alkaff family are Syed Abdullah-bin-Hussin Alkaff, Syed Mohamed-bin-Abdullah, and Syed Ali-bin-Saleh-al-Hamid-bin-Sjech Abubaker Alkaff, all connected prominently with Singapore, Sourabaya, and Batavia; and many of the Al Idroes family, strongly pro-British, came from Hazm, a Syed village just beyond Shibam; one of their leaders is Syed Abubaker-bin-Idroes-al-Idroes, formerly of Batu Tulis, near Batavia.

Finally, to revert for a moment to Kathiri taxation, we may note that—

1. The Sultans look on the rich emigrants, Syeds and Sjechs, as their special prey, and levy extortionate demands from these classes whenever they desire ready money.
2. The ordinary middle-class householder has to pay annually an average tax of 16 Maria Theresa dollars, women often being taxed at 10 dollars. This tax is called *Daf'a*.
3. Fieldowners must pay a proportion of their crop as a tax in kind (dhurra, barley, jowari, indigo, tobacco), called locally *Mijba*.
4. Each Terim and Seyyun tree-owner (date) pays annually 1 dollar per tree.

These payments all go to the Minister, Salim-bin-Aboud.

Articles entering Kathiri territory from Shibam are also taxed at 1½ dollars the camel-load.

The usual rate of money loaned is 20 per cent. per annum, and there is a shortage of money due to the detention of remittances by the Singapore and Aden authorities.

Section 3.—THE FUTURE.

One of the objects of the writer's visit to the Hadhramaut was to convey to the Kathiri Sultans and their advisers an intimation that the Dutch Government, as represented in the Netherlands East Indies by its Governor-General, Graf van Limberg Stirum, was so incensed at the foolish action of certain Arabs, all emigrants from the Hadhramaut and mainly centred in the Al Djofri group at Sourabaya, in mixing with the German agitators under Helfferich and Diehn, and in ranging themselves alongside the more seditious part of Sarikat Islam, called the Tentara Kaudjang Nabi Mohammad, that it had expressed the resolve to forbid further immigration from the Hadhramaut.* As the entire wealth, for all practical purposes, of Wadi Hadhramaut comes from its emigrant traders, and as 95 per cent. of these are emigrants to Java, Sumatra, and Madoera, the carrying out of the Dutch Colonial Government's threat would mean, *inter alia*:—

1. Financial ruin to Seyyun and Terim;
2. The locking up in Kathiri country of all the younger men who would, in the ordinary course, have taken up their parents' business in Java;
3. Consequent poverty and discontent;
4. Local outbreaks and attacks in Wadi Hadhramaut against the prosperous Kaaitis, the allies of the British;
5. Deep resentment, however unjust, in Java among the remaining Arabs against His Britannic Majesty's Government;
6. Resentment, moreover, at a most inauspicious time, following as it would on the special efforts made in 1918 to enlist these Arabs on our side; and
7. Finally, a complete defeat to our special aim for so enlisting Arab Java sentiment—the sentiment, *i.e.*, of the recognised leading spirits of Islam in an island whose population covers some 40,000,000 Mahomedans—as to enable us later to use it as a leading motif in our favour with the Islamic population as against the contrary breeze which the Japanese are endeavouring to direct over Asia.

In the second place the main object of the visit was to report on the general situation of Kaaiti and Kathiri.

Since British visits into the hinterland of Hadhramaut are as unlikely as they are at present unwelcome, from an exceedingly conservative, a somewhat fanatic, and an

* For authority on this point, *vide* reports from W. H. Lee-Warner to S. Gaselee, C.B.E., Foreign Office; and the account of a conversation on the Arabs between the Dutch Governor-General and Judge Cator of Alexandria (reported by the latter to the High Commissioner in Egypt).

essentially suspicious hierarchy, it is incumbent on the present writer, after reporting upon what he has seen and heard, not to flinch from an endeavour to suggest a possible policy for the future as regards British dealings between Aden, Makalla, and the Hadhramaut. It is also his obvious duty to suggest a line of action for His Britannic Majesty's consulate-general in Batavia. These two points will now be dealt with in the order set out above.

I.—Possible Policy between Aden, Makalla, and Hadhramaut.

"Arabia," used as a generic term for the whole peninsula, has loomed during the war, and must loom after the war, to a far greater degree upon the British horizon than was the case before 1914. Now, for present purposes, we can divide this "Arabia" into seven spheres: the Hail sphere, with Ibn Rashid; the Wahasi sphere, with Ibn Saoud; the Mecca sphere, with Sherif Husein; the Idrisi sphere, along the Tehama; the Yaman sphere, round Sanaa, with Imam Yahya; the Hadhramaut sphere; and the Muscat, Oman, and Bahrein sphere.

The last named presents few difficulties; the first five many. To these five in common, or at any rate to the third, fourth, and fifth, may be applied the gist of an expert's remarks: "To aim at an intensive influence over the tracts already defined should be our object after the Turks go." "We should keep others out by recognised admission of our predominant interests." "Things will right themselves without our interference." "Do not take the place of the Turks, who are loathed, and thus ourselves become loathed." "Enlarged boundary lines imply additional largesse and stipends." "Arabia is a democracy; we have too long administered it on Indian lines, and the chiefs have been placed on the status of Indian princes." "The genius of the Arabs is against confederacies."

Again, His Majesty's representative at Aden addressed Imam Yahya, of Sanaa, to the following effect, when emphasising that the British had no desire to take sides in the case of Arab disputes: "Our aims are entirely based on the desire to see an independent Arabia governed by Arabs."

Do such remarks, does such an enunciation, apply to the remaining sphere, the Hadhramaut?

The writer maintains that it does not apply, and that it should not apply.

For these reasons:—

- (a.) The entire Hadhramaut, Kaaiti and Kathiri alike, depends for its whole material (and therefore to an Arab no less than to every other practical intelligence for its whole essential) existence, and for the sinews of that existence, on money made abroad by its emigrant sons. (Mecca is the reverse, she depends on the profits gained locally by the annual pilgrim influx.)
- (b.) The Kaaitis are already our Allies; we have subsidised them. And, as a matter of fact, Kaaiti emigrants usually go to British possessions for trade—Aden, India, Egypt, the British Straits Settlements (comparatively few go to Djibouti, Massowah, Java). We cannot desert them.
- (c.) The Kaaiti Government, as I have endeavoured to show, is not despotic or unjust; the flourishing condition of Makalla, Wadi Doan, Haurah, Qatan, and Shibam is shared in by Bedouins, as well as by Syeds and Sjechs.
- (d.) The expenses of the Kaaiti Government need often to be met from the private fortune (located in India) of Sultan Ghalib, our protégé; and he avowedly adopts our model, and states openly that the British Government is the Government whose friendship he alone cares for, and whose orders he will at all times gladly carry out.
- (e.) Makalla is a flourishing, happy town, roads are being made inland and along the shore; Wadi Doan is prosperous; cultivation in Wadi Hadhramaut (Haurah, Qatan, Shibam) is yearly being extended; peace is assured inside Kaaiti territory.
- (f.) The one danger is from the Kathiris and the Hamumis (see sketch map (B)). The latter are Bedouins pure and simple, whose motto is robbery. Without the Kathiris they would be powerless. Recently (however savage was the method employed) they have lost their leaders. [But it must be remembered that these leaders were continually robbing peaceable travellers to and from Shihr.]

The former are ill-governed and ready for a change. Were they to come under direct Kaaiti rule the following results would occur:—

- (a.) The wild tribes north of Wadi Hadhramaut (which have no cohesive power) would remain as at present in their mountains between "the Empty Quarter" and the cliffs of Wadi Hadhramaut; but all chance of irruption on their part could easily be prevented were one Government prominent throughout Wadi Hadhramaut.
- (b.) A road would shortly be run from Makalla through the Howairah route right up to and then down Wadi Hadhramaut to Terim.
- (c.) Equal duties and taxation for Kaaitis and Kathiris would be assured: there is no possible adequate guarantee for such under present conditions.
- (d.) His Majesty's Government could at once espouse the cause of any would-be emigrants with much greater power than is at present possible. For not only could it, if necessary, emphasise to the would-be emigrant the need for proper behaviour in *e.g.*, the Dutch East Indies, but it could also, as active and not merely nominal protector or suzerain of the Kathiris, emphasise to the Dutch Colonial Government its desire that Kathiri emigrants be treated justly.
- (e.) Wadi Hadhramaut, under a single Government, could be irrigated, provided with road communication, and "unified" in such a manner that a vast increase in cultivation and in resultant universal prosperity for the country would occur.

These arguments tend to show that the Hadhramaut position, as an "Arabian" sphere, differs from all other such spheres; and therefore that the policy to be applied to them does not and should not apply to the Hadhramaut—save in so far that once the whole track was under one Government we could and should adopt the motto "Our aims are entirely based on the desire to see an Arabian province governed by its own people."

At present we are committed to the following: the Kaaiti is our ally; we have subsidised him; he always obeys our advice; we cannot desert him.

If we bolster up the Kathiri, and address the Dutch Government on behalf of their emigrants, we must be consistent and take off the embargo on their home-money remittances.

If we do this they may very likely attack the Kaaiti. Even if they do not attack, they will still be a thorn to impede progress.

If they attack we must always support the Kaaiti; such support means expenditure on each and every occasion.

Sultan Ghalib's policy has been based on British lines. He is annually extending communications and cultivation. His successor will in all probability be, if possible, more Anglophile than he is himself.

This policy is already rewarded by the prosperity of his subjects.

To clinch that policy we must either insure the permanent actual co-operation of the Kathiris as a free power; or else we must see that the Kaaiti is placed, or is permitted to place himself, in a position of actual supremacy, whereby under one rule the whole Hadhramaut may enjoy the same benefits.

I maintain that the present position is unsound. By artificial means (embargo on money remittances) we are checking the Kathiris, *i.e.*, many of the remitters being persons wholly well-disposed towards us and towards the Kaaiti (even were he to be presented as their new ruler); and at the same time, recognising the need for establishing a friendly relation with Java Arabs (practically all of whom are Kathiris), we are, in effect, saying to them, "Our desire is to help you; in what manner can this be done?" The present position, further, has gone far to alienate or, at any rate, to jeopardise the warmth of the loyal feelings of the Arab community in Singapore towards the British Government.

The two lines of action above are mutually antagonistic, and our present position might turn, once peace is declared, into a position approximating hypocrisy.

The position of the Hadhramaut and its people is in many ways unique. Did they not depend on emigrants' remittances for their whole material existence they could be dealt with or left alone as any other "Arabian" sphere. But being what they are, and with their Javanese and Straits Settlements associations, it is essential to have the emigrants as well as those who remain at home on our side.

Most of the emigrants are on our side now, but they expect some prompt assistance in the matter of the money remittances.

Once the embargo is raised it must not be left in the power of the Kathiri Sultans and Salim-bin-Aboud to levy their usual toll, thereby (a) providing sinews of possible trouble outside, and (b) continuing to excite trouble among their own subjects inside.

Upon the above grounds I venture therefore to urge either that the Kathiri be informed that a much more definite and much more public treaty must be made at once with the Kaaiti, whereby proper assurances can be received that proper government and proper methods of taxation shall at once be instituted in the Kathiri country; that mutual suggestions and contributions for better road, travelling, and irrigation communications shall be entertained and given, and that no further help, actual and secret, shall be given in future to rehabilitate the fortunes of the Hamumis. (See map (B).) This would finally scotch the only remaining robber tribe then left between Terim and Seihout on one side and Haurah and Makalla on the other; or that, failing the above, the Kathiris be informed that His Majesty's Government has no objection to the Kaaiti attacking them if he so desires, and assuming the direct government of all Wadi Hadhramaut.

II.—Action in Java and the Netherlands East Indies.

Once it has been decided what course to pursue as regards the Kaaiti and Kathiri, action in Java can be consistently instituted.

The necessary organisation for keeping in touch with the Arabs has already been formed (*vide* my despatches to Mr. S. Gaselee), save that the three gentlemen already working with their Arab links to that end will need an official link with His Britannic Majesty's Consulate-General.

In Mr. F. Robertson, Acting Vice-Consul in Batavia, that link can be supplied. This officer speaks Dutch and Malay, and is already cognizant, to a certain extent, of affairs and conditions in the Hadhramaut.

Once a satisfactory decision has been locally arrived at between Kaaiti and Kathiri, prompt help to the Kathiris in Netherlands East Indies can be given for—

- (1.) Their easier entry into and exit from these Indies can be championed by His Majesty's Government;
- (2.) A post office can be established at Makalla with money-order branch (an impossibility at present with the natural distrust of the hinterland dweller at the thought of his money passing through Kaaiti hands); and
- (3.) An excellent prospect could be held out for an Arab-English school in Makalla, where intending emigrants could learn a language of great importance to would-be merchants in Singapore, Java, and the East generally.

And we could establish on mutual firm foundations of helping interests our main object, which is to lead the intellectual side of Islam in Java to a strong pro-British basis. Once the Arabs are won the Javanese will follow.

Section 4.—WADI DOAN—STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL IMPORTANCE—INHABITANTS—ADMINISTRATION, &c.

(See Sketch Map (C) facing p. 81.)

Owing to the conflicts between Kaaiti and Kathiri, and to the hostility of the Hamumis against the Kaaiti, it became necessary for the latter to secure a safe transit route between their sea-base Makalla and their forts of Hajarein, Haurah, Qatan, and, chief of all, Shibam.

Fortunately the Seibans had remained their allies since the period (some twenty years ago) when the Hamumis attacked the Kaaitis and Seibans. At that time Omar-ba-Ahmed (called "Bassorah"), the Seiban chief, was besieged in Rashid, whither Sultan Ghalib, from Makalla (his father being then in Hyderabad), sent a force of 400 men (Somali slaves and Yafas) under Ahmat Abdul Abib and Mohamed Abdul Abib to aid. The Dein tribe opposed this force. At Agroon, some 2 miles south-east of Wadi Doan, the Deins were defeated with a loss of sixty men, and the Kaaiti force advanced and relieved Bassorah in Rashid.

Some seven years later the Amudis, with a force of about 1,100 men, advanced and occupied Qurrein and Owrah. The Kaaiti collected men from Khoreibah and Rashid, and these, reinforced from Makalla, broke the power of the Amudis once for all. The latter fled to the mountains and treated for peace. They were permitted to return to Sif and Bithah, and though wretchedly poor their numbers are now increasing (400-500), and they are in possession of a considerable area of fertile land in Wadi Doan and Wadi-el-Aisar. Their head chief (a Mançib named Sjech Salih-bin-Abdullah) died in February 1919, and has been succeeded by his son (Abdullah-bin-Salih). The whole tribe is peaceable, centres mainly in Bithah, and acknowledges the family of Motahhar as its leader. But for practical and political purposes the Amudis are under the actual control of the head of the Seibans, Omar-bin-Ahmed (Bassorah), to whom reference has been made above. He lives at Owrah.

Between Meshed and Qatan roamed the Nahdis, an unfriendly tribe of robbers, when Theodore Bent travelled through in 1893. This tribe under Mubarrak-bin-Mohamed ("Ibn Minif") has been reduced by the Kaaiti mainly through largesses paid in the past, and later by effective military occupation of Hourah and the valley to Qatan. They are now perforce allies of the Kaaiti, and remain, as before, bitter foes to the northern raiding nomads.

The past two decades had thus resulted in the three great tribes which dwelt between Makalla and Wadi Doan and Wadi Hadhramaut—the Seibans, the Amudis, and the Nahdis—joining the Kaaiti as overlord.

Thus when the recent Kathiri attack was made in the vicinity of Shibam, a safe route connected Makalla with Haurah, Qatan, and Shibam, clear of the Hamumis.

Wadi Doan had also increased in importance (politically) from the fact that it shelters the great Syed families of Al Mihdar and Al Attas. The latter dwelt at Meshed, the former at Howeirah.

Originally the Mihdars came from Inat (where a branch of the family still remains), emigrated to Habban, in the Aulaki country, and some seventy years ago Syed Ahmed-al-Mihdar came and settled in Wadi Doan, where he and his family became the Syeds of the Kaaiti clan, then newly entering from the Yafa country and beginning a career which has now made its representative Sultan of Makalla.

The Kaaitis have never employed a real Wazir until the present Syed Hussein-bin-Hamid-bin-Ahmad-al-Mihdar-bin-Sjech Abubakar (Sjech of all Hadhramaut Syeds) was so appointed.

His family (his grandfather was the Syed Ahmad noted above) has now increased, and owns Kaweirah; his uncle, Syed Mustafa-al-Mihdar, is Mançib of the valley of Doan (South); and his position as Wazir has caused the vicinity of Koweirah, where he has recently stationed himself for the Kathiri negotiations, to assume importance.

As regards Meshed, this was formerly a robber hold, tapping the mouths of Wadis El Aisar, Amd, and Hadhramaut. About 175 years ago Syed Ali-bin-Hasan-al-Attas determined to reform the place and established himself there. His descendants have increased, and Meshed is now an Al Attas village, free from crime. It is of importance because the Al Attas emigrants are great powers in Java, and their inclinations are warmly pro-British. Syed Ahmad-bin-Muhammad-bin-Hadoon-al-Attas is Mançib of Meshed, and a man of enormous influence among the Amudi and Nahdi Bedouins. He is warmly pro-British, a man of great charm, intelligence, and power.

Wadi Doan, then, is both politically and strategically the ultimate key of the Hadhramaut. At the south end lives the family of the Wazir of the Sultan, and close by, in Owrah, lives Omar-ba-Ahmed (Bassorah), fighting head of the Seiban and Amudi Bedouins.

Sketch map (C) shows their clustered villages. Midway north, at Hajarain, lies a strong town on the hill, garrisoned by a Yafa detachment.

North again lies Meshed, centre of the Al Attas Syeds, whose Mançib wields paramount power among the Amudis and Nahdis.

Finally, the garrisoned town and fort of Haurah hold the valley where it joins Wadi Hadhramaut proper, and thence an easy plain runs to the towns of Qatan and Shibam. A mile east of Shibam Kathiri territory is entered.

Section 5.—KAAITI MILITARY RESOURCES AND GARRISONS.

Sultan Ghalib maintains some 400 men, Abids (or Somali slaves), and nearly 1,000 Yafa fighting men.

He thus has a slave and paid fighting force at permanent call of some 1,400 men.

He garrisons—

Makalla with 100 Somalis and 150 Yafas, also with four guns.

Shihr with 80 Somalis and 150 Yafas.

Ghail-ba-Wazir and its vicinity with a mixed force of 250 men.

Shibam with 80 Somalis and 150 Yafas.

Qatan and neighbourhood with a mixed force of some 300 men.

While at Harshiyat, Koweirah, Hajarain, Haurah, and other small places petty detachments are stationed.

Note 1.—The Kathiris are reported to have between 750 and 1,000 slave soldiers, but no regular tribesmen soldiers such as the Kaaitis' Yafa men.

Note 2.—At Shibam are a few antiquated guns, also two modern guns.

Note 3.—The policy of garrisoning Wadi Hadhramaut from Haurah to Shibam via Qatan is to establish the Somali slaves mainly in the towns themselves, while the Yafa mercenaries inhabit various strategic posts at the entrances of the various wadis (Wadi Hinan, Wadi Sarr, &c.). Thus agricultural villages are springing up at various points, and already Kaaiti Wadi Hadhramaut shows the advantage of ever-enlarging plots of date palms, and barley, dhurra, and lucerne and vegetable fields.

Note 4.—The above remarks refer only to what may be termed the "regular" forces of Kaaiti and Kathiri. Each side could count several thousands of Bedouin rifles, but it is now doubtful whether the Kathiri Sultans would find their tribesmen—tired as these latter are of their rulers' misgovernment—inclined to put up a sustained effort.

Section 6.—THE HAMUMI.

(See "Handbook of Arabia," p. 542, vol. i, item 7.)

A strong warlike tribe of robbers roaming the country of Makalla, Shiheir, and Shihr.

Defeated some twenty years ago, when they attacked the Seibans at Rashid in Wadi Doan, by combined Kaaiti and Seiban forces, they soon recovered, and by systematic pillaging of travellers along the coast to Shihr they have become a by-word for murder and robbery.

Hating the Kaaiti, they formed a pact with the Kathiri, and, when recently the Kaaiti Wazir, Syed Hussein, succeeded in making a treaty with the Kathiri—travelling to Shibam for the purpose—a Hamumi deputation, headed by the then paramount chief Sjech Salim-bin-Ali Habreish, went to Terim and Seyyun, and endeavoured to foment trouble.

In 1918 Syed Hussein visited Shihr and summoned the Hamumi chiefs to a conference. Certain Syeds were used as middlemen, and the Hamumis met the Kaaiti Wazir at Dofaighah (north of Shihr).

After warning them that they must no longer interfere with peaceful caravans, the Syed gave them largesse and the meeting ended.

Repeated and continued pillaging went on and the situation became serious again.

A further warning was sent out, and the Hamumis, reading this as a sign of weakness, boldly demanded more largesse. The Kaaiti summoned them to a discussion in Shihr. The Hamumis, professing readiness to apologise for recent pillagings, promised to appear in due course.

In January 1919 some 400 armed Hamumis appeared at Shihr, where the Kaaiti commander, hearing of their approach, manned the forts, and secretly sent out an armed party to their rear.

He then sent a messenger to the Hamumis stating that in Shihr were certain individuals who could identify those who had recently pillaged their caravans, and he suggested that, to prove the truth of their repentance, the Hamumis meet their former victims in the town; a discussion could then take place.

Some 250 Hamumis came in (being disarmed as they entered). They were all captured; twenty-seven were killed (by the djembiah) next day, including their paramount chief, Sjech Salim-bin-Ali Habreish, and their leading moqaddams, Hamid-bin-Amr, Mohammed-bin-Awadh-bin-Aman, Awadh Mardoob, and esh-Shineeni.

Over 200 of the remainder are now in prison in Shihr. Their tribes, thus deprived of practically all their leaders, are now (March 1919) suing for terms.

Hitherto very little has been known of this large confederation. But details, gained with some trouble, appear to be as follows:—

The Hamumi are nomad Bedouins ranging from Shihr to Seihut, and up to the Manahils and Jabiri tribes. Their chief sub-tribes, &c., are as follows:—

Beit Ali. Chief village, Ghail-bin-Jiman. Paramount chief, Salim-bin-Ali Habreish (executed in Shihr mid January 1919).

Second chief, "esh-Shineeni" (killed as above).

Beit Bahsan-el-Maurab. Chief, Mohamed-bin-Awadh-bin-Aman (executed in Shihr, January 1919).

Beit Ba Ghashua. Village-es-Sid-el-Fagi. Chief (alive), Salim-bin-Ahmat-bin-Imain (connected with Beit Ali).

Beit Ajeel. Chief, "el-Effen" (alive).

Beit Gerzat. Chief, Khamis-bin-Shadyan; died a natural death in December 1915. Successor not yet appointed.

Beit Jimein. Chief, Salmeen-bin-Khor (in prison in Shihr).

Beit Obeid. Chief, "es-Somali," killed in Shihr.

Beit Sa'id. Late chief, Towar-bin-Sa'id, died in 1918, and his selected successor was killed in Shihr.

Thus the confederation is probably crippled for some time, but whether they will subsequently essay revenge remains to be seen.

The Hamumi are reported able to put 3,000 fighting men in the field.

I put up a rough sketch map (D)* as close as possible to such necessarily somewhat vague details as were given.

Section 7.—ROUTE: MAKALLA TO WADI DOAN (AND ON TO SHIBAM) (WADI HIMMAM ROUTE).

Makalla.

Direction north-north-east, then north-east 8 miles to Harshiyat. Water springs; dhurra and tobacco; several towers; garrison of 50 soldiers; road to Rashnid and road to Tillah here divide carriage road from Makalla to Harshiyat, well graded, has been completed in 1918.

Lasub (c. 18 miles).

Direction north-west from Harshiyat, 1½ miles to Tillah; village; dates; tobacco; water supply. Continuing west-north-west for 8 miles to Lasub (Bedouins of Beni Hassan, branch of Saiban tribe). Running water; extensive fringe of dates; dhurra and lucerne cultivation.

Lebaib (c. 21 miles).

General line now between Wadi Howeirah and Wadi Djirbah. From Lasub ascend short wadi of Beni Hassan Bedouins, 4 miles to Lebaib, their village; 300 inhabitants; flocks of goats; water; dates and cultivation. Headman, Mohamed-ba-Husein. Compact village.

Zimon (c. 30 miles).

Bear north-west into large wadi, Wadi Himmam. First few miles rock and boulder strewn; difficult for camels. Path then rises along left side of wadi, gradually rising, 9 miles. Large village (in two parts) on right slope of wadi. Running water; concurrent chain of pools in places. Village called Zimon. Coconuts, dates, bananas, dhurra, lucerne; large flocks of goats; Saiban Bedouins; prosperous. Many go hence to Java. Headman, Hassan-ba-Omar.

Himam (c. 36 miles).

Bear north-west, then west-north-west up Wadi Himmam; many curves, but main direction west-north-west. Path high up on left side of wadi. Pass Ghiyada, Bedouin hamlet, with two burial grounds (Syed Hussein-bin-Mahomed-al-Attas and Sjech Saleh-ba-Abood buried here). After 2 miles (west-north-west) Himam village on crag with good running water below; palms and

* Map facing p. 81.

green crops. Flocks of goats. Ba Hibri sub-tribe of Seibans. Long march up steep Wadi Himam, left side. Bear north-west. Rough travelling for 9 miles; path after leaving Himam village changes to right side of wadi. At end of wadi central plateau is reached. Wide panorama of sandy stone-strewn plains, with characteristic "table-mountains" preserved by caps of erupted harder matter. Water scarce unless after rain. Wells frequent, many generally dry. After crossing slopes, west-north-west, enter white stone-strewn bed, with poor Bedouin cultivation, and wretched hamlet, El Hisi. Sharp rise (bear west-north-west as before); track leads to a pass between mountainous ridges forming on the right. Through pass (Jebel-el-Khar on left) by Wadi Mamter. In centre of pass is famous tomb of Wali-ba-Matar (carefully tended; site of annual pilgrimage, when more than 1,000 people assemble on the 14th and 15th of Rejab). Ascending from the pass the watershed is reached. Plateau now called El Makad. Far to south-south-west is seen a large mountain (? Jebel Gharaiba). Wadi Hajar's high cliffs are visible in a clear atmosphere. Bear west-north-west across plateau (El Makad), past series of wells (often dry); barren country; nomad Bedouins.

El Hisi.

Wadi Mamter.

Dahmah.

Wadi Doan.

North-west to Dahmah, 10 wells (mostly dry), 2 miles from Dahmah, Bedouin inhabited hamlet Burarah (fields and flocks). Thence after two abrupt descents to Fardaha (wells sometimes dry). Thence west-north-west for some 20 miles, past Thidda (site of wells, dry) to extreme end of Wadi Doan, which commences as a slight crack or cleft, but becomes a deep precipitous ravine within a few hundred yards. Well-engineered path commences on left, crosses to right, and finally crosses to and keeps on left of wadi. Very precipitous* descent, almost impossible for camels save in the driest weather. Wadi runs east for a few hundred yards, then veers to north-east, with an abrupt curve towards west, and finally turns almost north. At the turn the wadi widens, and is filled with date palms, and dhurra fields, and villages. The sketch map (C) shows the route on to Wadi Hadhramaut.

Note 1.—For map in detail of Wadi Doan see sketch map (C).

Note 2.—For details of Wadi Doan see paragraph head "Wadi Doan."

Note 3.—It will be seen that no estimates of distances from Makalla are given after Himam. This is because the route taken was no fixed route, several alternatives being reported across El Makad (centre plateau). Routes vary with water supplies, some wells being now full, and at other times empty, and *vice versa*. The approximate distance from Makalla to Koweirah in Wadi Doan is between 70 and 80 miles. The route is one which would not be usually in use were the Hamumi tribe quiet.

Section 8.—"HIMYAR"? REMAINS AND RUINS IN WADI DOAN.

(See Sketch Map (C) of Wadi Doan.)

From South to North.

(a.) *Rahab*.—On right side of wadi, up the slope, stand the ruins of an ancient "Town of Ad." In 1917 a landslip occurred, but the fall of earth covered rather than uncovered the small hill on which the ruins stand. These consist of stone walls, the stones being small and unshaped by hand. Unfortunately the landslip has hidden the plan of the ancient village. No inscribed stones are reported, but fragments of marble have been picked up. The whole site could easily be excavated.

(b.) *Between Quaidan and Sif*.—On left side of wadi lie ruins called "Qarn-el-Ad." From these in 1919 a winged horse, very similar to Assyrian models, was dug

* *Mutatis mutandis*, Wadi Doan presents a close parallel to the famous formation of the Kerbanengat at Fort de Kok, Padangache Bovenlanden, Sumatra's west coast.

up, standing on a platter or plate; the material was brass(?). The wings and body bear clear evidence of colouring (red). The platter was thrown away and has not been recovered. Chipped pottery and marble fragments are often unearthed.

(c.) *Meshed*.—These famous ruins are extensive, and on their site must once have stood a considerable city. In the main we may discern three groups. About a mile and a half south of Meshed, in the centre of the broad wadi, are three mounds rising from the stony sand of the wadi. The centre mound still shows a well-made and compact square building, of which the stones, much larger than any others observed in other localities, are squared and laid carefully on each, fitting well. In spite of the effects of flood torrents which have scattered thousands of stones over the wadi, these mounds still keep their shape, and countless pieces of marble, sun-baked clay, and stone utensils lie around. Many of these reveal rough pattern work, and several stones were seen into which two cup-shapes had been cut, thus OO. Inscribed stones (so-called ?himyaritk) are to be found, but none were seen uninjured.

The second group lies immediately west of the present village of Meshed. The wadi here has suffered more from the torrents, as rifts of sand and loose stones have been tossed over the valley surface. The site of the ruins, however, rises from 20 to 30 feet in places, and it is clear that a considerable mass of buildings, probably the central city, once stood here. Fragments of inscribed stones are numerous, and the site would doubtless repay investigation. A magnificent circular well (now dry) is fully exposed and is in perfect preservation. Formed of unworked stones, mainly oval in shape, it has kept its formation and reveals some 60 feet of well-engineered excavation. There are two other partly-choked wells close by. Marble and clay fragments lie around on all sides, and several uninjured inscribed stones have been unearthed. A small axe-head, beautifully shaped, of green stone was recently picked up, as well as several pieces of worked marble, which gave evidence of careful decoration.

Quite close to the village of Meshed there rises a species of stone gateway, which local tradition names as the entrance to an ancient temple.

Trained excavators could easily deal with these ruins.

The last (third) portion of the ruins lies to the immediate north of Meshed, but all that here remains is a series of sand-covered mounds, on which lie scattered stones which once went to form a town. The wadi is covered for a considerable way with these numberless stones.

(d.) *Near Haurah, at Qaouthah and Ajlaniah*, are similar ruins, whence inscribed stones are occasionally uncovered. A (brass ?) figurette of a camel, and another of a naked man, were recently found.

Section 9.—CORRIGENDA AND/OR ADDITIONS FOR HANDBOOK OF ARABIA.

VOLUME I.

Page 227, last line but 12.

From Makalla to Harshiyat "a well-made road for 8 miles has been made (1918), while another road, flanked in parts by a sea wall, runs through Makalla town along the coast for 10 miles. Thus it is possible now for a motor-car to travel by this road, and then along the beach to Shiheir, and even inland to Ghail-ba-Wazir. A car has also travelled to Shihr."

Page 228. "Currency."

"In the Kathiri towns a local currency is in use, struck in Sourabaya (Java), in the Mahommedan year 1315 through the agency of the Alkaff family, at the order of the two Kathiri Sultans.

"The three silver coins so struck are as follows:—

"'El Saghira' (the small one); marked ٧ (= 6 Khamasi), reported worth 1 anna 3 pies.

"'Khamasi'; marked ١٢ (= 12 Khamasi), worth 5 annas.

"'Oqiyah' wa Ruba; marked ٢٤ (= 24 Khamasi), worth 10 annas.

"Scarcity of Maria Theresa reals during the war has resulted in British Indian money readily gaining currency, and although Indian paper money is not accepted in Wadi Hadhramaut (even in Makalla it suffers 5 per cent. discount when changed), rupees and the smaller British Indian coins are readily accepted."

Page 229. "Government," last line but 15.

"These two tribes have now signed a treaty, whereby, while Kathiri independence is acknowledged, all communications between the Kathiris and Aden shall pass through the Sultan of Makalla."

Page 230, last eight lines.—I doubt these figures. I suggest:—

"Thus Sultan Sir Ghalib of Makalla has a 'professional' army of something over 1,000, composed of 400 Somali slaves (Abid), and some 900–1,000 Yafa mercenaries. These garrison Makalla, Shihier, Haurah, Qatan, and Shibam. The Sultans of the Kathiri are reported to have some 750 Somali slave soldiers. Both sides could, of course, muster several thousand irregular Bedouin rifles, once hostilities commenced."

Page 232: "Towns."—I suggest as follows:—

"Makalla, next to Aden the principal port on the southern coast of Arabia, is situated about 2½ miles north-west of Ras Makalla, to which and past which point a well-made road runs out. It is built partly" (here continue last line of page 232 and first five lines of page 233). "The Sultan has several houses or palaces, but his permanent residence is at the western end of the town, where he has a large palace, a large European-furnished guest house, and a nearly completed barracks. The wall of the palace enclosure runs from the cliffs to the great western gate of the town and thence to the shore. Eastward from the palace enclosure the road runs past a medley of substantial and miserable dwellings to the eastern gate, just before reaching which rise the imposing buildings, not yet completed, of a very large mosque. Passing the eastern gate, Makalla town proper is entered; the houses are compact, prosperous, and in many cases well built and many storeyed. The bazaar is well stocked with the needs of Arab life, and the fish and vegetable markets are well filled. Passing the landing stage, a large enclosure marks the cemetery, and, proceeding still eastwards, the poorer portion of the town gives place in turn to numerous limekilns between the cliffs and the shore, through which runs the road to Ras Makalla. One mile or so inland, to the westward, is an oasis of gardens, with a large house belonging to the Wazir (Syed Hussein) and a large new palace and garden belonging to the Sultan. A carriage road leads to these and is continued as far as Harshiyat, 8 miles north-north-east of Makalla. The water supply, conveyed by iron pipes from the stream, enters the town from this direction, affording a clean and ample supply of water for drinking and washing. The climate is delightful in the winter months, but in summer the heat is often excessive. The sea breezes in winter make the days cool and the nights cold. The population is mixed: Somalis of both sexes abound; British Indians are numerous. The total number of persons in Makalla exceeds 12,000."

(Then continue as on page 233, lines 22 to 36 inclusive.)

Qatan or Hautah.—(As on page 233 and page 234). Corrections (line 13):—

"Palace of the 'Sultan.' Hautah is strongly garrisoned not only by resident Somali soldier slaves, but the adjoining villages, which are rapidly springing up, are peopled by Yafa mercenaries, whose womenfolk and whose followers increase every year. The Sultan's nephew, Sultan Ali-bin-Salah, governs as his uncle's deputy, and controls Haurah, Hautah, and Shibam."

(Then continue as in book.)

Page 234: Shibam.—Substitute "Sultan" for "Jemadar" in line 12. Delete the last five lines of the page, and read:—

"The town has been much improved since Hirsch's visit; the population is not less than, and probably exceeds, 6,000, and the number of substantial houses (stated to be 500), of which not more than five or six are in disrepair, bears witness to the well-being of this, the frontier stronghold of the Kaaiti. The increase of population has led to a suburb being formed on the southern side of the wadi—called Es Sihi—where a row of rich houses, each in its garden, gives proof of security and prosperity. Along the south side of the town, outside the wall, a row of cemented wells, giving an ample supply of water, somewhat brackish in taste. There are eight mosques (Al Kabir, Bin Ahmad, Ba Deep, Al Khoja, Ba Yara, &c.), one boys' school, and one girls' school. West of the town

a large area is planted methodically with thousands of young date palms, while a recently constructed substantial cemented masonry wall, about 2 miles from the town, forces the 'sel' water to the northern side of the wadi. Due north on the wadi edge lies El Kara-bin-Abdul Aziz, a Kathiri hamlet. A mile to the south east lies the Syed village of Hazm, and running north from this village is the boundary line between Kaaiti and Kathiri territory. Shibam town completely covers a small knoll in the centre of the wadi, and forms a walled parallelogram of some 350 by 275 yards."

Page 541, lines 1-3.—Read—

"The survivors now number 400-500 under *Sjech Abdullah-bin-Salih*. The whole tribe, however, looks up to Omar-ba-Ahmed (Bassorah), who lives at Owrah as its paramount ruler, and to him important questions are referred. He is the head of the Seibans."

Page 541: *Awamir*.—Add—

"Their chief is Saleh-bin-Yaher."

Page 542: *Hamumi*.

See special paragraph "Hamumis."

Page 542: *Beni Hassan*. Add—

"Chief village Lebaib, and headman Mohamed-ba-Hussein."

Page 543: *Kathiri*, line 3, &c.—Read—

"Their present Sultans are the brothers Mansur and Mohsin-bin-Ghalib-bin-Muhsin-al-Kathiri, who live in Seyyun, leaving the government of Terim to Sultan Mansur's Wakil, Salim-bin-Aboud. The brothers are unpopular with the Syeds and Sjechs, and since their defeat in 1918 at the hands of the Kaaiti their influence is on the wane. It is only by largesses that they can obtain any respect from the independent tribesmen. The latter may number 10,000 fighting men, and, with their allies, the Awamir and Jabiri, might form a powerful confederacy had not their unity been undermined by Kaaiti diplomacy. The Tamimi and Manahil no longer are Kathiri allies."

Page 543: *Manahil*.—

The "Handbook" information is now incorrect. See under "Tamimi."

Page 545: *Seiban*.—Add:—

"Many of them now live in Owrah and Qarreïn in Wadi Doan, villages of their paramount Sheikh Omar-ba-Ahmad (called Bassorah)." (Basarah is incorrect.)


Page 545: *Tamimi*.—

"A nomad tribe to the east of Terim (near Inat). Formerly the allies of the Kathiri; they have recently entered into a pact with the Kaaiti." The Manahil (immediately south), with the Tamimi, both acknowledge the leadership of Ali-bin-Ahmad-bin-Jamani, who lives at Kasm. The Tamimi represent the settled, the Manahil the nomad, element of the coalition. These tribesmen are sturdy fighters, and can put a combined force of perhaps 1,800 men in the field.

Page 541: *Awabthah*.—Read:—

"Independent nomad tribe of Himyar running from Wadi Ain (south-east of Haurah) to the neighbourhood of Ghail-ba-Wazir. Chief sheikhs are bin-Kardus and bin-Mogshar (both living in Wadi Ain). Mangib at Ghail is Sjech Abdulrahim-bin-Salim, loyally allied to the Kaaiti and inveterate foes to the Hamumi. The whole tribe would number between 2,000 and 3,000 persons, and the Awabthah fighting force amounts to some 700 rifles." (Van den Berg is incorrect in stating that the Awabthah form part of the Seiban Confederation. They are an independent tribe, who, like the Seibans, hate the Hamumi.) "Awabthah fighting men have good reputation as warriors."

(c)



(D)




SKETCH MAP OF HADHRAMUT.

(A)

SHOWING MAIN TOWNS & WADIS


Ruba el Khali (The Great Desert)



TRIBAL SKETCH MAP OF HADHRAMUT.

(B)

SHOWING ONLY THE MAIN TRIBES OF FIGHTING VALUE
AND NEGLECTING ENTIRELY THE NORTHERN NOMADS
FROM THE FRINGES OF THE RUBA EL KHALI.



VOLUME 2.

Page 298: Sif:—

"On left bank of wadi (Hirsch's map is correct). An Amudi town of some 400 inhabitants," &c.

Page 299: Hajarein.—Delete:—

"A Vice-Sultan governs here on behalf of the Kaaiti family,"

and read instead:—

"A small garrison of some twenty soldiers under a Somali headman is stationed here."

Delete "unfriendly" before Nahad.

Meshed.—Read:—

"Village of Syeds' houses of the Al Attau family. Two famous Al Attas Walis tombs; mosques. Extensive 'Himyar' ruins, and remains of a large city."

Hourah to Hautah is given as 18 miles, and Hautah to Shibam is given as 19 miles.*

I would add (as regards the Indian Government map, registered No. 2338, D. 10, S.L.) that Shihr and Shiheir (east of Makalla, along the coast) appear incorrectly set out. Shiheir is the port half-way between Makalla and Shihr. The easternmost of the three is thus Shihr.

[56108]

No. 36.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 771.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, April 18, 1919.

YOUR telegram No. 611.

We have made proposals to settle dispute about position in Asia Minor and Constantinople between ourselves and the French by friendly consultation, and have always been willing to adopt such a course. We preferred to send General Wilson specially to Paris, to endeavour to arrive at a settlement with M. Clemenceau, to the alternative of a commission, which we considered cumbersome and dilatory, and consequently we sent no reply to M. Pichon's note of the 13th February. We were informed that General Wilson had arrived at a settlement, but its effect seems to have been illusory, since there has been a resumption, increasingly frequent and vigorous, of those disputes which the French Government promised to settle.

I recently made the suggestion to M. Cambon that a representative, either civil or military, should be sent by the French Government here to discuss the matter, or that we should send a representative to Paris for that purpose, but I have as yet received no reply.

Before a final decision is reached on our proposal I suggest you should consult M. Pichon, but we can scarcely believe that a commission of eight persons is necessary. We shall, however, be glad to adopt whatever plan promises the most speedy and amicable solution.

[60671]

No. 37.

Note respecting the Middle Eastern Question by Earl Curzon.

MY colleagues know how anxious I have been for some time as to the situation in the Middle East, and the troubles, increasing from day to day, that seem likely to arise from a failure to arrive at a solution. I circulate a note on the subject which I have recently sent to Mr. Balfour.

C. OF K.

April 22, 1919.

* These are over-estimated distances and 15 miles in each case would be more correct.

[1356]

M

The Present Position of the Middle Eastern Question.

I AM reluctant to criticise in London a policy which is being pursued in Paris, as to the phases and reasons of which we are not fully informed, and for which there may be many justifications not easily visible here. At the same time, there is such an absolute concurrence of opinion from every authority whom I have seen, consulted, or read, that the position is dangerous, and that the policy said to be favoured by the Peace Conference is likely to produce widespread disturbance, if not disaster, that I should not be doing my duty if I were to observe silence.

Moreover, the Foreign Office here may at any moment be called upon to explain or defend the Paris decisions, and to justify the consequences that seem likely to result from them.

Finally, it may still be possible, by prompt decision or action, to avert some of the worst evils, and to recover at least a portion of the ground that would appear to have been lost.

I have had a summary prepared in the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office which reveals the existing position of affairs in the Middle East: a position of divided councils and conflicting ambitions among the Great Powers, of profound and increasing unrest in the regions affected, of military insecurity, and of impending bloodshed and chaos, that may rob us of many of the fruits of victory and create a standing menace in the Middle East, both to the peace of Europe and to the security of India.

When the Peace Conference assembled the situation in the Middle East was much as follows:—

The Allied Powers were in possession of Constantinople, where the Turkish Government, if not cowed, was subservient. Our military power in the occupied Turkish regions of Asia was sufficient to enable us to enforce not merely the agreed terms of the Armistice but almost any supplementary terms that were found necessary. The British were in secure possession of Mesopotamia up to and including Mosul, and the form which the veiled British Protectorate of those regions was likely to assume had practically been settled with the consent of the inhabitants. The British position in Persia was, both in a military and political sense, extraordinarily strong. We were still in Trans-Caspia, but were contemplating an immediate retirement, since accomplished. The Caspian was in our hands and was being made the base of naval action against the Bolshevik forces. British divisions occupied the entire Caucasus, from the Black Sea to the Caspian, and provided the only guarantees for peace, on the one hand between the rival peoples: Georgians, Armenians, Tartars, Daghanis, and Russians; and on the other hand between the nascent States and communities north and south of the main Caucasian range and the forces of Denikin on the north—interested quite as much in pursuing imperialistic ambitions and the recovery of the boundaries of Old Russia as in fighting and crushing the Bolsheviks in Russia itself. In Asia Minor (outside the region of British military occupation) no Allied forces had appeared. The fate of Armenia was undecided, the bulk of the Armenians being fugitives from their country. Apart from Armenia and possibly Cilicia, the partition of Asia Minor was not even contemplated. In Syria a more critical condition existed, owing to the difficulty of reconciling the aspirations of the French with the hard facts of the Arab situation and the insistence of the French on the letter of the unfortunate Sykes-Picot Agreement. In Palestine the interests of the Arab population and the Zionist immigrants appeared to be capable of reconciliation, and everything pointed to an early mandate for Great Britain with the consent of both. Egypt was still quiet.

If the above survey be accepted as correct, it would seem that the first task to be undertaken in Paris would have been:—

1. A reconciliation by mutual agreement of the Franco-Anglo-Arab dispute *re* Syria.
2. An early decision of, at any rate, the main outline of the future limits of the Turkish Empire in Europe and Asia.
3. The speedy assumption by the Powers concerned of their duties and responsibilities in the areas assigned to them in the new settlement.

Nearly four months have elapsed, and the situation, as depicted in the accompanying summary, is as follows:—

The fate of Turkey-in-Europe is not yet decided, though it is understood that the Turks are to lose Constantinople, which is to be handed over to the mandate of America

or some International Power. Meanwhile, the city is the scene of acute, though petty, conflicts of jurisdiction and policy between the French and British representatives. The Turks have recovered from the first dismay of defeat, and are intriguing with all their old spirit and skill. The Committee of Union and Progress are active in the provinces, and are the only vigorous force in Turkish politics. The decision as to Constantinople has been so long postponed that what might have been easy in January, may be found very difficult in May or June. Time is being given for Moslem sentiment throughout the world to consolidate and concentrate on a supreme effort for the rescue of Islam. In any case, events in Egypt, the Caucasus, Asia Minor, and India are not likely to render the Turks more amenable or subservient; and it is more than likely that the decision as to their expulsion from Europe will be followed by rebellions and massacres in Asia Minor, and by great commotions throughout the eastern Moslem world.

Given the expulsion of the Turk from Europe, the policy that seemed to be the most promising in Asia was that, deprived of the border provinces that had been wrested from him in the war, i.e., Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Cilicia, and also Armenia (which he had shown his complete inability to govern), he should be set up in the Asiatic residue of his former dominions under whatever conditions, military, financial, or otherwise, the Great Powers might think fit to impose.

In practice, it is understood that the Greek claim to Smyrna, and possibly to the Aidin vilayet, is likely to be conceded, although believed to be violently opposed by the Americans. This, it is reported, is due, not to any urgent political or military necessity, but to the superior diplomatic ability of M. Venizelos. The Italians have already anticipated, and indeed precipitated, the ultimate decision by a military descent upon Adalia (on a manifestly fabricated pretext) and the neighbouring coasts, and by sending troops to Konia. They have also, with a rashness to which it is difficult to find a parallel, accepted the mandate for the Caucasus and the Caspian, from which the British forces are in process of being withdrawn. It is believed that the whole of the former Ottoman dominions in Asia are to be made the subject of a mandate or mandates. One day we are told that the mandate is to be given to America, who, if she emerges from her traditional isolation, will consent to do so only on a large and dramatic scale. Another day it is to be given to France, to console her if she fails to obtain Cilicia. Meanwhile Italy, the most fantastic of all the aspirants, is establishing a chain of claims across the peninsula from Adalia in the south to the Caspian and the Caucasus in the north-east.

The fate of Armenia is still not decided, and there is a good chance that, when it is, the difficulty will be, not to define Armenia, but to find the Armenians.

The dispute about Syria has not been composed; and, in their inability to find a solution, the Peace Conference have fallen back upon the expedient of a Commission, which, so far from confining itself to the Syrian question, has, with perfect logic but deplorable imprudence, been instructed to examine and report upon the entire Middle Eastern situation.

Meanwhile, the exaggerated demands of the Zionists in Palestine have produced a new situation of unrest there.

Egypt has risen in revolt, and General Allenby's first solution has only led to a violent and dangerous recrudescence of nationalist, pro-Turk, and anti-British feeling, which is compromising the whole position in the East.

Finally, the repercussion has reached India, and there has broken out the most serious and menacing anti-British demonstration since the Mutiny.

This situation, of which I have described both the facts and the probable consequences, is one as to which I do not believe there is a single dissentient opinion among those who are entitled to be regarded as experts. I have spoken to every available authority, many of them fresh from Egypt, Mesopotamia, Syria, the Caucasus, or Constantinople. There is not one among them who does not believe that the solutions being attempted in Paris will end in terrible confusion, if not in ruinous disaster. They point out that, while the Commission is sitting, or flying, or wandering about, the entire country, of which the fate is to be postponed for another six months, will be in a state of ferment. Mesopotamia, which ought to be settling down under the new régime, will be agitated. A new and formidable problem may arise in Kurdistan. The tension between the Zionists and the Arabs in Palestine, fostered by the extravagant claims of the former, will become more acute. In Persia we may jeopardise the chances of a settlement to which we have devoted a great deal of care, and which is now very near to fruition, by the revival of military insecurity on the north-west.

As for the Caucasus and Italy, it is difficult to speak seriously about a solution

which would be a comedy if it were not so sure to develop into a tragedy. The Italians are the most ineffective and despised of the Western Powers in the eastern world. They are regarded with distrust and dislike by the Moslem community because of their exploits in Tripoli and Cyrenaica. They have no conceivable interest in the Caucasus or anywhere within a thousand miles of it. Their appearance there can only lead to the immediate resumption of internecine fighting between the Armenians, Georgians, Tartars, and Russians—with difficulty restrained by the presence of the British forces—to be followed before long either by the triumph of the Bolsheviks, already paramount at Astrakhan, or by the appearance of Denekin, preferring a certain spoil in the recovered trans-Caucasian provinces of Russia to more precarious military experiments in the north. It is not in the least likely that either the Tartars or the Russians will allow the Italians to control the oil-wells of Baku. The result can only be a state of sanguinary anarchy in the Caucasus in which most, if not all, of the new States will go down. Meanwhile, as soon as the Italian electorate realises that its soldiers are to be employed and its finances squandered in this madcap adventure, a sharp reaction will take place, and the mandate so hastily accepted will almost certainly be compulsorily and ingloriously resigned.

As to the Greeks, who cannot keep order 5 miles outside the gates of Salonica, is it to be believed that they will be allowed contentedly to occupy and administer a great city like Smyrna or a province like Aidin?

When the Turks realise that, in addition to being expelled from Europe, their Asiatic provinces are thus to be parcelled out among foreigners whom they despise, and that no corner of territory will be left to them which they can truly call their own, will they not indulge in a final and frantic outbreak of racial and religious fury which may turn Asia Minor into a vast shambles?

That the Turks should be deprived of Constantinople is, in my opinion, inevitable and desirable as the crowning evidence of their defeat in the war; and I believe that it will be accepted, with whatever wrathful reluctance, by the Eastern world. But, when it is realised that the fugitives are to be kicked from pillar to post, and that there is to be practically no Turkish Empire and probably no Caliphate at all, I believe that we shall be giving a most dangerous and most unnecessary stimulus to Moslem passions throughout the Eastern world, and that sullen resentment may easily burst into savage frenzy.

The question arises whether, if the above forecast is at all correct, it is possible, even at the eleventh hour, to take any steps that may avert what seems likely to be a great catastrophe, by which the greater part of the Allied effort in the East will have been thrown away. It is with great diffidence that I submit the following suggestions:—

1. It seems eminently desirable that, whatever the solution arrived at, whether it be bad or good, the Turkish question should be taken in hand by the Powers, firmly handled by them, and brought to a final conclusion with as little delay as possible. Delay is the certain precursor, it has already been the main cause, of fresh outbreaks in the Eastern world.
2. In the meantime, the disputes between the French and the British in Constantinople should be settled amicably by authoritative conference and consultation. Proposals have already been submitted to this effect.
3. The military and naval forces at Constantinople and in the occupied regions should be maintained at full strength, and any steps or military precautions recommended by the authorities should be taken.
4. Presuming that the Italians have already accepted the mandate for the Caucasus (though I am not aware of any existing authority for offering it to them), I know not what to suggest, except that, even at the last moment, they should be asked to desist from an act of such deplorable levity, for which no justification can be found on any plea of local self-determination, of public or private interest, of morality, or even of expediency.
5. If it is not too late, I would urge that the partitioning or mandatory policy be not pursued in Asia Minor beyond the geographical limits which were the inevitable consequences of the war. I am unable to find in the pronouncements of any of the Allies at any stage of the war any announcement which compels us not merely to decapitate the Turk, but to cut up and appropriate his corpse. It is more than likely that the body will decline to be treated as a corpse at all.
6. If it is not too late, I would urge even now the abandonment of the Eastern Commission (even though our representatives upon it are the most admirable whom it

is possible to appoint), seeing that it is equally distrusted and disliked by French and British, and that it is more likely to aggravate than to allay the difficulties of a situation already sufficiently threatening.

7. As a consequence of this, again, if it is not too late, and if Feisal has not already retired from Paris in a state of huff, I would endeavour to make an arrangement between the French, Feisal, and ourselves as to the boundaries of the French Syria of the future and the political status and frontiers of the Damascus State.

8. If the Commission cannot be abandoned, I would try to withdraw Palestine and Mesopotamia from its purview, and I would urge the coming to a decision that will enable the contemplated administration of these countries to be provisionally, at any rate, proceeded with. The same arguments apply to Armenia.

9. Presuming that America is to undertake the custody of Armenia, I would urge the conclusion of an understanding between Great Britain, France, and the United States as to the future of Cilicia.

10. I would not hesitate, if challenged, to present to the Conference our schemes for the future administration of Mesopotamia, and to secure their provisional agreement to them without delay. In this way we might be able to escape in part the difficulties and the heavy expense of another six months of military occupation.

11. Lastly, I would press the Peace Conference with all the insistence in my power, as I have no doubt the British Delegation has already done, for an early recognition of the British Protectorate of Egypt.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Foreign Office, April 18, 1919.

Enclosure 2 in No. 37.

Review of the Situation in the Middle East, with Special Reference to the Danger of Delay in Reaching a General Settlement.

I.—Districts more particularly affected by the decision of the Peace Conference to send a Commission to investigate on the spot, and to ascertain the wishes of the various populations as to their future status.

Smyrna and the Aidin vilayet.—For some months past we have been receiving warnings of the danger of a serious outbreak in the Aidin vilayet. The danger here is particularly acute, for the normal difficulty between the Ottoman Greeks and the Moslems is complicated by cross-currents of friction and intrigue between Italians, French, and Hellenes. The Italians are alleged to be intriguing with the Turks, giving protection certificates to Austrian subjects, and sending them up country to make mischief in collusion with the agents of the Committee of Union and Progress.

In Smyrna itself the French and Italians are at loggerheads, and there have been unpleasant incidents in connection with their respective flags.

The Italians, Greeks, and Turks, all threaten to intervene. The Italians have troops in readiness at Rhodes and keep a watchful eye on the Greeks, who are seeking to increase their forces in the islands and have decreed the cessation of demobilisation of their army. The Turks ask that they should be allowed to send a division of troops to keep order, and have suggested that British officers should be attached to it.

Adalia.—The decision to send a commission to the East, to which Italy was a party, had scarcely been taken when the Italians, on the pretext of a local riot, seized Adalia, and at the same time officially complained that the Greeks were making preparations for a descent on Smyrna from the islands. The Greeks, on their side, have now made official representations to His Majesty's Government, and expressed the fear that Italian action at Adalia may be only a prelude to encroachment on the sphere claimed by Greece. From Turkish sources, indeed, it is now reported that the Italians have landed further small parties of troops at Badrum, Makri, and Alaya.

Meanwhile, the belief that the Conference intends to hand over Smyrna to the Greeks has evoked a storm of protest from the local European colony, notably from the American missionaries, and a telegram of grave warning from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

Konia.—Further to the East the Italians are to be allowed to have a military force at Konia, a place of great strategic importance, so placed on the Bagdad Railway as to threaten the interest of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company, the only British railway

in Turkey, which has an admirable record and has suffered greatly during the war. In the event of the Italians succeeding in establishing themselves permanently at Adalia and Konia the legitimate hopes of development of this British company will be completely strangled.

Cilicia.—Cilicia is claimed by the Armenians as part of Armenia, by the Syrians as part of Syria, and by the French as part of their historical heritage in the Levant. To the north-east of Cilicia in the direction of Marash, difficulties have arisen between the French and ourselves owing to the fact that General Allenby has found it impossible, for military reasons, to hand over this district to French administration as required by the terms of the Anglo-French *modus vivendi*.

Alexandretta.—At Alexandretta the latent hostility between French and Italians has recently been shown by a petty incident in connection with the honours paid to the Italian consul from Jerusalem in the local Catholic church, and much more serious troubles have occurred owing to the misbehaviour of Armenian troops serving with the French.

Beyrout.—At Beyrout friction between the French and ourselves continues, chiefly over the question of the port, which the French claim as a French naval base, and over the restrictions which General Allenby finds it necessary to impose on the landing of travellers.

Lebanon.—In the Lebanon the despatch to Paris of the packed delegation engineered by the French has aroused a storm of opposition from the anti-French parties.

Damascus and Emir Feisul's Area.—In Damascus and throughout the territory administered by Emir Feisul disorder prevails. The Arabs refuse to recognise the French advisors and administrators appointed by General Allenby in accordance with the terms of the *modus vivendi*, and the French accuse our military authorities of stimulating the Arab resistance and indulging in every sort of low intrigue against them. Europeans complain that they can get no justice. The whole country is in a ferment, and there have been serious riots, resulting in great loss of life, between the Moslems and Armenians at Aleppo.

Here again the Italians are seeking to establish interests, and, since the announcement of the decision to send out a commission, have approached us with embarrassing requests for permission to open banks and establish consulates—a policy of penetration obviously aimed at the French.

Palestine.—In Palestine the feeling of both Christians and Moslems against our Zionist policy has now reached fever heat, and is increasing with every week's delay of a settlement. The Zionist claims become more and more exorbitant, and the resolutions of the Zionist Congress recently held in London included such items as the supervision of all educational establishments, the use of Hebrew as the medium of instruction in the schools, a monopoly of all public works and restriction of immigration to the Jews. The French are opposed to Zionism, and the Vatican has taken serious alarm at the activity of what it terms the extremist party of the Zionist Jews.

Occupied Enemy Territory Generally.—Meanwhile, the whole cost of the administration of the territory occupied by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force falls upon the British taxpayer, and there is, so far as is known here, no guarantee that it will ever be recovered from the power or powers to whom the various mandates may eventually be assigned.

For political reasons and owing to the undesirability of allowing the French to establish themselves in active occupation of the disputed regions, it has been necessary to disguise the expenditure as military expenditure, and His Majesty's Treasury are seriously perturbed by this arrangement which was only tolerated under the impression that a very early settlement would be reached by the Peace Conference, and that our liabilities in this respect would thus shortly cease.

Egypt.—The situation in Egypt only comes within the scope of this review in so far as the same forces are at work there as in Turkey, and as the deplorable situation which exists there is bound to react on Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and indeed throughout the East. Moreover, the sending of a mission to ascertain the wishes of Syria and Palestine as to their future form of Government is scarcely likely to be passed over in silence by those who now control the current of political feeling in Egypt.

The same remark may perhaps also apply to the effect on India of the promised commission's visit to Mesopotamia.

Mesopotamia.—In Mesopotamia itself, the difficulties of administration caused by demobilisation, &c., will become more and more accentuated unless an early decision is reached as to the future of the country.

Mosul.—In the Mosul vilayet no satisfactory arrangements can be made until the rights conceded to the French under the Sykes-Picot Agreement have been definitely and entirely abandoned by them. It is not known here whether the commission proposes to visit this area, but if not it would seem that a recognition by the French of the *de facto* situation should be reached at the earliest possible moment.

Meanwhile, further to the north the French have apparently been engaging, since the decision to send the commission to the East was taken, in a curious intrigue with Sherif Pasha and the Persians to throw Kurdistan under Persian sovereignty with a view to saving it from falling into the orbit of Mosul. This scheme, it seems, is also to extend still further to the north and to embrace Russian Armenia with its capital, Erivan, and even to extend across the Caspian and take in Sarakhs and some undefined part of Russian Turkestan.

II.—Districts more particularly affected by the decision of the Peace Conference to hand over the Caucasus to the Italians.

We now leave behind the regions more directly affected by the despatch of the proposed commission and reach an area where the problems arise from another decision of the Peace Conference—the transfer of the Caucasus to Italian control.

Trans Caspia.—Trans-Caspia is already being evacuated, and the danger of the penetration of Bolshevism into India and Persia from this side, and of complications in Afghanistan, need only be mentioned in passing.

The Caspian.—It is understood that arrangements are already being made to transfer our naval control in the Caspian to the Italians, and this at a moment when the spring offensive of the Bolsheviks from Astrakhan may be confidently expected. It will be remembered that our naval authorities regarded the numerical superiority of the Bolshevik fleet at Astrakhan with so much misgiving that they insisted upon measures being taken to destroy it while it was still frozen in. This was to be done from the air, and a strong air base was to be established at the north of Petrovsk for the purpose. The plan had for various reasons to be abandoned. It is now proposed to entrust to Italian sailors a task which our own British sailors regarded with considerable apprehension. The objective of the Bolshevik fleet will be Baku, and if Baku falls the line of supply of our forces in north Persia from Hamadan to Enzeli will be cut. Will it be possible to arrange in time for the substitution of a line of supply via Bagdad? Will it be possible in any case for our forces to remain in Enzeli and in North Persia if Baku falls, and the control of the Caspian passes into Bolshevik hands? If not, what will be the political effect in Persia if we have to withdraw our forces?

Caucasus.—Nor is the military outlook in the Caucasus itself any more encouraging. Even if the Italians can provide the necessary troops and transport, is it likely that the mixed and turbulent population of that region who have given us so much trouble will welcome them?

Will General Denikin, whom we have hitherto restrained with so much difficulty from attacking the small republics, be more likely to respect the principle of self-determination when placed before him by an Italian General? Can the Italians be expected to cope with the feuds of the Daghestanis, Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Georgians, and other warring races, and can these races in their turn be expected to stand the strain of a sudden change of régime without getting out of hand? Have the Italians the men to deal with such a situation or the money to finance it? Does their record in Tripoli and elsewhere justify us in supposing that they will be able to handle with any chance of success such an exceptionally thorny problem as the Caucasus presents?

It may be urged that all these troublesome people should be left to cut one another's throats and that the Italians, having accepted the task from pure greed, may quite fairly be left to get out of the mess as best they can. But unfortunately the effects of the chaos in the Caucasus will spread far beyond its borders. The Armenians will be the first to suffer. There are already serious troubles in Kars, and in the Shusha, Erivan, and Nakhichevan areas, and it may safely be asserted that in the event of any serious outbreak in the Caucasus not only will it be impossible to repatriate a single Armenian to the six vilayets, but that the few surviving Armenians there are likely to be massacred wholesale.

We have heard of trouble recently all over Turkey-in-Asia; a British political officer has just been murdered to the north of Mosul; anti-Christian movements have been reported from Diarbekr, Sivas, Samsun, and from many other places in the interior which are out of our reach. General Allenby reports a state of unrest at Urfa, Aintab, and Marash. It is becoming increasingly obvious that it only requires a sign for the

whole of Turkey in Asia to be up. Such a sign may well be given by the arrival of the Italians in the Caucasus.

Black Sea.—Nor is our position in the Black Sea entirely comfortable. Odessa has fallen, and Sevastopol is in the occupation of the Bolsheviks. Our only line of supply—perhaps of retreat—lies through Constantinople, and at Constantinople we have few troops and none too many ships, as the Admiral himself has recently complained; while the forts of the Dardanelles stand undamaged behind us. It is true that the forts are occupied by allied troops, but we have nothing to show that any preparations have been made for their rapid destruction in case of an emergency.

The Balkan States to the north are threatened with Bolshevism, and the effect of our withdrawal from the Caucasus will probably be to accentuate this tendency and to spur the Bolshevik leaders to fresh efforts in every direction, including the far north.

III.—Anglo-French Relations at Constantinople.

Constantinople.—Meanwhile at Constantinople itself the situation between the French and ourselves shows no improvement. General Franchet d'Esperey continues to assert himself and to dispute General Milne's claim that the whole of Turkey in Asia is an exclusive British military sphere, and that the French have no right to interfere there. French pretensions in this direction have, indeed, recently increased, and, whereas they were willing to acknowledge until recently that both Powers had equal military rights in the unoccupied parts of Asiatic Turkey, it appears from the despatches most recently received from Constantinople that General Franchet d'Esperey is now advancing the theory that the whole of Turkey not in our actual occupation falls within the sphere of his military command as "Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the East."

This question of the delimitation of the French and British military zones is one of vital importance, and the Foreign Office and His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople have been urging for months past the necessity of reaching an early agreement with the French on the subject, but so far their efforts have proved unavailing, and the visit of the C.I.G.S. to Paris, made at the instigation of Lord Curzon, appears to have brought us no nearer to a solution. The question is primarily a military one, but it hinges on the interpretation to be placed on the Convention concluded at Paris on the 23rd December, 1917, and on the resolution reached at the meeting of the allied premiers in London on the 3rd December, 1918, and the framers of these resolutions can alone say what their intentions were, or modify or alter the terms of these resolutions to suit changed circumstances.

No political principle vital to us is involved, and there would appear to be no objection so far as the Foreign Office is concerned, to conceding to the French a sphere of military activity on the Asiatic side. The important thing is not the size or extension of the respective spheres, but the definite fixing of a line on either side of which the respective military forces can act in complete independence without risk of overlapping and consequent friction. With goodwill on both sides the solution of this problem ought to present no insuperable difficulty, and our military authorities will probably be the more inclined to make some concession to the French in the matter in that it appears from recent evidence that neither General Allenby nor General Marshall has sufficient forces at his disposal to meet his pressing requirements. At the present moment, for instance, neither of them is in a position to send the necessary force to punish the persons responsible for the murder of the British officer referred to above. This murder took place a comparatively short distance to the north of Mosul, and as we are unable to strike at such short range, whether from lack of men or transport, there is surely no good reason why we should persist in a policy of excluding the French rigidly from the whole of Turkey in Asia.

Relations between General Franchet d'Esperey and the High Commissioners at Constantinople.

Closely connected with this question, and of scarcely less importance, is that of the relations between the French military command at Constantinople and the Allied High Commissioners.

Since the arrival of General Franchet d'Esperey there has been constant trouble on this score, and it appears that the French contend that the functions of the High Commissioners are restricted to matters connected with the fulfilment of the Armistice conditions, and that on other matters the military commander is supreme, and at

liberty to make any arrangements he chooses in direct negotiation with the Turkish Government.

This again is a question which cannot be settled by exchange of notes, and appears to require the personal attention of the supreme authorities of the Allied States now in Paris.

IV.—Future of Turkey and of Constantinople.

Meanwhile, the Turks at Constantinople note the growing dissensions between the Allies in the capital, in the Aidin vilayet, in Cilicia, in Syria, in Palestine and in Mosul, and bide their time. The old party cleavages and rivalries are being bridged over by a host of new parties and associations based on Nationalism and Islam, and while the extremist leaders of the C.U.P. are imprisoned and discredited, their followers are forming new combinations, and working in with the Bolsheviks on the one side and with the relics of the old Hamidian régime on the other. Time is on their side and they know it. Each week that passes reveals fresh intrigues in every quarter. In Switzerland, where there is coming and going between Enver and the other C.U.P. leaders in Germany and the agents of the party in Geneva, and grave suspicions of implication in the Egyptian troubles; in the Aidin vilayet, where the Italians, who owe Adalia to their intrigues with the C.U.P. before the war, are working with the Turks against the Greeks and French: In Kurdistan, where the agents of the C.U.P. are free to come and go, since we are quite unable to establish any military authority there; in India, and throughout the Islamic world and even in London itself, where time is being given for the consolidation of a formidable movement of the kind which is attractive to all the usual elements of unrest, and where agitation is being actively carried on against the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople, the conversion of Santa Sofia into a Christian Church and Christian interference with the Kalifate.

The Committee of Union and Progress, who have during the war kept in close touch with the Bolsheviks through Germany and Copenhagen by means of such notorious agents as Ahmed Agaieff and Parvus (alias Helphand), watch the westward progress of the Bolshevik wave, and look forward to the moment when they too will be carried forward with it.

What has the Turk to hope from an immediate peace? His material position is not likely to be greatly improved; the hated Greeks and Armenians are to supplant him, perhaps even to become his masters; he is told that he is to lose Constantinople and Smyrna as well as Syria, Palestine, Armenia, and all the Arab countries, and now a rumour goes forth that even the small patrimony that is to be left to him is not to be under his absolute control, but to be managed for him by a Christian Power; and that Power in all probability the despised Italian who cheated him out of Tripoli. Can it be wondered that he counts every moment of delay as so much gain, and watches with increasing satisfaction how the failure to reach any settlement in Paris, and the growing jealousies and dissensions of the Allies, are placing him every day in a better position to resist the conditions to be imposed upon him, and may even enable him in the end to take his revenge.

[66816]

No. 38.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 628.)

MR. BALFOUR presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith copies of correspondence between M. Clemenceau and Emir Feisal before latter's departure for the East.

*British Delegation, Paris,
April 30, 1919.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 38.

Mr. Kerr to Sir L. Mallet.

Sir Louis Mallet,

British Delegation, Paris, April 28, 1919.

I ENCLOSE for your information copies of correspondence which passed between M. Clemenceau and the Emir Feisal before the latter's departure for the East.

F. H. KERR.

[1356]

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Enclosure 2 in No. 38.

M. Clemenceau to Emir Feisal.

Altesse,

Paris, le 17 avril 1919.

JE suis heureux, au moment de votre retour en Orient, de confirmer ce que je vous ai dit dans la conversation que j'ai eue avec vous le dimanche, 13 avril.

Le Gouvernement français, désireux d'assurer à la Syrie comme à l'Arménie, à la Mésopotamie et aux autres pays d'Orient délivrés par la victoire de l'Entente, le régime de liberté et de progrès conforme aux principes dont il s'est toujours inspiré et qui sont la base des délibérations de la Conférence de la Paix, déclare reconnaître le droit de la Syrie à l'indépendance sous la forme d'une fédération d'autonomies locales répondant aux traditions et aux vœux des populations.

La France est toute prête à donner son aide matérielle et morale à cette émancipation de la Syrie.

C'est en référant aux besoins de ce pays, à l'intérêt de ses populations comme au rôle séculaire joué par la France, que votre Altesse a reconnu que la France est la Puissance qualifiée pour donner à la Syrie l'assistance des conseillers divers nécessaires pour instaurer l'ordre et réaliser les progrès que réclament les populations syriennes.

Lorsque l'heure sera venue d'élaborer des arrangements plus détaillés pour assurer la collaboration de la France avec la Syrie, ils devront être conformes à l'esprit de nos entretiens. J'ai grand plaisir, au moment de me séparer de votre Altesse, à vous le confirmer par écrit et à constater une harmonie dont ne manqueront pas de s'inspirer les représentants de la France en Syrie.

Je prie votre Altesse d'agréer, &c.

G. CLEMENCEAU.

Enclosure 3 in No. 38.

Emir Feisal to M. Clemenceau.

I AM happy to have an opportunity, as I leave Paris for the East, to thank you for the great kindness you showed me in our conversation of Sunday last. As I told you I am a warm friend of France and of your administration.

The deep sympathy that exists between the people of France and the people of Syria is founded on a tradition which you may rest assured I will do my best to confirm.

I was deeply impressed by the disinterested friendliness of your statements to me while I was in Paris, and must thank you for having been the first to suggest the despatch of the Inter-allied Commission, which is to leave shortly for the East to ascertain the wishes of the local peoples as to the future organisation of their country. I am sure that the people of Syria will know how to show you their gratitude.

Our conversations, to which I have referred, have convinced me of the need there is for us to come to a complete understanding on the points that interest us. As, however, it is impossible for me to put off longer my return home, I must ask you to accredit someone to continue the arrangements we have begun. Their completion will foster the good relations of the two countries.

Finally, let me assure you that on my arrival in Syria, I will do my best to assure my people of your kindly feelings towards us and will work to increase the friendly bonds between the French and the Arabs.

FEISAL.

[Letter sent on 20th April to M. Clemenceau. The previous draft, a frank statement of what the Syrians wanted from the Powers and were willing to offer France, was rejected by M. Robert de Caix (acting for M. Clemenceau) and, therefore, never transmitted.]

Feisal saw Colonel House and M. Clemenceau for a few minutes on the 21st April, to say good-bye.]

No. 39.

M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 6.)

LE Gouvernement français vient de faire savoir à M. Paul Cambon que les effectifs britanniques stationnés en Syrie diminuaient chaque jour par les effets de la démobilisation, tandis que les autorités britanniques se voyaient obligées de faire face à des situations nouvelles en Égypte et aux Indes.

2. D'autre part, les assurances réitérées données par M. Lloyd George à M. Clemenceau en ce qui concerne le rôle de la France en Syrie et les conversations entamées avec l'Emir Faysal ont amené le Gouvernement français à prévoir et à préparer l'envoi en Syrie de troupes françaises, afin d'assurer l'ordre dans ces régions et d'y préparer l'organisation des autonomies locales indépendantes.

3. Un régiment d'infanterie française, le 415^e, a déjà été débarqué à Beyrouth. Un régiment de cavalerie mixte, à quatre escadrons, est en voie d'embarquement à Marseille. Un second régiment, le 412^e, pourra être embarqué dans le courant du mois de mai. Un bataillon de zouaves est formé et pourra s'embarquer le 12 mai à Bizerte; enfin, un troisième régiment, le 409^e, pourra être embarqué dans le courant de juin.

4. Le Général Allenby, auquel il en avait été référé, a déclaré, en dernier lieu, s'en remettre à la décision que prendront d'un commun accord les Gouvernements français et britannique.

5. Le Gouvernement français a chargé M. Paul Cambon de demander au Gouvernement britannique d'agréer le plan suivant et de le notifier au Général Allenby.

(1.) Le 415^e d'infanterie restera stationné dans la région de Beyrouth et Tripoli, permettant ainsi le rappel d'un ou deux des régiments britanniques occupant ces territoires.

(2.) Le deuxième régiment mixte de cavalerie serait envoyé en Cilicie (deux escadrons à Mersina) et dans la région d'Alexandrette (deux escadrons).

(3.) Le 412^e régiment d'infanterie sera débarqué à Alexandrette et réparti dans la région avoisinante.

(4.) Le bataillon de zouaves sera envoyé à Beyrouth, où, réuni aux deux bataillons de tirailleurs indigènes déjà sur place, il formera un régiment mixte, réparti dans la région côtière entre Sour au sud et Latakiah au nord.

(5.) Le 409^e sera sur le port de Beyrouth et employé là où il sera nécessaire pour permettre la relève des troupes britanniques.

6. Etant donnée la nécessité de profiter des facilités de transport momentanées, le Gouvernement français serait reconnaissant au Gouvernement britannique d'envoyer les ordres nécessaires dans le plus bref délai possible.

7. L'Ambassadeur de France ajoute que tandis que le Général Allenby avait fait savoir au Commandant de Meru, attaché militaire français, auprès de sa personne, qu'il s'en remettait à l'accord entre les deux Gouvernements de Paris et de Londres pour l'envoi de nouvelles troupes françaises en Syrie et leur utilisation, le Haut-Commandement anglais transmettait au Général français Hamelin l'ordre (1) de dissoudre la Légion arménienne; (2) d'envoyer en Cilicie les 412^e et 415^e régiments français d'infanterie et les deux régiments de marche de cavalerie.

8. Cette décision tend à dégarnir de toutes troupes françaises les régions de Syrie; elle est en contradiction avec les assurances données par M. Lloyd George et M. Clemenceau et les indications du Général Allenby à l'attaché militaire français. L'Ambassadeur de France serait reconnaissant au Gouvernement britannique de faire suspendre de suite les ordres communiqués au Général français Hamelin.

M. Paul Cambon saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 5 mai 1919.

[71025]

No. 40.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 749.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 8, 1919.

THE French Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon with reference to a note which he had addressed to the Foreign Office on the 5th May, containing certain

[1356]

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proposals for the introduction of French troops into Syria. These proposals had not previously been communicated to the War Office, and the latter were consequently not in a position, at such short notice, to give a final opinion upon them. They contained a plan for the embarkation of considerable French forces, both infantry and cavalry, from Europe and Africa, with a view to a complete and extensive occupation of Beyrout, Tripoli, and Alexandretta, as well as of Cilicia. Relying upon some statement by General Allenby to the effect that he would be prepared to carry out any arrangement of this nature that was agreed upon by the French and British Governments, the Ambassador appealed to me to give prompt attention and early effect to the French proposals. Incidentally, the Ambassador's note contained a complaint regarding orders which were alleged to have been sent by the British Commander-in-Chief to General François Hamelin, who commanded the existing French forces in Syria, requiring him to disband the Armenian Legion, and to send some French infantry and cavalry regiments to Cilicia.

I said that neither I nor the War Office knew anything of the latter orders, which were probably required by military considerations. I did, however, know although the Ambassador expressed considerable surprise at what I said—that the French Armenian troops had proved to be thoroughly unsatisfactory; that it seemed to me a misfortune that troops of that nationality should have been chosen for the work entrusted to them; and that I thought the sooner they disappeared from the scene the better. As regards the movements of the other French troops to Cilicia, I presumed they were to take the place of the disbanded Armenians.

In reply to the Ambassador, I said that the question appeared to me to be in the main not political, but military. Through the mouth of our Prime Minister in Paris we had dissociated ourselves in a political sense from Syria. The fact that our troops were in occupation was the result, not of any political design, but of the circumstances of the war. On the whole, we should be glad to be relieved of the responsibility of occupation, having much more useful purposes to which we could devote our forces elsewhere. I said that I was quite prepared to submit the French proposals to General Allenby, to be reported or acted upon by him from the military point of view, but that I made my consent subject to two reservations, which I wished to make quite clear to his Excellency. The first was that the movement of French troops, if it were sanctioned, should not be of such a character, either in point of numbers or in respect of the time of their arrival, as to suggest that the British forces were being hustled out of the country with a view to making way for the French.

To this his Excellency replied that his Government did not contemplate anything more than a gradual and progressive augmentation of the French military strength in that part of the world.

My second reservation was that the appearance and action of the French troops should not be such as to prejudice the decisions of the Peace Conference with regard to the future mandator of Syria. France, I believed, expected to receive that mandate. Very likely she would, though even this was not quite certain. For our part, we neither expected nor desired to have it. But viewing the frequent warnings that had been issued in Paris to the Poles, the Greeks, the Serbians, and other nations not to compromise their case by seizing in advance territories which they might or might not receive at a later date, I ventured to think it very undesirable that the French should set a bad example in the matter.

The Ambassador answered, with some cogency, that the Italians had already been allowed to do it, and that if they were permitted to appear with Italian regiments at Adalia and Konia, which were a part of the true Ottoman Empire, he could not see any reason why the French should not be allowed to stake out their claims in another portion of the Turkish dominions which was Arab and not Turkish in character, and of which the Ottoman Government would in any circumstances be deprived.

I said that a bad example was not the same thing as a good precedent, and that I hoped his Excellency would bear in mind my warning.

In the course of our conversation, M. Cambon revealed to me what appeared to be a complete ignorance on his part of the final stages of the communications between the Amir Feisal and M. Clemenceau. He assured me that these had been thoroughly satisfactory, that the protecting and civilising mission which France had modestly prescribed for herself in Syria, was thoroughly understood and loyally accepted by the Amir; and consequently that the appearance of the French troops upon the scene would be welcomed by none more heartily than by him.

I said that I had always hoped that the Paris conversations would result in such an understanding, but that was not exactly my reading of the documents recording the

final interviews. I had seen the letter from M. Clemenceau to Amir Feisal, in which he had asked his assent to certain general propositions defining the French attitude and claims. To this the Amir had returned a reply, which I had also seen, of a very cautious and non-committal character, which was far from connoting that complete acceptance of the French point of view to which his Excellency had referred. I suggested that he should take an early opportunity of inspecting these documents.

Finally, M. Cambon pressed upon me the plea that, upon the withdrawal of the British forces from Syria, the French troops would be urgently required for the elementary task of preserving order in the territories concerned.

I refrained from observing that there was a likelihood that their presence might have a precisely opposite effect.

The conversation on this subject ended by my undertaking to refer the French military proposals to General Allenby.

M. Cambon then embarked upon his weekly discussion of the political situation at Paris, or rather Versailles. He thought that the speech of the chief German representative had been impertinent in tone; but his own reading of the German psychology was that, after a more or less theatrical display, the Germans would in due course accept the terms that were offered to them. He derived this impression, he said, not merely from a study of German mentality, but from the reports received from French officers in different parts of Germany, who described the state of disorganisation and debility there as worse than anything we had hitherto believed.

I said that our own reports differed somewhat according to the parts of Germany from which they came, but that the majority of them certainly conveyed the impression of the writers that the peace terms, if they were found to be very severe, would not be accepted. This was the view which I personally was inclined to hold, and I asked the Ambassador whether, if the French or the British were in the position of the Germans at this moment, he thought that either of us would accept the treaty that was propounded yesterday in Versailles.

Certainly not, he replied. In 1870 the French had declined so much as to consider the idea of an armistice, and, although thoroughly vanquished, they had fought on for six months with enfeebled forces until peace was signed. The British would have done the same. But German mentality was of an entirely different order, and groans and moans would, in his opinion, be followed by sulky submission.

M. Cambon spoke also of the proposed compromise about Fiume, which had been negotiated by the French Ambassador in Rome; but he did not see in it anything more than an extemporised and provisional solution of an almost insoluble problem.

The conversation revealed his Excellency once more as the very antipodes of an optimist about the European situation.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[70893]

No. 41.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 678.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 7, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your Lordship's despatch No. 2374 of the 19th April enclosing copies of a memorandum from the Department of Overseas Trade and a telegram to General Clayton regarding Wagner's Engineering Works at Jaffa. The complaints made by the director of the Cairo Motor Company (Limited) as to the difficulties placed in the way of a British firm acquiring enemy interests in commercial concerns in Palestine are understood, but it is, nevertheless, important to bear in mind the wider aspects of the issue thus raised.

His Majesty's Government, if and when they obtain a mandate from the Conference for Palestine, are pledged to carry out the policy of a national home for the Jews. In the adoption of this policy there can be no question of religious privileges for the Jews, and in the face of the present hostility of the majority of the population (both Moslem and Christian) in Palestine His Majesty's Government can hardly fulfil their pledges of any form of political preference. An increase in the numbers and economic influence of the Jews and steady colonisation must precede political favours. By this means the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine who fear the Jew primarily as a political and religious force may gradually come to welcome his presence, as they see

the full advantages from the influx of Jewish money and the Jewish methods of developing the country.

This line of policy is reinforced by the following considerations: Palestine is a rich and undeveloped country and a particularly good field therefore for the foreign concession hunter who may expect to obtain high profits quickly. Every care must therefore be taken to watch the commercial interests which establish themselves in the country and ensure that the development of its natural resources does not take place at the expense of the inhabitants or primarily for the benefit of foreign capitalists. It is here that His Majesty's Government's adoption of the Zionist policy may be found to offer the best method of insurance. As your Lordship knows, it is the intention of the Zionists, if His Majesty's Government feel able to adopt their plans, to institute some form of public utility company under the control of the Zionist organisation who could perhaps be given preferential consideration for immigration and land development generally. The company would take, say, 5 per cent. of the profits. The remainder would go to relieve the taxpayer (Jew and non-Jew) in Palestine.

In the uncertainty of the present situation these possibilities can only be indicated, but enough has been said to show how essential it is that as long as His Majesty's Government are in military occupation of the country, no policy should be adopted or step taken which would enable commercial interests, however reputable, and whether British or foreign, to establish themselves in Palestine or obtain control over the land or the principal industries until the decision of the Conference enables His Majesty's Government to work out the full implication of their acceptance of a mandate for Palestine and of the policy of the national home for the Jews.

I have no doubt that in the present instance some such considerations as these influenced the military authorities in substituting a shorter lease for the outright purchase of the Jaffa Engineering Works desired by the British firm.

I have, &c.

(For Mr. Balfour)

LOUIS MALLET.

[70513]

No. 42.

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, May 13, 1919.

IN pursuance of my note of the 24th March, I have the honour to inform you that I have now received a report from the military authorities which enables me to reply to the notes which your Excellency was so good as to address to me under the date of the 30th January, the 5th and 18th March, respectively, on the subject of the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway.

Your Excellency will readily recognise that so long as the military occupation of Palestine and the state of war continue, control of the railways in that country must be retained by the military authorities, who must necessarily administer them primarily with a view to military needs. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government this consideration is especially valid in the case of a railway which, as is generally admitted, no longer exists in its pre-war form, but which owes its present being almost entirely to the work of the army of occupation.

His Majesty's Government therefore regret that they cannot regard as practicable the suggestion put forward in the memorandum by M. Pavie, copy of which was enclosed in your Excellency's note of the 30th January, that the railway should be returned to the company's control. Nor, with regard to M. Pavie's further suggestion, that the section Ludd-Jaffa should be relaid on a broader gauge, do His Majesty's Government consider that they can reasonably be expected to order the undertaking of a new and considerable work of construction on the chance of recovering the expenditure involved from the Turkish Government.

Turning to the two specific complaints adduced in your Excellency's note of the 18th March, His Majesty's Government understand that the engagement of civilians is due to the necessity, the urgency of which at the present time your Excellency will easily appreciate, of relieving as many as possible of the military personnel for other duties. The alleged commercial exploitation of the line consists in permitting the passage of necessities for civilian maintenance and the export within limits of surplus produce, such as oil, soap, wine, and oranges. Civilian traffic is restricted within the

limits imposed by military exigencies. His Majesty's Government are reluctant to believe that serious exception can be taken to these regulations, which appear to them to be both natural and necessary.

I trust that the above information will enable your Excellency to convince your Government that the company are not being subjected in any way to unfair treatment by the British military administration.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[75892]

No. 43.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 695.)

Sir,

Constantinople, May 6, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith report of an interview which took place between my military attaché and Said Mollah Bey.

2. This individual is the editor of a newspaper, the "Serbesti," which is markedly pro-British in tone.

3. He is a son-in-law of the late Sheikh-ul-Islam, Jemal-ed-din Effendi, and an individual of no little intelligence who carries some weight in religious circles.

4. I desire especially to call your attention to his remarks on the relations of the French with certain undesirable elements here.

5. According to my own information, the French are anxious to create the impression that they alone amongst the *Entente* Powers are standing out for the defence of Moslem interests, and are striving for the retention of Constantinople in the hands of the Turks and for the non-partition of the Ottoman Empire.

6. This attitude is necessarily pleasing to members of the Committee of Union and Progress and the more pronounced Nationalists, through whom the French hope to gain for themselves a privileged position in the capital and throughout Turkey.

7. A member of the French High Commission recently informed the Assistant High Commissioner, in all sincerity, that he believed that his nation alone was competent to assume the task of reconstruction in Turkey, and that their co-operation was eagerly sought by all members of the population.

8. Their exaltation of spirit and flights of imagination have raised them to a plane above that of ordinary mortals, from which point of vantage the true facts of the situation are, no doubt, barely discernible.

9. In reality, all unbiassed observers are of opinion that if there be one solution which would be acceptable to all creeds and nationalities it is that which would accord to Great Britain a mandate for the whole country.

10. Especially is this the opinion of Moslems, who insist that the political advantages which would thus accrue to Great Britain are no less than the material advantages which would be derived therefrom for themselves.

11. It is seriously maintained by those who claim to speak with authority that the predominant position in the world of Islam which would be conferred upon Great Britain by the exercise of a mandate, would assure to her the loyalty of her Indian and Egyptian Moslem subjects, both in the spiritual and secular spheres.

12. The importance of apprehending the leading members of the Committee of Union and Progress requires, I think, no emphasis, and is the more important if the contention of Said Mollah be correct that the Committee draws its strength rather from certain material advantages conferred by membership than from any inherent virtue in the doctrines preached.

13. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Right Honourable A. J. Balfour, M.P., O.M. in Paris.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 43.

Report by Military Attaché of Interview with Said Mollah Bey.

I HAD a long conversation this afternoon with Maitre Said Mollah Bey. As this is the only conversation I have had since I have been here which has left any impression on me, I have thought it worth while recording.

Said Mollah Bey commenced by asking me why the attitude of the British High Commission towards the Turks was so markedly cold. I replied that there were various reasons. In the first place, the conditions in which we found ourselves here during the armistice period necessitated it; in the second place, our attitude to our Allies precluded our attempting to establish relations with any individuals or parties without their knowledge and concurrence; in the third place, we did not wish to leave any doubt in the mind of any Turk but that the punishment which would be meted out to Turkey at the Paris Conference would be a severe one, and that in consequence to establish any official or semi-official relations with persons or parties was, until the declaration of that decision, impossible; lastly, I said that whatever his or any other parties' professions of friendship for us might mean, the fact remained that there was a large party actively hostile to us in the country, and, for all I knew, attempting to stir up trouble for us in other portions of our Empire.

Said Mollah Bey replied that with regard to the first point, he fully appreciated the correctness of our attitude; that with regard to the second, it was a pity that our Allies did not follow our example. In this connection he ventured the opinion that the régime established by the *Entente* since the armistice in Constantinople was not one calculated to advance our interests or to produce the desired effects on our enemies. It appeared to outsiders that the nature of the régime here had resulted in a considerable amount of friction and discord amongst the Allied Powers from which our enemies, the Committee, derived every advantage. Nothing, he said, had given greater courage to, or had tended more to revive, the Committee of Union and Progress than the attitude taken up by one of our Allies who, consciously or unconsciously, was in communication with the Committee with very disastrous results.

With regard to the third point, he said that he (and he thought he was speaking as well for the better class of Turks) fully recognised that the punishment which would be awarded them would be a severe one. But, he added, that no punishment could very well produce a worse state of affairs than that now obtaining, or which had obtained during the war. The greatest desire that he himself and the class of Turk for whom he was speaking had was that the decision, whatever it might be, should be given quickly, and that the Turks who remained in whatever might be left of Turkey might be given an opportunity of enjoying some measure of freedom and prosperity which had been denied to them ever since the Committee had come into power in Turkey.

With regard to the last point mentioned by me above, he thought that some of the ideas entertained by us and in Europe about the Committee were erroneous. He said that there was no real "spirit" in the party, it was simply and solely a matter of "interest." He did not deny that the party as to-day existing was most active in stirring up trouble against us, and said that he had little doubt that it was, at all events, in part responsible for the recent events in Egypt and India, but, he said, that to destroy the party and all that it stood for was not so difficult as we imagined. He said that it could be done by the taking of certain vigorous measures; the arrest and conviction of certain leading members; the closing of certain papers, clubs, and other centres of activity. By these steps the party would be, to a large extent, scotched, and all those who derived benefit from it would cease to adhere to what remained of it.

He then went on to say that if we really desired that both now and in the future trouble should cease in India, Egypt, and the Arab-speaking parts of the Ottoman Empire now under our occupation, this could be accomplished by our taking under our tutelage what might be left of Turkey at the Peace Conference, together with the Sultan and Caliphate; that once Moslems in India and Egypt saw that Turkey, the Sultan, and the Caliphate were, for all intents and purposes in the hands of Great Britain, they would at once recognise that their interests lay with, and not contrary to, us.

He then went on to say that he thought a great mistake had been made in the attitude we had taken up regarding the punishment of offenders. He was informed by the late Grand Vizier, Tewfik Pasha, that we had at first demanded the punishment of

those responsible for the war, and that Tewfik Pasha had sent for him and asked him how this was to be brought about. Subsequently, however, we had not pressed this point, but had confined ourselves to, and made a special point of, the punishment of those responsible for Armenian massacres only. This had given the impression in the country that our attitude was a partisan one; that it had not been our desire to punish those who, he declares, had caused Moslems (as well as Christians) to suffer, but that we had only wished to punish those who had wronged Christians. We should have insisted primarily on the punishment of those who had declared war against us; who had forced a large portion of the Moslem world to fight against us; and who had brought ruin and starvation to Turkey.

Again, referring to the Committee of Union and Progress, he said that we had made no real attempt to destroy it. He ventured to think that if the Germans had been in our place, very little of the Committee would have remained at the end of five months; that when we first arrived here the whole of their organisation was on the point of being broken up, but that our subsequent attitude of leniency had given it courage, and enabled it to recommence its activities.

He stated that if he might express an opinion, he would now urge us to take action on the following lines:—

To insist on the apprehension and trial of leading Committee members here through the Turkish Government. It was essential that we should make the Turkish Government do the work, and if they chose to do so they were perfectly capable of carrying it out. Then, having cleared the country of the leading members of this party, which would immediately be followed by the results mentioned above, the foundation would be laid for our assuming control in the country should we be allowed to do so by the Conference in Paris.

May 1, 1919.

[75061]

No. 44.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 785.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 19, 1919.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 650 of the 22nd April, I have to inform your Lordship that M. Cambon called here on the 14th May, in order to discuss the difficulties and differences which have arisen at Constantinople between the French and British authorities, and saw Sir R. Graham.

The first question discussed was that of the extent of the British and French military spheres. After some conversation, M. Cambon agreed that the best and proper division was that General Frauchet d'Espérey should be in command of the town of Constantinople and European Turkey, while the whole of Asiatic Turkey should be under the British military command. But his Excellency considered that Scutari and the other suburbs on the east of the Bosphorus were in reality a part of Constantinople, and should be under the French military command. He pointed out that for all purposes of police, sanitation, municipal government, &c., it was considered part of the town of Constantinople. Sir R. Graham said that this might be, but that the British military authorities required, so long as British forces remained in the Caucasus, access to the Bosphorus and a free passage through the Black Sea. The terminus of the Bagdad Railway was at Haidar Pasha. It was important that this terminus should be in the hands of the British military authorities, and that they should have access to the sea by possessing the use and control of the port and docks of Haidar Pasha. M. Cambon said that he was perfectly willing to propose to the French Government an arrangement on these lines.

Sir R. Graham alluded to General d'Espérey's attempts to form a Turkish gendarmerie not only in European Turkey, but also in the Asiatic provinces, and to the question of French posts in Turkey in Asia, but as a definition of the British and French military spheres on the lines proposed would *ipso facto* settle these questions, Sir R. Graham did not labour the point.

As regards the respective powers and functions of the High Commissioners and the military command at Constantinople, Sir R. Graham found M. Cambon to be in full agreement with the views of His Majesty's Government. He stated that the military command should deal solely with military matters, and that all questions of

[1356]

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administration ought to be referred to the High Commissioners. Civil matters, such as the Ottoman Debt, &c., should be left to civilian control.

His Excellency informed Sir R. Graham that he was leaving for Paris at the end of the week, and would suggest to the French Government that an arrangement on the above lines might be arrived at.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[76397]

No. 45.

M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 20.)

LE Gouvernement français est désireux de voir préciser les attributions du Payeur principal Moulin, détaché à Damas auprès du Gouvernement arabe. Pour que cet officier puisse remplir utilement la tâche de Conseiller qui lui est impartie, il est nécessaire que ses attributions soient définies et précisées, et notamment qu'il puisse connaître le détail des dépenses effectuées et des rentes encaissées.

Le Général Allenby a, du reste, reconnu lui-même la nécessité de voir spécifier ces attributions, lorsqu'il s'est rendu à Damas en compagnie du Haut-Commissaire français.

Toutefois, il y a lieu de remarquer que l'accord du 30 septembre 1918 dit dans son paragraphe 30 (b) :

"Sous réserve de l'assentiment du Commandant en Chef, le Conseiller politique choisira :

"(a.)

"(b.) Le personnel de Conseillers et le personnel subalterne européens qui pourraient être requis par le Gouvernement arabe ou les Gouvernements arabes institués dans la zone (A) selon la Clause 1 de l'Accord anglo-français de 1916."

Il n'y est donc pas fait mention du contrôle de l'administration confiée aux Gouvernements arabes.

Il semble, par suite, à M. Pichon qu'il serait tout à fait nécessaire de compléter et de préciser, à cet égard, l'accord intervenu à Londres le 30 septembre 1918, et relatif à l'administration provisoire des territoires occupés dans le Levant, en ce qui concerne les attributions du Payeur principal Moulin.

L'Ambassadeur de France serait heureux de connaître les vues de sa Seigneurie le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat à ce sujet. Il saisit cette occasion, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 18 mai 1919.*

[66816]

No. 46.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

(No. 3475.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, May 26, 1919.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 628 of the 30th ultimo, the French Ambassador, who has just returned from Paris, alluded to-day to the letters said to have been exchanged between the Emir Faisal and M. Clemenceau.

M. Cambon said that he had noticed that when he had cast doubt, some ten days ago, on the existence of any such correspondence, his statement had been received with polite incredulity. He had taken the opportunity of his visit to Paris to clear the matter up. It appeared that there had been a proposal to make an exchange of letters between M. Clemenceau and Faisal, but the former was only willing to write on the clear understanding that Faisal's reply to his letter would be of a satisfactory character. A draft letter from M. Clemenceau was communicated to Faisal on the 17th April with a request to communicate the answer which it was proposed to return. When Faisal's draft reply was received its terms were not considered to be satisfactory, and therefore M. Clemenceau's letter was never sent to him.

It would therefore appear that the note from Faisal transmitted to me in your despatch No. 628 as well as the earlier letter, referred to in a footnote, both proved unacceptable to M. Clemenceau.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[80101]

No. 47.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 760.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 16, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1044 of yesterday, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of the note which the Grand Vizier brought to me last evening in reply to that which I had handed to him on the previous day in regard to the handing over of the Smyrna forts to the Allied forces.

2. It appears from this communication, as well as from the official statement in to-day's paper, of which also I enclose a copy, that Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe informed the Vali of Smyrna of the decision of the Supreme Council at Paris to proceed to the occupation of the town by Hellenic troops.

3. His Highness had but little to say in addition to the contents of the note; he stated, however, that he was receiving innumerable telegrams of protest from all parts of the country against the action which had been taken, and he brought a certain number as examples with him; he had, in reply, sent telegrams in every direction exhorting the people to remain tranquil.

4. But it appeared a very hopeless task, for whereas he had crushed the Committee, other committees were now springing up and public opinion seemed bursting into flames in every quarter. I might rely upon his using every effort to stop it, but he, personally, entertained grave fears for the safety of the numerous British officers and troops scattered in small parties or singly over a great expanse of territory.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure 1 in No. 47.

Damad Fërid to Rear-Admiral Webb.

M. le Vice-Amiral,

Constantinople, le 15 mai 1919.

PAR la note que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de me remettre au nom des Puissances alliées, en date du 14 mai 1919, elle a bien voulu me faire connaître la décision de la Conférence de Paris concernant l'occupation des forts de Smyrne par les troupes des Puissances alliées.

Votre Excellence a ajouté que la demande est basée sur l'article 7 de la Convention d'Armistice.

D'après plusieurs dépêches qui me sont parvenues depuis hier de la part du Gouverneur de Smyrne, je remarque que la forme d'occupation annoncée dans la note a été modifiée; en effet, son Excellence le Vice-Amiral Calthorpe vient de l'informer de l'entrée des troupes grecques dans la ville.

Le Gouvernement ottoman croit de son devoir de déclarer tout d'abord que rien ne justifie une pareille mesure dans l'état actuel de la province méditerranéenne de l'Empire.

Si dans leurs sentiments de haute appréciation et d'équité, dont je ne doute pas un instant, les Puissances de l'Entente avaient bien voulu accepter les demandes justes et réitérées que le Gouvernement Impérial a faites depuis deux mois, au sujet de l'augmentation de l'effectif de nos troupes, la tranquillité dans cette province serait déjà plus complète.

Bien que nous devions avoir, d'après notre proposition, qui jusqu'ici est restée sans réponse, 70,000 hommes sous les armes, il n'y en a en réalité qu'à peine 40,000, éparpillés sur un territoire assez vaste.

Le Gouvernement ottoman ne s'oppose pas à la décision de la Conférence de Paris, tendant à une occupation des armées de l'Entente, mais il ne consentira pas de son plein gré à une occupation hellénique. Car, ni ethniquement, ni historiquement, ni géographiquement cette ville asiatique, formant une partie intégrante de l'Empire ottoman, n'a aucun rapport avec la Grèce européenne. Si les souvenirs historiques pouvaient constituer un droit, un grand nombre de points sur le littoral de la Méditerranée devraient avoir le même sort. Remuer l'histoire de l'antiquité ne ferait qu'augmenter la confusion, sans pouvoir assurer aucune solution.

[1356]

O 2

Le peuple ottoman ne se fait aucune illusion sur l'étendue du malheur qui le frappe par suite d'une guerre désastreuse où il fut entraîné malgré lui. Mais ce qui le pousse au désespoir, c'est de n'être nulle part traité par ses anciens conationaux avec les mêmes sentiments de générosité qu'il a mis à traiter ceux-ci. Au moment où la violence luttait avec avantage contre le droit, le peuple turc a respecté tous les sentiments chers aux nations qui s'étaient soumises à sa loi, tandis que, depuis bientôt deux siècles, il voit, là, où il perd son autonomie, disparaître toutes ses institutions, ses propriétés, ses mosquées, ses écoles, enfin jusqu'à son existence nationale. Un grand nombre de dépêches adressées de toutes les localités de l'Empire ne font qu'appuyer ma pensée. Il sera donc plus juste de juger la nation ottomane par l'ensemble de son histoire et non pas par une période des plus désavantageuses.

Smyrne étant une ville moderne essentiellement turque, avec une majorité turque de 83 pour cent, d'une confession, d'une pensée, d'un idéal et de coutumes absolument différents de ceux de la minorité qui y vit, il serait tout aussi difficile que peu équitable de ne pas prendre en considération les droits de la nation turque dans cette localité. Ainsi, ni le Gouvernement, ni le peuple ottomans ne peuvent concevoir un instant que l'occupation de l'une des plus importantes villes de l'Empire ait un caractère définitif.

Le Gouvernement Impérial, dans sa déférence envers les grandes Puissances de l'Entente, s'incline devant leur volonté, sans donner nullement à cette décision le caractère d'une renonciation à son droit.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

DAMAD FÉRID.

Enclosure 2 in No. 47.

Extract from the "Entente" of May 16, 1919.

COMMUNIQUÉ OFFICIEL.

HIER matin à 11 heures, l'Amiral Webb s'est rendu au conak de son Altesse le Grand-Vézir, Damad Férid Pacha, à Nichantache, et a remis à son Altesse une note portant que les forces alliées occuperont les forts de Smyrne selon les décisions prises à la Conférence de Paris.

D'autre part, le commandant en chef des forces navales anglaises, l'Amiral Sir Arthur Calthorpe, a fait savoir par une note communiquée hier matin au Gouverneur général du vilayet de Smyrne que, se basant sur les décisions de la Conférence de Paris et selon l'article 7 de la Convention d'Armistice, les fortifications de Smyrne seraient occupées par les forces alliées.

De même, par une seconde note remise dans l'après-midi, l'Amiral, se basant encore sur la Convention d'Armistice, faisait savoir au Gouverneur général que les Puissances alliées avaient décidé de faire procéder à l'occupation de la ville de Smyrne par les troupes hellènes.

Le Gouvernement a pris toutes les mesures que lui dicte son devoir pour la sauvegarde des droits de la nation et de l'État.

En même temps, son Excellence le Ministre de l'Intérieur, a transmis à tous les vilayets une communication recommandant à la population de garder le calme et de ne point se départir de la modération.

[76397]

No. 48.

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, May 27, 1919.

WITH reference to the note which your Excellency was so good as to address to me on the 18th May, relative to the functions of Colonel Moulin, financial adviser to the Arab administration at Damascus, I have the honour to state that in view of the early departure of the Inter-Allied Commission to the East, and the prospect that the whole arrangement for the temporary administration of these regions will, in any case, have to be altered shortly, His Majesty's Government consider that it would be premature to make any change in the *modus vivendi* now in force. They are confirmed in the view by the fact that in the agreements referred to it was explicitly

laid down that the French advisers or functionaries should be appointed at the request of the Arab State, a condition as to the fulfilment of which, in this case, I have at present no information.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[82836]

No. 49.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 842.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 30, 1919.

M. CAMBON paid me his weekly call to-day. He had just returned from a visit to Paris, which indeed we had taken in common at the same time. But his confabulations with his Government and their accounts of what was passing at Paris had not inspired him with any different view from that which he had frequently expressed to me, of the degree of wisdom with which the future fortunes of the world are being determined, or of the nature of the solutions, particularly in the Eastern world, which seem to find favour among the arbiters of Europe. I found some difficulty in reconciling his account of what had happened at Paris in the preceding week with what I knew of the facts; but I record his statements as made to me.

He represented that on a Monday the British representative had practically offered to France the undisputed mandate for Constantinople, the whole of Anatolia, Armenia (if it were not given to the Americans), and Syria; and two days later had submitted the rival proposition that America should receive the mandate for the whole of Turkey, both in Europe and Asia, including Syria, but excluding Mesopotamia and Palestine. This suggestion, the Ambassador told me, had excited the vehement wrath of M. Clemenceau, who had been inclined to attribute it to my pernicious influence in Paris. M. Cambon had assured him, from his numerous conversations with me, that this could not be the case, since I had never favoured any arrangement by which the French claims to Syria were thus arbitrarily extinguished; and I confirmed his recollection by the further assurance that, in the conversations in which I had taken part in Paris, the question of Syria had not even been mentioned.

The incident, which probably rested upon some misunderstanding or misreport of what had actually happened, is only of value as indicating the passionate intensity with which France, while disinteresting herself, for reasons of expediency, from Constantinople and Asia Minor, means to adhere to her Syrian pretensions.

M. Cambon then recapitulated the heads of the agreement or understanding which he had already proposed at the Foreign Office, of the two disputed subjects of: (a) The division of civil and military control at Constantinople during the military occupation; and (b) the division of military commands between Turkey-in-Europe and Turkey-in-Asia. As regards (b), Turkey-in-Europe was to be the sphere of the French, Turkey-in-Asia of the British commander-in-chief. But the French military control was to extend over the city, really a portion of Constantinople itself, separated by a broad channel, on the southern or Asiatic side of the straits, excluding however Haidar Pasha which, as the starting point of the railway, was to remain in British military hands. Such was the agreement which he had proposed, which we had accepted, and which had equally been accepted by his Government. He now sought to obtain one further concession, viz., that the French should be allowed to retain military control over the coal-mines and small port of Heraclée on the Black Sea, which had been developed and were worked by a French company, though in consequence of the war but little had lately been done.

I failed to ascertain from his Excellency for exactly what reason, whether *amour-propre* or the intention of making a future claim, the French were anxious for the concession: which indeed the Ambassador said that he only sought as a favour and would not press if we felt any strong disinclination to grant it. I promised to look into the matter, which was new to me.

The Ambassador then raised once more the question of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, now in British military occupation, and urged that, immediately upon the signature of peace, the French company which owned it should be indemnified for the seizure. His Excellency also pressed most strongly that M. Pavie, the director of the company now in Palestine, should be accorded an interview, which had hitherto been refused to him, either with General Allenby or with the Governor of Jerusalem, Colonel Storr.

In conclusion, the Ambassador reported to me a very frank conversation which he appeared to have had with M. Sazonof, in which, in reply to the appeals and petitions of that statesman, he had vigorously rejoined that Russia had only to thank herself for her misfortunes; while, as regards the Allies, she had "let them down" so badly that the war had been prolonged for two years.

A little later, M. Sazonof himself, when calling upon me, presented the reverse side of the same picture, by actually contending that, had it not been for the valiant efforts of the Russian armies in the opening stages of the war Paris would have fallen, the Channel ports been taken, and the war ended in less than six months.

If these are the rival angles of vision of contemporaneous authorities, what will not be the perplexities of the historian of the future?

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[76653]

No. 50.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

(No. 3482.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 31, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that General Stewart, the Resident at Aden, called recently at the Foreign Office, and in the course of a discussion on the various points which have lately arisen in South-West Arabia, expressed the following opinions:—

1. *Proposed Treaty with the Imam.*—General Stewart said that the Imam was expecting to hear from us. The last communication we had sent him was that in which he was told that the question of his representation at the Peace Conference had been finally disposed of. General Stewart considered it highly desirable that something should be done at once, not only to show that we recognised the Imam's independence, but also that we intended to enter into negotiations with him. On hearing of the suggestion that Colonel Jacobs should visit the Imam forthwith to open preliminary discussions with him, he agreed that this ought to be done. He was of opinion that informal discussion of this nature would not be likely to suffer from Ramazan.

2. *Boundary of the Aden Protectorate.*—General Stewart agreed that the alternative of a buffer between ourselves and the Imam was no more likely to work in the future than it had in the past. He was inclined to favour the alternative of consolidating the protectorate up to the existing boundary on the understanding that the railway was extended. He personally had some doubt as to the advisability of making a sanatorium either at Dala or at Darsijan and considered that Aden was more healthy than either; but from the political point of view he deprecated our handing over any of the chiefs in our protectorate to the Imam. He did not think that the Imam had any real expectation of extending his boundary in the direction of Aden at all.

3. *Future Administration of Aden.*—General Stewart considered that Aden would be too small an area, even if the protectorate were consolidated, to form an independent administration, as the cadre would necessarily be a very small one. He was strongly of opinion that Aden should not be under the Government of India: nor did he think that it should be under Egypt unless Egypt were to exercise a central control over all Arabian affairs. If there were any idea of a department being formed to deal with all British administrations in Arab-speaking countries, he favoured a combined service in which at least the senior posts should be interchangeable. The spheres of the Idrisi, the Imam, and the Sultan of Shebr and Mokalla should remain, as at present, under the control of Aden.

4. *Political Resident at Aden.*—So long as our effective occupation of Aden was confined to the fortress and its immediate neighbourhood, General Stewart considered that the functions of General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and Resident should be combined in one person. If, however, the protectorate was to be consolidated up to the existing boundary, he thought that there would be an argument for dissociating the civil from the military. He mentioned that from a military point of view it was desirable that Aden and Somaliland should be not only under the same military command, but also under the same central Civil Administration. The alternatives were in his opinion: (a) to include Somaliland in the event of a central department being formed in London to deal with the various administrations in the Middle East; (b) if

no central department were to be formed, to combine Aden and Somaliland under one military administration.

5. *The Idrisi.*—General Stewart said that the Idrisi was also expecting to hear from us in the near future. The Idrisi's agent—Sayed Mustapha—had recently had an interview with him in the course of which he expressed some apprehension that the Peace Conference did not know enough about local conditions to be able to effect a satisfactory settlement of Western Arabia. Sayed Mustapha—and indeed all the Arabs in Western Arabia—were in his opinion strongly anti-Italian. At the time of the severe defeat of the Italians, General Stewart had had some difficulty in suppressing universal rejoicings. He had been appealed to by the Italian Consul to tone down the communiqués, and had done what he could to save the face of the Italians. He did not think that there was any fear that either the Imam or the Idrisi would turn to the Italians for support rather than to ourselves, so long as they had reason to hope for our support.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[82967]

No. 51.

M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 2.)

A LA suite des notes adressées les 5 et 18 mars dernier par l'Ambassadeur de France au Foreign Office au sujet du Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem, Sa Seigneurie le Comte Curzon of Kedleston a bien voulu faire connaître, le 13 mai dernier, les vues du Gouvernement britannique sur cette question.

Le Gouvernement français, en réponse à cette communication, a chargé l'Ambassadeur de France de signaler à l'attention du Gouvernement britannique les droits acquis par la Compagnie du Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem à des indemnités, du fait de la saisie de la ligne. Le versement de ces indemnités devrait s'effectuer aussitôt après la signature de la paix; d'autre part, le paiement de semblables indemnités incombe à l'occupant, en conformité de l'article 53 de l'annexe à la Convention de La Haye de 1907 sur les lois et coutumes de la guerre terrestre, et non pas à l'État souverain. C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement français s'adresse au Gouvernement britannique en cette occurrence.

Il semble, d'autre part, indispensable, en vue tant de la fixation des indemnités dont il s'agit que du règlement des diverses questions d'ordre pratique posées par la saisie de la ligne, que des entrevues aient lieu sur place entre M. Pavie, directeur de la société, actuellement en Palestine, et les autorités militaires britanniques. Tous les efforts faits par M. Pavie en vue d'entrer en conversation soit avec le Général Allenby, soit avec le Colonel Storrs, sont demeurés sans résultats; cette attitude des autorités militaires britanniques ne saurait se prolonger sans inconvénient.

Aussi le Gouvernement français insiste-t-il pour que le directeur de la Société du Chemin de fer de Jaffa à Jérusalem soit reçu en audience, le plus tôt possible, soit par le Général Commandant en Chef les forces alliées dans le Levant, soit par le Gouverneur des territoires occupés de Palestine.

M. Paul Cambon saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 27 mai, 1919.

[87743]

No. 52.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 876.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 11, 1919.

AFTER an absence of a fortnight, the French Ambassador, who had again been to Paris in the interval, resumed his conversations with me this afternoon.

On the occasion of our last interview he had expatiated upon the differences that had arisen in the Council of Three or Four in Paris concerning the future of Syria, which had produced such strong feeling between the Prime Ministers of France and Great Britain. He now came to explain to me that an even more regrettable situation had arisen out of the proposal of the British representatives to modify at the eleventh

hour the terms of the peace proposals to Germany. He enumerated with accuracy the three points upon which this modification had been attempted, and he found nothing to say in favour of any of them. He expressed extreme astonishment that the result of six months of labour, of countless committees and commissions, of so many hopes and disappointments, should be thrown over or threatened at the last moment owing to discoveries which ought to have been made before. The effect produced upon French official opinion had been very bad, and it was even said that, at one moment, a rupture of relations between the plenipotentiaries of the two Great Powers had been threatened.

For his own part, he was quite convinced, and so were the French Government, that the Allies had only to stand together in order to compel Germany to sign. He did not attach the least importance to her bluff or bravado. She was only attempting to profit by the alleged disagreement between the Allies. She had nothing to sustain her in resistance, nothing to fall back upon in retreat; and, if only a firm front were exhibited to her, she would without a shadow of doubt give way. That, at any rate, was his forecast of the future. Further, his Excellency remarked that, while it was the general impression in Paris that the British Prime Minister and the American President had hitherto acted for the most part in combination, and had promoted each other's views, on this occasion President Wilson's sympathies were said to lie with the French rather than with ourselves. The Ambassador was the more concerned at the existence of these serious differences between our two countries, because he believed them to originate from internal political considerations affecting the British Government mainly or alone. He felt convinced that it was in response to Socialist pressure that the British representatives had taken up this line. If this were so, he thought that it would greatly increase the already considerable momentum that had been acquired by international Socialistic propaganda during the past few months.

I replied that, so far from the British Prime Minister having yielded to any pressure of the sort to which the Ambassador referred, an allegation of this description had been expressly denied in Parliament; and I could testify to the fact that the decisions arrived at and put forward by Mr. Lloyd George at the meeting of the Council of Four were those, not of himself alone, but of the British War Cabinet and Empire Delegation, specially convened in Paris for the purpose. I had myself been prevented by indisposition from attending these meetings; but, having read a full account of what had passed, I was at liberty to tell the Ambassador that the action to which he objected had been endorsed by the unanimous voice of those who were present, and, whether it was wise or unwise, it represented the considered opinion of the British Government.

The Ambassador did not know whether anything had been done to ease the strained situation which had arisen in consequence, nor had I any information which could give him relief on this point.

I told him, however, that our information as to the intention of the Germans was not quite identical with his. The chances of a refusal to sign seemed greater than he had allowed for, and I could quite well conceive that dictates of the highest political expediency might suggest a modification of terms that would ensure a reluctant signature in preference to an obstinate refusal.

Passing from these subjects, I said it was my duty to call the attention of M. Cambon to a number of points of minor interest which, however, were not without their effect upon the relations of our two Governments and peoples. For some time past his Excellency had deplored to me the feelings of irritation that had been reported between British and French officials in the Middle East, and had complained to me of the attitude of our representatives. I reminded him that I had enquired into the whole of these cases, and in the great majority of them had been able to return most satisfactory replies. Now, however, it was incumbent upon me to point out a number of cases in which it appeared to me that the French themselves had not shown that attitude of friendliness and conciliation, the alleged absence of which in ourselves he had so earnestly and repeatedly deplored.

The first of these incidents had arisen in Persia. It was now some months since the Ambassador himself had come to me to explain that the French Government had been approached with a view to appointing a Financial Adviser in Persia and to interesting themselves generally in the affairs of that country. He had, upon instructions from Paris, consulted me as to the advisability of the French acting in this sense, and had at the same time assured me that the French desired to disinterest themselves from acquiring any influence in a country which clearly lay within the political ambit of Great Britain. I had accordingly on that occasion asked his Government to desist from any action of the sort referred to, and he had given me a promise to that effect. What, there-

fore, was not my surprise to learn that the new French Minister in Tehran, M. Bonin, had signalled his arrival there by a display of quite exceptional activity in the interests of his country, culminating in an attempt to extract from the Persian Government permission to appoint not less than fourteen officials to the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice in the Persian capital. I said that such an influx of Frenchmen into Tehran, however excellent they might be, and however useful in their professional spheres, could not fail to mean the practical absorption of those two departments by the French, while it ran the risk of reproducing in Tehran once again that unfortunate competition and rivalry between European Powers, upon which the Persian Government had relied in the past, and which had been the source of so much international trouble. If France desired to disinterest herself in Persia, why should she wish to have Frenchmen in the service of the Persian Government at all? It was perfectly clear that, when the war was over, whatever might happen at the Paris Conference, Persia would require both financial and administrative assistance from outside. To whom, in such circumstances, could she turn but to Great Britain? What other Power would have the real interest or would be able to find the money? Persia had always been an Indian interest of considerable importance; but now that her territories lay between those of India on the one hand and of Mesopotamia on the other, both regions under British administration, it would really be making gratuitous mischief to introduce any other European competitor on to the scene. I felt sure that the French Government, if appealed to, would desist from an attempt, not only inconsistent with their previous utterances, but likely to breed the very quarrels they deplored.

M. Cambon told me that this was the first he had heard of the matter, and it greatly surprised him. He was not at all convinced that M. Bonin had acted under instructions from the French Government. He was a gentleman of active and ambitious temperament, who had previously been consul in Cairo, and he was not at all unlikely to be affected by the well-known *morbus consularis*. M. Cambon would not hesitate, when he returned to Paris presently, to mention the matter to M. Clemenceau. For the moment, all that was necessary for him to do was to repeat the assurances as to French action or inaction at Tehran which he had already given.

I pointed out to him, before leaving the subject, that it was a matter on which I felt seriously, that I regarded the action of M. Bonin as distinctly provocative, and that he must understand my reference to the matter to be in the nature of a formal protest.

The next subject upon which I complained to the Ambassador was the recent conduct of the French High Commissioner in Constantinople. I reminded M. Cambon that, when he and I discussed the difficulties that arose there some weeks ago, he had himself laid down the proposition that they would all be solved if the High Commissioners of the Great Powers, instead of acting independently of each other, would meet together and make their decisions and issue their communications as the result of the combined action of the three or four. He and I had, indeed, just concluded a tentative agreement to that effect. And yet, what had happened in Constantinople? The Grand Vizier had recently expressed a desire that he should be heard in Paris on behalf of his countrymen. As to the grounds upon which this petition was either made or granted, I said that I myself was still in doubt. If a Turkish delegation was to be invited to Paris to receive the peace terms which had been agreed upon by the Powers, the position would be analogous to what it had already been in the case of Germany and of Austria, and I presumed to what it would be in the case of Bulgaria and of Turkey also. In such a case there was nothing to object to in the request. If, on the other hand, the Turkish delegation desired to be heard, irrespective of the terms of peace, I could not conceive why such a request should have been granted to Turkey alone of all the belligerents; and it seemed to me that, if this were the case, Paris was advancing on to very delicate ground. Apart from that, however, what I desired to complain of was the method pursued. The Supreme Council in Paris, having decided to issue the invitation, the French High Commissioner in Constantinople, instead of acting with his colleagues, had rushed round to the Grand Vizier to explain that the permission had been granted by the good offices of the French alone; he had published a statement in the press to the same effect; and he had arranged for the Grand Vizier to be conveyed to Marseilles on a French man-of-war. Such a proceeding on his part was, I thought, not only objectionable, but distinctly disloyal.

A further incident had happened which revealed a similar disposition on the part of the French. The Turkish Crown Prince, or Heir Apparent, had sent a telegram appealing for sympathy and support to the rulers of Great Britain, France, and Italy. This Prince was in exactly the same position as the Crown Prince of Germany, that is

to say, he was the eldest son of a monarch who had been, and still was, at war with the Allied Powers. Was it conceivable that such a telegram, coming from the German Crown Prince, would have received any reply? In this spirit, no answer had been returned by our King, and the same attitude had been taken up, after consultation with us, by the King of Italy. What was not, therefore, our surprise when we learnt that the President of the French Republic had actually, through the medium of the French Foreign Office, sent a telegram of thanks to the Turkish Crown Prince, and, in a message signed by M. Pichon himself, had assured him that France would not neglect the vital interests of Turkey. Mr. Lloyd George had already protested to M. Clemenceau against this proceeding, the impropriety of which had been frankly recognised by the French Prime Minister; but I could not help drawing the attention of the French Ambassador to it, because it was an additional illustration of the spirit of international rivalry and intrigue which the French representatives appeared once more to be manifesting in the East. Great Britain had, I reminded M. Cambon, declared her reluctance to assume the mandate for Constantinople or Turkey, even should it be offered to her. France, after some hesitation, had taken the same line, as reported to me by the Ambassador himself. In these circumstances, what excuse was there for these backstairs attempts on the part of French representatives to depict themselves as the particular friends of the Oriental States or Governments whose fate could be determined only by common agreement in Paris?

I then gave M. Cambon a third illustration of the same spirit. If there was any region, I said, in which France had good cause to be grateful for our support, it was in Syria itself. Not only had Mr. Lloyd George in the Councils of Paris openly declared that Great Britain neither desired nor would accept, if it were offered to her, a mandate for Syria, but we had actually telegraphed an intimation to the same effect to the Emir Feisal. Our policy, therefore, was aboveboard and known. If difficulties remained, they were not so much between the French and ourselves as between the French and the Arabs, who, according to my information, appeared exceedingly reluctant to accept France as a mandatory. Of all the French representatives in those regions, the one who had received most encouragement and assistance from us was M. Picot, the joint author of the unfortunate Sykes-Picot Agreement. This gentleman had on many occasions turned to us for aid. He had been taken, under the protection of the late Sir Mark Sykes, to Aleppo and Damascus. Every effort had been made by our representatives to secure him a good reception and a friendly hearing from the Arab and Syrian population. M. Picot indeed owed his entire position to ourselves. I was therefore very much surprised when I read that he had, on the 13th May, in a speech to the school teachers of Beirut, expressed himself as follows:—

"A people once asked the French to help them to gain their independence. The French responded and within a year the desired end was achieved. These people were the Americans and the country from which they were freed was Great Britain. Having appreciated the help given, the Americans asked what reward they could give. 'Have your independence, that is the only reward we seek,' said the French. The same attitude is now held towards Syria. To see you independent is what we long for. You have my assurance that France will help you to this end."

Having read this extract to the Ambassador, I said that I thought the Syrians would be greatly surprised to learn that it was to the French that they must look for their independence. But, putting that aside, the suggestion that it was from Great Britain that this independence was in danger, and that the French were appearing upon the scene as the emancipators of Syria from the British yoke, appeared to me to be an astonishing travesty of the facts.

The Ambassador sought to make little of the American analogy, and enlarged upon the French desire to secure and protect the independence of Syria. But neither in this case nor in those that I had mentioned previously did he seriously contest my proposition that these incidents were much to be regretted, and, in concluding our conversation, he promised to take an early opportunity of bringing them to the attention of the French Government.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[89010]

No. 53.

M. Cambon to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 16.)

EN répondant, le 27 mai dernier, à l'Ambassadeur de France au sujet du Payeur Principal Moulin, conseiller financier auprès de l'administrateur de la zone est, à Damas, sa Seigneurie le Principal Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères a bien voulu signaler que, aux termes de l'accord du 30 septembre 1918, les conseillers ou fonctionnaires français devaient être nommés à la demande de l'État arabe—condition qui n'aurait pas été, en l'espèce, réalisée.

Le Gouvernement français a chargé l'Ambassadeur de France de faire remarquer à sa Seigneurie le Principal Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères que l'État arabe n'est pas encore constitué et que les conseillers techniques détachés à Damas ont été désignés par le Général Allenby en territoire d'occupation. Aussi le Gouvernement français estime-t-il que la réponse donnée par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté ne correspond pas à la situation actuelle, et désire-t-il, ainsi que l'a fait connaître la note de M. Paul Cambon du 18 mai dernier, voir préciser les attributions du Payeur Principal Moulin, conseiller financier, dont les fonctions ne peuvent s'exercer utilement dans les conditions présentes.

M. Paul Cambon saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 13 juin 1919.*

[89850]

No. 54.

Brigadier-General Clayton to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 17.)

*General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
June 5, 1919.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward copies of reports rendered by Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwallis, Deputy Chief Political Officer at Damascus.

These reports give a clear appreciation of the political situation and they may be taken to be accurate, as Lieutenant-Colonel Cornwallis enjoys to an exceptional degree the confidence of Emir Feisal and of the Arabs in general.

I have, &c.

*G. E. CLAYTON, Chief Political Officer,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.*

Enclosure in No. 54.

Report by British Liaison Officer on Political Situation in Arabia.

(No. 24. Secret.)

THE visit of the Commander-in-chief on the 12th instant was given a political significance, and every effort was made to render it a success.

Organised bands of school-children and patriots wandered about the town during the day demanding independence, and a large crowd gathered round the Emir's house after lunch to honour the Commander-in-chief. Sheikh Abdel Kader-el-Muzghar started to make a speech but had to be stopped in mid-career. The demonstrations were all arranged by the police, no doubt under the orders of the Emir.

2. During the week there have been many political meetings and gatherings. Deputations have come in from all parts of the country to welcome Feisal and are being entertained at Government expense. The most important meeting was held on Wednesday afternoon. The official account of this is attached (Appendix "A"). By it, Feisal stands pledged to the independence programme and has received full powers from the notables. This gives him no new official standing since the notables had no mandates from their communities, but it is another proof that he stands very high in popular favour at present. The Pan-Syrian Conference, to which he refers in his speech, was to have been held with the object of bringing about a *coup d'État* by the immediate declaration of complete independence without reference to the Peace

Conference, and of discussing the form of Government to be set up. The Commander-in-chief, however, disapproved the idea which has been abandoned.

3. The "Nadi-el-Arab" has affixed a notice to its club-room stating that as the club is scientific and social, politics must not be discussed inside the building, and no more political meetings will be held. This is a "camouflage." Feisal realises that the club has fallen into political disrepute and can be of no further use to him, and he has, therefore, dissolved both the "Hizb-el-Istiklal" and the "Ittihad-es-Suri," and stated that there will be no more political societies in O.E.T. East. He knows, however, that it would be easier to dam the Falls of Niagara than to stop the Syrians from talking politics, and he will, therefore, allow discussions to continue in the houses of members. His policy is to bring the Extremists into line and to prevent the creation of an opposition party, and he claims to know everything which is going on. There is no doubt that he does, and he certainly has been very successful so far. The politicians are said to be bickering a good deal amongst themselves.

Feisal has taken the whole of the political campaign into his own hands, and has already sent instructions to all parts of the country. These instructions will be communicated to the people by Government officials, who, no doubt, will be used for political purposes much more openly than before. The people have been told to ask for complete independence for Syria, and, at the same time, to express a hope that it will be granted to other Arab countries. By this compromise Feisal has reconciled the "Ittihad-es-Suri," which thinks only of Syria, with the pan-Arab empire enthusiasts represented in the "Istikhal-el-Arabi."

Since the dissemination of these instructions he and the local politicians have been greatly perturbed by a letter received from Rustum Bey Haidar, the Arab representative in Paris, saying that it will be fatal to ask for complete independence, as the Powers have decided that there must be a mandate. People have been flocking round to ask whether Great Britain will accept the mandate if one is insisted on, and have taken no comfort either from evasive answers or advice to be honest and ask for what they really want. Several proposals are under discussion—to ask alternatively for British, American, or joint Allied control (Great Britain, France, and America)—but they vary from day to day.

The politicians have only two convictions; firstly, that they want independence, and secondly that they do not want France. Anti-French feeling is surprisingly strong amongst the people who count, and it is very doubtful whether Feisal would be permitted to bring about a "rapprochement" even if he wanted to. Unless he is exceptionally untruthful, this is far from being his intention, but he will find it hard to keep up the deceitful game he is playing, especially as M. Picot has returned and may reasonably expect to see some visible results of the Clemenceau-Feisal agreement. In any case, he cannot keep up the farce after the arrival of the Commission, since he intends to say quite frankly that fear of the French has forced him into his complete independence campaign, and that he would be willing to accept a British mandate at any time. Both he and his followers realise their weaknesses, and are frightened at what may happen if they are left alone. They are at present in a state of complete indecision, fearful lest the course they have taken is the wrong one, doubtful whether they can or should draw back, distrustful of our intention to help though recognising our general sympathy.

4. Feisal is beginning to realise the difficulties which he will have in reconciling the Palestinians and Zionists, and no longer treats the question as a minor one. He has abandoned his idea of having a conference here, but intends to ask various notables to visit him separately and endeavour to convert them. He will also try to induce the Zionist Commission to moderate its demands, and will probably propose a conference to the Peace Commission.

Meanwhile Palestinians here are as vehement as before, and Mohamed-es-Saleh-el-Husseini, of Nablus, has been advocating the defence of Arab independence in Palestine by the sword. Abdel Kader-el-Muzghar, also, does not allow his opinions to mellow with time. There was a meeting yesterday in honour of Feisal, at which the speeches aimed at independence and inclusion in the Syrian State. They were censored beforehand, and contained nothing very objectionable.

5. M. Kasbani, a Syrian cotton merchant from Manchester, and recently secretary-general of the Hejaz Delegation at the Peace Conference, has just arrived. He will act as liaison officer between Feisal and the Peace Commission. He has brought with him notes for a draft Syrian constitution.

6. Feisal has given his different heads of departments much greater freedom, and told them to refer direct to him on all important matters. This reduces the Chief

Administrator to a position of complete inferiority, and Feisal hopes that Ali Riza will resign. He realises Ali Riza's incapacity, but, always inclined to take the line of least resistance in personal matters, does not wish to offend him by dismissal.

Sherif Jemil, the first cousin of Feisal, is being sent to the Hauran as Mutessarif. In this connection, Feisal is sending instructions to all Governors, telling them to rely on the advice of political officers, and to consult them more freely than they have hitherto done. He has summoned the chief Sheikhs of the Hauran—settled and Bedu—and is going to try and come to a workable understanding in conference.

The Druses are also discussing their future Government with him.

7. Feisal asked the Commander-in-chief for approval and equipment for an army of 14,000, and was told to submit a case. His real object is undoubtedly to form a nucleus with which to fight the French if the necessity arises. He has already begun a spirited recruiting campaign in the press and elsewhere, and was the first to enrol himself as a private soldier in the new national army. The proposal will fall thoroughly flat amongst the people, who only want to be left in peace and quiet. He has been told that he cannot conscript, but he intends to bring to bear what he calls "moral suasion." It will be wise not to enquire into the details of this.

His immediate task is to bring to efficiency the brigade which was approved some time ago, and to ensure this he will probably ask the Commander-in-Chief for the loan of British officers for the cavalry, French for the artillery, and American for the infantry.

8. An emissary has come in from Ibn Rashid with a letter addressed to the British Military Governor and Sherif Feisal, proposing a reconciliation, and professing a readiness to obey orders. The emissary is an ordinary Bedouin and has little news of importance.

H. CORNWALLIS, *Lieutenant-Colonel, D.C.P.O.*

Damascus, May 16, 1919.

Note.—M. Picot has expressed his approval of Said Pasha Shoucair coming here to take over the finance. I have therefore wired to him to report at once.

APPENDIX (A).

Emir Feisal's Address to the Notables of Syria in the Town Hall of Damascus, the May 9, 1919, at 3 P.M.

The direct cause of the war against the Turks was to save the Arabs from the results of a war in which the Turks and their Allies were not expected to succeed.

Then after he had spoken about the war, the preliminary treaties made by his father, King Hussein, with some European nations, and of the good effects of the war, he spoke about his experiences in Europe. He said that people in Europe were ignorant of the present condition of the Arabs, and thought them to be still those savage ignorant nomadic tribes about whom they read in old books of history and legend. This gave me great difficulty in convincing them that the Arabs were one single nation, living in one country bounded by three seas from the south, east, and west, and by the Taurus range from the north.

When the Allies were better enlightened on the present conditions of the Arabs and understood their national hopes and wishes, and appreciated the great service they rendered to the Allies in this war, they agreed in principle to give them their independence. They also decided to send an international commission to make a thorough study of the character and condition of the Arabs.

In the Conference I spoke on two points:—

1. The indivisibility of the Arab country and that the Arab nation demands its absolute independence.

2. Owing to the difference in habits and in the degree of education and civilisation of the different parts of the countries, and to the difficulties in the lines of communication amongst them, I asked that El-Hedjaz, Syria, and El-Irak, should each have an independent Government by itself, but all united within the great union of Arab countries. Moreover, Nejd and the smaller parts of Arabia will be attached to the Hedjaz.

I spoke and I asked that the independence of El-Irak and of Syria should not be sold for the little help she needs from the outside, but Syria should be allowed to buy that help for what it is worth.

The little opposition that I experienced at first was caused partly by misunderstanding and partly by ignorance of what the Arabs wanted. The Europeans thought that the troubles that commonly took place in the country were the fault of the Arabs, and expressed their apprehension of our renewing such troubles, but when it was explained to them that the Turks were the cause of all the troubles in Syria, they agreed in principle to all that you asked, and the Inter-Allied Commission will soon arrive and will ask you to express freely your wishes with regard to the future of your country. In the League of Nations, which was formed to guarantee the peace of the world, the Arab nation will have one delegate. After its return to Europe, the Inter-Allied Commission will give a report of the demands of each of the nations liberated from the Turks, and it is according to these reports that the Peace Conference will decide the future of these countries. Thanks to our Allies, our foreign duty has already been accomplished, and it now remains to you to choose to be either slaves or masters of your destiny.

Before I tell you what we ought to do, I will say that so far we have done all without taking the opinion of the nation to see if they approve of our work or not. This was not done, because we had no time or chance of doing it; but now I take the opportunity of your presence here to ask you some questions, Gentlemen; though you are not elected to represent your people, your place in society and moral standing with regard to your people make you worthy of making an effective representation. Now please hear the questions, and give your answers to them:

"Do you approve of all that we have done?"

"Yes, good." (Great applause.)

"Are these deeds satisfactory to the people?"

"Quite satisfactory." (Great acclamations.)

"Is what we have done in conformity with the wishes of the nation?"

"Quite so; exactly." (Great applause.)

"Now these are our past deeds, and as you are present I have to ask your personal opinion whether you want us to go on with our work or not?"

"We shall go on, we shall go on." (Strong applause.)

"Does the nation depend upon the one that is pleading her cause?"

"With all good-will and confidence."

"Now listen to what I have to say: Does the nation permit me to handle her internal and foreign affairs, or not?"

"Yes, yes." ("Long live Feisal.")

"I thank you, Gentlemen, for your confidence in me and for your satisfaction with my deeds. You know that a lawyer cannot defend the rights of people unless he has official documents which he can present to the authorities, proving him to be a true representative of the defendant; so it is with politicians. They have to be appointed by those they say that they represent, and should be given power in all the matters whose discussion may take place. Now I have to ask the nation this question: Does the nation back me in speech and in action in all that I do in the country and outside; and does the nation give me all that I ask for without objection or discussion?"

"Yes, yes; yours is the command."

"That is what I want, and these are the essential points that are needed by the man or men who are authorised to deal with the political problems till the time when the Syrian Congress is held. To be able to work I wanted to have this authorisation; I asked it from you and you gave it to me, so now I ask God to lend His helping hand to me in my struggle for the welfare of this country.

"Gentlemen, be wise and cautious, and do not say that the nations have given you your independence thus sitting still and neglecting your duty towards your country. Gentlemen, it is you who decide the future of your homeland by saying in one voice that you want it, and proving to the nation that you are fit for it.

"I say that because of the great welcome of the nation for me, which will make me expect from her very strong backing in action whenever I ask that from her.

"What I asked from you to-day is short and summarised, simply because I do not know what I need in the future; but after I have got the approval of this honourable assembly, I shall ask the nation to back me physically and morally."

"Sad-ed-Din El-Khalil, one of the representatives of the Hauran, said: "The Hauran offers to his Highness all that he asks."

A delegate from Palestine said: "The blood and the property of the Palestinians are yours."

A delegate of the Amiriyen (Arabs) said: "We are equipped for war; we and all the Arabs are under your orders. The one who is killed let him die."

Emir Feisal: "Please stop and let the delegates of each district choose one to speak for them."

Then the delegates of the different districts began to rise in turn and show their approval of his work, and give him the authorisation to work as he sees fit for the welfare of Syria.

Their exact words were as follows:—

The Hauran delegate said: "The Hauran offers to his Highness all that he asks."

Nouri Pasha Shalan (head of the Rowala Arabs) said: "We, the Arabs, our families, and our hair-tents are under your orders, and the one who does not obey leaves the Moslem Faith."

Nasib Bey Atrash (Druze chief from the Hauran): "All the tribes in Syria whether Arabs, or Druzes, sacrifice their lives in your service and the service of the Arab nation, and the one who does not do this has no honour, and is a traitor to the Arabs."

Sheikh Abd-el-Hussein Sadik (Jebel Amil): "In the name of the inhabitants of Jebel Amil, I consider you my sovereign, even to death (this is the translation of one Arabic word which people said to the Khalifs on their becoming Khalifs. It is a sort of appointment of the Khalif and a vow of allegiance to him").

Emir Feisal: "It is not time for it yet; we are now in Damascus and I want to ask the people of Damascus, and then the other districts of Syria."

Mohammed Fauzi Pasha-el-Azm, Mohammed Abdul Kheir Effendi Abdeen and Sheikh Asad-el-Salib of Damascus, said: "Ready to accomplish your orders, we sacrifice ourselves for you and lay all confidence in you as our representative."

Catholic Patriarch: "Just as your Highness orders—so please order what you want."

Then his Highness asked the Greek Orthodox Patriarch who answered: "We came to an agreement in this very room under conditions that your Highness still has in memory, and I stick to that."

The Catholic Patriarch again: "I say just as my colleague, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch has just intimated."

This was also repeated by the Mutran of Syrian Catholic Church.

Said Pasha Suleiman of Baalbek: "All the inhabitants of the Kaza Baalbek are at your service: hundreds and thousands awaiting your orders."

Omar Bey-el-Atasi of Homs: "I only said farewell to the people of Homs after they had entrusted me with the power to represent them. They hand to you their blood and lives."

Ibrahim Effendi-el-Khateeb (Southern Lebanon): "We choose you as our Sultan." (Emir Feisal, smiling: "Leave that aside now"). "Mount Lebanon is at part to complete Syria and would not be separated from it."

Abd-el-Kadar Effendi Kilani of Hama: "We agree with you with our lives and property, and lay all confidence in you."

Sheikh Riza Rifai of Aleppo: "All the inhabitants of Aleppo, citizens, and nomads, lay confidence in your Highness."

Shawkal Effendi-el-Hirabi of Ma'ama: "60,000 of the district of Ma'ama lay confidence in you."

Sheikh Abu-el-Medj El-Mograbi of Tripoli: "The nation sacrifices her life and possessions for you."

Riza Bey Sulh of Beirut: "The Arabic nation lays confidence in your Highness."

Riaz Bey Sulh of Sidon: "The hopes of the nation are attached to your Highness; the nation sacrifices her blood and soul for you, and from this minute I volunteer as a simple soldier."

A Jarkas young man from Amman: "We sacrifice our children and possessions for the good of the Arab nation."

Mauh Effendi, Haroun of Sathikiya: "A friend of mine and myself were sent from Sathikiya with documents in our hands that enable us to speak for their loyalty and to lay confidence in your Highness to do what you think good for the country."

Adib Effendi, Wibbeh of Salt: "The inhabitants of Es Salt are the servants of your Highness. They sacrifice their lives and blood for you."

Emir Asad-el-Ayoubi of Lebanon: "We give your Highness full authority to work for absolute independence."

Mustapha Bey Awad, on behalf of the Druzes of Lebanon: "Everything that you see good is good and we give you our full confidence."

Abd-el-Razala Effendi, El-Daudashly of Husn-el-Akrad: "The inhabitants of Husn-el-Akrad, who form one-fifth of the inhabitants of El-Eutasarrifya of Tripoli, authorise your Highness to represent them, and they pour their blood for you."

The Religious Head of the Jews: "Our possessions and souls are in your hands."

Emir Feisal: "I have got what I wanted."

Then the Mutran of the Armenian refugees spoke in Turkish thanking the Arabs for their good treatment to the Armenian refugees during the four years of war, and said that in their history the name of the Arabs shall be written in letters of gold, so now I thank and congratulate you.

After hearing what the delegates said Emir Feisal continued his speech, saying:—

"There is no doubt that after I have received this authorisation from this honourable assembly I shall continue my work as before till the meeting of the Syrian Congress, which will formulate the laws for all Syria.

"I shall tell you now my personal opinion as regards the Government of this country, aiming by this at an explanation of the situation to the people, and a tranquillization of their minds without regard to religion or creed. I think that more attention should be paid to the votes of the minority, thus to efface the hatred and religious faction created by the Turks, and to sow in its place the seeds of love and of fraternity amongst the members of the different religions. I also think of dividing the country into parts according to its geographical location and to its attainments and habits, so that the southern part of Syria will not be governed like the northern part, and the Hauran and Jebel Druse will have special laws, which will be in conformity with the wishes of the people. So also we shall have for the coast and for the interior of the country. This, as I have said, is my personal opinion, but without doubt it will effect the public, and we will do according to it.

"For the attainment of the cherished independence please depend on God first and then on my humble person, and be sure that I will have no difference between the members of the different religious sects.

"I have no distinction between the members of the different sects, and I only look to degrees of education and promote the one who is fit only, never asking whose son he is or to what religious sect he belongs. In private affairs we should respect people of noted families, but we should not give them responsible posts unless they are fit for them, and then it is their education and character that gives them the post. We should not play with the Government posts because they are not ours but the nation's property, and the holders thereof are the trustees of the rights of the nation.

"I beseech you, sons of the nation, to depend and trust in our Allies who helped us, and who wish us good success and have no ambitions but to help us to progress. So we ought to prove to them that we are an energetic nation that wants her independence.

"Show them that we protect neighbours and refugees, that we help our old and young, and that we respect those of their number who come to us and work for us in this dear country of ours.

"I beg this especially from you because this is the only foundation on which we can build our future work, and I also beg from you to unite for the common cause, a thing which it is as much your duty as it is mine and to work towards it. I tell you that you will have no independence unless you keep the peace and do exactly as I tell you."

A few words as an excuse for the long speech and the faults made therein ended his address.

(For Lieutenant-Colonel, D.C.P.O.),

G. R. HUNTER, Captain.

May 12, 1919.

[91521]

No. 55.

Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 269.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 11, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 950 of the 10th June, I have the honour to forward one copy of a note by Captain Garland, of the Arab Bureau, on the "Khurma dispute."

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 55.

Note by Captain Garland, of the Arab Bureau, on the Khurma Dispute between King Hussein and Ibn Saud.

Ibn Saud.

IN 1915 a treaty was arranged between Emir Ibn Saud and His Britannic Majesty's Government, in which the latter recognised Ibn Saud as the independent sovereign of Nejd, El Hasa, Catif, and Jubail. It was a temporary agreement made chiefly for reasons of military expediency after the expulsion of the Turks, and no definite boundaries of the territory were specified.

Ikhwan.

Although generally regarded as a new creation, the Ikhwan or Brotherhood movement is really a revival in an intensified form of Wahabism, the great puritanical revolt against orthodox Mohammedanism in the 18th century, which was ultimately crushed by the Egyptian troops under Mohammed Ali in 1817, and which, since then, has existed in a merely moribund state chiefly within the confines of Nejd.

The tenets of the Ikhwan creed are very similar to those of Wahabism, though its followers are without doubt more fanatical. To the non-Moslem, however, it is the brutal methods of effecting conversions and of punishing sinners, rather than the principles of the creed itself, that appear objectionable. There is no doubt whatever that the Bedouin are systematically terrorised into conversion, and that those who refuse are done to death. In war, the Ikhwan are said to take no prisoners, but to cut the throats of all who fall into their hands.

It has been stated repeatedly that Ibn Saud had no connection with the Ikhwan movement in its early stages, and this is probably true, but it is now sufficient for our present purposes to know, firstly, that the sect originated close by his own capital, and was allowed to flourish there, and its leading missionaries are his own subjects; secondly, that it is merely a desperately fanatical edition of Wahabism, of which he is the acknowledged leader; and, thirdly, that Ibn Saud has recently put himself at the head of the movement, and will certainly not fail to use it for furthering his own ends.

For the purposes of this review, therefore, it is unnecessary to differentiate between Ibn Saud and the Ikhwan, or between the latter and the Wahabis.

Since the first appearance of the Ikhwan, about ten years ago, in the vicinity of the Nejd capital, Riyadh, it has made rapid progress. It is practically certain that the whole of Nejd is Ikhwan, and its missionaries have penetrated to all the corners of Arabia.

But its doctrines are detested by all orthodox Moslems, and the rulers of the Arab States surrounding Nejd (especially King Hussein) live in constant dread of its spread to their people.

Khurma Dispute.

The present Khurma crisis has two causes, one religious, the other political. The religious cause is the King's determination to stop Ikhwan sectarian propaganda in the Hejaz; the political cause is the dispute as to the actual ownership of the Khurma district.

King Hussein has put forward a very good case in proof of his ownership of

Khurma, and this, after much delay, has received the support of His Britannic Majesty's Government, but Ibn Saud, who bases his claim more upon the allegiance of the population of the Khurma district than on ownership of the actual ground, agreed that the quarrel should be submitted to our arbitration.

The territorial dispute has its origin in the conversion to Wahabism, in 1914, of the King's local representative at Khurma, a Sherif named Khalid, whom the King appointed Emir of Khurma before the war. By embracing Wahabism, Khalid became a rebel, and for four years the King appears to have taken no steps to rectify the position at Khurma or to collect his taxes there. In 1918, however, he sent tax gatherers, but they were arrested by Khalid, who, realising that his action meant war, collected a scrap Bedouin force with which he ejected all loyal elements from Khurma.

In May 1918, the King drew our attention to Ibn Saud's "oppression and encroachment on tribes bound firmly to the Emirs of Mecca from ancient times," and said that, in consequence, he had been compelled to send a force to Khurma. This force consisted of about 800 Bedou under Sherif Hamud, a brother of Emir Shakir, and though it was claimed to have restored order soon after its arrival at Khurma, the King sent reinforcements in June, consisting of 82 men, 2 old guns, and 2 machine guns. This force was surprised by a party of Ikhwan, losing fourteen killed and all its guns.

Military Incidents.

Following this defeat, Emir Shakir was despatched by the King to the Khurma district with about 800 men and 4 guns and 6 machine guns. The King stated that he was to occupy Khurma as Emir of Ateibah tribe (Khurma is Ateibah territory). Shakir's force ultimately arrived at Marran.

The next military incident was an attack by a loyal Ateibah sub-tribe (the Miqatah) under their Sheikh, Shuleiwih, against the Ikhwan in Khurma, but they were utterly routed. This attack was probably, though not necessarily, instigated by Shakir.

In August, Shakir moved from Marran and met the Ikhwan at Hannu Wells, 16 miles east of Khurma, where his force was annihilated. It was reported that during the conflict one of the Ateibah tribal sections (the Ruqa) deserted *en masse* to the Ikhwan. Each side was blamed by the other as the aggressor in this action, but it was undoubtedly the result of Shakir's advance from Marran, which may not, however, have been intended aggressively by him.

Up to this time Ibn Saud, pronouncing the King the aggressor in every incident, declined to be responsible for his men at Khurma, though he affirmed that he himself would not intervene. In spite, however, of Ibn Saud's repeated denials of lending support to Khalid and the Ikhwan, he cannot be absolved. Khalid, undoubtedly, was acting as his agent, and looked to him for guidance and help. In fact, a letter written to Ibn Saud by Khalid, after the Hannu Wells fight, and which was seen by Mr. Philby, contained a full report of the action, and stated that the captured guns were being kept pending the orders of Ibn Saud as to disposal.

This defeat necessitated the despatch of further reinforcements to Emir Shakir, and accordingly more guns and machine guns were sent from Abdullah's camp, but, except for minor raids by the Ikhwan, on caravans taking supplies from Taif to Shakir's base, there were no military incidents for some time. The King and Abdullah continually repeated their promises to keep to defensive measures only, and denied all aggressive intentions.

In one of the raids Abdullah's son had a narrow escape, and the Ikhwan captured all his belongings. This incensed Abdullah, and he is known by the writer to have made up his mind at that time to obtain his revenge as soon as an opportunity occurred; he was itching to move Khurmawards in person.

But although the King and Abdullah had been warned consistently by us to avoid aggressive acts or even an advance on Khurma, it must be emphasised that this policy of ours was dictated purely by military expediency, and was decided upon in spite of our strong sympathy with the King's claim to Khurma. It was realised that the Sherifians could spare neither commanders, troops, nor guns from the forces which were besieging Medina, and further, that a big defeat at Khurma at that time would probably result in a disastrous reaction on the siege operations by heartening Fakhri Pasha and enabling him to come to some arrangement with Ibn Saud for the further defence of the city or for surrendering it to the Ikhwan.

Little was done, however, by India to call off Ibn Saud or to order him to cease his anti-Sherifian propaganda amongst Hejaz tribes. The Indian view at that time was

that it would be wrong for us to support the King in military action against our treaty Ally, Ibn Saud, and it was not until March 1919 that a message was sent by His Majesty's Government to Ibn Saud, "advising him to modify his attitude and to persuade his followers from further opposition to the administrative measures of King Hussein at Khurma."

The fall of Medina, in January 1919, left Abdullah free to set out on his long-cherished expedition to Khurma, which, he had often prophesied, would be over, with the complete destruction of Ibn Saud's forces, within two days of his (Abdullah's) arrival on the scene.

It was feared by British advisers on both sides (Iraq and Egypt) that Abdullah's ill-advised move must inevitably result in a collision of the rival forces, and it is quite probable that had Abdullah remained in Medina the present crisis would not have arisen. Indeed, had we been aware of the Emir's actual warlike intentions, we should no doubt have strongly protested against the advance instead of merely suggesting the impropriety of it. Abdullah's regular force consisted of 60 officers, 770 other ranks, 10 guns, and 20 machine guns. It reached Asheirah early in April. As soon as he learned of Abdullah's move from Medina, Ibn Saud began counter preparations. He certainly warned His Britannic Majesty's Government of these, and, reasserting his wish for arbitration, stated that he was compelled by pressure of public opinion to take measures against aggression by the Sherifian troops. "If the King and Abdullah will remain in their own places," he said, "I will remain in mine." But although we looked upon Abdullah's advance as unwise and foolhardy, and advised him not to start, we do not, and cannot, deny his right to occupy Khurma.

The next military incident was a raid by Ikhwan (as reported by Abdullah) on loyalists at Degheibjah early in May 1919. The raiders were pursued by a detachment of Abdullah's who failed to overtake them, but intercepted and defeated a second Ikhwan party, said to be *en route* to attack a Sherifian post at Madarmah. About the same date, another detachment of Ikhwan was attacked at Radheim by a patrol of Abdullah's and routed, whilst sleeping, by a hand-grenade bombardment. Of these raids we have not yet received reports from Ibn Saud's side.

On the 21st Abdullah reported that, after two and a half hours' fighting, he occupied Tarabah, and that after consolidating it, he would advance to Khurma. In that report Abdullah stands self-condemned. He had obviously scrapped his defensive policy and doubtless decided to take the Ikhwan raid on Degheibjah as his excuse for an attack on Tarabah.

Abdullah also reported the arrival in person of Ibn Saud at Sakphah (80 miles north-east of Khurma).

We may be sure that if Ibn Saud does not deny that the Ikhwan raid on Degheibjah ever took place, he will certainly assert that it was not done at his instigation and was, therefore, an ordinary tribal raid for which he cannot be held responsible.

On the night of the 25th-26th May, the Ikhwan, under Emir Khalid, attacked Abdullah at Tarabah, driving him out, and, according to several accounts, destroyed his regular force, capturing all its guns and machine guns. Emir Abdullah got away with 500 irregular mounted men only, and retired to Okheidir. Later information shows that Sherif Sbaraf (Abdullah's second in command) had a small force at Kelaikh, which the Ikhwan attacked at dawn on the 26th May, but were repulsed, Sbaraf afterwards decided to join Abdullah at Okheidir. The retirement on this latter place was probably necessary to protect the Sherifial base at Asheirah.

With the destruction of Abdullah's army, the road from Khurma to Taif lies open to the enemy. Mecca and even Jeddah are at the mercy of the fanatical Ikhwan. From Medina, Emir Ali can only send reinforcements of the same fighting value as Abdullah's original force.

Results.

It is a sad fact that, in every conflict with the Ikhwan, the Sherifian forces have been badly defeated. Abdullah's regular army has failed the expectations of the British officers who served with it during the war. After two and a half years' experience of war service it has failed when put to its first crucial test, and although heavily equipped with guns and machine guns it apparently failed to put up any sort of a fight against an untrained enemy armed only with rifles.

Future Policy.

Although King Hussein may now receive temporary military assistance from us, the question arises—what steps does he propose to take for the permanent defence of Mecca and Medina? The rightful guardians of these places are, of course, the great Harb Tribal Confederation, in whose territory they lie, but whether they would obey a call to arms is problematical because their allegiance to the King has been impaired by the considerable arrears of pay in which Emirs Ali and Abdullah kept them during and since the war. And, further, they are just as vulnerable to the proselytising methods of the Ikhwan as the other tribes, and at a critical moment might go over *en masse* to the opposite side.

The Ikhwan menace will not cease when the present crisis is over. Aeroplane defence of Taif and Mecca can be but temporary, even if its moral effects (combined with our political pressure on Ibn Saud) are great enough to stall Ikhwan aggression, but directly our aeroplanes are withdrawn the pro-Nejd tribes on the frontier will recommence their raids and the safety of the Holy Places will depend on—

1. The maintenance of a regular force by the King. This, to be of any use must be trained and staffed by qualified officers, and must be of a very different type to the present Arab army.

2. Our hold on Ibn Saud from the east.

3. The King's alliance with Ibn Rashid.

The King should be able to maintain an army good enough to stop Ikhwan and other raids not organised or supported by Ibn Saud. Unfortunately, there seems to be little hope that the King's forces will ever be able to cope with Ibn Saud's armies, and the task of keeping the latter in check will therefore devolve on His Britannic Majesty's Government.

And with regard to the means at our disposal of subjugating Ibn Saud, it is suggested that threats by our forces on his eastern districts, Hasa, Hofuf, &c., from whence he draws his supplies and which are greatly prized at Riyadh, are much more likely to be effective than giving King Hussein military assistance which, as has been proved, is only an indirect method of ordnance supply for Ibn Saud.

It should not be forgotten that the King's dream of an Arab Empire, over which he or his successors will reign, is also Ibn Saud's dream, with himself in the leading rôle. But, whereas the King is dependent for his army upon mercenaries of the worst type, Ibn Saud has at his command large forces prompted by religious fanaticism of a most desperate and self-sacrificing character.

The third factor likely to be of use in keeping Ibn Saud in check would be by our fostering the promised alliance between King Hussein and Ibn Rashid. The latter has always been a doughty opponent of Wahabism, and can collect large Bedouin forces from Central Arabia for threatening the Nejd lines of communication. But this will no doubt mean paying a subsidy to Ibn Rashid, probably through the King. It is indeed difficult to see how Ibn Rashid can be brought into line without the inevitable subsidy drawn by all the other leading chiefs of Arabia. He himself appears willing to be the first Arabian chief to accept Hussein's suzerainty (at a price).

For the further repression of the Wahabi and Ikhwan movements, it will be necessary to include in the treaties ultimately to be made with the individual independent Arab rulers, except Ibn Saud, a clause under which the latter is made responsible that Ikhwan missionaries are not sent out of his territory, and, further, giving power to the other rulers to expel such Ikhwan missionaries as may obtain entry into their countries. Such a clause would give the utmost satisfaction to all the orthodox Moslem rulers.

Ibn Saud has now been ordered to withdraw all his forces from Khurma, failing which his intentions will be regarded as hostile to His Britannic Majesty's Government, and his treaty rights and subsidy will be forthwith cancelled.

The geography of the Khurma district is practically unknown to us—even the distance of Taif from Mecca is not agreed upon by those who have visited both places. Mr. Philby passed through Khurma on a journey from Riyadh to Jeddah in 1917, but he has not yet issued any detailed maps.

The position of the villages east of Taif, shown on the attached sketch map* are therefore only approximate.

H. GARLAND.

Arab Bureau, June 4, 1919.

* Not reproduced.

[91491]

No. 56.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 1007.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 18, 1919.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship herewith copies of various reports received either direct or through the American Delegation of the atrocities perpetrated by the Greek troops in Smyrna. The reports are detailed, circumstantial, and trustworthy, and there can unfortunately be no doubt of the disgraceful conduct of the Greek troops or of the lack of control of the Greek authorities.

Owing to the nature of the sources from which these reports have been received, your Lordship will appreciate that the documents themselves cannot be communicated in original to the Greek Government. I would suggest, however, that your Lordship should bring the substance of these papers to the knowledge of the Greek Government in the manner that you may deem most fitting.

I am, &c.

(For Mr. Balfour),

LOUIS MALLET.

Enclosure 1 in No. 56.

M. A. van der Zee to United States Senior Naval Officer, Constantinople.

(Confidential.)

Swedish Consulate, Smyrna, May 20, 1919.

Sir,

THE military occupation of Smyrna by the Greek forces.

I have the honour to report as follows:—

1. Early in the morning of the 15th instant, sailors and marines landed from the Greek ships, occupied the captaincy of the port, the sanitary offices, and the guard-house on the lesser quay, and, together with British sailors, the telegraph and post office buildings.

2. At about 9.30 summer time, the disembarkation of forces from the Greek transports arriving one after the other began simultaneously on the quay, between the Culb des Chasseurs and the Khedivial Steamship Agency, on a space of about half a mile, and at the railway pier of the Aidin Company at the point.

3. Forming up in companies, the troops marched down the quay to the barracks, situated at the extreme end thereof, opposite Government House, hemmed in by the rabble of the town.

4. At about 10.30, just as the head of the column had debouched into the main street of the Kemeralti-quarter, past the barracks, a few shots were fired—it is said, from a hotel and coffee-house.

5. The troops thereupon fell back, and, taking cover behind the trees and parterres of Clock Tower Square, opened fire on the barracks, Government House, and adjoining streets and buildings for about three-quarters of an hour, when a white flag shown from Government House induced a Greek sub-lieutenant to stop it.

6. According to the evidence of British and French subjects, eyewitnesses of the performance, not a shot had been fired by the barracks during the whole time of the fusillade, and this testimony is supported by the fact that when firing commenced some 200 civilians, including a Greek priest, sought refuge in the barracks, and were seen by very many persons leaving them when calm was restored.

7. Another proof that the barracks did not fire in the strife is the fact that no bullet marks are visible on the stores facing them, which would inevitably have been the case.

8. As soon as the danger of a stray bullet had passed the soldiery and the crowd rushed the Government House and the barracks.

9. The terror-stricken officials, the Governor-General at their head, and the officers, who had calmly awaited events, were, after being for the greater part stripped of all they possessed in the way of money and trinkets, marched with hands up into the square, and lined up, while the looting of Government House was proceeded with.

10. After being kept with hands up for about 20 minutes, the so-called prisoners (I use the word employed by the Greek officers) were marched up the quay, still hands up, to the transports, where they were put in the holds.

11. The Governor-General, who had been made to walk a good half-mile in a like

state, was, with the Commodore of Smyrna, the only exception, a motor-car having been provided for them.

12. The brutality of the troops to their prisoners during this mile-and-a-half march, the cold-blooded way in which they shot down defenceless men who were unable, on account of their wounds and the treatment they had received, to walk as fast as they were ordered, the savage and cynical manner in which they treated the bodies of their victims, booting off the heads of some and pushing others into the sea with their bayonets, have aroused the indignation and anger of the Europeans in this city, the officers of the *Entente* ships, and the crew of the "Adventure," who witnessed them.

13. I attach the statements of two British subjects, members of one of the oldest and most honourable family in this place, as their reports give fuller details of what occurred.

14. While these tragic scenes were being enacted on the quay a regular man-hunt had been organised in the side streets.

15. Led on by all the roughs of the town, the Greek soldiers, firing recklessly to right and left at every head that protruded from window or balcony, forced open houses and stores, dragged out the wretched Turks who had sought shelter therein, and, after robbing them of all they possessed, marched them to the transports, leaving the premises broken open to the prey of their co-religionaries, who had assisted them in this gallant task.

16. The reports that have come in of what was done in the side streets exceeds belief, and the conclusion that most Europeans have come to is that these arrests of harmless people, the manner in which these arrests were made, the brutality to which prisoners have been subjected, the spoliation of property, and the wanton destruction thereof have not been provoked by want of discipline on the part of the troops or the excitement of the populace, but are the results of a premeditated plan of action.

17. This is based, firstly, on the evident unwillingness of the Greek authorities to punish criminals who have been caught red-handed and brought before them; and, secondly, on the encouragement they had given to all the roughs of the place.

18. It is true to tell that the commander of the troops, Colonel Zaphiriou, issued proclamations to the effect that marauders will be severely punished, and that the doors of the court-martial are open ready to hear any complaints.

19. It is also true that two men have been shot, probably to throw dust in the eyes of the *Entente* naval and military authorities, who have bitterly complained of the misdeeds of his men, but the many instances of absolute refusal to punish criminals, the licence given to well-known bad characters to walk about armed to the teeth, and the expressions of opinion of all classes of the Greek community clearly prove that these proclamations and the executions above mentioned are but sops to Cerberus.

20. What the loss of life and property in the city has been cannot at present be established. I will report thereon as soon as reliable information can be obtained.

21. It is stated, though without authority, that between 700 and 800 persons have lost their lives.

22. While this state of affairs was reigning in the town, the bad characters in the suburbs of Smyrna and the surrounding villages, encouraged by the immunity granted to assassins and thieves, promptly set to work to murder as many Turks as they could lay hold of, and to rob every place they could break into.

23. *Cucuz-Tepe and Cocaryali*.—In these two suburbs about twenty persons have been killed. The loss of property is very great; big sums of money kept by the Turks in their houses have been robbed.

24. *Bournabat*.—In this village nine men were shot down and stranded, 1,000 sheep and about fifty horses, mares, and bullocks lifted. Loss of property, 8,000*l.*, and damage to standing crop difficult to estimate.

25. *Boudjah*.—Seventeen persons killed, and loss of property not yet estimated.

26. *Cordelia*.—Twenty-three persons killed in this place and adjacent villages. Loss of property great.

27. *Tahtali Villages*.—These two villages have been ransacked. Many of the inhabitants missing. Fate unknown.

28. *Djim-Ovassi*.—This place and all the villages around it (Jujukler, Keler, Kiény, Sasal, Deyirmen Lere, Tratz, Palamout, Chileme, and Curedje) have been sacked. Turkish population is invading trains leaving for Smyrna. Loss of lives very heavy. Figures not yet at hand. Some women and children found dead in Kokar Dere buried by Baron van Heemstra.

29. *Vourla*.—Villages around have been partly destroyed. No details yet obtained as to loss of life or property.

Before closing this report, I cannot refrain from expressing my regret that steps were not taken to obviate this loss of life and property. Had proper publication been made or small detachments landed from the ships to give this occupation the appearance of an inter-Allied one, there is absolutely no doubt that perfect order would have reigned.

I am, &c.

ALFRED VAN DER ZEE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 56.

Memorandum.

ON Friday, the 16th instant, having got an order from Colonel Lafoiow for three soldiers to guard our factory, which is situated at Haeha Boumar, I proceeded at 3:30 P.M. that same afternoon to the cataract of Haeha Boumar and found only one sentry on duty, surrounded by two or three civilians. I asked the sentry where I could find his corporal; he answered that he'll be returning soon, whilst someone else added that at the moment the body of troops stationed there were out "shooting sparrow." Being rather surprised at such an answer and seeing all their looks directed towards the gardens adjoining the Aidin Brewery, I soon found out and saw about 10/12 soldiers stalking two men; a shot was fired and a man rolled over, the body being immediately thrown in the river. The return of the band of soldiers followed soon after. I went up to the first soldier and asked who was the man that had just been shot, and he informed me that he was one of the two Turks they were after; the other, he said, managed to escape, but he also will be found and shot. It so happened that a woman at Haeha Boumar station was quite proudly relating this very same affair to her friend, adding that the Turk shot was the cavass of the Oriental Café Mts., Ltd., factory, situated quite near the shot. I want to add that the unfortunate cavass's body was still floating in the river on Saturday evening, the 17th instant, with only, as far as clothing consisted, a shirt on; the rest of the clothes had been stolen off this dead body.

H. E. S. SOLES.

Haeha Boumar, May 21, 1919.

Enclosure 3 in No. 56.

Statement of a most old and honourable Subject in Smyrna.

I WAS standing on the balcony of our office when the first batch of troops put in an appearance, accompanied by cheering Greek civilians. Six companies marched past the barrack entrance and disappeared round the corner, presumably towards the Turkish prison, when I heard some shots from the direction of the coffee-houses in that neighbourhood. Almost immediately after troops and civilians came rushing across the square in a state of panic. The troops then lined the edges of the square and commenced a terrible fusillade at the barracks, the coffee-houses, and Government House. What they were firing at was difficult to say, since, as far as I could make out, not a shot was fired from the barracks opposite. To my mind the trouble was provoked by the first few shots I heard, evidently the act of some patriotic hotheads. The fusillade was kept up by the Greeks for over half an hour, when a white flag, hoisted over the barracks, was at last seen by them.

As soon as the firing ceased the Turks in the barracks began to come out, holding up their hands in token of surrender. They were made to go through no end of humiliation and received a good deal of knocking about. I now left the office and began walking up the way almost at the same time as the first batch of prisoners was started, and noticed that the officers could with difficulty prevent their men from shooting the prisoners. As far as the custom-house I only saw one Turkish porter shot and then bayoneted. From there up to Kramer Palace Hotel I was the unwilling witness of the massacre of some thirty unarmed men, who were being marched with hands up. This butchery was committed by the Greek soldiery entirely.

At a point between the Corn Exchange and the Orient Bank I saw six being shot out of one batch within ten yards. At a point higher up I saw five others succumbing under the fire of Greek rifles. Close to the landing-place of the Cordelio boats I saw a

lot more shot down. Near Kramer I witnessed three more cases of shooting. The most horrible cases of brutality I witnessed were the following:—

- (a.) A fat Turkish officer, shot in the stomach, tried in his agony to sit up. A Greek soldier at once rushed at him and struck him with the butt-end of his rifle.
- (b.) A Turkish officer, over 50 years of age, shot in the back, tried to rise into a sitting position. Rifles were at once levelled at him, but before they could fire he had fallen back dead.
- (c.) A civilian Turk, shot and lying on the quay, tried to move, whereupon the Greek soldiers kicked him on the head and face.
- (d.) An officer, shot in both legs and chest, commenced to groan and asked for mercy. He was jeered at by the soldiery and struck down.

What prevented more of these horrible deeds was the fact that the soldiers had to be careful not to shoot the Greek civilians escorting the prisoners and the Europeans on the ships and quay.

DONALD WHITTALL.

Smyrna, May 18, 1919.

Enclosure 4 in No. 56.

Statement by Mr. G. Perry.

Observations made during the Occupation of Smyrna by Greek Troops.

To whom it may concern:

Smyrna, May 17, 1919.

Thursday, 15th May, the first day of the occupation.—Near the American consulate I saw Greek sailors shooting at the windows. All during the morning there was shooting in the streets in this quarter. From the roof of the consulate, about mid-day, I saw about 100 Turkish civilian prisoners being marched along the quay—each person was compelled to hold his hands in the air.

Between 1 and 1.30, from my window at 386 Quay, during the height of the rain, I saw what looked to be about 150 civilians, hands in the air, being driven down the streets by soldiers and Greek civilians. One very old man in particular was being pushed on roughly. Later, I saw a waggon with three dead Turks in it being driven down towards the point. There were a number of Greeks following along, seeming much amused and pleased at the event. At another time, during the afternoon, I saw smaller groups of prisoners being marched down the quay. In the evening, about 7 o'clock, in the Rue Roses, I saw two Greek women carrying loot, and one Greek civilian with a rifle on his shoulder.

Friday, 16th May.—At 8.15 A.M. I saw a Turkish store on Frank Street which had been looted of everything. At 11 A.M. I went to the Turkish quarter by way of quay, where all along I saw pieces of torn fezes. At the konak I saw the bodies of two dead Turks floating in the water. A large number of Greek civilians and soldiers were standing by. I saw the same two bodies later in the afternoon. Going past the konak to the hospital I saw two cafés, a barber's shop, and a small home, which had been looted—windows, chairs, and tables were completely broken. In one café there was a large amount of blood on the floor. They had attempted to get away the iron rolling door of a Turkish warehouse without success. They had tried to break open doors of the same warehouse. Turning up the main street which led to the bazaars I saw some eight stores, and as many more in the bazaar, which had been looted. All during the afternoon morbidly curious Greek people were passing through the Turkish quarter, gloating and priding themselves over their efficiency in pillaging and looting. In the morning, at the morgue, I saw twenty-two dead Turks, six of whom were without one stitch of clothing. Many of them were very old men. There was one spare leg which appeared to have been hacked off by an axe just below the hip. The rest of that particular body was not there. Turkish men, women, and children were coming there to identify their dead. Greek guards were not keeping the large, curious Greek mob away from this scene. At two houses where there were large numbers of prisoners, Turkish women were coming to find some information about their missing brothers or husbands. And, as at the morgue, the Greek civilians would hardly make room for them to pass.

Again, late on Friday afternoon I visited the Turkish hospital. At the morgue

this time I saw twenty-five more bodies, twenty of which were without clothing. Three or four were only boys, 14 to 17 years old, and many were old men. There was a spare arm cut off just above the elbow either with an axe or a large knife.

17th May, 1919.—At 4 o'clock at the American Relief Orphanage I saw a Turkish young woman who showed me her veil, which had been torn from her by two well-dressed Greeks at noon, 16th May, not far from the American consulate. There were two other well-dressed Greeks in the party, she said. In addition, the Greeks pushed her down, and I saw her leg, which had been bruised and bandaged. She and her brother, who had been killed by the Greeks, were roomers in a Greek house.

At 3.30 P.M. Mrs. Underwood, Miss Berg, and myself visited the Turkish quarter. On the way, on the quay, not far from the konak, we saw three dead Turks which had just been taken from the water. Two of them were the same bodies I had seen twice the day before and in the morning. With a Turkish man we visited three stores which had been pillaged of everything. I saw three cafés which had been pillaged as well. Going on, we saw, in all, perhaps twenty-five stores which had been pillaged. Turkish men told how Greek soldiers and civilians had come and robbed them of all clothing, household articles, and money. I saw one little tobacco shop which looked as though it had been struck by a cyclone.

Returning to my room in an Italian home on the quay, I found four Turkish refugees—a man, his sister, and two small children—relatives of the little Turkish boy who is a "pensionnaire" here. Their home was in Guestepe, a suburb of Smyrna. At 6.30 Friday evening, thirty Greek soldiers and civilians came with a machine-gun and fired upon their home, entered it, and stole everything but the clothes on their backs. They stole £ T. 800 gold and £ T. 900 paper. The father and mother of the Turkish boy were each wounded in the head. The man said £ T. 2,000 were taken from another person. In Guestepe, he thinks, 200 houses have been pillaged.

GEORGE W. PERRY.

American Y.M.C.A. Secretary, Smyrna, Turkey.

Enclosure 5 in No. 56.

Statement by Ahmed Feizi.

I, THE undersigned, live in Boudja, suburb of Smyrna. On Thursday morning, the 15th May, I took the train, as usual, and came to town. I had been hearing several reports about the Greek military occupation. Everyone had a different opinion about this event, but we had hopes and a promise that the American ships would protect us against injustice and bad handling by the Greek authorities. But, as you will see, nothing was done to prevent the plunder and massacres by the Greek population, helped by the Greek authorities.

I, as an eyewitness, have seen the following:—

At 10 A.M. I was walking in the square of the konak. A great crowd was gathered round the above-mentioned place, all shouting, insulting, and clapping their hands, and then the Greek soldiers made their appearance and went round the corner of the konak street leading to the prisons. Five minutes later, I heard a shot go off amongst the crowd, and all at once the Greek soldiers took a hostile position against the crowd. As soon as I saw this, I understood that some trouble was to ensue, so I jumped from the garden into the central barracks and tried to avoid the firing by hiding in the above-said building, but I was not long there before I heard the machine-guns going off and bullets going through the windows. I found all the barrack employees working at their desks, but as soon as they heard the noise and the bullets raining inside the building, they were in two minds as to whether they should hide or answer the Greek fire, but we decided to give ourselves up by putting out a white handkerchief. Besides Turks, there were a lot of Jews, Armenians, Greeks, &c., and as soon as the fire ceased a little, we all came out of the barracks and explained to the surrounding troops that we only got into the barracks to protect ourselves from the firing, but as soon as we got out the troops started sorting out the Turks from the Christians and Jews, tearing off our fezes, insulting, and striking us down. Seeing this, I took off my fez and hid it so that I could escape from imminent danger, but this was not enough. I soon got discovered, was put in the row of Turks and marched away by the quay, hands up and bareheaded, and obliged to cry "Long live Venizelos!" If such words were not proffered we were immediately struck on

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the head with the butt end of the rifle or bayonet. As many old men could not proffer these Greek words, as is natural, not knowing Greek, they were struck down, and as they could not follow, the Greek civilians serving as guides to the troops were recommending their comrades to see if those that were wounded were Turks, and, if so, to kill them and throw them into the sea. This recommendation was immediately put into execution. Some American and English subjects recognised me and delivered me from the clutches of this barbarous crew. As I was searched for arms and there was not a thing found on me, they simply took my money away, a sum of about £ T. 150.

I went and hid myself in a friend's house, for all the lives of Turks were henceforward in danger, for any Greek civilian who met a Turk was simply allowed to kill him outright away without any scruples and had to keep in safety for four days.

After, I went to my house in Boudja to look for my house and belongings, which I found ransacked and everything stolen. Clothes, boots, bedding, jewels, money, &c., everything gone, and several other Turkish houses had undergone the same treatment—even worse, for some people who knew me tried to save what was left.

As I dared not remain in Boudja, I closed down my shop and house and came down to Smyrna. It is a miracle how I got saved from the madness of such a barbarous army; it is indeed a shame to call them civilised. Instead of putting order, they simply brought here the worst sentiments and discord amongst all the European colonies and among us Turks too.

The Greek civilians, taking an example from the Greek soldiers, went straight to the police station, pulling out the policemen and commissaries, tearing their uniforms, insulting and beating them. Such things we never expected from a European nation.

AHMED FEIZI.

Enclosure 6 in No. 56.

Commanding Officer U.S.S. "Manley" to Senior United States Naval Officer, Turkey.

1. THE "Manley" anchored in Smyrna harbour at 1:40 P.M., Sunday, the 11th May, 1919, having accompanied the "Arizona" to port. The situation at that time was practically the same as it had been for the previous week, the most prominent feature being the animosity, expressed and suppressed, between the Greeks and Turks.

2. On Tuesday evening, the 13th May, the senior United States naval officer present, Captain J. H. Dayton, U.S.N., informed the commanding officer of the proposed occupation of the four Turkish forts in this vicinity by landing parties from British, French, Italian, and Greek ships present, and of the contemplated landing on Thursday, the 15th May, of a Greek division to take over the military control of Smyrna. At the same time Captain Dayton stated he had made a counter-proposition about the manner in which the landing and occupation should be accomplished, in which he proposed that American, British, French, and Italian landing parties take over the city on Wednesday, and on Thursday turn it over to the Greek troops. This suggestion was not agreed to.

3. The Greek transports arrived about 8 A.M. on Thursday, the 15th May, and landed immediately. Their arrival was accompanied by violent outbursts of enthusiasm and rejoicing on the part of the Greek civilian population, shore boats meeting the troops' ships off the quay, the ships being dressed and blowing their whistles. Greek flags were everywhere in evidence. The first troops to land stacked arms and did a dance on the dock. The above facts are stated to show that very little or no tact and discretion were shown by the Greeks in handling a people the occupation of whose territory by them was the bitterest pill that could be administered. It is believed that Captain Dayton's plan would have produced a minimum of friction.

4. As the troops marched down the front street, along the sea wall, towards the administrative centres of the city, it was accompanied by a mob of civilians. On reaching the City Hall a shot was fired, by which side, whether military or civil, it is impossible to state, but from that time on volley firing, machine-gun fire, and individual rifle fire continued intermittently throughout the day, with occasional shots during the night. Casualties probably large, but impossible to state with any degree of accuracy. On Friday, the 16th, the situation was comparatively quiet.

5. Reports of wanton brutality by Greek troops are very current, but the commanding officer can state none to which he was witness, due to the ship's anchorage and distance from the town. It is understood that several people of repute ashore have

agreed to submit statements to the senior officer present about facts in connection with the occupation to which they were witness. No attempt has therefore been made to obtain similar statements. The captain of H.M.S. "Adventure," whose ship was made fast to the quay wall, and who was in a position to observe accurately, has expressed to me personally his disgust at the wanton and unnecessary brutality of the Greek troops, which leads me to believe that the current reports from other sources are in no way exaggerated. The Greek troops were seemingly under poor control, there being very few officers with the troops. I was informed that the division landed here was the same that turned machine guns on unarmed British and French troops in the streets of Athens some months ago. Several bodies, evidently thrown overboard from the sea wall, drifted by the ship, and when close aboard, a boat, flying the Greek flag, was observed to go through the pockets and then take the clothes and shoes from the bodies.

6. On Friday and Saturday the supply of bread in the city was exhausted, due probably to the fact that everything shut down when trouble started. Reports of looting are frequent, and several cases can be substantiated by reliable witnesses.

7. In the opinion of those ashore who understand conditions from long observation, it would seem the situation in the interior is much more tense than in Smyrna, and will be a great deal harder to control.

R. L. BERRY.

U.S.S. "Manley," Smyrna, Asia Minor,
May 18, 1919.

Enclosure 7 in No. 56.

Commanding Officer U.S.S. "Manley" to Senior United States Naval Officer, Turkey.

1. IN addition to the report already submitted by me, dated the 18th May, 1919, on the occurrences in Smyrna, Asia Minor, on Thursday, the 15th, and Friday, the 16th May, I have to submit the following reports which are current in the city of Smyrna, and which have been related to me by reputable persons concerning the treatment of Turkish residences of Smyrna by Greek troops on the day of their occupation of Smyrna and on the day following.

2. The captain of H.M.S. "Adventure" told me that he had seen a Turkish officer marched along the street by Greek troops, with his hands over his head and compelled to shout at intervals a Greek word meaning "Long live Greece!" as were all the rest of the persons taken on the date in question. This officer was observed to veer slightly out of line, probably slipping on the pavement, and one of the Greek troops struck him alongside the head with the butt of a musket and he went down on his side. He attempted to rise and was struck on the other side of the head by another Greek soldier and went down flat, probably unconscious, whereupon a Greek soldier bayoneted him and stuck the muzzle of his gun close to him and blew the top of his head off. A similar occurrence was observed a little farther along the quay by Mr. Fred V. Green, Jun., connected with the firm of MacAndrews and Forbes, in Smyrna. A Turk civilian about 60 years of age was struck with the butt of a musket and bayoneted, and, when in practically a dying condition, Greek civilians took his clothes away, and one man was about to remove his shoes when Mr. Green called out from the balcony of the hotel and the man desisted. The wounded man while still alive was thrown off the quay by civilians.

3. The chief of police, with his subordinate officers, waiting in the police station for the arrival of the Greeks to turn his office over to them, the office was entered with a rush, and he was severely beaten, then led into the streets, where the soldiers, incited by the civilian population, cut off his ears, gouged out his eyes, and generally mutilated him without actually killing him. It is believed he died later in hospital. The aunt of Mrs. H. C. Green, wife of the Standard Oil representative in Smyrna, was witness to the maltreatment in the street.

4. The captain of the "Adventure" further stated that the Greek troops surrounded a small Turkish gunboat tied up to the quay and fired volley after volley into the ship, wounding two of the crew severely, and not desisting until the captain of the "Adventure" intervened and remonstrated with the troops. The Turkish gunboat had committed no offence, and the action of the Greek troops was wantonly brutal and without excuse. They had machine guns turned on a larger Turkish gunboat secured

on the other side of the "Adventure," and fired some shots into her, but the captain of the "Adventure" got her out of the port before any casualties to her personnel.

5. A Turkish civilian, said to have been the cause of the arrest and execution in Roumania of two Englishmen, and who was in prison in Roumania and later released by the Germans when they entered Roumania, returned to Smyrna and openly boasted of what he had done in Roumania. The Greeks entered his house, bayoneted and shot him, and five Greek troops ravished his sister. She sought aid at the American Commission hospital in Smyrna, and, on being examined by the surgeon from the "Englewood," confessed to him that five Greek soldiers had assaulted her.

6. A good deal of looting took place in the Turkish quarter. Greek troops in many cases not attempting to safeguard the property of Turkish civilians, but seeming to encourage Greek civilians to do as they liked. I myself have seen several shops so pillaged and destroyed. One Turk tobacco dealer came to an American tobacco representative in Smyrna, and requested a loan of £T. 10,000 (paper) to pay it to some Greeks who had stolen several hundred bales of tobacco from him. He declined to have the matter taken up with the Greek authorities, stating that he would be killed by the Greeks, and stated that he would pay the money and avoid trouble. I am further told by an American tobacco representative in Smyrna that the Italians were secretly encouraging the Turks to resist the Greeks and probably supplying them with arms and ammunition. I cannot substantiate this statement, but I believe it to be founded upon fact and based on information received by him through Turks in his employ.

7. A Turkish merchant in Smyrna, in whose house I called on Friday, the 24th, informed me that his house had been entered by Greek troops, on the pretext of searching for fire-arms or something that might harm the Greek soldiery, and stated that the Greek troops were brutal in the treatment of his family, including the women; that the Greek neighbours intervened and had two Greek troops stationed in the house to protect them. This Turk naturally feels very bitter, and states that the interior Turks have plenty of arms and ammunition, and are determined to resist to the last man. Many Turks are closing out their business and leaving Smyrna rather than to remain with the city and vicinity under Greek control.

U.S.S. "Manley," Constantinople, Turkey,
May 25, 1919.

R. L. BERRY.

Enclosure 8 in No. 56.

Notes of a Conversation with Dr. Alexander MacLachlan, of the International College at Smyrna.

DR. MACLACHLAN is a Canadian.

Beginning of war Moslem refugees from Macedonia came to Smyrna, 90,000 of them. Smyrna overrun with them.

Greeks deported from Tschechme, Aivali, Phokia, by German orders. Practically none killed. Brutally done. Mostly to Mytilene, Lesbos, &c. Only a few to the interior.

After the armistice and before the Greek occupation in Smyrna, the Greeks of Asia Minor were teaching pupils vile songs about Turks in the schools. They said, "Now is coming our turn. We will show the Turks that we are the better men."

The foreigners comforted themselves with the view that no such foolish thing would be done as to give this territory to Greece. They encouraged the Turks that they were disturbing themselves needlessly.

The Turks represent three-quarters of the province of Aidin. In Smyrna Greeks are in majority over the Turks. But adding the Jews and Armenians, &c., the Greeks are in a big minority in Smyrna itself. The suburbs—Sevedekeui, Boudjah, Koukloudjah, Vourla—are preponderatingly Greek. The whole peasantry, hundreds and thousands of villages, are purely Turk.

Within thirty-six hours before the landing of the foreign guards (twenty at each embassy), the Turks turned down the last Italian offer on ground that they would receive justice from the United States and England.

Admiral Calthorpe sent, on the 14th May, statement that Smyrna would be occupied solely by Allied troops, according to article 7 of armistice. Asked if Greek

troops would be included. Answer indecisive. They never thought that it would be a Greek occupation.

Colonel Smith, the British official in control, said that if Greek troops landed there would be no trouble.

At 2 o'clock on morning of the 15th May the news got out among the Turks that Greeks would be landed. The news spread like wildfire. The Turks fled, to the number of 50,000, up the hill of the Acropolis. Greeks had already occupied the fort.

(Horton, the American consul, arrived the day Dr. MacLachlan left Smyrna.)

A few were killed by the Turkish soldiers when the Turkish populace rushed the barracks to get arms. The next day the Greek populace were given these same arms by the Greek soldiers.

The Greek bishop had given absolute assurance that nothing toward would happen. When landing occurred, contrary to the plan of occupation, the Greek troops landed on the quays of the Turkish quarters. The troops were blessed by the Bishop Chrysostomos in his mitre. Marched along the quays with tremendous demonstrations.

Small troops of Turkish cavalry came out of barracks to quiet Turkish population. A shot was fired. No one knows who did it. Then the Greek troops fired upon the barracks, a regular fusillade. Instructions to Turkish troops were that they were to stay within the barracks.

Turkish officers surrendered, marched along the quay with arms up in air, and were forced to shout "Zeto Venizelos!" Turkish Governor-General was abused.

Some Greek soldiers were killed, but probably chiefly by promiscuous Greek firing. The Turkish populace had been disarmed by the Turks themselves.

Turks were knocked down, bayoneted, and thrown into the water from the quays.

The American representative Chesborough was called to Constantinople the day before by three telegrams.

Dr. MacLachlan, at request of Turkish officials, went to Captain Dayton, of the "Arizona," to see whether the Americans would protect the Turks or give one word of promise of safety. The young American lieutenant at the American Embassy was terribly afraid, and wanted to send the Turkish officials away who had come to the embassy for advice. He was frightened.

Number killed, minimum 300 to 500. Now Dr. MacLachlan puts it at 400 to 600, many mutilated. Over 100 unclaimed bodies known to Dr. MacLachlan.

Looting began everywhere. Everything taken from Turkish houses. Looting still going on on the 29th or 30th May, when Dr. MacLachlan left Smyrna.

The Greek young men around the suburb where the American school is located attempted to take the Turkish menservants stationed outside the school and murder them. They were only saved by being taken within the buildings of the school. One was caught and murdered, and his body lay in a stream near by for four or five days.

The Greek Metropolitan Chrysostomos confided to Rev. MacLachlan, at a meeting just before he left, that Greece could not handle the Turkish situation.

Enclosure 9 in No. 56.

Commanding Officer U.S.S. "Arizona" to Senior Naval Officer, Constantinople.

U.S.S. "Arizona," Smyrna, Asia Minor,
May 18, 1919.

My dear Admiral,

YOU may be interested to hear, from one who has been an eyewitness, a brief account of the events of the last three days connected with the Greek occupation of this city.

Early Wednesday morning a note was sent to the Vali by Admiral Calthorpe, representing the Allied Powers, advising him that, in accordance with article 7 of the armistice, the forts of Smyrna and the approaches of the city with the city itself would be occupied by Allied forces.

Shortly after 12 o'clock a Greek force was landed out near the old fort and took possession of it. This is the fort that commands the entrance to the harbour. It appears that an English force was landed on Long Island, some 12 or 15 miles down the Gulf, with French and Italians at other minor points. Later in the day, at 4 p.m., landings were made from the United States, British, French, Italian, and Greek warships, some twenty in each case, as guards for their respective consulates. The presence of the Greek troops in the old fort and their predominance in other places

aroused the suspicion among the Turks that the occupation was not to be by the Allied forces, except as a pretext for handing the city over to the Greeks.

About 10 o'clock P.M. a second note was handed to the Vali by the British military representative in English, the exact meaning of which did not seem for a time to be understood by the Turks, though it shortly became clear to them that the city was to be occupied by the Greeks alone, a fact which caused general dismay and excitement among the Turks, who at once congregated in large numbers in their quarter of the city, in their mosques, and on the side of the hill to the south-west of the Government headquarters.

The commander of the barracks was notified that he must retain the few troops that were in the city within the barracks enclosure, and be prepared to hand over the barracks at the pleasure of the Greek commander. By early morning there was great excitement among the Turkish population, and the crowd in large numbers went to the entrance of the barracks and demanded they be furnished with arms to protect themselves against the Greeks. The demand was refused, but in time the crowd succeeded in forcing an entrance. They were then fired upon by their own troops, and some were killed, the remainder fleeing back into the streets. No notification of the desire of the Greek commander having reached the commanding officer in barracks, and knowing that Greek troops were then being disembarked in large numbers on the quay, less than a mile away, he sent over to the Governor to ask if the barracks were to be handed over, receiving the reply that they were not to be at once handed over. Consequently, some ten minutes later when the Greek commander arrived, the Turks were still in possession. The Greek commander complained that the barracks had not been vacated in accordance with his demand some time earlier—a demand which, if given, had not been conveyed to the officer in command of the barracks.

The Greek troops, at the head of which were the Bishop of Ephesus and the Metropolitan of Smyrna, Chrysostom, were now passing along the water front from the landing-stage amid great manifestations of patriotism and shouting "Long live Greece!" and "Long live Venizelos!" The landing also had been carried out with great demonstrations of joy and welcome. The steamers, which frequently blew their whistles, had come alongside the quay, a few paces away from the United States consulate, while across the end of the consulate street on the quay was a long banner stretched, bearing a welcome greeting to the Greeks, while beside this was a very large picture of M. Venizelos. The troops after landing stacked arms on the quay and executed a dance round the stacked rifles. All this was calculated, whether intentionally or not does not seem clear, to aggravate the Turks to the utmost limit.

As the Greek troops marched around to the other side of the barracks to enter them from another street, a small troop of Turkish cavalry was leaving to quell some disturbances in the neighbourhood. At this critical moment a single shot was fired (in the Turkish quarter) in the street, close at hand. On this the Greek officer in command gave the order to fire, and the barracks were at once brought under a heavy and continued fire of Greek soldiers, who also fired promiscuously on the surrounding populace. This heavy firing continued for a considerable time, and resulted in killing from 50 to 100 persons, practically all civilians.

Two of our Red Cross relief workers who passed over the scene of this fighting shortly afterwards saw only two dead soldiers (they carried some of the wounded to the American relief hospital near by). Most of the Turkish soldiers who were in the barracks on the arrival of the Greek troops fled out by another door and escaped up the hill near by; those who remained, or at least a portion of them, replied to the fire of the Greeks from the windows of the barracks, as did also some of the populace in the streets with their revolvers, and thus at least two Greek soldiers were killed and some fifteen or twenty wounded, according to the statement of the Greeks. A hurried consultation of the officers in the barracks was held, and it was decided they should at once surrender, and a young officer stepped out on the balcony waving a white window curtain. He was at once slightly wounded and fell, but the heavy firing ceased almost immediately. Considerable fighting took place, if it may be called fighting, where the shooting was practically all done on one side by soldiers in the little park in front of the Governor's palace and on the water-front close by, where considerable numbers were killed and wounded, practically all of whom were Turkish civilians. Although there had been considerable excitement earlier in the day on the edge of the Turkish quarter, owing to the endeavour of some of their leaders to hold the Turks in check, it was not until about 11 A.M. that the fighting referred to above began, and it was not until a few minutes later that the heavy firing began right beside the United States consulate, said to be due to shots having been fired from windows close by. Very few,

however, were killed here, although the firing was promiscuous and very heavy for some minutes. Considerable killing took place at many points along the quay between the landing-stage and the Governor's palace, and it was in some of these places where most of the killing was done, although in many parts of the city where the Turks were few in number very regrettable incidents took place.

I am credibly informed that when the Greek troops took possession of the barracks they served out the arms and munition there to the Greek populace. Indeed, we had ample evidence of this the next morning at Paradise when we found all the Greeks in our neighbourhood able to bear arms fully equipped with rifles, and in some cases with bayonets also, which they told us had been given to them the day before by the Greek military officials.

The firing went on intermittently for some hours, and occasionally with great violence. As was natural under the circumstances, the Turks suffered almost exclusively. On Thursday evening one of our former students who was in touch with Greek headquarters told me in answer to my question that two Greek soldiers had been killed and some fifteen to twenty wounded, and also that some twenty to thirty Greek civilians had been killed and forty or fifty wounded. (Have since discovered only a very few Greek civilians were killed and wounded.) I have not had time or opportunity to verify these statements. As to the number of Turks killed and wounded, it is difficult to form an exact estimate. On Thursday evening I was inclined to believe the number killed was not much above 100, but since then I have been obliged to increase this estimation from time to time until by this evening, due to my personal observation, I am bound to estimate the killed among the Turks at from 300 to 500 and the total casualties at from 700 to 1,000. Here is some of the evidence upon which I base this estimate. Up until this afternoon there were still about seventy unclaimed dead bodies of Turks in the morgue at the American relief hospital and at one other place near the point. During the afternoon of Thursday and all day Friday, Turkish women in large numbers flocked to this morgue to try and identify their dead among these bodies. Besides the bodies lying here there were a number of arms and legs not belonging to them. The bodies of many of the killed were at once removed from the streets by their friends and relatives, while large numbers were immediately thrown from the quay into the sea, and many of these are still floating about the bay and harbour. Only this evening as I passed along the quay near the Governor's Palace four bodies, three of them stark naked, were lying on the quay and which had evidently just been drawn from the sea.

The killing of unarmed and undefended Turks continued throughout Friday in the suburbs, some of it at the entrance to the college campus, in Paradise, where a Turkish official was taken by the young hoodlums of the neighbouring villages over to the edge of the roadside near by and foully murdered during the forenoon of that day. His body was left by the roadside for the rest of the day, and then in the evening thrown from the high bridge near by into the stream below, where it still lay the following Tuesday evening, and was photographed by officers from the U.S.S. "Arizona."

Some of the Incidents on the Quay.

Some of the worse events of Thursday took place on the quay, while large bodies of Turks, chiefly civilians, were being marched along in file with uplifted hands, by the Greek soldiers who were in charge of them, and by the Greek populace, who were permitted to inflict various kinds of inhuman treatment upon these unhappy victims.

While from my position I could not command but a very small portion of the quay, some of my personal friends, Americans and Britishers, who were eyewitnesses at close quarters have informed me of many of these untoward incidents. Old men, unarmed, and other unoffending civilian Turks were knocked down by Greeks, killed by stabbing with knives or bayonets, and then afterwards, having their valuables and clothing stripped off their bodies, were thrown into the sea. In one instance the man was again shot after being thrown into the sea, this by Greek soldiers. Many of the prisoners, including high military officers, as they were marched along with hands up were permitted to be beaten by the rabble who followed. Specific instances are cited by these same eyewitnesses where Turkish soldiers and soldiers [sic] were bayoneted from behind by their Greek guards, while the rabble rifled their pockets and then threw their bodies into the sea. Many of the worst instances of inhuman treatment of the Turks were while they were under arrest and on the open sea front at noonday. On

Thursday a report went out that the Turkish sailors on a small gun-boat (lying beside the British destroyer "Adventure" inside the breakwater) fired on the Greek troops as they passed along the quay on their way to the barracks. I have carefully looked into this report and find that it is absolutely without foundation. The Turkish officers who were taken prisoners at the barracks were put on board a Greek transport and placed in the quarters just vacated by horses. The Civil Government officials, who were all at once arrested, were thrown into a close warehouse room where there were no sanitary arrangements, and left there for thirty-six hours without food. In other prison quarters where the civilians were placed to the number of 1,500 or 2,000, including many schoolchildren, no food was provided from the time of their arrest on Thursday noon until it was provided by the British naval chaplain, Lieutenant-Colonel Embling, with funds furnished by our American Commission for Relief in the Near East. On Friday this chaplain distributed food in one prison to 1,100 persons. The Governor-General of the province, Izzet Bey, when arrested was obliged to march along the water-front with uplifted hands, and while thus under escort had his fez knocked off by the rabble and his gold watch and chain taken.

In practically all cases where prisoners, including officers, were thus marched along the quay they were compelled to shout out every few steps "Long live Greece!" "Long live Venizelos!" and when they failed to do so they were prodded with bayonets or with long needles from behind, which seemed to have been prepared for the occasion beforehand. Occasionally those arrested were not Turks but Armenians or Jews, one of the former being our interpreter, an Armenian, at the hospital, the occasion of his arrest being that he was wearing a fez. The quay especially, but also the streets leading to it, were strewn with, I may say, literally thousands of torn fezes. All Thursday afternoon and Friday the fez was a mark for arrest, insult, or, in some cases, a bullet. I saw in front of the consulate an Armenian, with his wife and daughter at his side, subjected to insult through wearing a fez. It was unsafe even to carry it in his hand as a sign of his submission to the demand of the mob that insulted him, and he had finally to thrust it inside his coat. All day Friday Turks, when they ventured in the streets, did so either without any head covering or under a hat.

Looting.

The plundering of dead and wounded bodies on the quay had its counterpart in the other quarters of the city, where looting of Turkish houses and establishments became general, Thursday afternoon, all day Friday, and up to this evening. The almost numberless cases that have up to late this evening been continually brought to my personal notice makes it clear that no adequate measures have up to this moment been taken to stop this plundering of Turkish homes and establishments of various kinds.

Much of it had better be classed as robbery (for it is frequently being done under the pretext of searching for arms on the part of the soldiers or civilians dressed as soldiers). Paper money, sometimes in very large quantities, also gold coins, jewels, watches, and all kinds of valuables, are seized and carried off. In some cases, and on the main streets, homes are forcibly entered by the mob and everything of value carried off. In some cases the soldiers stop this looting, and in a few cases of which I know, they have taken steps and have succeeded in restoring plundered property. In other cases, I regret to say, the soldiers encouraged the plundering, while in others they shared in it. I will mention a single instance of the plundering of a large Turkish tannery, beside our American Collegiate Institute for Girls, where, in the presence of our American ladies, the crowd rushed in, drove out the Turks, seized and carried off thousands of pounds worth of hides, &c. When a Greek patrol happened along they first of all told some of those carrying off the goods to put them down, which they did. Almost at once, however, the patrol passed on, and the thieves again picked up their loads and carried them off.

All the Turkish homes in the neighbourhood of our college campus at Paradise were plundered throughout Friday before our eyes by the hoodlums in the neighbourhood, who were armed on Thursday by the Greek military authorities. They (the Turks) have all fled to our campus for protection. As I finish this report, Sunday morning, Turks from the neighbouring town of Dejimovasi come to me reporting that all their homes there have been looted to the last item, and that they are absolutely stranded. They were told by the Greeks that if they paid them 500 gold liras they would see that the town was not sacked. They paid the 500 liras, and shortly after were stripped of all their possessions.

In the neighbouring town of Boudjah, where there are many British and some American residents, and which is only a mile and a half distant from our campus, all the Turkish homes have been plundered. Efforts are now being made, and with success, to restore some of the plundered property, and I trust these efforts will be continued.

I should say, however, that not all of this plundering of Turkish homes and establishments is being done by the Greeks, for I know of special cases where those of other communities—of course, in every case by people of the baser sort—have followed the lead of the Greeks and joined in the plundering. I should also add that naturally many of the better class of Greeks, and I trust most of them, if not all, deplore all that has happened during these past three days quite as much as we do, and wish as earnestly as we do to have it stopped. Strong representations have been made with protest to the Greek military authorities in regard to all these untoward events by the representatives of the Allies, but up to Saturday evening no efficient remedies have been applied, though I understand pledges are readily given that it will all be stopped and restitution made.

Notes (added after coming into the city to hand this report to Captain Dayton).

As I drove along the water front dead bodies are being washed up on the quay, in addition to those that were reported as being there last evening. I have this moment received an appeal for our ambulance people to bury nineteen dead Turks who are lying in their homes up in the Turkish quarter of the city since Thursday afternoon; also seven more dead who were thrown into a pit in the same neighbourhood and still lie there.

This morning news comes in that different towns and villages some few miles to the south of the college are being looted and burned by bands of Greeks. There is also a report that the hooligans of Prophet Elias beside our campus and at Boudjah are being deprived of the arms and ammunition that were handed out to them on Thursday. This is good news if true. I am also told, on what seems credible authority, that the large interior towns of Manissa, Menemen, and others in this district have been partly occupied by the Italians. If this is true it will prevent certain terrible reprisals against the Greeks by the Turks in these cities.

[89509]

No. 57.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

(No. 4099.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, June 20, 1919.

ON grounds of public policy I have been a good deal disturbed at the continuous and as yet unarrested advance of the Italian and Greek forces in the western parts of the Turkish dominions in Asia Minor, and I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement from such information as is available in the Foreign Office of the extent to which that advance has so far in each of the two cases been pursued. Though these movements were in part undertaken in the first instance with the knowledge, and in the case of the Greeks with the sanction, of the Allied Powers at Paris, they appear to be continued in their later stages, so far as is known here, with no similar authority, and in open disregard of the principle, laid down in the early days of the Paris Conference, that its ultimate decisions should not be prejudiced by premature and aggressive action in respect of the occupation of territory by any of the interested States or Powers. Moreover, in the case of the Greeks in particular, they are alleged to have been accompanied by scenes of discreditable and unprovoked outrage.

I am the more concerned at the occurrence of this twofold penetration because it is apparently being prosecuted without interference or protest (save from the Turks) at a time when the importance of retaining at least some portion of the Turkish sovereignty and of the former Turkish dominions in Asia is reported to have received a somewhat tardy recognition at the hands of the Allied Powers, although it must be clear that the realisation of any such policy will be seriously compromised by the presence in the regions affected of the forces of two States whose ulterior pretensions so small an attempt is made to conceal. A further disquieting symptom is the constant recurrence of warnings from our representatives at Constantinople of the consequences that must ensue from these continued encroachments upon what remains of Turkish sovereignty in Asia, and the likelihood that this part of the Middle East will thereby

be plunged into a state of renewed and, in all probability, protracted violence and disorder.

The further these advances, whether of Greeks or of Italians, are pushed, the greater becomes the difficulty of withdrawal, and the more inevitable the prospect of future strife, if not of serious bloodshed.

In the various appreciations that reach the Foreign Office of the policy that is now being pursued with regard to Turkey, I cannot find any voice that welcomes or indeed defends these encroachments. And yet the persistence of the actors appears successfully to effect what the considered judgment of the spectators declines to approve.

I have ventured to submit this representation, not as a protest, which I cannot but feel will be useless, but with a view to ascertaining whether it is in contemplation to place any limit to the extension of these advances, and whether there is any ground for regarding them as provisional in character and duration. I shall be very grateful for any information that you may be able to give me on these points.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 57.

Italian and Greek Penetration in Asia Minor.

1. THE distribution of the Italian troops may be divided into two categories:—

- (1.) The force at Konia, which the Director of Military Intelligence puts at two companies and a brigade headquarters, but which an earlier report from Constantinople estimates at 1,200 men, which is under General Milne's orders and is responsible for the patrol of the Anatolian Railway between Konia and Eskishehr.
- (2.) A force distributed along the coast from Adalia in the south to Ephesus in the west, occupying as intermediate points between these two places Makri, Marmarice, Budrum, Sokia, and Scalanova. This force is based on the Island of Rhodes, where, according to the Director of Military Intelligence's information, a reserve force of at least five infantry battalions and one cavalry regiment exists.

Of these places Adalia was occupied on the 3rd April and is held by a force comprising the 4th Bersaglieri battalion, one company of Carabinieri, and one machine-gun company. From Adalia the Italians have pushed inland to Budjak, which they have occupied, and to Buldur where, if they have not established a permanent garrison, their political officers are extremely active in canvassing the project of a railway to Adalia.

Of the other coast positions, Budrum, Makri, Marmarice,* and Scalanova were occupied on the 12th May (that is to say, two or three days before the Greek landing at Smyrna), and are held by forces varying from 100 to 250 men with machine guns, except at the last-named place, where there is a force of 500 men with field guns. There are 250 men at Sokia and 100 at Ephesus.

At this western extremity of their area, the Italians have shown a disposition to dispute the Greek hold on the Smyrna-Aidin Railway, and "an incident" has already taken place at the village of Cherkesskeui on that railway north-east of Sokia, where strife seems only to have been averted by the Greek commander's readiness to evacuate in favour of the Italians.

2. Turning to the Greek operations, the landing at Smyrna on the 15th May was effected in force, and Admiral Calthorpe reported that by the 22nd May 15,000 troops had been disembarked. After this landing the Greeks proceeded to push east along the railways as far as Alashehr and Nazilli, which was occupied on or about the 3rd June. The country between these points has apparently been secured by the occupation of Eudemish, which the Greek troops were expected to enter on the 2nd June, and where their entry was being contested by the Turks. (We have had no confirmation of the place having been actually occupied.) A force of about 1,000 men was landed at Aivali on the 29th May.

West of Smyrna they have occupied Vourla and Chesme with small detachments,

* The Italians have since declared their intention of making Marmarice a naval base.

while within the last ten days they have pushed north of Smyrna up to Menemen and Bergama.

In addition to the considerable forces already employed it is reported from Athens that the 13th Greek division, lately released from South Russia, will not improbably be sent to Smyrna.

The boundaries of the Sandjak of Smyrna and the Vilayet of Aidin are marked in the attached map, and it will be seen that while, generally speaking, the Greek occupations have been carried out in accordance with the authorisation given by the Peace Conference and communicated in Mr. Balfour's telegram No. 914 of the 19th May, their occupation of places in the Aidin Vilayet, north of Aidin, was only to be effected with the approval of the Senior Naval Officer of the Allied Fleet at Smyrna. This approval has not, so far as we are aware, been requested, and Mr. Morgan, Admiral Calthorpe's representative at Smyrna, has specifically reported that the occupation of Nazilli was carried out without previous authorisation and was not justified by any disturbances.

That the Greeks do not regard their occupation as merely temporary appears from a request, which the Greek Minister has recently addressed to us, that the survey study of the Meander River Valley made prior to the war by a British group may be transferred or sold to the Greeks. This view appears to be confirmed by the fact that the representatives of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway in Paris have approached M. Venizelos, with the knowledge of the British Peace Delegation, with a view to securing recognition of their company's rights.

The Turkish view of these rival movements seems to have been expressed by a recent deputation from the Council of Ministers at Constantinople, who contrasted the Greek behaviour at Smyrna with the "however regrettable, but nevertheless peaceful" Italian penetration.

June 18, 1919.

[92736]

No. 58.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 970.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 6, 1919.

IN accordance with the instructions, both written and verbal, which the members of this High Commission have received, it has been our consistent attitude to show no kind of favour whatsoever to any Turk, and to hold out no hope to them, but that the treatment to be meted out to the Ottoman Empire as the result of the war is likely to be of great severity.

2. All interchange of hospitality and comity has been rigorously forbidden, and no opportunity has been lost for proclaiming the absolute solidarity of Great Britain with her Allies as against the Turks, and I have been, indeed, most careful to prevent any indication, whether by deed or word, which might give rise to a situation where the Turks could once again begin the practice of spreading jealousy and dissensions among the Great Powers and of turning the results to their own advantage.

3. The same line of conduct has been observed with both the Grand Viziers who have been in power since the signature of the armistice, Tewfik Pasha and Damad Ferid Pasha, although both of them entertain strong pro-English sentiments. The only advantage which I have endeavoured to draw from these feelings has been in the direction of establishing order in the provinces and of assisting Armenian and Greek refugees in their deplorable plight.

4. There have, however, been certain evidences that my French colleague was endeavouring to draw direct political profit from the subservient attitude of the Turks, evidences which I have reported to your Lordship from time to time as they occurred. It has not, however, been until these last few days that the French High Commissioner has openly sought to obtain favour of the Turkish Government and people by means of the publication of the permission granted by the Supreme Council in Paris to the Turkish Government to send a delegation to the Peace Conference. M. DeFrance told me that his telegram directed him to inform the Grand Vizier and his colleagues immediately of this permission. He informed the Grand Vizier first, giving him to understand that it was the results of his own efforts. He then informed my Italian colleague and myself, but up to yesterday he had not informed

[1356]

the American Commissioner, although the telegram specifically referred to the Allied and Associated Governments.

5. I already reported to you in my telegram No. 1193 the terms in which the invitation to the Conference were made public, attributing it to the action taken by M. DeFrance.

6. As nothing was so eagerly desired by the Government and the people here as the permission to be represented at the Conference, the effect produced by this announcement has been very great; it has been followed by a continuous flood of propaganda in the press, of which I enclose herewith some specimens. I should add that my delegate on the Censorship Bureau brought round the first indication for approval, but when the words "à la suite de la démarche faite par lui," i.e., by the French High Commissioner, were deleted, the French delegate after applying for instructions insisted on retaining them.

7. A further bid for favour was made in arranging that the Delegation should be conveyed to France in a French man-of-war, which was done by M. DeFrance at his first interview with the Grand Vizier, much to the embarrassment of the latter, who has told a mutual friend that it was impossible for him to refuse, though he is jealous of his colleague, who will be carried in a British man-of-war.

8. Your Lordship will not fail to perceive that these actions, trifling as they may be in themselves, constitute nevertheless an entire break with the conduct we have adopted since the signing of the armistice, and a reversion to the unfortunate system which I believe prevailed in Turkey before the war.

9. I am quite unaware of what the atmosphere in Paris at the present time is; whether it is one of regarding the Turks as a defeated enemy upon whom conditions, maturely and deliberately decided on, are to be imposed without regard to their feelings or wishes, or whether competition for Turkish goodwill forms an element in the situation. However this may be, I believe it would be difficult to select a deputation which would, on the whole, be more favourable to Great Britain than the present, nor have I much fear that a journey of five days in a French man-of-war is likely to alter the opinions professed through life by the two Grand Viziers. There has been a question of attaching Ali Kemal Bey, Minister of the Interior, to the Delegation, but I am not sure of his sentiments, and a hint from me was sufficient to procure his elimination.

10. With regard to Ferid Pasha, his views are that the Turkish Government are unable to carry on without assistance. The disorganisation of every branch of the Administration is hopeless. It is a financial chaos; not a financial position. The interior is a welter of refugees of all races and religions who have been driven in the course of the war from their homes. The most serious problems are presented by the occupation of Smyrna by Greeks, whilst the situation is complicated by the encroachment of the Italians further south. His Highness sees no possible hope save in the assistance of a mandatory Power, and he reasons from the signal success of Great Britain in governing their Mussulman countries that the remains of the Turkish Empire should be administered with the help of Great Britain; or the more so as the Sultan and Caliph would then be under the protection of the same Power as that which already controls the destinies of the great mass of the Mahomedan world. If the mandate does not fall to Great Britain he desires that it should then be taken by the United States, but he declares himself opposed to a French mandate.

11. Tewfik Pasha is a considerably older man, and is haunted by recollections of the Congress at Berlin. I have reason to believe that he nourishes hopes of some secret understanding with Great Britain which, whilst assuring the unity of what remains of the Turkish Empire, will bind it closely to Great Britain. Though there is a certain divergence in the aims of the two delegates, in the main their objects are identical.

12. Whilst it is true to say that in Turkey such a thing as public opinion does not exist, there can be no question but that the popular feeling here has been strongly pro-English. The people would prefer, of course, to be under no control whatever, but if there is to be a control they desire that it should be English. Numerous delegations have come along to present this point of view, as I have informed you in previous telegrams and despatches, and granting even that there may be some kind of parity in the comparison as between a French and British mandate, all parties are unanimous in repudiating the idea that any considerable part of the Turkish Empire should fall under domination so contemptible in their eyes as that of the Italians, or, last of all, that of the Greeks.

13. But I wish to make it clear to your Lordship that an entirely new situation

has arisen since last Sunday, the day on which the French High Commissioner made his individual communication to the Grand Vizier of the permission for a Turkish delegation to be present at the Peace Conference, and the announcement which appeared the following morning, that this permission was due to his own efforts. From that moment onwards there has been an active and most marked French propaganda, without any attempt at concealment.

14. The French officer attached to the Allied police organisation has now given instructions to his Turkish subordinates to supply him daily with political reports, although heretofore the orders of the Allied officer in command, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Wilson, who is in charge of the military administration in this capital, have been of the strictest character to avoid interference in political matters in any way, and to attend merely to the preservation of public order.

15. On my first arrival here I was approached by many Turks who imagined that there was already a breach between French and British interests, and in this connection your Lordship may recollect the incident of Sami Bey which occurred in December last. Hopes of this nature were at that time disappointed, but they are now finding their realisation, and I fear that already the many different factions in Turkish politics, such as the Committee of Union and Progress, the *Entente Libéraux* of Souh-i-Selamet, the so-called National Liberal Party, and others, are already ranging themselves into French and British camps, partly on the chance of scoring one over the other, but mainly in the hope of getting the better of the foreigner.

16. A party is already springing up prepared to denounce any treaty or compact which may be accepted by the Turkish Delegation on the ground of the delegates not having been selected by the Parliament in accordance with the Constitution.

17. The continued progress of the Greeks in the vilayet of Aidin, and their gradual occupation of towns and villages, whilst received with outward tranquillity by the Turkish people, is causing them deeper and deeper resentment, and the very calm of the surface only increases my uneasiness.

18. I consider that an outbreak directed probably in the main against native Christians is very probable, and I am to-day in receipt of very disquieting reports from Mr. Hurst, the officer in the Levant Consular Service, who is now at Samsoun.

19. Mr. Hurst states that Mustapha Kemal, who was sent there, with the best intentions, by his Highness Ferid Pasha, is organising a movement which is only too likely to find an outlet for its energies in massacres. Certain knowledge has reached me also to the effect that various army officers have quietly left Constantinople with the intention of checking the advance of the Greeks further inland. Your Lordship will recollect also that when the Turkish troops were withdrawn from Smyrna the Greek authorities failed to secure the embarkation of the majority of the officers, who retired inland. It cannot be expected that these will remain inactive.

20. The weakness of the Sultan and of his situation is enhanced by his fears for his own personal safety.

21. The weakness of the Government is augmented by the departure of the present and the past Grand Viziers, whose character and intelligence offered at least fairly considerable guarantees.

22. Thus it is at the very moment when there is the greatest need for unity of purpose and of action among the Allies that the French have openly commenced bidding for Turkish favour, and that one is forced to harbour apprehension of serious discord between the Greeks and the Italians.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 58.

Note.

To his Excellency Colonel Maxwell.

IT is known by your Excellency that Captain Dépré has been complaining of the Turkish police of not having sent him the political reports. He had forwarded his complaints to you, and you asked me to go to him to have clear explanations with him. I went to see Captain Dépré, who was very sorry on account of these political reports. I said I sympathised with him, and explained, as far as I could, that our police commissariats, because there is a separate section in the general directory dealing with this purpose alone. I tried to explain this over and over. M. Dépré replied, "Since w :

are working together for the same purpose, you must help me as much as you can. I think your demands and petitions were never refused." Then with a proper language he said he had been in Merakesh for a long time, studied the Koran, and therefore is far from being an enemy of the Mussulman. After all this introduction, and adding about the French friendship since the time of Francis I on, he turned his subject to the present conditions, saying that it was, as a matter of fact, France that helped us to be invited to the Peace Conference; that we shall be obliged to France for returning Smyrna if conditions change; and that France, 90 out of 100, will have the mandate.

We thanked for all his kind conversation with us, and promised we would do our best to please him. I repeated, nevertheless, that I could not possibly enforce the commissariats on account of the reports dealing with political currents. Then I added that there was not a word dealing with politics even in the reports handed to your Excellency, and that it would not be right to compare our police with the European system of police. At the end we decided to send him a copy of the reports from all the commissariats, which I am doing now.

REFIK.

Enclosure 2 in No. 58.

*Captain Dépré to Colonel Maxwell.**Constantinople, le 5 juin 1919.*

MALGRÉ la demande que j'ai faite, le 24 mai 1919, les commissaires de police ne communiquent aucun renseignement pouvant intéresser la sûreté publique de Constantinople à mon commissaire de liaison, ou communiquent des choses insignifiantes; malgré les demandes de ce dernier à Refik Bey, on ne répond pas.

J'ai donc l'honneur de vous rendre compte que si cet état de chose ne cesse pas immédiatement, c'est-à-dire si les commissaires de police ne communiquent pas exactement tout ce qu'ils savent, en vertu de je ne sais quel ordre secret, je déclare ne pouvoir pas assurer la responsabilité du commandement de mon secteur, et je me verrais dans l'obligation de demander à être relevé de mes fonctions pour ce motif.

J'exige que chaque matin les commissaires de Péra adressent un rapport écrit à ce sujet à mon commissaire de liaison.

(Parafé.)

[89010]

No. 59.

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, June 25, 1919.

IN reply to your note of the 13th June, relative to the position of Lieutenant-Colonel Moulin at Damascus, I have the honour to point out that the *modus vivendi* of the 30th September, 1918, was expressly designed to cover the period preceding the creation of an Arab State.

While His Majesty's Government have every desire to meet the wishes of the French Government in such matters, they do not consider that any good reason has been shown for entering upon a discussion to modify the above arrangement, at the very moment when the whole question of the future status of these regions is about to be discussed by the Peace Conference.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[95840]

No. 60.

General Sir E. Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 278.)

My Lord,

Cairo, June 15, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 269 of the 11th June, I have the honour to forward copies of a further note by Captain Garland, of the Arab Bureau, carrying on the narrative of events connected with the Khurma dispute to the 10th June.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 60.

*Note by Captain Garland on the Khurma Dispute.**Latest Information.*

LATER reports from Jeddah have confirmed the completeness of Abdullah's defeat at Tarabah. According to a telegram sent by the King to Emir Feisal, the "martyrs" (i.e., Shereefian killed) amounted to 250, including several Ateibah Sheikhs, and also Seyyid Hilmi, who was Abdullah's Major-General Commanding the so-called "division" of regular troops. Emirs Abdullah and Shakir were themselves slightly wounded, all guns and machine guns and two-thirds of the supplies were lost, and only one-tenth of the mule mounted infantry got away.

It is worthy of note that, although they had had previous warning of the night attack, the regular officers who got away did so in their night attire. It was ever one of the Bagdadi officer's maxims not to allow military duties to interfere with his night's rest, and during the war, outposts, pickets, and the like were invariably dispensed with by the Hedjaz armies.

The 10,000 Bedouin originally reported to be with Abdullah seem to have melted away and, as Colonel Bassett remarks, "everything points to the majority of the tribal elements which profess allegiance to King Hussein being absolutely unreliable." A consoling feature is that the captors of the guns, &c., have no followers trained in their manipulation and employment.

In spite of the King's assertion that Ibn Saud reinforced Tarabah and Khurma, with a view to attacking Abdullah, no enemy advance from Tarabah is reported. Abdullah, according to the King, is now "remaining on the defensive," but both he and the King fear an advance by Ibn Saud on Taif and Mecca.

It is thought, however, that Ibn Saud will now rest content with his success and his reoccupation of Tarabah. He has common sense enough to realise that any further advance towards the Hedjaz cities would mean sacrificing our friendship, subsidy, and help, and he must realise that we possess the means to punish him even if he knows the King does not. It seems probable that His Britannic Majesty's Government's orders to withdraw from Tarabah will have the desired effect when he gets them.

The fact that the Ikhwan have not advanced from Tarabah since they recaptured it tends to show that Ibn Saud has them under some sort of control, and if the more fanatical elements had intended to raid Taif without his authority, they would surely have moved towards it by this time.

On the arrival of our aeroplanes, the King will no doubt insist on immediate punitive bombing raids of Tarabah, Khurma, and other Ikhwan camps, but it appears necessary that the possible results of such action should be well considered before undertaking it. From every point of view it will be infinitely better if Ibn Saud can be compelled to withdraw by political pressure from Bagdad, as aeroplane bombing would increase the hatred and ill-will between Nejd and Mecca, would render future reconciliation more difficult, would henceforth affect the hospitality extended to British official travellers through Nejd, and might quite conceivably precipitate a wholesale conflagration, besides possibly forming matter (suitably distorted) for Indian anti-Shereefian propaganda.

One feels constrained, therefore, to suggest that the aeroplanes should be reserved entirely for defence purposes, in case of an advance by Ikhwan from their present positions. And, if Ibn Saud retires personally from Khurma district, it would be wisest for the King to refrain from occupying it until the boundary dispute is settled by our arbitration. The King will, of course, denounce this as a mere maintenance of the defensive policy which, according to his views, is at the root of the present trouble, but he should realise by this time that armies incapable of carrying out successful offensives have no alternative to keeping to defensive measures.

It is obvious that the settlement by us of the boundary between Nejd and the Hedjaz is one of the Arabian affairs claiming our prompt attention, and it ought not to be much longer delayed.

The military position at Khurma to-day (10th June, 1919) is as follows:—

Ibn Saud is said to be at Tarabah, and his force probably amounts to 20,000 Bedouins, of which some are posted 10 miles west of Tarabah.

Emir Abdullah has collected from his original force a remnant of about 3,000

Bedouins at Okheidir, 250 semi-trained regulars have left Mecca under Sagh. Kaisuni to join the Emir, whilst Emir Ali at Medina is reported to be sending some machine guns and ammunition.

Cairo, June 10, 1919.

N. GARLAND.

[96973]

No. 61.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 1047.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 18, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to state that the following interim appointments have been made to posts in the Turkish Government during the absence of the Grand Vizier and the Ministers who have accompanied him to Paris.

Grand Vizier ad interim.—This post has been given, in accordance with practice, to Sabri Effendi, Sheikh-ul-Islam. He is a fair sample of the Ulema class. He has for many years been an outspoken opponent of the Committee of Union and Progress, and distinguished himself as a deputy by the vehemence (and length) of his speeches in the Chamber against the Committee Government before the war. He spent a good part of the duration of the war in exile. He is honest, but probably not very firm. He still belongs to the *Entente libérale* Party.

Minister of Foreign Affairs ad interim.—This post has been given to Sefa Bey, a professional diplomatist, who was formerly Minister at Bucharest. He has never played a conspicuous rôle in politics, but may be regarded as a person of moderate Union and Progress complexion.

Minister of Finance ad interim.—This post has been given to Shevket Torgout Pasha, Minister of War. The explanation given of this rather curious arrangement is that it was thought it would minimise friction, as the Ministry of War is still the Department most apt to come into conflict with the Ministry of Finance. In present circumstances it matters very little who is Minister of Finance, but it might have been thought that the one Minister not to appoint as Acting-Minister was the Minister of War, as the cause of the friction between the two Departments is that the Ministry of Finance has not only to curb Military extravagance, but also to secure for general purposes, any liquid assets which may be available in the War Office.

President of the Council of State ad interim.—This post has been given to Edhem Bey, Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, one of the less conspicuous members of the Cabinet, but one of the few whom the *Entente libérale* still regard as loyal.

2. The following is a complete list of the Cabinet as now constituted :—

Grand Vizier *ad interim* and Sheikh-ul-Islam, Sabri Effendi, strong *Entente libérale* up to date.

Minister for Foreign Affairs *ad interim*, Sefa Bey.

Minister of War and Minister of Finance *ad interim*, Shevket Torgout Pasha.

Minister of Marine, Avni Pasha.

Minister of Interior, Ali Kemal Bey.

Minister of Justice, Wasfi Effendi, strong *Entente libérale* up to date.

Minister of Commerce and President of Council of State *ad interim*, Edhem Bey.

Minister of Public Instruction, Said Bey.

Minister of Public Works, Ferid Bey.

Minister of Pious Foundations, Hamdi Effendi.

Ministers without Portfolio.

Tewfik Pasha, ex-Grand Vizier, Plenipotentiary to the Conference.

Ahmed Izzet Pasha, ex-Grand Vizier, came into power to conclude the armistice.

Is regarded as Moderate Committee of Union and Progress.

Reshid Akif Pasha, Senator.

General Ali Riza Pasha, Senator.

Riza Pasha, Senator.

Ismail Hakki Pasha, Senator.

Abdurrahman Sherif Bey, Senator. A historian who has taken part in national revival movements since the armistice.

Haidarizade Ibrahim Effendi, ex-Sheikh-ul-Islam, a pan-Islamist.

Ahmed Abouk Pasha, ex-Minister of War.

Colonel Sadik Bey, Titular leader of the *Entente libérale* Party. Strongly anti-Committee of Union and Progress and pro-English. In exile in Egypt during the war, and worked with British.

3. I have in a previous despatch mentioned the inclusion in the Government of this large number of Ministers without portfolio, and pointed out that the effect has been to give the Government as a whole the character of a Coalition, while retaining the administrative functions in the hands of the *Entente libérale* plus Opportunist, but in the main, anti-Committee, elements.

4. It is generally considered that the inclusion of the new Ministers without portfolio was in the nature of a concession intended to disarm the Committee and other Opposition elements. Some of the Ministers, e.g., Izzet Pasha, ex-Grand Vizier, are regarded as being more than a little tainted with committee sympathies. Churuksoulu Mahmoud Pasha, who was one of them, is thought to have these sympathies in an even more pronounced form. On the other hand, Sadik Bey, the latest addition to the Ministers without portfolio, is the recognised leader of the *Entente libérale* Party, and has been an aspirant for the Grand Vizirate since that party became discontented with Ferid Pasha because of his opportunist, and as they wrongly thought, pro-French character. Marshal Shakir Pasha, ex-Minister of War, who was also a Minister without portfolio, has just died.

5. From the above description you will see that the Turkish Government is of a mixed and nondescript character. The most important single figure in it is Ali Kemal Bey, a journalist of tortuous ways and great personal ambition. He is detested by the Committee and equally so by the Extreme *Entente libérale* Party, who regard him as a henchman of the French. There was probably some foundation for this accusation a short time ago, but Ali Kemal Bey seems rather to have shifted his ground quite recently. His one desire now appears to be to keep things together, and ensure his political and personal safety, and he displays perfect readiness to co-operate with this high commission. He claims, indeed, to share the general view that the only salvation of this country lies in English protection of some kind.

6. On the other hand, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and still more the Ministry of War, must be regarded as strongholds of veiled anti-foreign and, perhaps, more particularly anti-British feeling. They are a good deal staffed with men who consider that the Committee's only crimes were its blunders, and that its blunders were its misfortune rather than its fault.

7. The incoherent character of the Government has been emphasised by the departure for Paris of Ferid and Tewfik Pashas, both because it removes the two most authoritative figures, and because the selection of Ferid Pasha to go to Paris is in itself a bone of contention. His appointment pleased neither the Committee of Union and Progress elements nor the extreme adherents of the *Entente libérale*. An impetus has been given to the activities of the Committee of Union and Progress sympathisers inside and outside the Government. The *Entente libérale* are extremely dissatisfied with the situation because, though they had the choosing of the Government only a little more than three months ago, and though there has been no avowed changes in its orientation, they feel that they have to-day only four or at most five men in the Government on whom they can absolutely rely.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner.

[96986]

No. 62.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 1060.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 22, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a memorandum by Mr. Ryan, of this High Commission, giving an account of an interview between Ali Kemal Bey, the Minister of the Interior, and Brigadier-General Deedes and himself.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner.

[1356]

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Enclosure in No. 62.

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.

THE Minister of the Interior asked to see General Deedes and myself last evening. We visited him at his house.

Ali Kemal Bey expressed fresh perturbation over the national defence movement in the Interior, especially in the direction of Karassi. There is no longer the slightest doubt, in his opinion, that this movement has the full approval of the Ministry of War, and is to some extent organised there, especially by Djavad Pasha.

Djavad Pasha went to the Council of Ministers the other day and openly criticised the policy of the Government in not defending the country against Greek aggression. The people organising the present movement all shared Djavad's views.

Ali Kemal Bey showed us several papers. He began with a telegram sent broadcast by the National Defence and Anti-Annexation Committee of Edremid. This proclaims a gullant victory over the Greeks. He said instructions had been given by the civil authorities to the telegraph officials to stop all such telegrams. His next document was a telegram sent by Moustapha Kemal Pasha from Amassia to the Inspector-General of the First Army and to all army corps commanders. Moustapha Kemal said he understood that orders had been given to the telegraph officials to stop telegrams about the national defence movement. He hoped no honourable telegraph official would obey these orders. Any official doing so should be court-martialled. By this telegram Moustapha Kemal not only assumes the authority of a commander-in-chief, but definitely joins issue with the civil authority.

Ali Kemal's next point was this: A number of students had applied for permission to go into the Interior on a sort of lecturing tour to enlighten their compatriots. By a singular coincidence the Ministry of War had communicated to him officially a telegram from the Commanding Officer, Ezerdjia, pointing out in connection with the expected advent of *Entente* commissions of enquiry that the voicing of the people's wishes could not be left to peasants in turbans and cummerbunds, and suggesting that some intelligent young men should be turned on the job. Halil Bey had been asked to "get" the applicants here, and had reported that all of them were all right.

Ali Kemal Bey said that all this placed himself and his friends in a very embarrassing position. They had to choose between making way for the Chauvinists and resigning their own places in the Government or trying to eliminate the Chauvinists altogether. He seemed to think they could achieve the latter result, but what would be their own position afterwards if the Greek aggression continued unchecked? He had in mind not only further advances in North-Western Asia Minor, but assumptions of authority here, which were causing the greatest anxiety.

He referred especially to the action of the Greeks in haling Turks into the Greek consulate-general and maltreating them. He showed us a long report on incidents of this kind.

General Deedes and I dissuaded Ali Kemal Bey from giving in to the Chauvinists. The latter might have the appearance of playing a *beau rôle*, and he and his friends with their policy of long-suffering could never have that appearance. The Chauvinists were creating a situation in which a single spark might start a conflagration, and if that happened it would be the final catastrophe for Turkey. The limits of the Greek advance in Asia Minor had at first been uncertain; limits had since been prescribed, and steps had been taken to confine the Greeks within them. As for incidents in Constantinople, they were a matter for the Inter-Allied authorities, and we had no doubt they would be dealt with suitably. Anyhow, though disagreeable and humiliating, they were incidents which would not affect the future, and afforded no indication of the intentions of the Peace Conference.

I took the opportunity of again mentioning the question of elections. Ali Kemal Bey said the Sultan favoured them because he shrank from sole responsibility for the peace. The Unionist Ministers in the Cabinet clamoured all the time for an election for their own reasons. I said that the proposal seemed to me simply fantastic, and that I knew the same view was held by my chiefs. The answer to people who talked about the constitutional necessity for parliamentary sanction for the Peace Treaty must be quite brutal. It was that the peace would not be a treaty which the Turks could accept or reject, but an imposed peace admitting of no choice.

That would be the Sultan's defence before his people and before history. Ali Kemal Bey fully agreed. He thought it would be possible to overcome the Sultan's difficulty when the time came by some sort of Crown Council.

There can be no doubt that a very definite conflict exists to-day between the military party and those who wish to continue Ferid Pasha's policy. It is quite on the cards that the former may force the issue in Constantinople very rapidly, and it appears to me to be a question for urgent decision whether we should help the Moderate party morally, or whether we should let things take their course. If we choose the latter, it is quite possible that in a few days we may have in power a strongly Nationalist Government capable of giving us a great deal of trouble. Its programme would not include massacres, but it would countenance every kind of passive resistance to Allied intervention in the affairs of this country, and it would put no check on irresponsible people prepared to go further. It would also be quite capable of disavowing Ferid Pasha, though on the whole I think it more likely that it would be content with relegating him to the second place in the Peace Delegation.

The most urgent question of all would not appear to be that of replacing Halil Bey by a new Director-General of Police. I am myself strongly in favour of accepting Ali Kemal Bey's choice, subject to an undertaking that subordinate personnel will not be changed except in consultation with General Fuller.

[98129]

No. 63.

Brigadier General Clayton to Earl Curzon—(Received July 4.)

(No. 311.)

General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force,

My Lord,

June 23, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward a summary of the situation up to date in Syria.

In spite of the impression which appears to prevail in French Government circles that some sort of agreement was arrived at in Paris between M. Clemenceau and Emir Feisal, there seems little doubt that the Emir has in no way changed his attitude of uncompromising opposition to any form of French intervention in Syria.

At a meeting between himself and the Commander-in-Chief in the middle of May he outlined the situation in France at the time of his departure; and, even at that time, so little was he affected by any discussions which may have taken place between himself and M. Clemenceau, that he put forward a proposition to assemble selected Syrian representatives with a view to bringing about a *coup d'Etat* by the immediate declaration of the complete independence of Syria. The Commander-in-Chief forbade any such action, and the idea was therefore dropped.

Emir Feisal then observed that he was unable to ask for Great Britain alone as Mandatory Power, and at the same time forgo the demand for independence, for reasons that—

- (a.) He feared that the French would hear of it and take steps to defeat his plans;
- (b.) He was uncertain whether or not Great Britain would accept a mandate, even if offered it by the Peace Conference; and
- (c.) He had gone so far in his campaign for independence that it was difficult to make any change at short notice.

He had therefore decided to instruct his people to ask for complete independence for Syria, at the same time expressing the hope that it would be granted to other Arab countries. By this means he would be able to reconcile those who were thinking only of Syria and those who favoured the idea of a great Pan-Arab State. At the same time he proposed to tell the Commission sent out by the Peace Conference that he had been forced into this course for fear of the French, and that he would at any time accept a British mandate.

Emir Feisal added that the French could only enter Syria by force of arms, and that he himself felt so strongly on the subject that he would identify himself with active opposition.

As regards Mesopotamia, the Emir felt that an agreement should be made between Great Britain and the Arabs without recourse to the Peace Conference. He hoped that the Arabs would have a semblance of independence in that area, but realised that they must have some sort of control the details of which should be worked out between the two parties concerned. He was anxious that British officials in the Iraq should be answerable, not to India, but to London or, preferably, Egypt.

Towards the end of May Emir Feisal received a telegram from his delegate in Paris stating that the Commission appointed by the Peace Conference was not coming

[1536]

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out to Syria. He was greatly distressed at this news, and the result of lengthy interviews between him and the political officers in Damascus are given in the attached Appendix (A). On receiving a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief stating that the American portion of the Commission had already left he was reassured, and the crisis passed off.

There was still some uncertainty in the minds of Emir Feisal and his followers as to the best course to take up before the impending Commission, and Emir Feisal continued to endeavour to obtain a mandate from as many of the local notables as possible, giving him a free hand in his dealings with the Commission. He has approached all communities in this sense, including the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and the leading chiefs of the Druses in the Hauran.

Some indication of a tendency to look to America was given during the visit of two American journalists to Damascus. The Arab Club took the opportunity of giving a reception in honour of these representatives of the American press, and of expressing appreciation for all that President Wilson and his country had done for the cause of Arab independence.

Lately some rumours seem to have spread abroad that Emir Feisal came to an agreement with the French during his visit to Europe, and there are reports of feeling against him owing to a suspicion that he has been entering into agreements without the knowledge of the people. He is aware of this, and has now decided to ask the Peace Commission openly for a British mandate. This may be due to his realising that there is little chance of complete independence being granted.

The investigations of Said Pasha Shoucair and his trenchant criticisms of Arab financial arrangements have probably shown the necessity for European advice and control. Said Pasha has suggested certain immediate reforms, including the cutting down of the army and gendarmerie, and the reduction of Feisal's own Civil List. A committee has now been formed, consisting of Said Pasha himself and certain other Arab officials, to examine the various departmental budgets and see whether further retrenchments can be effected.

The defeat of Emir Abdullah's army in the Hedjaz has greatly disturbed Emir Feisal, and he and his chief advisers are anxious that a Mohammedan force should be sent to the Hedjaz to assist King Hussein. All agree, however, that it is not possible to send any large reinforcements from Syria, and assistance is being confined to the despatch of a few guns and machine-guns, together with a small detachment of selected officers and other ranks.

In the middle of June Emir Feisal paid a visit to Aleppo district and was received with considerable enthusiasm throughout his tour of inspection. He had a long interview with the General Officer Commanding and the Political Officer at Aleppo, at which he gave a full statement of his views on the general situation. A detailed report of this interview is attached as Appendix (B).

There is no doubt that political questions are occupying the entire attention of all Arab leaders in Syria to the detriment of administrative reform, which is urgently needed. Until a decision is arrived at it is hopeless to endeavour to interest either Emir Feisal or his immediate advisers in questions of local administration. As a consequence the Government is not progressing to any marked degree and many urgent reforms are being postponed. Old feuds are beginning to revive, especially in the Deraa district, where the Arabs of the Hauran are indulging in desultory quarrels with Beni Sakhr and other tribes with whom they have long-standing enmities.

In the Lebanon there are two main parties, one in favour of an independent Lebanon and the other desirous of forming part of an Arab State with central government at Damascus.

The Independence Party have recently been active and indulged in a demonstration at Baabda, the headquarters of the Lebanon Government, at which the Lebanese flag was hoisted and the independence of the Lebanon declared. The incident did not cause any particular disturbance and was brought to an end by the Military Governor, who ordered the flag to be pulled down and dispersed the assembly.

The Independence Party, of which the Maronite Patriarch is a leading member, are showing signs of nervousness in view of the reports that the French have come to an arrangement with Feisal which they think may lead to the inclusion of the Lebanon in a Syrian State, in opposition to the programme of independence which they are pressing.

On the other hand, the counter party are not idle. Meetings take place every day and Moslems are working harmoniously with some of the prominent Christians. Their programme is an autonomous Lebanon comprised in the more extended boundaries

which they consider essential to economical prosperity, on condition that this autonomous Lebanon will recognise in principle the suzerainty of the future government of all Syria at Damascus. A considerable number of Greek Orthodox Christians and of Druses have joined this party and are engaged in canvassing in opposition to the programme of the Lebanon Administrative Council, which is in favour of the complete and absolute independence of the Lebanon.

It is not easy to appreciate the lines which the policy of French officials in this area is now following in this complicated situation. They are faced with the difficulty of having to conciliate Emir Feisal and the Arabs at Damascus without alienating the traditional support of the Maronite Christians, the majority of whom are members of the party which desires an independent Lebanon. Attached to this despatch, as Appendix (C), is a report rendered by the Chief Administrator (Colonel Copin).

I have, &c.

G. F. CLAYTON, *Brigadier-General,*
Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

APPENDIX (A).

AT 1 o'clock on Thursday, the 29th May, Colonel Cornwallis and Colonel Joyce were sent for urgently by Emir Feisal. Arrived there they found him in a state of almost distress. He proceeded to read out a telegram which he had received from Rustom Haider, the Hedjaz delegate at the Peace Conference. The gist of the telegram was that the Conference was now engaged on Turkish questions, that all British troops in Syria were going to be withdrawn, and that the Commission to Palestine and Syria had been stopped. This Feisal interpreted as meaning that we were going to abandon the country to the French without any attempt being made to ascertain the wishes of the people. This he said would inevitably cause bloodshed. It would mean war between the French and the Arabs. The Arabs would attack the French, and since in that case the British might be expected to come to the assistance of the French in the country, it would mean war with us as well. He made it fairly evident what part he himself would play in such a contingency. He did not even hint at trying to prevent trouble, and it is clear that he meant that he would identify himself with the movement, and place himself at the head of it. He stated that if our troops were withdrawn, and any French troops left, even if only in the coastal sector, he would regard it as a hostile act. On being asked if he wanted all troops, British and French, to be withdrawn, he hedged, and hinted that he would consider it an unfriendly act if the British troops were withdrawn under any circumstances. His point of view in this is rather hard to follow, as it is surely what would happen if he attained the objects of his programme and was granted complete independence without any mandatory Power. He finally wrote a telegram for the Commander-in-Chief, requesting an answer in twenty-four hours, and demanding:—

1. That no British troops should be withdrawn unless all French troops were withdrawn.
2. That the Commission should come out.

He was very insistent about the Commission coming out, and scouts the idea that any arrangements acceptable to him might possibly have been arrived at in Paris. He is still unwilling to accept any compromise as regards an independent Syria. Although at one time he said he did not mind about the Lebanon being French, he afterwards hedged, and said that by the Lebanon he meant the mountains only without any portion of the coast, not even Beirut. He also showed himself very mistrustful of our Zionist aims, although he declared that he was only presenting the point of view of the people of the country to us. On Friday morning he was not quite so excited, but announced his intention unless he received a satisfactory answer to his telegram to the Commander-in-Chief of executing a *coup d'Etat* by proclaiming the independence of Syria, including the coastal sector, and sending his troops to occupy the latter.

He asked what would be our attitude, having in view the fact that the Arabs in Palestine would probably rise. He was informed that such an act would finally and irreparably destroy all friendship between us, as it would probably entail the loss of British lives. He agreed that this would be the probable result, but asked what could he do.

APPENDIX (B).

THE General Officer Commanding and Political Officer at Aleppo have had several long interviews with Emir Feisal. His attitude and policy seem very reasonable, and with his personality it should be very easy to form a National Government even in Syria. His great difficulty now is what he considers the extraordinary attitude of Britain; after liberating the Arabic-speaking countries at an immense cost in blood and treasure, and after four years' unbroken friendship with the Emir and the Arabs, England has suddenly cooled, refuses to say whether she is going to help any more, and is now giving the impression that she has sold the Arabs to suit the exigencies of politics in Europe. As for Syria, England did not conquer Syria—she defeated the Turkish forces in Syria, and thereby liberated the country, and Syria is no more a chattel to be used for political bargaining than is liberated Belgium. All the more is the Emir surprised at our attitude because of the obvious importance to England of the firm friendship of the Moslem Arabs. By breaking up the Turkish Empire and delivering the Hedjaz, Mesopotamian and Syrian Moslems, England has caused alarm among all the Moslems who look to the Sultan as Caliph, and now she is deliberately throwing away the friendship of the very people she has risked so much to save. Besides, these Arab countries command all the roads leading to the East, and every consideration demands that England should not surrender this enormous advantage, political, commercial, and religious, to even her closest ally. With these countries under her control and in her firm friendship the way to the East is safe, and the rest of the Moslem world will soon be reconciled. With these countries in anyone else's hands England becomes the humble suitor of that country. France, to all appearances, relies solely on England and America for her future existence; this the Emir knows full well, and he cannot understand why England should be so afraid of doing anything to offend the country which should logically be prepared to make almost any sacrifice to void alienating England. The result is a lurking suspicion in the Emir's mind that the Arabs are being sold. He regards Syria as the crux of the whole problem. Syria is full of promise, the gem in the Arab crown, and will be the natural leader of the Arab race. If that goes to other hands the Arabic-speaking countries will suffer a loss that will cripple them for ever. The Emir is confident that he can unite the Syrians in a common nationality. After all, the Christians and Moslems are of the same race and language—in physique the Moslem is superior owing to the sedentary occupations long followed by the Christians, while in intellect there is nothing to choose. In education alone the Christian is superior, and this is not due to the money and efforts of the Christians themselves, but to continuous effort and expenditure by outside Christians. Put the two religions on equal terms for purposes of education and eliminate foreign influence, except under the control of the mandatory Power, and in a few years the Syrians will be one race again.

The Emir is very uncertain whether England really means to accept the mandate if it is offered her. The natural inference that otherwise the sending of the Commission was waste of time is discounted by the story said to come from French sources that the Commission is pure camouflage, and the fate of Syria has already been settled. If England is not going to accept the mandate, the sooner this is widely known the better. If England will accept Syria the cry for complete independence and the immediate recruiting of troops will be at once dropped. If England is determined to avoid further responsibilities in Syria—although she must well know that the undertaking of a Syrian mandate would make many of her other responsibilities infinitely lighter—then Syria wants complete independence; she knows well enough that it means Capitulations, foreign protection of Syrian Christians, foreign concessions, and corruptions and intrigues innumerable, but the Moslems deliberately accept this as better than a French Protectorate. A French mandate is regarded as a national death. It will bring French colonists and French citizenship and Christian hegemony. The Emir and his Arabs did not make their revolution to see the fairest part of their country handed to France, whom they regard as nothing less than an enemy, and whom they fully intend to resist by force of arms should she attempt to exercise a protectorate over Syria.

The Arabs would, in a few years more, have thrown off the Turkish yoke by themselves. They did not join the Allies to be put under the infinitely stronger yoke of France, and until England shows her hand it is exceedingly hard for Syria to show hers. Those who prefer England, but will not actually fight France, do not want to ask for England and then find France in charge—they fear the very natural resentment of France; their own countrymen who spoke for France will naturally be preferred until they have lived down the mistake of asking for England.

The worst of the whole situation is that the people who will oppose France most bitterly are the very best and most enlightened of the Moslems, the pick of Syria. It will not be the scum but the true Syrian Arab who will "go out" and wage war if France comes to Syria—of course the Bedouins will join the outlaws. Failing England, and failing complete independence, America is the only hope. Anything, in fact, but France.

These are the Emir's views and the views of all the best Moslem Arabs as well.

The actual details of the interests of England in Syria were, of course, not discussed with the Emir, but they were obviously present in his mind, as he insisted on the fact that our interests were identical with those of the Arabs.

It is easy, of course, to say that the Emir is actuated by personal ambition, &c. That may be true enough, but he undoubtedly has the Moslems of this part of the country with him, and also all the Bagdad Arabs now here.

The Christians are sitting on the hedge, and are hopelessly intractable and fanatical. Their only platform is anti-Moslem and self-interest, and they will fawn upon whatever Power receives the mandate. A statement that England will accept the mandate would be received with unbounded enthusiasm by every Moslem from the sea to the desert, and there is no question but that the stimulus of England's acceptance of the Protectorate would go far to tide over the difficult days of forming a Government and getting the country going on modern lines.

With an English Protectorate the French will at once become not only tolerated but actually popular, as their language and civilisation are undoubtedly intensely admired. In the present political situation they are unpopular, and their language tabooed.

APPENDIX (C).

Report by Colonel Copin (French Army), Chief Administrator Occupied Enemy Territory (West).

NO civil administration or government exist in the Lebanon besides the Military Administration. On the arrival of the Allies and in accordance with the instructions contained in General Headquarters telegram of the 22nd October, 1918, the Administrative Council of the Lebanon continued to function, the only modification being that the Senior Military Administrator of the Lebanon was entrusted with the presidency of the Council.

Under this senior officer there are three deputy administrative officers, one at Batroun (northern Lebanon), one at Beiteddin (southern Lebanon), and one at Zahleh (eastern Lebanon).

The kaimakams and the mudirs are the only people who have been retained as civilian officials of the Administration.

I beg to furnish hereinafter the information required regarding the political situation of the Lebanon:—

The Lebanon has at all times been constituted in Syria as a small island, partly isolated, sheltered by its mountains, and has remained always, whoever was the dominator of the country, a feudal people, very attached to its beliefs, its traditions, and its family customs. In 1860 the European Powers guaranteed to it a separate statute in Turkey in Asia, with special privileges, of which it has always shown itself excessively jealous, and to which it holds with the greatest possible energy. The arrival of the Allied troops in the country last October had been enthusiastically welcomed, because it marked the end of the Turkish régime. The Lebanese have only seen in those alterations the absolute certainty henceforth of the maintenance of the privileges previously conceded. Confident in this hope, and of the Allied nations, they have awaited the decisions of the Peace Conference with the greatest tranquillity.

Towards the end of April, after the arrival of Emir Feisal at Beirut, the Sherifian Party stirred themselves, organised manifestations, and started carrying out an active and an undisguised propaganda. The Moslems proclaimed that Syria, including the Lebanon, must return to El Emir. The Lebanese, surprised, deceived, and uneasy, saw in these exaggerated manifestations a menace of Sherifian attempts at inclusion. The consequence of this fear was a calm, pacific, and orderly, but firm and decided reaction. The great majority of the Lebanese, the municipalities, and the clergy undertook a campaign for independence.

At present the situation is clear. On one side, and these represent the great majority, the partisans for the autonomy of the Lebanon claim a Lebanon more or less large, but are entirely firm and unanimous on the principle of the independence of the country, under the French Protectorate. On the other side, the partisans of Feisal, most of them are Druses, demand the attachment of the Lebanon to Syria.

The Sherifians, and more particularly those of Zahleh, show themselves very active, trying to gather signatures in favour of El Emir, distributing money, and promising posts and employment in the future government. This propaganda is carried out in full daylight.

As a proof, I beg to draw your attention to the attached tract, of which I am sending the original and a translation, which has been distributed at Zahleh by Michel Bey Loutfallah, member of the Committee of "Société des Secours pour la famine." The latter has been authorised to circulate in Syria so as to control the distribution of relief, on the express condition that he should not interfere in policy during his journey, it being well understood that the permit for travelling could be withdrawn from him on the 18th February, 1920. I cite also Iskandar Bey Ammoun, Inspector-General of Justice, Damascus, who has held numerous meetings in the Lebanon, and who has endeavoured to recruit adherents to the Sherifian cause, thus breaking the neutrality which his official functions impose on him.

Such is, at present, the political situation: on one side an active propaganda; on the other a very clear and a very calm reaction.

It is quite evident that it would be advisable to regulate, as soon as possible, the political status of Syria in order to avoid the uneasiness which is developing from day to day, and which is provoking manifestations and enervation, and which may, in accentuating itself, cause trouble against public order.

For the moment, the disorder does not offer any cause for anxiety. The general attitude of the population remains satisfactory.

Beirut, June 4, 1919.

Enclosure in No. 63.

Les Lois fondamentales.

Parti du l'Union syrienne centrale—Égypte.

(Traduction.)

1. LA Syrie tout entière doit être une, depuis les monts Taurus jusqu'au Khabour et l'Euphrate à l'est, le désert arabe jusqu'aux villes de Saleh au sud, la mer Rouge jusqu'à la ligne El-Acaba, Rafge et la mer Méditerranée à l'ouest.

2. La Syrie doit être parfaitement indépendante; son indépendance doit être garantie par la Ligue des Nations, aussi bien que ses lois fondamentales. Cette garantie doit conserver les droits de l'indépendance.

3. Le Gouvernement du pays doit être aidé par la Ligue des Nations, en choisissant au début des hommes expérimentés aux hautes fonctions de conseillers nécessaires.

4. Le Gouvernement doit avoir une forme démocratique; la base de ses lois et de ses codes doit être civile, sauf les lois régissant les statuts personnels, qui doivent rester telles qu'elles sont.

5. Les lois actuelles doivent être conservées jusqu'à la réunion du Parlement général, que les corrigera ou les changera d'après les intérêts du pays et les lois de la civilisation moderne.

6. Le pays doit se diviser en vilayets indépendants intérieurement, reliés les uns aux autres pour le bien commun. On doit garder les considérations traditionnelles et géographiques, telles que les considérations locales particulières de Palestine et Hauran, les traditions des tribus bédouines et Nasirieh dans les vilayets d'Alep, de Damas et de Deir Ez-Zor, et les traditions du Liban, ses anciennes limites naturelles et ses anciens privilèges.

7. Chaque vilayet aura un Conseil administratif particulier élu par le suffrage universel, selon une loi qui conserve les droits de la minorité. L'élection de ce Conseil aura lieu une fois tous les quatre ans. C'est lui qui dirigera les affaires du vilayet, qui formera ses lois intérieures, selon les cas qui conviennent au vilayet, à condition qu'elles ne contrarient pas à celles du pays.

8. Le pays aura un Parlement général composé de membres élus par les Conseils administratifs; la proportion sera de un sur trois. Ce Parlement se réunira une fois par an pour étudier les affaires du pays et ses intérêts communs et pour former les lois qui conviennent au pays.

9. Un Gouvernement central général de tous les vilayets, et y compris le Liban, aura pour capitale en été Damas, en hiver Beyrouth; il aura un Ministère responsable devant le Parlement.

10. Tout vilayet formera des agents de police pour sa propre sécurité, et le Gouvernement général élaborera une loi spéciale pour le recrutement des forces nécessaires.

11. Les fonctions seront dans les mains des hommes capables du vilayet.

12. Le programme de l'enseignement doit être unique, commun à tout le pays et convenable à tous les enfants des divers rites et religions.

13. Les frais et dépenses de chaque vilayet seront payés de ses propres impôts. Mais les revenus des intérêts communs, tels que la douane, la poste, le télégraphe, les chemins de fer, les bateaux et les mines seront mis à la disposition du Gouvernement central, qui les utilisera pour les travaux communs.

14. Si la nation arabe formait une nation séparée, la Syrie s'unirait à elle, à condition que cela ne change rien de sa propre unité ni de la forme de son Gouvernement.

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No. 64.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 1148.)

MR. BALFOUR presents his compliments to Earl Curzon, and transmits herewith copies of two documents on the subject of the proposed Zionist activities in Palestine.

Paris, July 2, 1919.

Enclosure 1 in No. 64.

Dr. Weizmann to Sir L. Mallet.

Délégation sioniste au Congrès de la Paix,

10, Place Édouard-VII, Paris, June 18, 1919.

Dear Sir Louis Mallet,

I HAVE been thinking a great deal over the valuable suggestion you made when I last saw you a few days ago regarding the desirability of entering on practical work in Palestine as soon as possible. Since seeing you I have discussed the same subject with Lord Eustace Percy who, I understand, has mentioned it to Mr. Balfour. These two gentlemen, as well as others, seem to share your views in the matter, and after a further conversation with Mr. Vansittart I have decided to approach your department formally and submit a programme of work in Palestine, which, to my mind, is already both desirable and possible. Before doing so, however, I venture to submit to you one or two general considerations.

In the first place, any encouragement which may be given to us by His Majesty's Government would, in the present state of extreme pressure on Jewry, be received by the whole of the Jewish world with deep relief and gratitude. Secondly, the development of certain of the undermentioned lines of action would introduce into the country both additional men of character and of brains, and also capital, and would thereby improve the economic condition of the country, and thus contribute more than anything else towards establishing good relations between the Jews and the Arabs. If the Arabs see that practical work, remunerative to them as to the other elements in the population, is beginning in earnest, and that this work, far from affecting their conditions unfavourably, improves them, any artificial agitation that may still be prevalent will be checkmated, and wild and unfounded rumours that may be circulating will be stopped.

I should also like to point out for the information of His Majesty's Government that we have not been unmindful of the great financial responsibilities which will probably fall on the Zionist Organisation immediately after the signature of peace, and to meet these responsibilities we have been endeavouring to create the necessary

[1356]

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instruments. This work has been rendered even more complicated than would otherwise have been the case by the difficulties encountered in communicating with the greater number of our supporters in the east of Europe. However, in addition to balancing the Zionist budget for the current year at 500,000*l.* we have established a company with a capital of 10,000,000 roubles for the erection of dwellings in Palestine, this company to be registered in England, and we are moreover establishing a development company with a capital of 4,000,000*l.* The status of this latter company is being considered now in London by the committee of our Organisation, of which Mr. Herbert Samuel is chairman, and it is hoped that it will be possible to register it in the near future. In the meanwhile negotiations are in progress on behalf of this company for the purchase of a number of transportable houses, and the erection on its behalf of hotels in Palestine has already commenced.

The activities in Palestine which seem to us of an urgent character are as follows:—

1. The acquisition of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway.
2. The acquisition of the German colonies and town settlements in Palestine.
3. The acquisition of the Kaiserin Augusta Victoria Hospice on the Mount of Olives, which is German State property. We are specially anxious to effect this as the hospice adjoins the university site, and if we acquired it we could fit it out as a temporary university building, library, &c. I need not point out the immense importance of such a step, equally from the moral, intellectual, and political points of view. The erection of buildings for the University is very difficult at present on account of lack of building material, which is itself a consequence of the scarcity of transport. The acquisition of the hospice building would relieve us of this responsibility.
4. Permission for Jews to enter and settle in the country. These would be guaranteed by the Zionist Organisation as economically sound and anxious to invest their capital in Palestine. There is a large number of Jews who are ready to proceed to Palestine to found small industries there, to open commercial undertakings, and to acquire and work land. Their entry into Palestine is at present rendered very difficult. The Zionist Organisation would be quite prepared to guarantee the *bona fides* financial position and suitability for the purpose of such immigrants. We are ourselves most anxious to stop all unsuitable immigration and have published warnings to that effect throughout the Jewish world. On the other hand, we are also anxious to introduce into the country in limited numbers people willing and capable of assisting the development of the country on sound lines.
5. The transfer to the Zionist Organisation or other body to be constituted specially for the purpose of the waste or unoccupied lands that could be put under the plough almost immediately. We are particularly anxious to settle the demobilised Jewish soldiers in Palestine as an encouragement not to leave the country. Means are available to do this, and, if only we had the land, we could set to work immediately.
6. The establishment of a shipping line principally for the transport of material from the Mediterranean ports and Palestine, but also possibly from England. This would enable us to import building material, of which the need is greatest at present and the meeting of which need is an inevitable preliminary to further activities.
7. The acquisition by the Zionist Organisation or other public body of certain small concessions to be developed for the purposes of public utility, e.g., telephone, radio-telegraph, and water-power of the Audja.

I should like to point out to you that all these concessions, with the single exception of that of the waste lands, would not affect the present agrarian policy of the administration and should not interfere with the susceptibilities of the Arabs. For us, however, they would mean a very important beginning. If, as I hope, the Secretary of State considers the immediate carrying out of the programme outlined above desirable, I would be ready to proceed to Palestine in the near future, and in the company of Justice Brandeis and other friends discuss with the administration on the spot the best ways and means of putting the programme into effect. I would also propose to visit Feisul in Damascus, and, in co-operation with him, elaborate a

conciliatory policy so far as the Arab population is concerned. For this purpose I shall be grateful to receive the necessary recommendation from His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
CH. WEIZMANN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 64.

Sir L. Mallet to Dr. Weizmann.

July 1, 1919.

Dear Dr. Weizmann,

I HAVE read and shown to Mr. Balfour your letter of the 18th ultimo, submitting a programme of work in Palestine which you would like his authority immediately to carry out.

I understand that you have already received a letter from him for presentation to General Allenby asking him to discuss with you in detail whether there are any immediate questions which could be quietly taken up and "pushed forward a little" without waiting for further developments.

You will no doubt raise with him the question of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, but, as you are aware, this railway is French property and the French Government have already addressed His Majesty's Government several times with regard to its immediate return to French control, so that it is not possible for the British authorities to dispose of it.

Mr. Balfour doubts therefore whether it would serve any useful purpose to open a discussion of this question with the French Government at the present stage, and thinks that it might possibly provoke inconvenient opposition if broached before the mandate is given to the British.

As regards the acquisition of the German colonies and town settlements, so long as the country is only in the military occupation of the British, they are not in a legal position to expropriate the German possessions, so that we fear that little can be done in this direction for the present.

The same argument applies to the Kaiserin Augusta Victoria Hospice, but it occurs to me that possibly an arrangement might be made for its provisional use by the Zionists as a temporary university building. This, however, is a matter on which General Clayton's advice would be valuable, as there may be practical reasons against its adoption.

No. 4 is also a matter for discussion with the local authorities. I, personally, think that it is the most useful suggestion in your letter. If a few of the best sort of Jewish immigrants were allowed to enter Palestine and to purchase land at good prices from Arabs who were willing to sell, the effect might be good, but, in view of the accounts which we have been receiving of the hostility felt by the inhabitants for the Jews, the greatest care and tact would have to be exercised and the immigrants carefully chosen. If there were any waste lands available on which settlement of demobilised soldiers could be unostentatiously begun, it would be very desirable.

The establishment of a shipping line for the transport of materials to Palestine is not one upon which the views of His Majesty's Government or of the Palestine authorities is presumably required.

As regards your seventh suggestion, I fear the military authorities would not have legal power to grant permanent concessions to the Zionist Organisation.

Meanwhile, as you are aware, precautions have been adopted that no step shall be taken which will enable commercial interests, whether British or foreign, to establish themselves in Palestine or obtain control over land or industries until the decision of the conference enables His Majesty's Government to work out the full implication of their acceptance of a mandate for Palestine and of the policy of a national home for the Jews.

I have just heard that General Clayton is shortly due in London, so that you will have an opportunity of discussing these matters with him before going out.

Please understand that I am not raising these difficulties with a view to discourage you from trying to make some small beginnings.

When I enquired of you the other day whether some small practical work could not be begun, it was with a view to make your own position rather easier with your fellow Zionists, and I was really thinking more of the necessary preparation in the way of providing houses or at any rate provisional shelter for the first arrivals, of settling beforehand in what regions the early immigrants would be placed, and of the

necessary organisation for the distribution of food than of concessions, but it is useful that these questions should all be discussed and I much hope that there will be some good result.

Believe me, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[102545]

No. 65.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 14.)

(No. 1091.)

My Lord.

Constantinople, June 27, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1326 of the 24th June relative to the zone of the Greek occupation of Smyrna and disorder prevailing in the interior, I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a memorandum by Mr. Ryan relative to a conversation which took place on the 22nd June between him, my military attaché, and Sabri Effendi, the Grand Vizier *ad interim*, relative to the agitation being conducted in Turkey to carry out armed resistance to the peace terms.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 65.

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.

GENERAL DEEDES and I called on the Acting Grand Vizier yesterday, as instructed, while the Council of Ministers were sitting. He had himself asked earlier in the day that someone from the High Commission should call on him. This may have been because he had heard through the Minister of the Interior that we were thinking of a *démarche* of the kind, and welcomed the idea.

Anyhow, we made it clear to his Highness at the start that, even if he had not asked us to call, we had intended to come with a very important communication. We asked him to tell us what he wanted first.

Sabri Effendi said that they were trying to get Mustafa Kemal back without driving him into revolt. He had countered a request for his return by a request for reasons. He had also telegraphed (I think to the Sultan) to say that if he did come back he anticipated as possible the fate of Ali Ihsan Pasha. Sabri Effendi wanted to know whether he (Mustafa Kemal) could be reassured on that point.

General Deedes and I said we could say nothing about this without taking instructions. As, however, the matter was closely connected with what we ourselves had come for, the best thing would be to make our communication straight away. We had prepared it beforehand in Turkish and read it out, making it clear that it was a verbal communication of which no copy could be left, and which was read only as a matter of convenience. It was to the following effect:—

The High Commissioner, we said, had sent us to speak about a matter which had much preoccupied him for some days and which had now acquired a character of urgency. He had spoken to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and would speak to him again, but the matter was so serious that he desired also to draw the attention of the head of the Government to what was passing.

There were many indications that an agitation was being conducted in this country with a view to armed resistance to possible decisions of the Peace Conference. It was even said that the movement was definitely directed against the constituted authorities of the country, and that it was because of their known policy of compliance with the decisions of the Conference. The High Commissioner did not know how far this was true, but the existence of an agitation admitted of no doubt. It was equally certain that certain military authorities were playing an active rôle in the agitation. The activities of Mustafa Kemal Pasha in the district of Samsoun left no doubt on this subject. The High Commissioner had been compelled a few days before to address to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a written demand for this officer's recall, and he awaited impatiently information that effect had been given to his demand. The High Commissioner had also received less detailed, but not less significant,

information from the district between Balikesser and Edremid, where certain military and naval officers or ex-officers were also believed to be stirring up trouble.

These activities constituted a further grave menace to the security of the country, which had long been seriously disturbed. The High Commissioner had not yet discussed them with his colleagues, but, speaking for himself, he wished the Acting Grand Vizier to understand that the continuance of this agitation was calculated to lead to dangerous results. It should obviously be the aim of everyone to maintain public tranquillity until the decisions of the Peace Conference were known. Anything in the nature of serious incidents or any attack on the constituted authorities of this country could not leave the British Government indifferent, and the High Commissioner did not think it could leave the other *Entente* Powers indifferent either.

The authors of the agitation attempted to justify it by the necessity of preventing illegitimate advances by the Greek forces in the Smyrna and Aivali districts. Even if this were a justification, it had ceased to exist, as the limits of the Greek occupation had now been defined, and steps had been taken to ensure observance by the Greeks of these limits. The High Commissioner hoped that it would be possible in the very near future to inform the Porte officially of the limits of the occupation.

In the course of the ensuing conversation Sabri Effendi made light of the agitation in so far as it might be supposed to have any revolutionary character. He dwelt upon the effect produced by constant Greek advances, and the lack of definition of the area to be occupied. He also dwelt on the insolence shown by the Greeks in many ways here. He admitted the existence of the agitation, however, and the impotence of the Government to deal really strongly with Mustafa Kemal. Asked whether it was true that another military mission, including Fevzi Pasha, was being sent Panderma way, he said the Council were considering a proposal in that sense. He was sure that Abouk Pasha would not be like Mustafa Kemal. General Deedes and I suggested pointedly that Fevzi Pasha might be very like him.

Finally, Sabri Effendi spoke very disparagingly of the Minister of the Interior, as being unequal to the situation, and very *mal vu* because of his irreligiousness. He seemed very much inclined to try to replace him. I reminded him that "*le mieux est l'ennemi du bien*."

A. RYAN.

Constantinople, June 23, 1919.

[104612]

No. 66.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 18.)

(No. 1152.)

My Lord.

Constantinople, July 5, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for the information of your Lordship, copy of a memorandum (with enclosure), dated the 28th June, addressed by the British Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean station, to the Commodore Commanding, British Aegean Squadron, relative to the naval measures to be taken as a result of the Italian decree establishing a naval base in the Dodecanese.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 66.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean Station, to the Commodore Commanding
British Aegean Squadron.

(No. 5505. Secret.)

H.M.S. "Iron Duke," June 28, 1919.

HEREWITH is forwarded for your information a copy of an Italian decree regarding the establishment of a naval command in Dodecanese.

2. The terms of the decree would appear to imply the desire on the part of the Italians to inaugurate an exclusive Italian control in these waters, and on the shores of the mainland, and it has already become apparent that they would, if they had the right, resent the presence of British ships in these parts.

3. The important point is that we must on no account encourage this idea by refraining from visiting these waters, or by acquiescing in the exclusive use by Italians

in these ports, most of which, according to international agreement, still come within the limits of the British Aegean command.

4. They should therefore be visited as frequently as the resources of your command permit, and it would appear that the sloop which up to the present has been normally stationed at Suda or Syra would generally be available for this service.

5. In this connection, it should be noted, that for the above purposes the limits of the Aegean command have been extended as far along the Karamanian coast as longitude 31° 50' E (see my communication of the 6th June, 1919, No. 5404).

A. CALTHORPE, Vice-Admiral.

Enclosure 2 in No. 66.

Extract from the "Official Gazette" of April 16, 1919.

(Translation.)

NO. 487 of the Collection Law and decree of the kingdom contains the following decree:—

We, Thomas of Savoy, Duke of Genoa, Lieutenant-General of His Majesty Victor Manuel III, &c., in virtue of the authority delegates to us, in view of the Royal Decree of the 28th February, 1904, relative to the attributions and duties of commanders of naval stations abroad, in view of the regulation for military discipline for the naval forces of the 29th October, 1903, in view of the regulation on special duties afloat, approved by Royal Decree of the 16th May, 1907, and its successive modifications, recognising the necessity of uniting under a single command the ships scattered in the islands of Dodecanese and on the coasts of Asia Minor from the Gulf of Scala Nova to the south of Smyrna as far as Adalia and beyond, as well as the services of the Royal Navy on shore in the above localities: have decreed and decree:—

Single Article.

From March 16, 1919, there is established in the Dodecanese a "Naval Station Command" with coastal jurisdiction over the islands of the Dodecanese and over the coast of Asia Minor from the Gulf of Scala Nova to the south of Smyrna as far as Adalia and beyond, under which are placed all the ships operating in these waters as well as the services of the Royal Navy on shore in the above localities. We order that the present Decree, to which the Seal of State is attached, be inserted in the official collection of the Laws and Decrees of the Kingdom of Italy, enjoining on all whom it may concern to observe it and cause it to be observed.

Given at Rome this 23rd day of March 1919.

(Signed) THOMAS OF SAVOY.

DE BONO.

Seen: The Keeper of the Seals:
(Signed) FACTA.

[105186]

No. 67.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 1350.)

My Lord,

British Delegation, Paris, July 19, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 4163 of the 24th June enclosing a copy of a note from the French Ambassador relating to the indemnification of the shareholders of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway.

2. It seems clear that no responsibility can attach to His Majesty's Government for anything that occurred up to the date when British military forces occupied the territory in which the railway is situated, and any claim based by the French company upon proceedings before that date must be a claim against the Turkish Government and not against His Majesty's Government.

3. The French company's case for compensation for any action taken by British military authorities after the date of occupation appears to rest on article 53, second paragraph, of the Land War Regulations, according to which the railway should be "restored and indemnities for it regulated at the peace."

4. In order to reply to the French Ambassador satisfactorily on this aspect of the matter your Lordship may consider it advisable to obtain a full report from the military authorities showing clearly what has been done to the line during the period of occupation. If, as seems probable, the railway has been improved during this period His Majesty's Government will have a complete answer to both parts of the French claim.

5. As regards the French company's claim against the Turkish Government, the proper procedure to be followed is to await the political settlement of Turkey, when the claim would presumably be dealt with by the appropriate financial commission which it is proposed to establish to deal with such reparation claims.

6. If it is found after receipt of the report from the military authorities that the line has not been improved, the company will be presumably entitled to require that the future Government of Palestine should restore the line to the position in which it was when the British military authorities took it over. It seems, however, likely that if His Majesty's Government secure a mandate in Palestine they may desire to expropriate the railway and make it a State concern, in which case the problem of compensation might be simplified, as it would only be necessary to give the company fair compensation for the loss of their property without going into the question of what has been done to the line by His Majesty's Government during the occupation period. Such power to expropriate private interests in the line will probably be granted to the mandatory by a general clause dealing with concessions in territories ceded by Turkey, whether this clause be eventually inserted in the treaty with Turkey or in some separate instrument determining the mandates of the territories ceded by Turkey.

7. The reply to M. Cabon might await the result of the report from the military authorities suggested above, but if your Lordship is then satisfied that the line has been improved, M. Cambon should be so informed, and details of the actual improvement would doubtless strengthen His Majesty's Government's answer. In any case it should be added that His Majesty's Government admit no claim whatever against themselves, and that none can be based on the above-mentioned article 53, which fully justifies the present position of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(For Mr. Balfour),

EYRE A. CROWE.

[105777]

No. 68.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 1127.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 30, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1358, of the 29th June 1919, and other recent correspondence relative to the general situation here, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a circular issued by the late Minister of the Interior on the 18th June and published a few days later in the local press.

2. Ali Kemal Bey's personality has never implied great confidence, but it must be admitted that he showed no little courage in issuing this circular, in which he openly joins issue with the chauvinist elements, who wish to organise physical resistance to any extension of Greek occupation, and possibly to unwelcome decisions generally of the Peace Conference.

3. The enclosed circular is one of the factors which finally compelled Ali Kemal Bey's retirement.

4. It was intimated to him definitely by the acting Grand Vizier (not himself a chauvinist, but anxious to hold on) that if he did not retire, the Cabinet as a whole would resign.

5. As his position was rapidly becoming untenable in any case, he complied with the strong hint and tendered his resignation with the results indicated in my telegram under reference.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 68.

Circular issued by the Minister of the Interior.

LE CALME EN PROVINCE.

APRÈS l'avoir fait approuver par le Conseil des Ministres, Ali Kemal Bey, Ministre de l'Intérieur, a envoyé la circulaire suivante à tous les vilayets :

Tout en étant vivement ému de l'occupation brutale et contraire à tous les droits, effectuée sur certaines parties de l'Empire, le Gouvernement ottoman, n'étant pas en état de faire la guerre présentement, a jugé que les moyens politiques sont sa seule défense. Grâce à Dieu, ces moyens réussissent complètement.

Notre espoir concernant l'assurance de l'intégrité de l'Empire, que nos délégués finiront par obtenir, grandit de jour en jour. J'attends donc du patriotisme de tous de s'abstenir de toute formation de milice ou de défense nationale, qui ne pourraient que compromettre les résultats attendus.

Il faut donc prodiguer des conseils à tous ceux qui troublent la tranquillité publique, qui provoquent le mécontentement des représentants des Puissances alliées, en agissant à façon de semer la discorde entre éléments. Alors que nous sommes obligés de clore à jamais les périodes de brigandage, de pillage, et d'inégalité, nous ne pourrions tolérer en aucune façon la résurrection de cet état d'âme, qui, pouvant être jugé endémique, nous ferait perdre notre cause à la Conférence de la Paix.

Ne reculez donc devant aucun moyen pour réprimer avec la dernière énergie tout acte qui pourrait porter un coup décisif aux intérêts de la patrie. Prodiguez vos conseils à tous ceux qui, poussés par l'excès de zèle envers la patrie, se jettent dans des aventures pareilles. Agissez sans hésitation contre ceux qui persévèrent dans leurs idées, guidés par une ligne de conduite et par intérêt qu'ils ont adopté dans le passé. Tâchez de faire comprendre à tous que nous possédons enfin un Gouvernement énergique qui travaille de toutes ses forces à la restauration et au maintien du droit et de la concorde entre les éléments. Voilà le devoir sacré qui incombe aujourd'hui à tous, grands ou petits. Je vous invite à faire comprendre par le détail, à vos subordonnés, ce devoir dont vous êtes conscients, et je vous fait savoir que, dans l'intérêt supérieur de la patrie, je n'hésiterai pas à frapper avec une rigueur extraordinaire tous ceux qui n'obtempéreront pas aux instructions précises que je vous mande.

ALI KEMAL,

Ministre de l'Intérieur.

Le 18 juin 1335.

[105779]

No. 69.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 1129.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 1, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copies of a report handed in to the Armenian-Greek section of this High Commission by the representative of the Armenian Patriarchate, which is a fair specimen of the reports received weekly during the last month or more.

2. While in several cases it is probable that the provincial representatives of the Patriarchate somewhat exaggerate the present state of affairs in the interior, there is no doubt that it is very far from satisfactory. Reports similar to the enclosed are being received by me almost daily from all sections of the Christian communities in various districts of the interior of Asia Minor and Thrace which are not in effective military occupation of the Allies.

3. A continuation of the present state of insecurity in the interior, coupled with the possibility of the cessation of American relief before the end of the autumn of this year, will produce a state of affairs during the coming winter which will be extremely difficult to handle, and must result in the death from starvation of thousands of Christians.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 69.

Report.

Samsoun, May 27.

FIFTY Armenians deported from Samsoun, Tcharshamba, Baffra, Tokat, &c., have arrived at Samsoun from Sokhoun in a very poor and miserable condition. There is no means to feed them. The houses of most of them are ruined, and the Turks are hastening to demolish the houses of the newly returning by night. The timber and tiles of such houses are carried off in open daylight even in a city like Samsoun.

In the vicinities of Samsoun, 400 out of the 500 Armenian houses are pulled down.

At Tcharshamba, the number of Armenians, both those that have remained there and those that have been deported but have now returned, amounts to 1,000. There are also 400-500 orphans detained in Turkish houses.

Complaints are made against Rahmi Bey, the chairman of the Emigrants' Commission at Samsoun. He is charged as attempting to appropriate to himself of the travelling expenses to be paid to emigrants. He has even proposed to pay only half of the fixed amount.

The 600-700, and the Islamised young ladies of a considerable number, found in the diocese of Samsoun, have not yet been gathered on account of the lack of means to take care of them.

Malatia, May 28.

Great preparations for resistance are going on. The Kurdish chieftains of Arabkir, Maden, Petourig, and other sanjaks and kazas, are united with the Turks and grow very active. They declare that since they are to die anyway, it is better for them to die as bravely as possible.

More than 400 orphans and widows who have been gathered are thrust into great misery, and need immediate relief.

The orphans that are found in the kazas and villages are not being handed over, but made to labour gratis by the Turks.

Sivas, May 23.

Meeting on the occasion of the occupation of Smyrna. Fiery speeches and orations. Threat to declare "dijihad." The threatening telegram of the Grand Vizier sent to the Council of Four has strongly excited the Turks, and rendered them more unmanageable.

Fatsa (Samsoun), March 28.

An attempt is made to kill Hovhannès Roumian, of Hovagar village of the Kaza of Umid, who was neither exiled nor Islamised. His house is burnt by night, and two members of his family die in fire, while others who try to escape are shot down. The man escapes and comes to Fatsa, where he remains with other poor Armenians in need of support and security.

Samsoun, May 23.

Means are lacking to support the 600-700 orphans now found in the diocese of Samsoun, and relief is asked with urgency. The Americans do not wish to supply these expenses, objecting that they are already caring for 400-500 Greek orphans.

The Americans help the orphans on condition that the Armenians supply the buildings and the officials of the institution.

There is no means of gathering the Islamised girls and women. Even the few gathered are escaping on account of the lack of proper care.

Malatia, May 25.

Appreciation of Governor Rahmi Bey, who tries to guarantee the general security.

Yozgat, June 2.

The Government is prosecuting ten Armenians of Indjirli, who, after completing their military service with twenty-nine other companions, had returned to their houses, and have been now accused of murder.

[1356]

X

Arab Oghlou Abdulrahman, a notorious lawyer, who had been instrumental in organising massacres, is now forming a political party named "Millétpérvéran" (patriots), the aim of which is to excite provocation and prepare massacres. His dismissal from office is urgently asked.

Yozgat June 4.

Insecurity dominates. The returning Armenians are threatened by death. Accusations have been made against Ghevont Seraidarian and Yervant Apkarian as though they had killed a Turk four years and a half ago in the neighbourhood of Gelin Gulu village. Also Haroutune Malian, Khatcher Khatcherian, Nigoghos Nigoghossian (Mukhtar), Isahag Donigian, and Kerovpé Yosmayer have been charged with the murder of a Turkish emigrant at the place called Tash Odjaghi, half-an-hour distant from the city. Besides these, Garabed Tchetchikian, Arshalouis Tashdjian, Khosrov Sétragian, Hagop Tchekian, and Haroutune Kotchakian are also accused as having murdered a Turk in the forests of Soghouk Oghlou of Yozgat five years ago.

Orders have been issued for the arrest of all these innocent persons.

Since three months Hadji Kehya Medzadourian, of Satchle village, is being kept in prison accused of having killed a gendarme, while it is already verified by the military authorities that he was serving in the Turkish Army at the time when he is said to have committed the crime.

If the situation be not ameliorated, the returning young men will be obliged to go to Constantinople or somewhere else, and the orphans and widows will be left without any supporting hand.

Boghazlian, May 27.

It is complained that the attorney-general Refik Bey and examining judge Mustafa Bey are defending the organisers of massacres, and obstructing their arrest. Dervish Ibrahim and Kemal, members of the Turkish notability, are instigating their co-nationalists to annihilate the returning Armenians.

Telegraphed to this end, and also sent the notorious Ormandji Hassan to the villages, for the purpose of supplying false witnesses against Armenians.

Instead of trying the case of the awful crimes perpetrated upon the Armenians, the Government is busied with the examination of false accusations against them.

Broussa, June 7.

Ibrahim, the Union and Progress delegate of Broussa, and the ex-mayor Moukhtar, who are both responsible for the awful massacre on Mount Atranos, are still not arrested. The first is in Constantinople and the second in Broussa.

Edib Bey, one of the employees of the "Régie" at Broussa and the father of Halidé Edib Hanoum, the writer and orator, is continually coming to Constantinople in order to visit and consult the above-named Ibrahim and similar criminals, who are supposed to be connected with certain plots.

Denek Maden, June 5.

Lack of security continues. The ignorant population does not have any idea about the real political situation and the awful defeat of Turkey. Certain criminals who had disappeared have, on the occasion of Smyrna's occupation, reappeared on the scene and begun their disastrous activity.

A captain from Beyoba village, Kaplan Bey by name, who was a deserter, is now organising a band ("tchéte") of 150 persons of whom are notorious with their criminal past. The local Government, though aware of these happenings, yet tolerates them with absolute indifference.

Nicomedia, June 9.

Eighteen years old, Samuel, of Arslanbeg village, is found murdered on the 7th instant, at ten minutes' distance from the farm of Ali Kenya where he used to work.

Another Armenian from the same village is shot while labouring in the fields near Bardizag, but fortunately he is not wounded. It is becoming impossible to work in open air in those regions.

Karadjabey (Broussa), June 9.

Out of 180 families, only 40 have survived and returned. Reshid Bey, the son of Tchekkes Ali Bey, of a neighbouring village, is very active in cultivating relations with

members of the Union and Progress. It is rumoured that he will gather 2,000 Circassians and declare Bolshevism. The Armenians run the danger of being the first victims of that movement. The Greeks have also grown anxious, and have sent a report to their Patriarchate.

Balukessir, June 12.

Insecurity is at a climax. Massacres are threatened every day. The Government has notified the Armenian and Greek "Mukhtars" to facilitate the conscription of soldiers whenever the need arises, threatening them with appearing before the court-martial.

The existing insecurity, along with this plan for conscription, has created a state of hopelessness.

The comparatively well-to-do class of returning Armenians has begun to migrate to Smyrna and Constantinople, while the poorer class, which was just beginning to earn a living, is being obliged to sell all belongings at even a lower price than that of the deportation period, and to depart as soon as possible.

The British military representative of Panderma has visited Balukessir, but the request of the Armenians for the extension of protection over them has not been satisfied no account of the lack of forces to be sent there.

[102622]

No. 70.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Wardrop.

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 22, 1919.

I HAVE to inform you that you are appointed to proceed on a special political mission to Transcaucasia, with the title of Chief British Commissioner.

Although the *de facto* authority of the Governments of Georgia, the Armenian Republic of Erivan, and of Azerbaijan has not as yet been formally recognised by His Majesty's Government, you will be required to keep in close touch with these Governments, who will be informed of your mission through their Delegations at the Peace Conference in Paris.

You will be accompanied by a staff composed of Mr. Vice-Consul T. E. Milligan Grundy, Mr. Vice-Consul J. A. Waite, and another secretary to be selected.

The objects of your mission, in addition to that already mentioned, will be—

(a.) To report on the political situation in Transcaucasia.

(b.) To do your utmost to prevent friction between the volunteer army and the Transcaucasian Republics, and to ensure respect for the line to be drawn between their respective spheres.

Should this line at any time in the future be so defined as to leave the territory of Daghestan, or the North Caucasus Republic, on its southern side, you will be required to maintain relations with its Government in the same way as with those of the three Transcaucasian Republics already mentioned, and in any case you should endeavour to obtain information as to the political situation in Daghestan and report from time to time to His Majesty's Government.

(c.) So far as the personnel at your disposal and the circumstances permit, to advance the interests of British trade in Transcaucasia and to report on trade matters.

(d.) So long as British military forces remain in Transcaucasia, matters of a purely military character will, of course, continue to concern the General Officer Commanding; but in political matters, especially in the advice to be given to the Governments of the various States mentioned, you will be independent of the British military command, though you should make a point of consulting the General Officer Commanding in the various questions which may arise. It will at the same time be the duty of the General Officer Commanding, in so far as political questions may affect his work, to consult with you, and not to act without your advice and consent.

You will correspond direct with the Foreign Office, with the exception that, in matters of supply and relief, your communications should be made direct to the Supreme Economic Council in Paris, and in matters of trade to the Department of Overseas Trade. Copies of your communications with these bodies should be sent to the Foreign Office and also, in the case of relief and supply, to His Majesty's High Commissioner at

Constantinople, for communication to the representative of the Supreme Economic Council at that place.

Detailed accounts of the expenditure of the mission should, of course, be kept, and it will be convenient that the first account should be rendered in respect of the period from the commencement of the mission to the 30th September next. Accounts should be rendered quarterly thereafter. Suitable forms of accounts and vouchers will be supplied by the chief clerk to the member of the mission who will be charged with the preparation of the accounts.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[107336]

No. 71.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

(No. 4970.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 23, 1919.

IN the course of a conversation with the Italian Ambassador to-day, I asked if he could give me official confirmation of the intimation which had reached me some time ago from Paris that the Italian Government had abandoned their intention to take charge either of the Caucasus or the Caspian (see your despatch No. 1257 (14809) of the 10th instant).

I told him that we were proceeding upon the hypothesis that this was the case, and were accordingly making arrangements to hand over the Caspian flotilla to General Denikin prior to the withdrawal of the military forces from the Caucasus.

The Marquis Imperiali replied that he believed me to have correctly represented the decision of his Government. There had been a change of policy when M. Tittoni became Foreign Minister. He would, however, telegraph to his Government to obtain official confirmation of the fact.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[109747]

No. 72.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 1230.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 17, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for the information of your Lordship, copy of a letter of the 2nd July, which I have addressed to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, relative to the removal of General Mustapha Kemal Pasha and General Djemal Pasha from their posts, and copy of the reply received thereto of the 10th July.

2. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 72.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir,

Constantinople, July 2, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that, from reports received, there appears to be a serious movement in the districts of Sivas and Konia, having as its object the formation of armed bands and action contrary to the interests of the Allies.

2. This movement appears to be directed by agents of the Committee of Union and Progress, and to contemplate action independent of the Ottoman Government.

3. The principal instigators of this movement are General Mustapha Kemal Pasha, at Sivas, and General Djemal Pasha, at Konia.

4. On the 6th June, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, requested the Ottoman Minister of War to remove General Mustapha Kemal Pasha from his appointment. An order to this effect was despatched to that officer by

the Ottoman Minister of War on the 8th June, but so far it has not been complied with.

5. I addressed a letter to your Excellency on the 17th June in the same sense, but no reply has been given to my letter nor has any effect been given to the request contained therein.

6. It is my duty to draw the attention of your Excellency once again to the gravity of the information which is being received from the interior, to the disastrous effects of the occurrence there of untoward incidents, and to the immediate necessity of recalling to Constantinople, without conditions and without delay, both Generals Mustapha Kemal and Djemal Pashas.

7. I request that I may be immediately informed what action is taken on receipt of my letter, a copy of which is being forwarded to His Britannic Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 72.

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe.

Constantinople, le 10 juillet 1919.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser, le 2 juillet, concernant l'agitation qui régnerait à Sivas et à Konia et la nécessité de rappeler à Constantinople les Généraux Moustapha Kémal et Djémal Pachas.

En réponse, je m'empresse d'informer votre Excellence que Kémal Pacha, n'ayant pas immédiatement obtempéré à l'injonction qui lui a été faite de rentrer sans retard à Constantinople, a été relevé, par iradé Impérial, de ses fonctions d'inspecteur de la troisième zone militaire. Il n'a donc plus aucune qualité officielle. Ce fait a été porté à la connaissance de toutes les autorités civiles et militaires de ladite zone.

Quant à Djémal Pacha, inspecteur d'armée à Konia, il se trouve déjà à Constantinople depuis plus d'une semaine.

En ce qui concerne l'agitation susvisée, je me permettrai de faire observer tout d'abord qu'elle n'existait pas avant l'occupation de Smyrne par les troupes helléniques et qu'il ne serait pas exact de l'imputer uniquement aux affiliés de l'Union et Progrès. Elle est due, avant tout, à l'indignation profonde causée par l'invasion absolument injustifiée des dites troupes dans le vilayet d'Aidin et le caza d'Edremid et aux horreurs et atrocités inouïes commises par elles de connivence avec les bandes grecques qu'elles ont formées sur les lieux.

La surexcitation des populations musulmanes a encore été accrue par les bruits concernant l'extension du territoire de la République arménienne jusqu'à Sivas, et la formation dans le vilayet de Trébizonde d'un nouvel État grec sous le nom de République du Pont.

A cette surexcitation, parfaitement compréhensible, des musulmans s'est ajouté naturellement le souci de défendre leur honneur, leur vie et leurs biens en cas où de nouvelles invasions viendraient à avoir lieu.

Bien que les massacres, les viols et les déprédations de toute nature commis par les Grecs ne laissent pas que de justifier l'effervescence et les inquiétudes de la population dont il s'agit, le Gouvernement Impérial, dans son vif désir de maintenir la sécurité dans le pays et de prévenir toute perturbation, n'a pas manqué et ne manque pas de travailler, par tous les moyens qui lui restent, à l'apaisement des esprits et de recommander toujours la modération.

Je suis porté à croire qu'il vaut mieux ne pas avoir recours en pareille circonstance à des mesures de violence extrêmes qui pourraient bien avoir pour résultat une plus grande exaspération des populations en question. Cet inconvénient aurait existé même dans le cas où l'effectif de l'armée ottomane n'aurait pas été considérablement réduit, comme il l'est à l'heure actuelle.

Néanmoins, les autorités Impériales des dites provinces, conformément aux ordres catégoriques et réitérés qui leur ont été donnés, déploient tout leur zèle pour maintenir la sécurité qui, heureusement, ne peut pas être considérée comme étant troublée.

A ce propos, je crois de mon devoir d'attirer une nouvelle fois l'attention la plus sérieuse de votre Excellence sur le fait que des associations, d'agitateurs politiques, patronnées et aidées par certaines institutions ecclésiastiques, tâchent de provoquer des troubles et de se livrer à des excitations et agressions dans le dessein d'irriter et

d'exaspérer l'élément musulman et de l'amener à se porter à des représailles et à des excès. Le but qu'elles poursuivent est évident, comme j'ai déjà eu l'occasion de le relever. Elles veulent, par là, jeter le discrédit et l'opprobre sur le peuple turc, accréditer l'opinion que le Gouvernement est impuissant à remplir ses devoirs et obtenir ainsi la réalisation de toutes les visées et convoitises grecques.

Avant de terminer, je me permettrai de dire que le moyen le plus efficace de calmer les esprits et d'assurer le règne de la tranquillité serait de mettre les troupes hellènes en demeure d'évacuer les territoires qu'elles ont envahis en Asie Mineure, au mépris des droits les plus incontestables du Gouvernement ottoman et de la nation turque, et qu'elles continuent à souiller des crimes les plus odieux, avec l'assistance des troupes grecques.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

(Le Ministre *ad interim* des Affaires Étrangères.)

[109749]

No. 73.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 1232.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 17, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for the information of your Lordship, copy of a report dated the 27th June which I have received from my representative at Smyrna relative to recent events at Pergama.

2. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, *High Commissioner*.

Enclosure in No. 73.

Representative of British High Commissioner, Smyrna and Aidin Vilayet, to British High Commissioner, Constantinople.

(No. 50/11.)

June 27, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on Pergama, supplied by various witnesses including Jews, Armenians, and Moslems:—

The town of Pergama contained some 30,000 inhabitants. Owing to the expulsion of Greeks just before the war there were no Greeks in the town, the inhabitants being Moslems, Jews, and Armenians. About the 12th June some 800 Greek soldiers entered the town and stayed there until the 15th, when the Greek Officer Commanding hearing that Turkish irregulars had collected outside the town sent for the notables of the town and threatened that in case they made common action with the irregulars the town would be burned. In the evening of the 15th, the irregulars being now near the town, the Greek troops engaged with them, but in a short time they (the Greeks) were put to flight. A few escaped to Menemen. The irregulars entered the town, and for two days pillaged indiscriminately Jews, Armenians, and Turks. The total number of Greek soldiers missing is 600.

The Turkish irregulars shot two Turks in front of the Government for having manifested sentiments of goodwill towards the Greeks. A third Turk was wounded, and it is said that one Jewish woman and an Armenian were killed. The irregulars, who were about 3,000 in number, seemed to have come from Panderma, Balikear, Soma, &c. After pillaging for two days, it was reported that Greek troops had landed at Dikili, and the irregulars went out to meet them. The people of the town seeing that the fight was going badly for the irregulars, and that they were retreating towards Pergama, began to get alarmed as to their fate at the hands of the Greeks, although they allege that they had taken no part in any action against the Greeks or their property. Leaving nothing to chance, the greater part of the Moslem population fled just before the arrival of the Greeks, and are now scattered about Soma and district, having lost practically all their possessions and being without food or homes. These refugees at Soma are still in a state of alarm, as they have heard that the Greeks have occupied Kinik, some three hours from Soma. In order to remedy this state of affairs, it would be necessary that all these people should be sent back to their homes, but they refuse to go without a guarantee of some *Entente* Power.

JAMES MORGAN.

[109762]

No. 74.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 1246.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 20, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a report dated the 1st July from my representative at Smyrna, relative to a meeting held by the High Commissioners' delegates to discuss the Greek evacuation of Aidin.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, *High Commissioner*.

Enclosure in No. 74.

Representatives of British High Commissioner, Smyrna and Aidin Vilayet, to Commodore Commanding British Aegean Squadron, Smyrna.

(No. 142/11.)

July 1, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that at to-day's meeting of the delegates of the High Commissioners the Greek evacuation of Aidin was discussed.

We were of opinion that the Turks are aware that the Greeks have only been authorised to occupy a part of the sanjak of Smyrna, and that they are likely to go on attacking the Greeks until the Greeks are driven within their proper limits.

In these circumstances fighting between Turks and Greeks is likely to go on until the Greeks are driven back (if they are driven back) to Ayasoluk. Such fighting will naturally be accompanied by massacre, pillage, and incendiarism on both sides, and by the flight from their homes of both Christians and Moslem inhabitants.

In these circumstances the delegation thought it might be best if the Greeks were to withdraw within the sanjak of Smyrna after due public warning of their intention to evacuate territory at present held by them had been given, and after some arrangements had been come to between a Commission of Allied Officers and the Turks that the latter should refrain from any further activity.

The French and Italian delegates were of opinion that a Turkish attack might also be expected in the Manisa district, with the object of driving the Greeks out of Kassaba and Manisa, both of which towns are outside the Smyrna Sanjak.

How far the Turkish attacks are actuated by a desire to push the Greeks back into the limits assigned to them remains to be seen.

Will the Turks, in the eventuality of their driving the Greeks back into the Smyrna Sanjak stop at the sanjak frontier?

If not, the possibility of having to hold in readiness, from now on, *Entente* troops, guns and material to be landed in support of the Greeks may have to be taken into consideration.

The use by the Turks of Aidin of cannon against Greeks who, for the moment at least, had been authorised by the *Entente* to stay in Aidin, raises the question as to whether Turks in now attacking Greeks are not making war on the *Entente*, and thus violating the Armistice.

I think the Turkish Government ought to be asked to define its attitude in connection with the Aidin incident.

JAMES MORGAN.

[109763]

No. 75.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received July 30.)

(No. 1247.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 20, 1919.

WITH reference to recent correspondence relative to the effects of the Greek occupation of Smyrna, I have the honour to transmit herewith a message addressed to Mr. Balfour by the Sheikh-ul-Islam, who was Acting Grand Vizier in the absence of Ferid Pasha, when he sent it to me, and, I understand, to the other High Commissioners also.

2. The message was enclosed in a short letter from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, asking that the message should be transmitted by telegraph. The note was delivered by the private secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was charged with a personal message from Sefa Bey entreating me on his own behalf also to do something to put an end to the deplorable incidents which had arisen out of the occupation of Smyrna.

3. The member of my staff to whom the note was handed could only repeat that, so far as this High Commission was concerned, every endeavour was being made to put a stop to these incidents by obtaining a clear definition of the limits of the Greek occupation. I fear, however, that after so many weeks during which the question has made no progress this assurance has worn rather thin.

4. I have not thought it necessary to transmit the Sheikh-ul-Islam's message by telegraph, and it adds nothing to what is already fully known in Paris and London.

5. Copies of this despatch and enclosure have been sent to the Peace Delegation.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 75.

Sheikh-ul-Islam's Message to Mr. Balfour.

Son Excellence,

APRÈS l'occupation de la ville de Smyrne, occupation que rien ne justifiait d'ailleurs, les troupes hellènes se sont étendues graduellement sur les autres parties du vilayet. Elles y ont occupé différentes localités dont les populations sont en grande majorité ou en totalité musulmanes. L'entrée de troupes hellènes dans chacune de ces localités est suivie de toutes sortes de violences et d'atrocités contre l'élément musulman, atrocités auxquelles participent aussi les grecs indigènes. Les quartiers musulmans sont incendiés et leurs habitants mis à mort sans merci. Les enfants et les femmes ne sont pas épargnées. Celles-ci sont violées et tuées avec des raffinements de cruauté.

Tel a été le sort de la ville d'Aidin, une des principales villes de la province, ainsi que d'autre localités où l'énorme majorité de la population est musulmane.

Des milliers de musulmans ont péri, et plus de 150,000 ont été obligés, pour échapper au massacre et aux horreurs, de quitter leurs foyers et de se réfugier à l'intérieur du pays où ils se trouvent actuellement sans abri et dans un état de dénuement complet.

Ces faits pourraient être constatés facilement par une commission d'enquête dont nous sollicitons l'envoi immédiat sur les lieux.

D'autre part, les autorités hellènes font constamment venir dans la province, pour les y installer, un grand nombre de grecs des autres provinces de la Turquie ou de l'extérieur, sans compter les indigènes qui s'en étaient éloignés.

Ce fait rapproché de ceux qui précèdent ne permet pas de douter que le but poursuivi est évidemment de faire disparaître les musulmans en les exterminant systématiquement ou en les obligeant à quitter leurs foyers sous l'influence de la terreur et de les remplacer par des Grecs.

Profondément ému par le danger qui menace les populations musulmanes du vilayet de Smyrne, le Gouvernement Impérial croit de son devoir de le signaler à la bienveillante attention des grandes Puissances alliées.

Le Gouvernement Impérial est persuadé que ces Puissances ne manqueront pas, dans leur haute et juste appréciation, de prendre toutes les dispositions qu'elles jugeront efficaces pour mettre fin à une situation qui, il en a la ferme conviction, ne répond ni à leurs intentions ni aux sentiments de justice et d'équité dont elles sont animées envers tous les peuples.

La plus juste de ces dispositions et celle qui répondrait en même temps le mieux aux principes du Président Wilson serait évidemment la prompte évacuation par les Hellènes des territoires qu'ils ont occupés en Asie Mineure et sur lesquels ils n'ont aucun droit valable.

(Grand Vézir *ad interim* le Cheikh-ul-Islam.)
MOUSTAFA SABRI.

[112576]

No. 76.

Colonel French to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 6.)

*General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
July 19, 1919.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have now received various accounts of the ideas formed and the conclusions reached by the American commissioners who are examining the conditions in Palestine and Syria.

The most important of these ideas and conclusions are as follows:—

1. That Syria as represented by occupied enemy territory (East) will not accept France peaceably as mandatory Power.
2. That the Zionist programme for Palestine can only be carried through against the wishes of the people and by force. The opposition of the non-Jewish portion of the population was not at all realised by the members of the Commission before they reached the country.
3. That Arab national aspirations to semi-independence under an Anglo-Saxon regis are worthy of encouragement.
4. That the general wish of the people is for a United Syria.

The commissioners have formed a high opinion of British officials in occupied enemy territory and of British systems of administration.

I have, &c.

C. FRENCH, *Colonel,
Acting Chief Political Officer,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.*

[109680]

No. 77.

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Grahame.

(No. 1041.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 8, 1919.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 738 of the 27th ultimo, enclosing a copy of an article by M. Robert de Caix, which appeared in a recent issue of the "Bulletin de l'Asie française," attacking the British administration and policy in Syria, and your subsequent telegrams reporting similar attacks on the part of other French newspapers.

The recrudescence, after some weeks of silence, of these quite unjustifiable attacks upon His Majesty's Government in the French press causes me serious concern.

In the absence of M. Cambon I accordingly sent for M. de Fleuriau, who was received by Sir Ronald Graham.

Sir Ronald Graham spoke very strongly, and pointed out that what amounted to an organised campaign against our attitude appeared to be in progress. It had stated in the "Bulletin de l'Asie française," and had been continued in the "Temps," the "Journal," the "Démocratie nouvelle," and the "Pays." The accusations against His Majesty's Government were some of them a reiteration of complaints already received from the French Government. They were generally extravagant, and many of them had already been disproved. It was unnecessary to dwell on the true facts with regard to Franco-British relations on the Syrian question, as they had already been indicated in conversations with M. Cambon. It was perhaps possible that subordinate British agents in Syria had shown an anti-French bias, although this had not been proved.

Sir R. Graham went on to say that certain fresh allegations had been made officially by the French Embassy, such as the unwarranted arrest of eight Arab chiefs at Homs, and Field-Marshal Allenby had at once been called upon for a report, but it should be pointed out that previous allegations of a similar nature which had formed the subject of enquiry had been proved to be of the flimsiest nature. The French Government could not pretend to have any cause of complaint against Field-Marshal Allenby or against His Majesty's Government. Their whole position in Syria was dependent upon our support. Our attitude both in Paris and in the Middle East had been perfectly correct. We had categorically, repeatedly, and publicly disclaimed any

[1356]

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intention of accepting a mandate for Syria, and had, in so far as was possible, supported French claims. If the French position in Syria was bad they owed it to their extreme unpopularity and the want of confidence which they inspired. Field-Marshal Allenby had to act with great discretion in order to avoid an explosion, and when he expressed fears that the decrease of British or the increase of French troops in those regions would produce a collision with the Arabs his fears were genuine. It was true that M. Cambon affected to disbelieve the possibility of any such danger, but the responsible officer on the spot was presumably the better judge.

His Majesty's Government were now faced with what might be described as an anti-British campaign in the French press. Its systematic continuance in a series of French newspapers made it appear that, if not organised, it must at least be encouraged by the French Government, although His Majesty's Government would be most reluctant to believe that anything of the kind was possible.

Sir Ronald Graham reminded M. de Fleury that a campaign of a somewhat similar nature had been conducted in the Italian press with the connivance of the Italian Government. It was directed against the allies of Italy, and had ended not only in exciting public feeling in that country to a dangerous extent, but had finally passed out of the control of the Italian Government, and had overwhelmed them. There was a danger of these French attacks embittering French feeling against this country, and they would certainly lead to replies in the British press and to polemics extremely detrimental to our good relations with France. Moreover, so serious a view on the subject was taken by His Majesty's Government that unless the propaganda was discontinued they would feel compelled to take steps, either by a public statement or otherwise, to bring the true facts of the situation to the public knowledge.

M. de Fleury accepted all that was said in extremely good part. He declared that he had no wish to discuss the rights or wrongs of the British attitude on the question of Syria or the grievances which the French Government entertained on the subject. He entirely agreed that press articles of the nature indicated were most undesirable. They could serve no useful purpose, and must lead to mutual bad feeling. He took careful note of the names of the papers in which the articles had appeared, and promised to call the immediate attention of the French Government to the matter, and to repeat Sir Ronald Graham's observations to them.

M. de Fleury said that he felt certain that neither M. Pichon nor the French Government were in any way responsible for the articles in question, and had given no encouragement to the campaign.

M. de Fleury added that there might be subordinate British agents in Syria who did not carry out the wishes and intentions of His Majesty's Government, and there were certainly subordinate French agents in Paris who wrote in the press and could not be trusted to follow the lines which the French Government recommended. He enquired whether a representation on the same lines as that addressed to him by Sir Ronald Graham would be made to the French Government through His Majesty's Embassy in Paris and was informed in reply that this was the case.

You should, therefore, take the earliest opportunity to make representations to the French Government in accordance with the terms of Sir Ronald Graham's statement.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to Mr. Balfour.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[115267]

No. 78.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay.

(No. 459.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 11, 1919.

THE American Ambassador called upon me at his own request this afternoon in order to enquire about the position in the Caucasus.

By a fortunate coincidence, there had arrived only twenty-four hours before a letter from Mr. Balfour, in Paris, in which, anticipating the massacres that were almost universally prophesied as certain to follow our contemplated evacuation of the Caucasian regions, he had suggested that, while our troops were being withdrawn, an attempt should be made to interest the American Government as the possible future mandatory for Armenia, in the subject of the Caucasus, and that we might even

delay the concluding stages of our withdrawal if we could induce the American Government to send military forces to take the place of ours.

I accordingly explained the situation with complete frankness to Mr. Davis; told him the circumstances in which we had decided to withdraw our troops; explained the stage which arrangements for withdrawal had already reached; referred to the abortive attempt to introduce the Italians on to the scene, and confirmed Mr. Balfour's apprehensions as to the local consequences that might be expected to follow the departure of our troops.

I then asked the Ambassador these questions: Did he think that the American Government were at all likely to entertain such a request if it was made to them? Had they the troops available in Europe or elsewhere who could be used for the purpose? Was it likely that Congress would be willing to accept a mandate for Armenia or any other portion, larger or smaller, of the Turkish Empire? If so, what was the earliest date at which such a decision might conceivably be reached? If the American Government decided to assume responsibility for Armenia, was it probable that they would extend their interest to the Caucasus as well?

The Ambassador was very careful to explain in reply that he could not speak authoritatively or officially for his Government on any of these matters. In so far, however, as he was entitled to express an *a priori* opinion, he had very little difficulty in doing so. In the first place, he said that the Americans now had only 100,000 troops remaining in Europe, the bulk of whom were under orders to return to their country, and any of whom it would be impossible, in existing conditions, to move to the Caucasus. Indeed, any despatch of American troops to that region could not be attempted without the knowledge and consent of Congress. As regards the larger question of a mandate, although he was aware that, on humanitarian and philanthropic grounds, the American people were deeply interested in Armenia, yet he personally did not believe that these considerations would induce his country to depart from the twofold traditional basis of its foreign policy, namely, (a) the refusal to be entangled in foreign alliances or commitments; (b) a strict adherence to the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover as soon as the American public began to realise—which they probably did not at present—the inherent difficulties, political, ethnographical, physical, and otherwise, of the Armenian problem, he felt very doubtful whether philanthropy would survive in the contest with expediency. As to an American mandate for Constantinople or any other portion of the Turkish Empire, while it was conceivable that the American nation might be attracted by such an idea, here again, expressing his personal opinion, he did not believe that, in the last resort, it would take effect.

Summing up the situation, therefore, the Ambassador said that, while he saw no reason why the request suggested by Mr. Balfour should not be made to the American Government if we wished to make it, he did not anticipate that it would be attended by any practical results.

In reply to further questions which I put to him, he informed me that he did not think it probable that the American decision on the mandatory question would be reached in a period of less than three months from now.

With this very uncertain and rather disquieting forecast of events, which promised little relief from our impending anxieties in respect of the situation in the Caucasus and of the position in Asiatic Turkey in general, the American Ambassador took his leave.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[115568]

No. 79.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 1328.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 1, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 1521 and 1525 of the 23rd July, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum on a manifesto published by the representatives of a large number of Turkish parties on the 22nd July and a translation (as published in a local French paper) of a circular issued by Damad Ferid Pasha immediately on his resumption of office.

2. The universal hostility with which the new Government is regarded by the party leaders and the press augurs ill for the future of the Cabinet. It is specially

[1356]

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noteworthy that that larger fraction of the "Entente libérale" party which follows Sadik Bey and disavows the Sheikh-ul-Islam have at last found common ground with parties whose advances the "Entente libérale" had hitherto rejected.

3. The fact is that this country has now quite definitely reached the point at which every Turkish element in active political life is dominated more by national sentiment and the desire to conserve at least the unoccupied remnant of the Empire as an undivided whole than by any other consideration. Broadly speaking, the various elements, all equally nationalist, are ranged in two camps according as they think that there is still something to be hoped from the *Entente* Powers, especially England, or think that the time has come for resistance, however desperate, to the increasingly humiliating decrees of the Peace Conference.

4. The distinction between these two schools of thought is blurred in Constantinople, where both sides are for the moment united in detestation of the Grand Vizier, and where even the most Chauvinistic think it still advisable to affect respect for the *Entente* Powers as a whole and love of England in particular. In the provinces the second school of thought is definitely in the ascendant. The present Government cannot afford to fight the movement in the interior. Its only strength lies in the support of the Sultan, himself a rather uncertain factor, and in the fact that few of the parties have much solid backing, as the bulk of a Moslem population care nothing at all for politics, and demand only a quiet and well-fed life.

5. The issue of this confused situation is as difficult to foresee as ever. I see nothing, however, to make me alter the opinion which I have so often expressed that the combined result of adverse single decisions and the delay in announcing a general settlement must be to make all the active political elements coalesce more and more, and to make the centre of gravity of the growing coalition shift more and more in the direction of Chauvinism and resistance. If I were to hazard a definite prophecy, it would be that the Chauvinists will either gain a definite ascendancy here, as they have already done in the provinces, or will set themselves up in some provincial centre in open opposition to Constantinople.

6. Considerable uncertainty prevails as to what is going on in the more remote parts of the interior. The Grand Vizier himself remarked on the 25th July that he was in the presence of an enigma. Every sort of rumour was current, he said, about Chauvinist activities and provincial congresses, but a telegram just received from Erzeroum said that the situation there had never been so calm. This telegram proved to come from a military authority who would almost certainly be in sympathy with the Chauvinist movement, and on being asked what the civil authorities said the Grand Vizier lapsed into vagueness. My latest information leads me to believe that the congress is sitting, but I have not been able to obtain anything certain as to the line it is taking.

7. I do not think that I exaggerated the potentialities of the present situation when I stated in a recent telegram that the country was faced with the possibility of a disintegration of order and security on a large scale. The new Government inspires no confidence in its ability or in the character of the majority of its members. Ferid Pasha is perplexed and easily deceived. The presence of Tewfik Pasha makes for sobriety, but, while less easily gulled than the Grand Vizier, he is to some extent accessible to the suggestions of an entourage steeped in Chauvinism. The Sheikh-ul-Islam, an outcast from his party, had already, before the Grand Vizier's return, played with the idea of a rapprochement with the Chauvinists. There is no outstanding figure among the remainder of the Ministers, and as a whole they may be expected to do any time-serving that is required of them.

8. As against this inadequate Central Government we have the Congress at Erzeroum, of which we know little except that it is dominated by dashing young soldiers, who are willing to stake everything on a gambler's throw, and who have purposely shifted the main scene of their activities east and north with the double purpose of securing a freer field and defending Armenia from the fate of Smyrna. The new Government has not dared, even if it wished, to remove from the Ministry of War the "opposite numbers" of these provincial officers. It was rumoured on the morrow of its advent to power that Djavad Pasha, Chief of the General Staff and another equally notorious sympathiser with the "national defence" movement, would be removed. There was a storm of protest, and nothing more has been heard of the proposal.

9. A further indication of the desire of the Government to be all things to all men is the decision definitely taken on the 27th July to proceed with the elections. There is an endeavour to placate its critics here and to steal the thunder of the Congress at

Erzeroum. If any serious attempt is made to give effect to the decision, it can only lead to fresh troubles, and the end may easily be to conjure into existence a Parliament representative of nothing but the unquiet ghost of the Committee of Union and Progress.

10. Taking it all round, the present outlook is more disquieting, from the point of view of tranquillity, than it has been at any time since the Supreme Council decided that Greek troops were to occupy Smyrna.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 79.

Memorandum.

YESTERDAY'S "Idrak" newspaper ("Socialist") published a manifesto adopted by a meeting of party representatives at the "Entente libérale" headquarters on Monday night, the 21st July.

The manifesto recites the names of the parties, &c., represented, as follows:—

"Entente libérale."
Sulh-u-Selamet ("Peace and Security").
Milli Akarar ("National Liberal").
Turkish Socialist.
Social Democrat.
Trebizond and District Decentralisation.
Smyrna Defence of Ottoman Rights.
National Congress.
Kurdish National.
Kurdish Club.
Turkish Press.

The manifesto states that the representatives, considering the formation of a third Ferid Pasha Cabinet dangerous in the extreme to the national interests, after he has by his performances at home and abroad lost the confidence of the nation, unanimously adopted the following resolutions after three hours' continuous deliberations for submission to Caliph and the nation generally:—

1. The third Ferid Pasha Cabinet formed yesterday is an unconstitutional Cabinet.
2. The said Cabinet has no qualification or capacity to direct the foreign policy or internal affairs of the Empire.
3. Damad Ferid Pasha is absolutely undeserving of confidence, as a result of the incapacity displayed by him hitherto in defending and maintaining the sacred rights of the nation. Consequently all the parties are united in seeing the necessity for the removal from power of a Cabinet of this kind and the formation in its place of a Cabinet enjoying general confidence and capable of defending the national interests.

July 23, 1919.

Enclosure 2 in No. 79.

Circular respecting the Situation in Anatolia.

LE Grand-Vizir, Damad Férid Pacha, a adressé aux vilayets d'Anatolie une importante circulaire dont voici le texte :

Nous avons pris connaissance du télégramme-circulaire du commandant de la division de Karahissar dont un exemplaire nous a été transmis par le mutessarif de Bordour. Cette circulaire porte à la connaissance des intéressés que la réunion d'un Congrès national, dans une région orientale de la Turquie convenablement choisie, Congrès chargé de régler et de fixer les destinées du pays, ayant été décidée, trois délégués devaient être élus et envoyés à Angora. De même, nous avons pris connaissance de divers télégrammes parvenus de Konia et relatifs aux frais de route de ces délégués.

L'état de désordre et de trouble dans lequel j'ai trouvé l'Anatolie après une absence de six semaines, motivée par mon séjour à Paris, à la Conférence de la Paix, m'a causé une grande peine.

Dans la Constitution que nous sommes tous tenus de respecter, la ville de Constantinople étant la capitale de l'Empire ottoman, il est clairement dit que l'Assemblée législative ne peut et ne doit être ouverte que par Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan. Par conséquent, cette façon d'agir, qui est contraire à la Constitution, aux désirs et ordres de notre gracieux Souverain et aux intérêts supérieurs de la patrie, doit absolument cesser. Je vous demande donc tout particulièrement de faire des communications énergiques et réitérées dans ce sens, à tous les mutessarifs et caïmaks dépendant de votre vilayet.

Quant à savoir s'il y a lieu ou non de payer les frais de route aux délégués, l'acte de les élire étant tout d'abord illégal et contraire à la Constitution, il est du devoir des autorités civiles et militaires non seulement de ne pas faciliter un acte aussi illégal, mais surtout d'empêcher de pareils agissements.

Je vous recommande tout particulièrement et de la façon la plus catégorique d'agir dans le sens que je vous indique.

Le 20 Juillet 1334/1919.

[115591]

No. 80.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 13.)

(No. 1353.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, July 31, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Hohler, regarding a conversation which he had yesterday with the Grand Vizier.

2. Among the points touched upon in this interview, the first one which I wish to deal with is the question of the personal safety of the Sultan and the Grand Vizier, in the event of the abdication of the one and the resignation of the other, as both of them have, according to every indication which has reached me, done their utmost to carry out the terms of the Armistice and to conform to them. I consider it will be proper and in conformity with the views of His Majesty's Government that I should take any steps that might be necessary to ensure that these persons should be treated with all proper respect, and that they should not be molested in any way, nor their safety endangered.

3. With regard to the political issues involved, I find myself confronted by very serious difficulties. It is not many days past that I telegraphed to you that the situation here has gone beyond the application of any local remedy, and to this view I still strongly adhere, but no remedy is coming or appears to be in sight from outside, and it becomes therefore incumbent to consider what action, if any, should be taken in order to meet the present complications.

4. It is by no means easy to estimate accurately the importance which is to be attached to the "congresses" which are now being held at Erzeroum, Sivas, and Amassia, and though at times the Grand Vizier is disposed to make light of them, it is only natural that a man in his position should do so in order not to admit that the authority of his own Government was seriously shaken. At other times he contradicts himself, and confesses that the situation is very serious, and it was only yesterday he admitted to Mr. Hohler, in plain words, the possibility of the provinces shaking off their allegiance to the capital.

5. The precarious position of the present Government is sufficiently clearly shown by the memorandum which I enclose. It is a Government which shows good-will, and is, I think, genuinely in favour of the Allies, understanding that the Turkish Empire can have no possible hope save in them. It is, however, little able to ensure that its orders shall be carried out in the provinces, and it appears to contain within itself certain disloyal elements. It seems certain that it can only be maintained in power by a very determined effort on the part of the Allies. But it has been our policy not to interfere more than appeared indispensable for the maintenance of public order in the internal affairs of the Empire, and whilst in a number of cases our interest on behalf of the Christian populations has carried us rather far in this respect, no interference has taken place which has been instigated with a view either to the political or the commercial advantage of His Majesty's Government. In other words, our interference has been purely altruistic, and on no occasion selfish. The results promised

well, and would have, I believe, been entirely satisfactory, had it not been for the unfortunate events attending the Greek occupation of Smyrna. It was these that threw the whole of the Turkish people into the orbit of the Committee of Union and Progress, a faction which, but for these events, was rapidly being broken up.

6. According to the Grand Vizier, the Sultan states that he will never accept Izzet Pasha as his Counsellor, but it may well be that events may prove too strong for His Majesty. It is true that it might, perhaps, be possible to deter Izzet from seeking office on the lines mentioned by Mr. Hohler, but I am not certain that this is desirable. If Izzet, who of course used to be an adherent of the Committee, came into power with a Cabinet composed of Unionists, it is probable that they would be possessed of much greater authority in the provinces than the present Government; the "congresses" in the interior would be replaced by the "Parliament" (Ferid Pasha has had to yield to the cry for parliamentary elections, though I understand that it is his intention to protract the proceedings as much as possible) in the capital, where is would be exposed to the powerful influences of the *Entente* forces; much lip service would be rendered to the Allied High Commissioners, but a tacit and sullen opposition to any of the measures which they might desire taken in the interior for the protection of Christians would have to be anticipated. In fact, we should exchange impotence and good-will for ill-will and influence.

7. The position which I have above outlined recalls forcibly to my mind the eighth paragraph of Mr. Balfour's private letter of instructions to me on the 9th November. At that date it appeared incredible that the Armistice could possibly be so greatly prolonged, but the turn of events is again bringing us face to face with the situation which nine months ago, he was contemplating. There will be more satisfaction, even if there should be more difficulty, in exacting hard terms from the Unionists rather than those who, one has reason to believe, are fundamentally well-intentioned and friendly.

8. It is my intention therefore to be guided by the principles laid down in my telegram No. 1525 of the 23rd instant, which, not having evoked any comment from you, has presumably met with your approval.

9. I should note that whilst I expressed to the Grand Vizier the opinion that it was not desirable at the present time to hold elections, yet I have taken no further or more active steps to stop them, as it appeared to me to do so would be in contradiction with the liberal spirit of the age, and the principles of President Wilson, although opinions may differ as to how much or how little those ideals are to be considered as adaptable to the conditions prevailing in this Empire. This High Commission will continue to act in the closest accord with the French, with whom I propose to discuss at the earliest possible moment the considerations I am presenting to you in this despatch.

10. I have hopes that a material amelioration in the situation will be produced so soon as my French and Italian colleagues receive their instructions to sign the Note informing the Porte of the decision of the Supreme Council limiting the Italian and Greek spheres in the Aidin vilayet, though the delay which still continues in making this pronouncement is every day more regrettable, and I fear lest the Grand Vizier be correct when he states that now it will be insufficient to allay the agitation in Asia Minor, and that its effect will be far inferior to that which it would have had two months ago.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 80.

Memorandum.

THE Grand Vizier came to see me this morning. He said that the situation was fast becoming impossible. The Committee were "again raising their hydra heads," and the members of his Cabinet were continually receiving orders from them to resign, as well as threatening letters of all kinds. He was taking the most active steps in his power against its manifestations in the provinces, but he believed that the centre of the organisation was here. He said it had cost him five days' hard struggle before he could succeed, as he did last night, in getting orders sent for the arrest of Mustapha Kemal, Raouf Bey, an officer called Shakir, and a brigand chief near Ismidt whose name he had forgotten. Opposition to him in this had come from the military party,

but especially the Minister of War, whom he believed was a traitor to him. The orders sent before with this object had been of a general nature, not specific like those sent last night. He stated that at the head of the movement were Izzet Pasha, Ahmed Riza, and Mahmoud Churouk Solou, and they had got the Crown Prince entirely into their meshes.

2. The Crown Prince had been to see the Sultan yesterday, and had neglected all the forms of courtesy which are usually used by the members of the Imperial House in addressing the Sovereign, and had simply abused him for maintaining the present Government, and as being the ruin of the country, the Caliphate, and the Sultanate. At the same time he had not made any proposals which had the slightest practical bearing.

3. Seeing the extreme difficulty of the situation, the Grand Vizier had, in the presence of Tewfik Pasha, proposed to the Sultan to withdraw. The Sultan turned to Tewfik and asked him if he could form a Cabinet. Tewfik replied that it would be useless, because he could only make one exactly similar to the present, and it could not last. Also he referred to the indecorous circumstances which had attended his last fall from power. The Sultan had expressed the firm decision not to summon Izzet Pasha to form a Cabinet, as he had suffered too much at the hands of the Committee during the past two years, and he was unshakeably resolved not to call them in as his counsellors. Sooner than do this he would resign the throne.

4. The Grand Vizier asked me, supposing this were to take place, would Great Britain ensure that the person of the Sultan in such circumstances would be protected? He also asked the same question in respect to his "insignificant self." I said that he broached a grave question, which it would be necessary to refer to London, but if such an event happened before it were possible to get an answer, I could only say that I felt certain that this High Commission would take a lively interest in their fate, and would intimate to any succeeding Government that interest. I did not go so far as to express my personal opinion, which is that we should take every possible step to ensure their personal safety.

5. The Grand Vizier went on to say that the Sultan could see no one at all who was fit to take on the Government except himself and Tewfik, and it was for this reason that the situation was so extremely acute.

6. I asked the Grand Vizier whether it would produce a considerable effect for the better if it were known that the Peace Conference were taking steps, through British instrumentality, to define the zones of Greek and Italian activity in the Aidin vilayet, and he replied that it most certainly would, although at the same time he doubted whether it would be altogether sufficient. I told him then that steps of this nature were being elaborated and would shortly be communicated to him, together with the statement that the occupation of certain regions by Greek and Italian troops in no way prejudged the decisions of the Peace Conference as to the final disposal of those regions. I told him that he should regard this information, for the present, as entirely confidential, as the details had not been finally worked out. He regretted that it could not be used for publication, but expressed very great satisfaction at the news; but still, he said, this will not be sufficient entirely to calm the agitation which is being provoked by the Committee. He affected to attach little importance, nevertheless, to the Congress which is being held at Erzeroum, and said that the gatherings at Sivas and Amassia were really only in the nature of Committee meetings.

7. He again reverted with great insistence to the malevolent influence of Izzet Pasha.

8. He said that the Sultan had suggested his visiting both the French and the British High Commissioners, but he had replied that it was useless to go to the French as no effective assistance would be forthcoming. He had throughout his tenure of office sought help and advice for the government of the country from the British, and this had been the result of his efforts and convictions for thirty years past. He regretted that no action on the grounds of his previous suggestion in this direction had been taken, though he quite understood the situation which was caused by the imperative necessity of consulting the Peace Conference. He repeated his old statement that now more than ever before he had no hope save in God and Great Britain.

9. It appears to me fairly certain that Izzet is at the root of the present trouble, and I do not see that it could do any harm, and on the other hand it might do much good, if an indication in polite terms could be made to him of the reasons why he would do well to abstain from causing trouble.

10. It appears to me that it would be most emphatically undesirable in the highest degree to have anything in the form of a Committee Government, and it looks as if we shall have to take perfectly firm action to stop such an eventuality. If therefore

the warning were to prove insufficient, I am inclined to think that we should be prepared to face the necessity of arresting and deporting of Izzet, and perhaps of one or two of his fellow-workers as well.

Constantinople, July 30, 1919.

[116385]

No. 81.

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Grahame.

(No. 1061.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 13, 1919.

I ASKED M. de Fleuriau to call upon me this afternoon in order to draw his attention to an announcement which had appeared in the French newspapers of the impending despatch of a French judicial mission to Tehran. I recapitulated to the French Minister the previous history of this question, and read to him *verbatim* my notes of the last conversation which I had on the subject with M. Cambon when the latter visited me in the Foreign Office on the 4th July.

I had explained to M. Cambon on that occasion that, while I had no reason to object to the deputation to Tehran of French professors skilled in medicine, surgery, and mathematics, I was at a loss to understand why the institution of a Law School or the sending of French Professors of Law should be required. I had pointed out that, the frontier between law and politics being admittedly thin, there was some reason to fear that the French lawyers, in the absence of any serious occupation, might feel tempted to take a hand in the local political game. I had also put to the French Ambassador the hypothetical case of what his Government would have thought and said had the British attempted a similar move in some sphere of clearly French influence. In reply, M. Cambon had said that, upon his approaching visit to Paris, he would discuss the question of the French legal professors; and he had left upon my mind the impression that it would not be necessary to persevere with that part of the French programme.

In these circumstances, I had been considerably surprised at reading in the "Temps" only a few days ago an announcement to the effect that a French Judicial Mission had been formed by the French Minister of Justice, with the consent of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, and was to leave for Persia next month to found a School of Law in Tehran. The names of the members of the mission were given, and it had been added in the "Temps" that the mission itself could not fail to benefit French influence in the East.

The ground which I had taken in my conversation with M. Cambon was, I now told M. de Fleuriau, greatly strengthened by what had passed in the interval. The British Government had for some time been engaged in negotiations with the Persian Government, culminating in an agreement which I had just concluded and which was about to be published in both countries. I gave the French Minister a general sketch of the contents of this agreement, and I said that it seemed to me singularly inappropriate that—at a time when the Persian Government had themselves recognised the predominant political interest of Great Britain by inviting her assistance in the manner provided for in the agreement—the French Government should think it fit to appear upon the scene almost in the guise of rival competitors, suggesting to Persia and to the world that the old competition between European nations (in former times usually Russia and Great Britain) was about to be revived, and that France regarded with some jealousy the occupation of the field by England.

M. de Fleuriau undertook to verify what I had said to M. Cambon, and to communicate to Paris the substance of our conversation to-day.

I went on to say to the French Minister that indications had reached me lately from more than one quarter of an inclination on the part, not, I hoped, of the French Government, of whose loyalty I was convinced, but of certain advanced sections of French colonial and public opinion, to pick causes of quarrel with this country, and to adopt an attitude towards Great Britain that was scarcely consistent with the close and cordial alliance between us, which was still in being. One day it was Syria, another day it was Tangier, again it was some other part of the Eastern world. I told him that I thought we had said good-bye to the policy of pin-pricks, which had done so much to exacerbate relations between our two countries in the past; and, when on the part of the two Governments there was still the firmest intention in the public interest to pursue a policy of close co-operation, it seemed to me little short of scandalous that

any encouragement should be given to those who sought to poison the wells. I reminded M. de Fleuriau that, upon my instructions, Sir Ronald Graham had spoken to him with great frankness last week on the question of Syria, pointing out to him that, while we desired no mandate for that region, and would certainly refuse it if offered, the only reason for which a military occupation of Syria by the French had not been encouraged by our military authorities was that such an occupation would be absolutely certain to lead to collisions between the French and the native populations.

Upon the French Minister doubting whether this was the case, I informed him—and this he had not previously heard—that on a recent occasion a French official of the highest rank had actually been fired upon and wounded by the population of a district of the Lebanon in which the French claimed a long-standing political predominance.

Further, I asked whether a stronger evidence of our disinterestedness could be forthcoming than the fact that, though France had no legitimate claim to Cilicia, had not received a mandate for that part of the Turkish Empire, and might indeed in the future not receive one at all, yet we had voluntarily invited French troops to occupy that country, of which they were now in possession. Not a word of recognition was given to this fact; while, on the other hand, inspired writers in the leading French newspapers endeavoured to make mischief as regards Syria by bringing wholly unfounded charges against this country.

M. de Fleuriau disputed the inspiration under which these writers penned their articles; but I said that I could not doubt seriously that such had been the case.

I urged him to help to keep the relations between our two countries free from this atmosphere of suspicion and insinuation, of which there appeared to be too many propagators in the French press.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[116079]

No. 22.

Sir G. Grahame to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 14.)

(No. 791.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 12, 1919.

ON receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 1041 of the 8th instant on the subject of the anti-British campaign here in connection with Syria, I requested the Minister for Foreign Affairs to receive me. His Excellency fixed this morning for my visit.

I began my conversation by saying that, as he was aware, the attacks in the French press had caused His Majesty's Government serious concern. In the absence of M. Paul Cambon, Sir Ronald Graham had seen M. de Fleuriau, and I was instructed to repeat to his Excellency what Sir Ronald Graham had said to him. M. Pichon showed unusual warmth directly I informed him of the subject of my visit, and said, before I could begin: "I will answer you!" I then communicated to him the tenor of what had been said to M. de Fleuriau, a report of which had apparently already reached him. M. Pichon, speaking at first heatedly, declared that his *dossiers* were full of reports of anti-French propaganda carried on by Anglo-Syrian agents. He received them almost daily, and they formed a formidable mass of evidence. These reports were so detailed and concordant that it was absolutely impossible for the French Government not to believe that they were well-founded. He did not for a moment wish to insinuate that His Majesty's Government were at the back of these proceedings. He knew Field-Marshal Allenby personally, and believed in his good faith, but at the same time he must tell me that he felt sure that neither Field-Marshal Allenby nor the British Government could be aware of what was being done. I interrupted his Excellency at this point to tell him that British officers, personal friends of mine, who had come back from the Near East and who had talked to me on the subject, had spontaneously assured me that the French were entirely mistaken in thinking that we were working against them there; that the sole idea of the British authorities was, pending a settlement of the destinies of the regions in question, to prevent any parties from carrying on premature propaganda calculated to stir up trouble. M. Pichon listened to me, but maintained his view that contrary information was reaching him from many quarters, which he could not possibly disregard.

His Excellency said that I must know that the press here could not be controlled by the French Government. In fact, the latter were attacked in many of these articles for not properly defending the French cause. Needless to say, M. Robert de Caix had

acted entirely independently of the French Government. I said to him at this point that these articles against England were of daily occurrence, and I showed him two: one in the "Figaro" (reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 783 of yesterday's date), and another written by M. Gauvain in the "Journal des Débats" (please see my despatch No. 789 of to-day's date), of which, I pointed out, His Majesty's Government were not cognisant when sending to me the instructions on which I was acting. In M. Gauvain's article the British Government were directly accused. M. Pichon had not seen them, but he observed that in the "Figaro" article the French Government were accused of *mutisme*. As regards M. Gauvain, he attacked the Government frequently, and paid no attention to their wishes. The same was true of the authors of the other articles brought to his notice.

M. Pichon said there was another aspect of the question which he would like to emphasise. He was convinced that His Majesty's Government were not fully aware of the intense feeling about Syria in this country. It was not a thing of yesterday, but a traditional sentiment which was continually increasing. It would be the greatest mistake to underestimate the almost passionate interest which the French took in this question. If the Government laid themselves open to the charge of not properly defending French interests, they would be swept away. They would not get ten votes in the Chamber if they tried to thwart this sentiment, and he told me that a strong attack was coming when Parliament met towards the end of the month about the manner in which the French Government were neglecting the proper defence of the French position in the Near East. M. Franklin-Bouillon and others would certainly go into the Tribune and deliver it. M. Pichon's tone in mentioning this prospect suggested that it was not one which he relished.

I said that it was a really deplorable situation. Up to the present I had not noticed that the British press had taken up the matter, but this might happen at any moment, with the result that the controversy would be still further aggravated. I knew that he would be the first to regret any diminution in the cordial feelings between the two countries. To this M. Pichon replied: "I have always been Anglophil, and I shall be so to the day of my death." I begged him earnestly to take some steps which would have the effect at least of putting the soft pedal down upon this loud anti-British campaign. M. Pichon said that he saw no means of succeeding in so doing unless he were helped by us; both sides must do something, and not only the French Government. His Majesty's Government should send instructions to their agents in Syria to abstain from the attitude of which the French complained.

In one part of our conversation M. Pichon mentioned the fact that Mr. Lloyd George had at an earlier date made an attempt with M. Clemenceau to find some settlement, but that it had been abandoned, and now M. Clemenceau would not take the initiative.

In spite of my attempts to shake his belief in the anti-French action of British agents in Syria, I came away from my interview feeling that he was firmly persuaded that the reports which had reached him represented in the main a true picture of what was happening. He seemed to be honestly convinced of this, and there does not appear to me to be any prospect of eradicating this belief from his mind. I gathered that M. Paul Cambon was quite as convinced as he was himself that the French have the most serious and well-founded reasons for complaint.

As regards public opinion here, one cannot but feel that, if such difficulty is found in disabusing the minds of the French Government of these suspicions, there would be still greater difficulty in obtaining a favourable hearing of our case from the public in general. A detailed statement rebutting the charges brought against us would be disregarded as an *ex parte* one, but it is just possible that a conciliatory statement of a somewhat general character as to the desire of His Majesty's Government to give fair and favourable consideration to the French point of view might have some emollient effect on the public mind and help to tide over the period until some real progress towards a settlement of the various outstanding questions in the Near East can be effected. It is not believed here that Great Britain is seeking a mandate over Syria for herself, but it is believed that British agents are endeavouring to prevent France from obtaining one and are insidiously combating French influence in the Near East, especially in Syria.

(Communicated to Peace Delegation and Mr. Balfour.)

I have, &c.

GEORGE GRAHAME.

[112962]

No. 83.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

(No. 5363.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 14, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 5252 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to inform you that M. de Fleuriau called at this Office on the 5th instant and saw Sir R. Graham.

In leaving the note, of which a copy is enclosed, M. de Fleuriau took occasion to state that he was not satisfied with what Sir R. Graham had said to M. Cambon in the interviews reported in my despatch under reference, and that he did not consider that the question of the division of military spheres in Turkey should be dropped, but, on the contrary, that the arrangements summarised in his note, which were based on instructions from the French Government, should be carried into effect.

After reading the note, Sir R. Graham at once took serious exception to the first paragraph. This proposal, he pointed out, constituted an entirely fresh departure and entailed the substitution of a French officer for General Milne in command at Constantinople under General Franchet d'Esperey. In previous conversations M. Cambon had assured him that there was no intention on the part of the French Government to bring about any change in control at Constantinople, and he had so informed our military authorities.

M. de Fleuriau replied that the new functions allotted to General Milne by the Paris Conference appeared to him to necessitate some readjustment of the command at Constantinople. General Milne could scarcely exercise his new supreme command in Asiatic Turkey and at the same time remain commander at Constantinople.

Sir R. Graham said that M. de Fleuriau's proposal would be communicated to the military authorities, but that he could hold out no hope of its being accepted. The best course at the present moment seemed to him to be that the question of military spheres in Turkey should be allowed to sleep.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 83.

Note.

LE général français commandant l'armée d'Orient à Constantinople (actuellement le Général Franchet d'Esperey) exercera le commandement des troupes alliées à Constantinople; il désignera l'officier qui exercera effectivement le commandement militaire de cette ville.

La zone du commandement confiée au général français s'étendra sur le territoire asiatique de Constantinople jusqu'à la limite du Mutessariflik de Scutarie d'Asie. Dans cette zone, le contrôle du commandement britannique d'Asie Mineure s'exercera sur le chemin de fer d'Ismid à Haïdar-Pacha, y compris la gare et le port de la gare de Haïdar-Pacha.

Les mines de charbon d'Héraclée continueront à être exploitées sous le régime actuellement en vigueur, et le charbon extrait de ces mines sera utilisé, comme il l'était pendant les mois de mars à juillet 1919, pour l'approvisionnement de Constantinople et de chemins de fer de Roumélie.

M. de Fleuriau saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 5 août 1919.*

[118381]

No. 84.

Vice-Admiral Sir A. Calthorpe to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 1368.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 5, 1919.

I REPORTED in my despatch No. 1353 (paragraph 9) of the 31st ultimo that I intended to discuss with my French colleague the serious problems presented by the

internal situation of this country. It is unnecessary that I should trouble you with the details of the two or three very long and friendly conversations which I have had with him; it will be sufficient if I acquaint you briefly with the results.

2. The acting Italian High Commissioner had not yet received instructions to sign the note to the Sublime Porte concerning the delimitation of the Greek and Italian zones in Asia Minor, and I arranged with M. DeFrance that he should call upon him to explain that whilst according to the terms of the telegram of the Italian Government it was the presidency of the Supreme Council which was to notify the Turkish Government of the delimitation, yet it was the High Commissioners who were the channel of communication between the Supreme Council and the said Government. M. Lodifé accepted this interpretation, and agreed to sign the note (a copy of which I enclose herewith*), which was handed to the Grand Vizier on Sunday last, the 3rd August. His Highness received it with great satisfaction, stating that it would greatly improve the position of his Government.

3. Next, as we were entirely agreed that the advent to power of a Government even moderately Unionist in character would be essentially undesirable in the interests of the Allies both for the purpose of maintaining order as well as for the reason that it would place additional obstructions to the continued observation of the armistice, and to the acceptance, eventually, of the terms of the peace which would be imposed, we were forced to the conclusion that it was necessary to give such support as we properly could to the present Government, although we felt we should continue to avoid, as far as possible, all interference in internal politics.

4. In order to reconcile these various aims we had decided that after presenting the note above mentioned, we would cause an intimation to be conveyed to the Grand Vizier by our Dragomans that he would do well to proceed with greater severity against those whom he knew to be implicated in Unionist intrigues, or in plots which would have the result of placing obstructions in the way of the execution of the terms of the armistice.

5. This we did, and I again impressed this matter on his Highness's attention this morning, when he came to pay me a visit of farewell on the occasion of my approaching definite departure from Constantinople.

6. Ferid Pasha is thoroughly pleased to have our support in taking action against the Committee, to whom he is as entirely opposed as we are, but his Government is weak, and he asked whether, in the event of a number of arrests being effected, it will be possible for us to arrange that the persons arrested should be conveyed to a place of safety for confinement, such as Malta. I told him that I would enquire into this matter, which was not altogether unattended by difficulties. I believe it is his desire also that some should be allowed to proceed abroad, though not as prisoners.

7. I have further arranged with M. DeFrance that we will cause a serious intimation to be conveyed to the Crown Prince to the effect that his name is being widely used by the Committee Party as being their leader, and to warn him of the unfortunate results which may attend such a connection.

8. News has reached me from General Sir George Milne as well as from other sources to the effect that Mustapha Kemal was organising something in the nature of an army at Erzeroum. It is clear that the Allies are not at the present time in a position to check a movement of this kind by force, and the only suggestion which General Milne had to make was that the port of Trebizond might be occupied. He did not think that this would have any great effect beyond providing a base to which Christians in the interior might retreat in the case of necessity, and rendering somewhat more difficult the question of movements of men and supplies to and from Erzeroum. I brought the above also to the attention of M. DeFrance, who is giving it his best attention. He is quite alive to the seriousness of the matter, but he seems at present doubtful of the utility of occupying Trebizond. He has promised me to express his opinion on the question at the earliest possible moment, with a view that we may continue to work as hitherto in the closest agreement.

9. It was with no little regret that I parted with my French colleague, with whom my relations have always been most agreeable, and indeed, during the last few weeks, extremely close.

I have, &c.

A. CALTHORPE, High Commissioner.

* Not printed.

[118406]

No. 85.

(No. 1412.)

My Lord,

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 20.)
Constantinople, August 9, 1919.
 WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 1240 of the 24th July relative to atrocities alleged to have been committed by Greek troops in the Aidin Vilayet, and to my telegram No. 1576 of the 31st July, I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a report, dated the 30th July, received from my representative at Smyrna on this subject.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,
 Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 85.

Representative of British High Commissioner, Smyrna and Aidin Vilayet, to British High Commissioner, Constantinople.

(No. 104.)

July 30, 1919.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 109 of the 25th July, I have the honour to submit the following report on events at Aidin after its occupation by the Greeks:—

Greek troops occupied Aidin on the 27th May, 1919, without incident; and for three or four weeks nothing untoward appears to have occurred, although a memorandum presented to a British naval representative at Denizli on the 11th July alleges that Moslems were arrested and imprisoned and their fezzes torn off, and that at Ebeili and Carabunar, stations west of Aidin, forty-eight Moslems were killed by Greeks.

On the 21st June, a skirmish took place near the Meander river between Turkish irregulars and Greek troops. The Turks were driven off. The Greeks then set fire to the two Turkish villages of Emir-Keuy and Kadi-Keuy between Aidin and the Meander. The Turks retaliated by burning various farms belonging to Greeks.

After this engagement relations between Turks and Greeks in Aidin town became worse.

South of the Meander bands of Turkish irregulars were gathering with the knowledge of Turkish regular officers, who were warned on the 21st June by Lieutenant Hodder that any attack on Aidin was not to be allowed.

Lieutenant Hodder, on the 28th June, on returning from a tour as far as Denizli was handed at Omerli station, east of Aidin, an ultimatum, signed by Yuruk Ali, head of the Turkish irregulars operating east of Aidin, and addressed to the inhabitants of Aidin, stating that if Greek troops did not evacuate Aidin in three days they would be driven out by force.

Fighting, however, had begun on the same day to the south of the town where Greeks appear to have attacked Turks, and continued till the 30th July, when the Greeks finally evacuated the town, and Colonel Chefki Bey, commander of the Turkish troops, entered it.

During the evacuation the Greeks set fire to the Turkish quarter, and shot down Turks who tried to escape.

The attached report, which was supplied to me by M. Diacono, manager of the Imperial Ottoman Bank at Aidin, gives an account of this killing of Turks by Greeks.

This killing seems to have been done entirely by Greek soldiers.

The Greek defence is that they were fired at from houses as they retreated through the Turkish quarter and had to reply.

The number of Moslems thus killed or burnt in their houses is unknown. Turks say 2,000, but it seems impossible to arrive at a correct estimate.

In entering the town the Turkish irregulars found that numbers of their co-religionists had been killed, and began massacring Greeks. The Greek quarter was fired, and persons who attempted to escape from burning houses were shot down. All civilians seen in the streets were fired at. Those who took refuge in the French convent were respected, but all others found about were killed without distinction of age or sex. A number of Greeks who had tried to follow the retreating Greek army and had been repulsed by the latter were found by the Turks on the hills and cruelly massacred.

Lieutenant Hodder saw the bodies of persons thus slain, and has sent photographs and a report to the British naval representative here.

Greeks estimate the number of Greeks killed at 1,500 to 2,000.

On the 3rd July the Greek troops again occupied Aidin, but before their arrival all the Moslem population, except about a hundred, had fled over the Meander to Chinar.

Lieutenant Hodder's report of the 10th July and subsequent British naval representatives' reports give more ample details of the Aidin incidents.

On the other hand reports come in from Turks in the Denizli and Chinar region accusing the Greeks of having begun the massacre in Aidin, and thus provoked reprisals.

The Greek side of the matter is that they were first attacked by irregulars, and that subsequently the Moslem civilian population fired on Greek troops, who were obliged to take measures to protect themselves.

That both Turk and Greek have committed atrocities cannot be doubted. The Greeks, however, show a tendency to regard public opinion in Europe, and to punish the wrongdoers. In this respect I find M. Sterghiadis very firm, animated with the best intentions and able to carry them out.

On the Turkish side there seems no tendency to punish the wrongdoer. The irregular bands and the regulars obey no orders from above and act as they please. They have added to the Turkish record for barbarism and massacre without any attempt being made to restrain them.

The Italians south of the Meander, far from preventing Turks attacking Greeks, seem to encourage them.

Both Turk and Greek seem to be acquiring anti-British feelings, the former for our aiding Greece to occupy parts of Asia Minor, and the latter for our preventing him dealing with the Turk as he wishes.

Copy sent to Commodore.

JAMES MORGAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 85.

Report of Events in Aidin.

(Confidentiel.)

A LA suite d'une escarmouche qui eut lieu aux environs du Méandre, le 21 juin, entre quelques irréguliers turcs et les troupes helléniques, ces dernières, après avoir repoussé les Turcs, pillèrent et incendièrent deux villages, Emir-Keuy et Kadi-Keuy, d'une population de 150 habitants chacun. Les Turcs, de leur côté, brûlèrent, à titre de représailles, quelques propriétés grecques non loin de ces deux villages.

Le 26 juin, le Colonel Chefki Bey, ancien commandant de la division d'Aidin qui, lors de l'occupation grecque, s'était retiré avec un millier de soldats au delà du Méandre et qui aujourd'hui commande les troupes tant régulières qu'irrégulières de ce secteur, envoya un ultimatum au commandant grec, le Lieutenant-Colonel Skinas, l'invitant à évacuer la ville au plus tard le 2 juillet. En réponse, le Colonel Skinas envoya, le vendredi matin, 27 juin, un détachement de 150 hommes jusqu'au pont du Méandre, à 10 kilom. de la ville (limite de la zone grecque, l'autre rive se trouvant dans la zone italienne), qui sont mis en déroute par l'attaque des Turcs. Le reste de la journée se passa dans le calme et le lendemain matin, samedi, 28 juin, un nouveau détachement, dirigé vers le même point, est de même attaqué par les Turcs, qui le poursuivent, sur la chaussée, vers la ville.

Dans l'après-midi, des renforts turcs étant arrivés, nous entendons, à notre sortie du bureau, des coups de feu et nous nous rendons sur la colline de Képèz pour voir ce qui se passe. Pendant que nous sommes là les Turcs tirent dans la vallée; des coups de fusils et de mitrailleuses partent des points occupés par les Grecs dans la ville et sur ses hauteurs, et nous remarquons des soldats grecs, postés sur trois points dominant le quartier turc, tirailler dans direction de ce dernier. Des coups de feu ayant été tirés, dit-on, de certaines maisons de ce quartier, les evzones pénétrèrent dans quelques-unes de ces maisons et, après s'être livrés au pillage et au massacre, ils y mettent le feu. Alors commence à partir des hauteurs de Tralles, occupées par l'armée grecque, des coups de canon dirigés vers ledit quartier et le village de l'cherkez-Keuy, très proche de la ville, au sud de la voie ferrée.

Le feu se propageant dans le quartier turc, tous ceux qui essaient de fuir sont abattus par les mitrailleuses placées autour dudit quartier, et les soldats sont aidés de civils qu'on avait armés de fusils de guerre.

La fusillade devenant de plus en plus vive et nombre de balles commençant à tomber autour de nous, nous sommes obligés de quitter notre point d'observation. Devant la tournure grave que prennent les choses, nous nous réfugions, M. Stolzenberg et moi, dans le couvent des Sœurs de Charité, qui est sous la protection française et où viennent se réfugier à leur tour quelques familles musulmanes, chrétiennes et juives.

Bien que plus espacés, les coups de feu se font entendre durant toute la nuit. Le pillage des maisons et des magasins turcs, commencé dans la journée, continue.

Le lendemain, dimanche, 29 juin, la fusillade et les coups de canon reprennent dès l'aube; la fusillade des Turcs est plus rapprochée, ce qui nous fait comprendre qu'on se bat aux abords de la ville.

L'incendie, alimenté par des constructions en bois et par un léger vent, prend des proportions et se dirige d'un côté vers la gare et de l'autre vers le bazar et le quartier grec de Nazli-Keupru.

La bataille fait rage, des milliers de coups de feu font un vacarme assourdissant (mitrailleuses, fusils, grenades à main, fusils à machine, fusils lance-grenades et canons), tout est mis en jeu simultanément et sans interruption. C'est un véritable enfer, lorsqu'à ce sinistre concert viennent se joindre les décharges d'artillerie des pièces turques d'au delà du Méandre; les obus éclatent autour de nous, dont un à quelques mètres du couvent; deux autres tombent sur le quartier de Képèz, où ils provoquent des incendies. Aux obus succèdent les shrapnels. Toute la journée se passe ainsi et, en dehors des incendies allumés en ville, deux villages des environs, Tcherkez-Keuy et Tepedjik, sont entièrement détruits par le feu et par l'artillerie grecque.

Le soir du même jour, à 11 heures, on vient nous informer que la garnison grecque, ne pouvant plus tenir, a décidé de se retirer. La nouvelle se propage et affole, à juste titre, la population qui se porte vers le quartier général, demandant à suivre l'armée. Quatre à cinq cents civils réussissent à passer, lorsque survient le Lieutenant-Colonel Skinas, qui refuse au reste de ces malheureux de suivre les troupes; devant leur insistance, il les fait repousser brutalement en les menaçant des baïonnettes. Cette conduite du commandant grec est aussi inconcevable que sa retraite devant 1.500 Turcs irréguliers, alors que les troupes grecques s'élevaient à plus de 3.000 hommes. Nous avons eu la certitude de l'exactitude de ces chiffres après notre départ d'Aidin. L'excuse avancée par le Colonel Skinas est d'avoir manqué de munitions. Nous ne saurions dire jusqu'à quel point ceci peut être exact; le fait est qu'il y a eu un gaspillage inouï de munitions, dont le résultat, jusqu'au moment de la retraite des Hellènes, n'a coûté aux Turcs que la perte de quarante-sept hommes entre morts et blessés.

Aussitôt que la nouvelle du départ fut connue, le Couvent des Sœurs a été envahi par la plus grande partie de la population chrétienne de la ville, qui arrivait en masse pendant la nuit et jusqu'au lendemain, le 30 juin, à midi. On comptait plus de 6.000 personnes entassées dans le local et la cour du couvent, où les balles pleuvaient de tous côtés.

En ces moments si critiques, le courage et l'abnégation des deux bonnes sœurs, notamment de la Supérieure intérimaire, Sœur Marie Rueddin, est au-dessus de tout éloge; elles ont été sublimes. Et, comme elles, les trois sous-officiers de la gendarmerie française, envoyés de Smyrne après l'affaire de Nazli pour protéger les sœurs, se sont multipliés pour inspirer le courage et maintenir l'ordre, en s'exposant tout le temps dans les endroits les plus dangereux.

Les coups de feu qui se font entendre dans les rues de la ville nous annoncent l'entrée des Turcs.

Afin de prévenir une attaque du couvent, où les lamentations des femmes et des enfants n'auraient certainement pas manqué d'attirer les hordes turques, nous décidons—cinq notables Turcs réfugiés dans le couvent, soit le Gouverneur intérimaire, le mufti, un vieux hodja, deux négociants, Edhem et Rifaat Bey, avec les trois gendarmes et moi—d'aller au-devant des premiers arrivants et de leur faire comprendre que la maison des sœurs était française, qu'elle avait protégé nombre de familles musulmanes et les prier de respecter tous ceux qui se trouvaient sous la protection du drapeau français. C'est ainsi que nous sortîmes au moment où les premiers irréguliers débouchaient dans la rue; ceux-ci nous assurèrent qu'aucun mal ne nous serait fait et mirent deux de leurs hommes en faction à la porte du couvent.

En entrant dans la ville, surexcités par la vue de leurs quartiers brûlés et par la quantité de cadavres musulmans gisant dans les rues, les Turcs mettent le feu aux maisons chrétiennes après avoir tué et dévalisé tous les habitants trouvés chez eux.

L'incendie se rapproche de plus en plus et nous voyons le moment où le couvent sera entouré de flammes. Nous décidons de la quitter pour nous rendre dans l'église

arménienne, sise en face du couvent et qui est tout à fait isolée. Comme je servais d'interprète entre les gendarmes français et les deux factionnaires, je demandais à ces derniers de permettre au monde de quitter petit à petit le local. Après avoir laissé sortir une vingtaine de personnes, ils refermèrent la porte en disant que seuls les musulmans pouvaient sortir. Ils livrèrent alors passage à ces derniers en faisant rentrer à coup de crosse les non-musulmans qui essayaient de se faufiler. Dès que tous les musulmans furent partis, je revins à la charge pour prier nos deux gardiens de laisser sortir le reste aussi, en leur faisant remarquer que tout ce monde serait étouffé dès que les flammes nous auraient entourés. Leur réponse fut: "Yok, bizé né?" (Non, que nous importe?) Alors des scènes de désespoir se produisirent parmi tout ce monde affolé, qui voyait clairement quelles étaient les intentions des Turcs à notre égard. Heureusement pour la majorité, mais malheureusement pour un petit nombre, la porte du dispensaire du couvent venait d'être forcée par une bande d'irréguliers. Les cinq ou six premières personnes qu'ils virent devant eux furent tuées à coup de baïonnettes. Grâce au Gouverneur intérimaire, à Edhem Bey et surtout à Rifaat Bey, qui se trouvaient déjà dans la cour de l'église arménienne et qui accoururent à notre secours, le restant des réfugiés put sortir en laissant aux mains des Turcs tout ce qu'ils avaient sur eux: bijoux, paquets d'effets, portefeuilles, &c.

Les gendarmes français, dont la conduite, comme je l'ai déjà dit, a été au-dessus de tout éloge, ont quitté les derniers, sans pouvoir, malheureusement, empêcher les deux factionnaires de tuer une dizaine de personnes parmi les dernières sortantes du couvent.

Comme les flammes envahissaient de plus en plus le quartier de l'église arménienne, nous avons été conduits sur la place de Tsakiroglou. Là nous trouvons le Colonel Chefik Bey, qui, après avoir rassuré tout le monde, dirige la foule vers le Konak et l'installe dans les divers bureaux et dépendances dudit local et celui de la gendarmerie.

En me voyant, le Colonel Chefik Bey me dit qu'à peine entré dans la ville, il avait mis une garde devant la banque. L'incendie se propage de tous côtés et durant toute la nuit on voit du Konak, qui domine la ville, se consumer ce qui reste de cette pauvre cité, tandis qu'on entend, au loin, les coups de canon et de fusil de l'armée grecque poursuivie par les bandes turques.

Mardi matin, 1^{er} courant, arrive au Konak l'officier anglais, M. Hodder, qui décide avec le Colonel Chefik Bey de faire évacuer la ville en commandant à diriger les habitants sur Nazli et Dénizli, les moyens de les loger et de les nourrir faisant entièrement défaut à Aidin.

Les gendarmes français, envoyés à Aidin, lors des événements de Nazli, pour protéger les sœurs avec ordre de les faire passer dans la zone italienne dès qu'il y aurait eu un danger, décident de partir mardi matin, 1^{er} courant, en compagnie des deux sœurs de charité et l'agent consulaire de France, M. le Docteur Apololides et sa famille. Ma connaissance du turc et de l'italien ainsi que les quelques petits services que j'ai pu rendre pendant que nous étions dans le Couvent des Sœurs me valent la chance d'être pris comme interprète et de les accompagner. Je tenais beaucoup à cela, pour pouvoir me trouver en contact avec les Italiens et voir s'il n'y avait pas possibilité de les faire intervenir pour faire sortir d'Aidin quelques-uns des survivants et surtout le personnel de la banque.

Le Colonel Chefik Bey met très aimablement à notre disposition le seul chariot dont il disposait et nous donne une escorte de deux officiers et de deux soldats devant nous accompagner jusqu'au pont du Méandre. Je fais tout mon possible pour amener avec nous M. Stolzenberg, qui me prie de ne pas l'abandonner, ainsi que ses trois enfants, mais les gendarmes français s'y opposent formellement, craignant qu'un plus grand nombre de voyageurs ne donne lieu à quelque attaque de la part des bandes en cours de route.

Nous quittons donc Aidin le mardi, 1^{er} courant, à 10 heures du matin, après avoir obtenu l'assurance formelle de Chefik Bey qu'il aurait veillé sur notre local et nos dépôts.

Je suis, en effet, heureux de porter à votre connaissance que l'agence ainsi que nos dépôts n'ont eu nullement à souffrir. A mon arrivée ici, j'ai malheureusement appris le meurtre de notre cavass Kalamanoğlu Ibrahim, qu'on a trouvé assassiné dans le local même de l'agence.

Nous arrivâmes à Smyrne, le dimanche soir, 6 courant, après six jours d'un voyage des plus fatigants, mais où nous avons trouvé, partout, l'accueil le plus cordial et le plus empressé de la part des autorités italiennes. L'itinéraire suivi a été du Méandre à Tchima, Millas et Kulluk en camion automobile, de Kulluk à Scala Nova à bord d'un

bateau marchand, et de Scala Nova à Smyrne nous avons fait la traversée à bord du contre-torpilleur italien Bronzetti venu de Smyrne pour nous prendre à son bord.

Dans l'entre-temps, à notre arrivée à Millas, le jeudi, 3^e courant, j'avais fait des démarches auprès du général commandant les troupes italiennes, pour pouvoir faire venir M. Stolzenberg, le restant du personnel de l'agence et les quelques familles étrangères restées à Aidin. Le général expédia immédiatement un officier avec des camions à Aidin, mais, son arrivée en cette dernière ville ayant coïncidé avec le retour des troupes grecques, il a été obligé de rebrousser chemin.

Après notre départ de Aidin, le Colonel Chefik Bey, d'après ce que j'apprends, ne réussissant plus à maintenir les bandes, celles-ci se sont portées à des actes inouïs de barbarie; des hommes, des femmes, et jeunes filles ont été massacrés et mutilés. Suivant l'évaluation des derniers arrivants d'Aidin, le nombre des victimes s'élèverait à plus de 1,000 musulmans et 2,000 chrétiens, parmi lesquels beaucoup de notables et anciens clients de votre établissement.

A l'heure qu'il est, le 80 pour cent des maisons et magasins d'Aidin ont brûlés, les quartiers chrétiens ayant complètement disparus. On me rapporte que les cadavres en décomposition gisent encore sans sépulture au milieu des décombres fumants et que la puanteur empesté jusqu'aux abords de la ville.

Bien que l'armée hellénique ait réoccupé Aidin, la situation est des plus incertaines, les bandes turques ne se tenant pas pour battues. Des renforts importants arrivant de la région de Dénizli, il ne serait pas étonnant de voir bientôt se produire quelques nouvelles et plus sérieuses attaques.

En ce qui concerne la situation économique, Aidin peut être considérée comme ruinée, nos négociants ayant perdu en dehors de leurs biens, meubles et immeubles, toutes les marchandises qu'ils détenaient. En outre, les figues, seul produit sur lequel comptait cette année-ci nos agriculteurs, peuvent être considérées, d'ores et déjà, comme perdues, n'ayant pu recevoir les soins qu'on doit leur donner à cette époque.

Vu, comme nous le disons, l'incertitude de la situation, d'une part, l'exode de la population et l'impossibilité de séjourner, en ce moment, dans la ville, d'autre part, nous vous prions de vouloir bien nous autoriser à nous mettre d'accord avec les autorités grecques pour faire transporter à Smyrne notre encaisse et nos dépôts de titres et d'objets. M. Laporte, consul général de France, a fait les démarches voulues auprès des autorités grecques pour que notre local et nos dépôts soient gardés par des factionnaires appartenant aux troupes helléniques.

Tous les musulmans ayant quitté la ville avant le retour des troupes helléniques, sur 45,000 habitants que comptait Aidin il n'en reste plus que 3,500 non-musulmans, dont une partie sera certainement évacuée sur d'autres localités.

En terminant, je me permets d'attirer votre bienveillante attention sur l'extrême dénuement dans lequel se trouve tout le personnel de votre agence d'Aidin. Nous sommes tous partis avec le seul costume que nous portions le premier jour des événements et sommes arrivés à Smyrne dans un complet état de délabrement, le reste de nos effets ayant entièrement brûlé. Ceux qui avaient pu emporter quelques économies ont dû les laisser, pour sauver leur vie, aux mains des brigands. C'est vraiment miraculeux qu'aucun de nous n'ait péri. Seul notre magasinier, M. Hadjidimo, a à déplorer la perte de son père, qui a été égorgé.

En ce qui me concerne, je n'ai pu rien sauver et j'ai été obligé, à mon arrivée ici, de sortir avec des effets empruntés à des amis; je me permets de vous remettre, par lettre spéciale, un relevé des effets que j'ai perdus dans l'incendie et vous remettrai prochainement le relevé de ceux perdus par le personnel de l'agence, qui se trouve actuellement réfugié au complet à Smyrne.

J'aime à croire, MM. les directeurs, que vous voudrez bien prendre en sérieuse considération la triste situation dans laquelle nous nous trouvons et nous accorder le secours nécessaire pour remplacer les effets que nous avons perdus.

Smyrne, le 10 juillet 1919.

P.S.—Writer wishes his identity kept dark lest he may be persecuted by Greeks in future.

J. M.

[118409]

No. 86.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 1417.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 9, 1919.

WITH reference to Admiral Calthorpe's despatch of the 31st ultimo, and his despatch of the 5th August, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that after careful discussion my French colleague and I decided that we would each send a representative to converse with the Crown Prince to point out the dangers that would be attendant on any participation by His Royal Highness in the proceedings of the Unionist Party.

2. Prince Abdul Medjid on being sounded expressed his desire to see Mr. Hohler, but we thought it undesirable under present circumstances that any person of diplomatic rank should see him, and it was arranged that Mr. Ryan should go in the first place, being supported later by M. Ledoux, of the French High Commission.

3. Mr. Ryan accordingly had his audience with the Prince yesterday morning (8th August), and I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a very interesting account of the conversation which took place.

4. It is difficult to reconcile the great divergence between the Crown Prince's language and the reports of him which reach me from the Grand Vizier, as well as from other sources.

5. The Grand Vizier's utterances are no doubt coloured by feelings of personal pique, whilst the Crown Prince is probably of a fickle character and is under the sway of the person who has last seen him.

6. I was glad to have an opportunity to refer to the reasons for which His Majesty the King did not answer the telegram which Abdul Medjid had addressed to His Majesty some three months ago, and it served as a useful introduction for the more personal message which we had considered it advisable to convey to him.

7. In paragraphs 4 and 5 of the second of Admiral Calthorpe's despatches above mentioned he referred to the intention of himself and his French colleague to advise the Grand Vizier to proceed with greater severity against those who were connected with the Unionist Party. The result of this was that his Highness first communicated to me the names of some of those people whom he desired to see out of the way. It eventually appeared that his idea was not so much to cause these people to be imprisoned, which indeed would be difficult, as they have committed no definite crime or offence, but that they should be banished as political undesirables.

8. It was not long before the list of five or six grew to almost fifty, and it then transpired that he had by a misunderstanding believed that the arrests would be carried out by the Allies. He has been thoroughly undeceived on this point, and the question is now narrowed down to one of inviting the persons originally mentioned to go on a visit to Italy if the Italian Government have no objection.

9. At the same time, whereas some ten days or a fortnight ago a considerable agitation was going on, at the present time there is a marked apparent suspension of political movement, but I think it will be a great mistake to assume that on that account it has in any way ceased.

10. It would be difficult to exaggerate the complexity of the present situation with a Government which is moderately satisfactory in its general character, but too weak to ensure the execution of its orders, and to which there appears to be only one alternative, namely, a Government which would be strong, but which would be definitely opposed to the aims and interests of the Allies, and to the execution of the terms of the armistice.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB, Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 86.

Account of Mr. Ryan's Conversation with Prince Abdul Medjid.

(Very Secret.)

I SAW the Crown Prince this morning as arranged. He received me with cordiality and spoke freely. The audience lasted nearly two hours.

I spoke first to the Prince in the sense of the attached note (which I had prepared

[1356]

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beforehand and had communicated to M. Ledoux), adding various politenesses and embellishments. The Prince listened carefully and without interruption. On my emphasising, in conclusion, the point that his name was being made use of, he denied categorically that he had any hand in the movement or that he had the smallest idea of putting himself at the head of it.

I knew, he said, what the circumstances of the Imperial family had been. Under Abdul Hamid they had been prisoners. After the Constitution they had enjoyed personal liberty, but had been kept remote from politics. Princes were without influence in the political life of the country. His own convictions were that Turkey's policy should be that of Reshid Pasha and Ali Pasha—steadfast by the side of England. He had expressed his views freely before the war in conversations with, among others, Sir G. Lowther. He did not know whether Sir G. Lowther had thought them worth recording, but they had taken place. He had held the same language successively to Sultans Abdul Hamid, Reshid, and Vahid-ud-din.

His relations with the present Sultan, the Prince said, were based on a community of opinion and a friendship which had lasted forty-five years. There was no quarrel between them. The one question on which they differed profoundly was that of Ferid Pasha, of whom the Prince spoke with the utmost bitterness and contempt. The Sultan's insistence on keeping Ferid Pasha in power was a fatal mistake. Ferid had admitted himself guilty in the matter of Smyrna, and yet had been recalled to power. He had made a fiasco of the delegation to Paris, and had again been placed in power. The people did not want him. What was necessary was a strong Government commanding the confidence of the people. Let the Sultan send for Tewfik Pasha, not a genius certainly, but a man of experience, intimate with British statesmen; or let him call some other person, who would appeal to the people, like Izzet Pasha, Tchouk-soulou Mahmoud Pasha, or Ahmed Riza Bey.

The people, he explained, did not want much. They wanted to see Turkey maintained, not as a fantastically extensive Empire, but Turk-peopled countries for the Turkish people; instead of which there was nothing but talk of partition, and the tragedy of Smyrna was before their eyes. A foreign estimate, he was told, had put the butcheries committed by the Greeks in a short time at 20,000. The movement in the interior, of which I had spoken, was traitorous, idiotic, monstrous; but the people wanted something better than a Ferid Pasha Government, and if they responded to the incitements of people like Mustafa Kemal and Raouf, it was because their wishes were not respected. He gave his word of honour that he had no connection with the movement or its organisers.

I said that the views expressed by the Prince about the movement in the interior were the only ones that could be held by a sane and reasonable person. His word of honour was unnecessary therefore to prove that he held them; but, if it were given, it was the word of a Prince and a gentleman. As for the position of Princes in the political life of the country, it was true that they had no direct rule, but they could exercise great moral authority. That was why Abdul Hamid had sought to exclude them altogether. He was himself distinguished among the Princes by the efforts he had made to get a grasp of affairs from every standpoint, including the European.

I could not deny, I said, the unfortunate incidents which had followed the occupation of Smyrna. The figures which he had heard were, I thought, exaggerated. The incidents were tragic enough to need no exaggeration. They had been aggravated by the counter-movement, about which I had spoken to him. Anyhow, they were now to be the subject of investigation by an inter-Allied Commission. This could not undo them, but it would place them in their true light.

The most serious question which he had raised, I said, was that of Ferid Pasha. Turkey was poor in statesmen. Tewfik was all his Imperial Highness said, and might be a possible Grand Vizier, but he had tried three times; his third attempt had been a complete failure; and he was old and worn out. All the other men he had mentioned were more or less implicated in the movement in the interior, I was assured. Ferid Pasha seemed to be making a serious endeavour to get the situation in hand, and the confidence of the Sultan must count for a great deal. Everything I heard from the interior led me to believe that the real people desired only peace and quietness. There were agitators everywhere who pretended to be the voice of the people. They shouted a lot, and when Mustafa Kemal passed through any given place the real people, too, were momentarily stirred, because they were accustomed to see authority go hand-in-hand with violence. When Mustafa Kemal had gone by the agitators continued their work, but the real people subsided into passivity.

The Prince said he really knew nothing of what was going on in the interior. He

had no sources of information. He saw little of any but a few intimates of his; not politicians. He was out of touch with the Government, because of Ferid Pasha's attitude towards him, which was incorrect and unmannerly. They had once been friends, and a cause of difference had arisen. It need not have prevented correct relations when Ferid came into power, but Ferid's conduct had been such that at last he himself had said he would not now respond to advances if they were made. These personal matters were too petty to influence his own views. He only mentioned them to explain how little he was in touch with official sources of information. He kept clear of politics. He lived remote, and amused himself with art and literature. When he had views to express on the situation, as he sometimes had, he expressed them direct to the Sultan and to him alone. If his name was misused, it was not his doing. One of his objects in remaining at Tehehlidja, which I told him was being used to give colour to idle rumours, was to ensure his aloofness.

I remarked that the only thing which seemed to separate his Imperial Highness from the High Commission was the question of Ferid Pasha, unfortunately a very important one.

The Prince then spoke more generally. He reaffirmed his faith in the principle that Turkey's only policy was to march with England. He had held it before the war. He held it still. He had implored Sultan Reshid not to send Jemal Bey as Vali to Bagdad, and had deplored Jemal's wild ideas about Egypt. He had known Jemal as Mutessarif of Scutari; and had known him as a friend; no, not as a friend, the Prince added laboriously, as an acquaintance; in short, a man good enough for Scutari, disastrous in Mesopotamia. He (the Prince) had sought to stop the Armenian massacres. The Armenian Patriarch would confirm that, and he besought me to ask him to do so.

These were his views. March with England. Lord Palmerston's portrait hung on his wall, and had hung there throughout the war. He might one day be Sultan; not that he desired the throne, but it might happen in the course of nature. If it did, his views would be the same. He asked me to tell that to my chief, and to get him to tell the British Government. The position now was not unlike that before the war. The folly of our diplomacy had then given Turkey into the hands of Germany, despite the wave of pro-English feeling which followed the Constitution. There were now, in his view, only two Great Powers left—England and America, two peaks rising side by side. He did not know how complete our unity of view might now be, but we should have our disagreements in future. Let us not hand Turkey over to America, but keep her a friend and useful neighbour on the north of the stretch of country towards India held by us—Egypt and Mesopotamia.

The Prince invoked Wilson's principles emphatically in the course of the conversation, expressed no views about mandates, and only mentioned the Caliphate incidentally as an appanage of the Sultanate. I did not enter into any discussion of his views on general policy beyond suggesting that the surrender of Turkey to Germany was not so much a post-constitutional episode as the fruition of Abdul Hamid's policy. The Prince said, no, Abdul Hamid had sown a seed, but it was only a seed in a forest. I said I thought he had planted a tree in a field, and that in the fulness of time (i.e., after the Constitution) the tree had shadowed the whole field.

The Prince spoke without open bitterness of the episode of his telegram to the King. He had been disappointed at not getting a reply, as he had done from the other heads of States, but he accepted the explanation that each country had its own way of looking at things, and that for one reason or another, including constitutional reasons, the King had found it impossible to answer him.

On my departure the Prince personally conducted me to another room to show me the picture of Lord Palmerston.

The Prince makes a favourable impression; speaks with at least an air of sincerity; shows considerable intelligence and reading; expresses himself well and easily in French; is obviously highly strung, and, I should say, impressionable.

M. Ledoux told me he intended to ask for an audience for Saturday, the 9th August.

Note.

M. HOHLER regrette de n'avoir pu se rendre au désir de votre Altesse Impériale pour telles et telles raisons.

2. Votre Altesse Impériale a témoigné de son intérêt direct et personnel dans la question de Smyrne par sa dépêche aux chefs des États ententistes. Elle sait, de son côté, que les Gouvernements de ces États ont étudié la question des événements suivant l'occupation de Smyrne de la manière la plus sérieuse.

3. La décision prise dernièrement par la Conférence donne satisfaction au Gouvernement ottoman à deux points de vue. Il y aura délimitation et l'on a déclaré formellement que tout cela ne préjuge en rien la solution éventuelle des questions territoriales.

4. Cette décision prive de toute ombre de justification l'agitation menée depuis quelque temps, à l'intérieur et même à Constantinople, dans le but peu caché de préparer une résistance aux décisions définitives de la Conférence. C'est pour cette raison que les Hauts-Commissaires d'Angleterre et de France, conscients de la responsabilité toute particulière qu'ils ont pour le maintien de l'ordre, ont suivi la note collective d'une démarche verbale pour attirer l'attention du Gouvernement encore une fois sur la nécessité de réprimer l'agitation à l'intérieur.

5. Les Hauts-Commissaires estiment que la responsabilité dont je viens de parler découle des termes même de l'Armistice. Ils sont résolus à s'en acquitter par le seul moyen possible, c'est-à-dire en soutenant l'autorité légitime du souverain et de son Gouvernement.

6. Les Hauts-Commissaires sont confiants que votre Altesse Impériale partage leurs idées et qu'elle se rend compte de l'effet dangereux qui produirait sur les destinées de ce pays tout mouvement qui serait contraire à l'ordre ou qui mettrait en danger la vie des habitants. Ce serait compléter la ruine d'un Empire déjà ébranlé jusqu'à ses fondements par la folie des Gouvernements d'il y a cinq ou quatre ans.

7. Malheureusement des gens malveillants abusent du nom auguste de votre Altesse Impériale pour attirer vers ce mouvement les âmes simples. Les Hauts-Commissaires savent combien ces calomnies sont injurieuses pour votre Altesse Impériale, qui ne saurait vouloir s'opposer à l'autorité du Gouvernement légitime ni s'associer à des menées tellement contraires aux intérêts de l'Empire et de chaque membre de la famille Impériale.

8. Le peuple ignorant est d'autant plus facilement trompé par ces calomnies que la résidence de votre Altesse Impériale à une certaine distance de la capitale donne lieu à toutes sortes de bruits relatifs à ses mouvements actuels et futurs.

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No. 87.

Colonel French to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 23.)

*General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
August 11, 1919.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith for your information copy of a letter from the Commander-in-chief, Egyptian Expeditionary Force, to the Secretary, War Office, London, in regard to Mr. Justice Brandeis and Zionism.

I have, &c.

(For Acting Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force—
E. WALEY, Major, G.S.)

Enclosure in No. 87.

General Sir H. Allenby to Mr. Churchill.

Sir,

General Headquarters, August 6, 1919.

MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS, who sailed for Europe on the 26th July, will no doubt discuss at some length with you the impressions he has gained and the conclusions he has come to as the result of his visit to Palestine.

On his arrival in Egypt I pointed out to the Judge, in a lengthy interview between us, the peculiar local difficulties besetting the Zionist programme in Palestine, the opposition to it on the part of the non-Jewish elements of the population—which at present constitute a large majority—and the fact that my administration, being a purely military one, can only act in strict adherence to the laws and usages of war. I laid stress on the fact that scrupulous fairness characterised the dealings of my administration with all classes and creeds, and I pointed out that His Majesty's Government's policy, contained in the Balfour declaration, though fully appreciated by myself and my subordinates, did not entitle me as a military administrator to grant to the Zionists privileges and opportunities denied to other members of occupied enemy territory. Mr. Justice Brandeis, who appears to me to consider the future of Zionism in a statesmanlike and broad-minded manner, at first gained the impression, I believe, that I was unduly apprehensive, and consequently rigorous in my control of the actions of the Zionist Commission. On his return from his tour, however, he admitted that my review of the position was in no wise exaggerated, and that he found the difficulties more numerous and serious than he had anticipated. At the same time his visits, which included twenty-two colonies and all the towns where important Jewish influence exists, confirmed and strengthened his opinion as to the wisdom and practicability of the establishment of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine. He agrees with me that the only policy to be followed at present is one of great patience and moderation, and that every care should be taken to avoid exciting, by threats of expropriation and subjection to Jewish dominion, the enmity and fear of the non-Jewish elements.

It is a matter for regret that the same sane spirit and sound vision does not characterise the leading articles of Zionist publications in Europe, most of which find their way into the chief centres of Palestine and are the primary cause of the bitter antagonism at present shown to the Zionist programme.

Mr. Justice Brandeis was accompanied by the Zionist Commission during his tour, but Major Waley also travelled with him and ensured his coming into close contact with such sections of his community as cause a bad impression and represent the unsatisfactory aspect of Zionism. His demeanour towards local leaders was exceptionally dignified, and on several occasions he administered rebuke to those who had caused trouble by immoderate conduct and self-advertisement, thus giving proof to Palestinian Jewry that the real leaders of the movement appreciate the pettiness and undesirability of local disputes and intrigues. The Zionist Commission, on the other hand, has not always been firm enough with the unruly spirits of the community, and has made promises of concessions impossible to be carried out. This has resulted in a loss of authority and prestige.

During his tour various grievances against my administration were laid before Mr. Justice Brandeis. It was alleged that there had been unfair restrictions on Jewish development, amounting to contravention of His Majesty's Government's policy, and that this was due to anti-Semitic prejudice on the part of Government officials.

I have enquired fully into the alleged anti-Semitic attitude of the administration, and am satisfied that any such complaints are without foundation. I understand that Mr. Justice Brandeis on the conclusion of his visit held the same opinion. There have certainly been some misunderstandings between the administrators and the Jewish leaders, and it has been and will continue to be necessary for questions of public security or military exigency to take precedence, a necessity which the Zionists are naturally sometimes unable to appreciate. The chief administrator has, however, invariably been ready to receive the representatives of the Zionist Commission at any time, and if those grievances had always been brought before him they would have been carefully considered. The Zionist Commission has, however, not always adopted this policy, and has referred complaints direct to its organisation in Europe. Such procedure makes difficult the relations between the Chief Administrator and the Zionist Commission.

Mr. Justice Brandeis fully appreciated this and has explained to the present leaders of the Commission his views as to the correct method of procedure.

On his departure the Judge expressed his gratitude for his sympathetic reception by the authorities and for all the facilities afforded him during his stay.

I have, &c.

E. H. H. ALLENBY, General Commanding-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

Colonel Wilson to Major Young.—(Received August 26.)

My dear Young, *The Rest, Ellington Road, Taplow, Bucks, August 23, 1919.*

I SEND you herewith some notes on the ownership of Khurma which I wrote on my way home.

I would be very much obliged if you would kindly bring them to the notice of the authorities concerned. I regard this question of Khurma as being of very special importance, and it merits the serious consideration of His Majesty's Government at an early date.

Sincerely yours,
C. E. WILSON.

Enclosure in No. 88.

Some Notes on the Ownership of Khurma.

1. THE Emir Ibn Saud claims that Khurma is within the boundaries of his Emirate of Nejd. As far as I am aware, practically no evidence has been produced by Ibn Saud to substantiate his claim.

2. All the evidence obtained from notables in Jeddah and in Mecca (some of them Wahabis), from tax collectors of the Turkish Government, greybeards of the Buqum and Subai tribes, and others is unanimous on the point that Khurma district for generations has been under the jurisdiction of the Emirs of Mecca, with the exception of the period during which the holy cities were occupied by the Wahabis early in the nineteenth century.

3. Assuming Ibn Saud's contention to be correct, it follows that the Emirs of Khurma are subjects of, and owe allegiance to, Ibn Saud alone, and it is relevant to consider how far the conduct of Emir Khali-ibn-Eluwai has been consistent with such alleged allegiance.

4. Late in 1916 King Hussein, hearing that Khalid was getting too enthusiastic about the recently formed Akhwan, sent him orders to come to Mecca; he came, and was kept under "open arrest" as he refused to return to the orthodox fold.

At the request of Emir Abdulla he was allowed to go to the former's camp at Wadi Ais, where I met him in April 1917.

Emir Abdulla states that he had long talks with Khalid about the Akhwan sect, and towards the end of 1917—being satisfied with the latter's professions of loyalty—obtained the reluctant consent of King Hussein to the return of Khalid to resume his duties as Emir of Khurma.

5. With reference to the Cadis of Khurma, I offer the following remarks:—

After the suppression of the Wahabi revolt early in the nineteenth century, a proportion of the inhabitants of several villages, amongst them Khurma, clung to the new faith (Wahabism).

The Wahabi belong to the Hambali division of the Moslem religion, and owing to the number of Wahabis in Khurma the Emirs of Mecca usually appointed a Hambali as the official cadi.

Emir Abdulla informs me that the present cadi is from Wadi Dawasir, and was appointed in the ordinary course by the Emir of Mecca (King Hussein), who paid his salary and those of his assistants. It is not impossible that the cadi also received some salary from Ibn Saud.

In 1917 it was reported to King Hussein that the cadi was preaching the Wahabi creed, &c. He was ordered to Mecca, where he was given a serious lecture by King Hussein, and returned to his post at Khurma. As he still continued preaching the Wahabi faith, he was sent for to Mecca a second time, and appears to have satisfied King Hussein with his protestations of loyalty, &c.

However, on returning to Khurma the second time, the cadi threw off all pretence by openly joining the Akhwan, and his religious enthusiasm gained many adherents. An order for him to come to Mecca was treated with contempt. King Hussein thereupon selected another cadi and sent him to Khurma to take over charge from the original cadi, who was officially discharged.

6. The Emir Khalid arrived at Khurma from the Emir Abdulla's camp about the

time the Cadi of Khurma had refused to obey the third summons to Mecca, thereby openly defying King Hussein's authority.

7. On the arrival at Khurma of the newly-appointed cadi, Khalid refused to allow him to take up his duties or to recognise his appointment, and openly raised the standard of revolt against King Hussein.

8. It is a fact that Khalid obeyed the King's summons to Mecca and spent the best part of a year (1917) at least in that town and Emir Abdulla's camp. Also in October 1916, Khalid, as Emir of Khurma, attended King Hussein's "coronation" and swore allegiance; it was during this visit that King Hussein ascertained that Khalid had joined the Akhwan.

9. If Khalid was an Emir under Ibn Saud and ruling a part of the latter's territory, would Ibn Saud have quietly acquiesced in an important official of his being kept a virtual prisoner for about a year?

If the cadi was an official of Ibn Saud's and appointed by him, would he have kept quiet knowing that King Hussein had sent for the cadi and severely lectured him?

Ibn Saud has lost no opportunity of making complaints to His Majesty's Government about alleged hostile actions of King Hussein, and if either of the above men was really an official of Ibn Saud's, I find considerable difficulty in believing that he would allow such flagrant encroachments on his sovereignty to pass unnoticed and in silence.

I understand that Mr. Philby largely bases his assertion that Khalid is one of Ibn Saud's governors on the statement that Khalid was in receipt of some salary from Ibn Saud before his revolt. This is by no means unlikely; indeed, it is probable that when Khalid joined the Akhwan, Ibn Saud paid him some sort of stipend for propaganda and political purposes, a financial investment which has proved highly profitable.

10. Soon after Khalid raised the standard of revolt, Mr. Philby passed through Khurma (December 1917), and it is interesting to note how the situation was reported to him on the spot. In the account of his journey from Riyadh to Taif (Arab bulletin No. 81, page 74, dated 9th March, 1919), Mr. Philby writes as follows:—

"Khurma is inhabited mainly by Subai tribesmen, who at the moment of our arrival were all out in the desert, leaving the village to their slaves and women, and to the Jew merchants, mainly representing Washm, who reside here in connection with the trade with the interior.

"The cause of the exodus of the tribesmen with the local Emir—a shereef—appeared to be that the latter had incurred the displeasure of the Shereef of Mecca by embracing the Wahabi faith, or perhaps had embraced the Wahabi faith because he had incurred the shereef's displeasure, and that the Shereef of Mecca has commissioned the Emir of Turaba and the Buqum tribe to attack the rebels of Khurma as occasion offered.

"The place was therefore virtually in a state of siege in the sense that no exit was allowed to its people in the direction of the Hedjaz, while the warriors of the Subai and Buqum were trying to out-manoeuvre each other in the vast plains between Qunsalya and the Hadhu hills."

It will be noted that Mr. Philby writes of the "rebels of Khurma." Thus Khalid and those inhabitants of Khurma who revolted with him were described to Mr. Philby as being rebels against King Hussein.

Mr. Philby had been living in Riyadh for some time. His escort was composed of Nejdīs supplied by Ibn Saud, and it is probable, though I have no information on the point, that Ibn Saud sent a responsible sheikh or a member of his entourage with him.

When passing through Khurma district Mr. Philby records the fact, on information given to him at the time, that the Emir and some of the inhabitants of Khurma are in open rebellion against King Hussein.

It will be agreed that Khurma cannot correctly be described as being in a state of revolt against King Hussein if it forms an integral part of Ibn Saud's dominions.

Surely if Khurma belonged to Nejd some one member of the escort or some local sheikh or Arab would have informed Mr. Philby of the fact.

11. As I have frequently pointed out, the Khurma episode has its origin in Khalid joining the Akhwan movement and eventually openly revolting.

King Hussein was fully occupied at the time with the war against the Turks and, miscalculating the strength of the revolt, twice sent a hopelessly inadequate force to put it down. Both were defeated, and, owing to our insistence, King Hussein remained on the defensive, and no further attacks were made by him.

12. Ibn Saud, seeing that Khalid had firmly established himself (and undoubtedly the two had corresponded and arrived at an understanding), laid claim to Khurma; he

now lays claim to Turaba, and should the Emir and a sufficient number of the inhabitants of Taif join the Akhwan movement, a serious claim to that town would not be unexpected.

One of the big Sudai Sheikhs (Mishari-ibn-Nasir) came to Jeddah last month with Emir Abdulla. He states that his tribe has always belonged to the Hedjaz, and been under the Emirs of Mecca; he himself has left the country because of his aversion to the Akhwan sect, and his tribesmen have become Akhwan by force of circumstances; an Arab strongly objects to leaving his own country, and as remaining entails sudden death or an outward profession of the Akhwan faith, it is not surprising that the latter is the course usually taken.

13. I feel it my duty to again emphasise the fact that it is impossible for King Hussein to accept arbitration on the question of the ownership of Khurma. If he did his prestige would suffer a very severe blow, while Ibn Saud's would be correspondingly increased.

Should His Majesty's Government insist on the ownership of Khurma being made a subject for arbitration I have little doubt (Emir Abdulla and others have none) that King Hussein would abdicate, a course which would almost certainly be followed by general anarchy in the Hedjaz; Emir Abdulla, the Grand Cadi of Mecca, and all other notables I have consulted are convinced on this point.

I maintain that it is common knowledge in Central Arabia that Khurma belongs to the Hedjaz, and if its ownership is arbitrated upon by His Majesty's Government Akhwan shares would certainly boom.

14. King Hussein has times innumerable warned us of the dangers of the Akhwan movement; both the Idrissi and Ibn Rashid are beginning to realise and fear them, and both appear willing to co-operate with King Hussein in preventing further infiltration of Akhwan propaganda into their countries. Indications of a growing nervousness in Koweit and Iraq are also not wanting (see recent reports circulated by Bagdad).

15. In our own interests the only course open to His Majesty's Government is to adhere strictly to their frequently-expressed decision that they regard Khurma as being within the dominion of King Hussein; any other course is fraught with grave danger to British interests.

16. With regard to the fixing of the Hedjaz-Nejd boundary, it will, in my opinion, be many years before any Boundary Commission could work on the ground, and at any time the erection of boundary marks would be a useless expenditure.

A meeting between duly authorised representatives of each side should be arranged to be held at Cairo, Koweit, or some suitable place; an impartial British official with a good knowledge of Arabic, e.g., Commander Hogarth, C.M.G., would be appointed arbitrator by His Majesty's Government with or without assistants and decide on the future boundary.

If Ibn Saud and the Emir Abdulla were the representatives at such a meeting I am inclined to think there would be a good chance of an amicable agreement being arrived at.

17. The decision as to the line of action to be taken by His Majesty's Government should not be delayed.

C. E. WILSON, Colonel.

August 8, 1919.

No. 89.

Earl Curzon to Rear-Admiral Webb.

(N. 1416.)

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR despatch No. 1417 of August 9th.

I approve Mr. Ryan's language.

You should discourage project of sending Unionist undesirables to Italy.

Foreign Office, August 27, 1919.

[121950]

No. 90.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 28.)

(No. 1457.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 17, 1919.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 1327 of the 9th August, and to my telegram No. 1669 of the 17th August, I have the honour to state that I have already on many occasions impressed upon the Turkish Government its responsibility for taking all possible measures to prevent massacres of Christians; I have pointed out that such occurrences can only result in opinion in Europe becoming more averse to Turkey. The Grand Vizier and the Cabinet realise this, and also the fact that disorders or massacres are most prejudicial to Turkish interests and aspirations. I am continuing to make strong representations in this sense.

2. The difficulty is not due to failure on the part of the Turkish Government to realise the seriousness of such occurrences, but rather to its lack of authority, and to its powerlessness to enforce its will in many of the districts of Anatolia.

3. In this particular case (the reported killing of Christians at Oushak), the Turkish Government asked permission to send the 23rd Division, some 1500 strong, from Afion Karahissar to restore and maintain order. This could not be agreed to, as General Milne was of opinion (in which I fully concur) that there was a danger of these troops making common cause with the irregulars who are opposing the Greek Army of Occupation. The Government has, however, no means of taking effective action to put down disorder except the army, and the feeling aroused in the army by the events following the Greek occupation of Smyrna is so bitter that it is most inadvisable to allow part of it to be employed near the area of occupation in order to put down Turkish risings directed against that occupation.

4. I am convinced that the present unsatisfactory situation in Anatolia (which tends to grow worse as time goes on) is the direct result of the presence of Greek troops in the Aidin vilayet, and the regrettable excesses of which, there is unfortunately no doubt, they have on several occasions been guilty.

5. It is hoped that the delimitation of the respective spheres of military occupation will bring about a more peaceful situation locally though, even at the best, I anticipate the continuance of guerilla fighting by bands of irreconcilables.

6. I would, however, urge that more than local conditions in and around the Aidin vilayet are affected by the continuance of the Greek and, in a lesser degree, the Italian occupations. Their effect has been to compromise the position of the Allies, seriously to weaken the authority of the Turkish Government, to increase racial animosity and lawlessness in other districts than Aidin, and to give into the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress and National Defence leaders a weapon of which they are making full use to work up Turkish opinion against the Allies.

7. The fact must not be lost sight of that every Turk, of no matter what party or political sympathies, is sincere in looking upon the Greek and Italian occupation as a violation of right and justice.

8. I consider that the difficult situation with which the Allies are now faced in Turkey would greatly improve if an agreement were come to by which both Greek and Italian troops were entirely withdrawn from Asia Minor. This withdrawal would, moreover, strengthen the prestige and authority of the Government and correspondingly weaken the National Defence Party by depriving it of its main *raison d'être*, and would thus largely assist to put an end to the present state of affairs which is the direct outcome of the landing of these troops.

9. The presence of a number of Allied officers in the districts evacuated by the Italian and Greek troops would, I consider, ensure that reprisals were not carried out, and the Turkish Government, in its measures to maintain order, would have the support of all elements except the professional brigands and the Committee of Union and Progress leaders.

10. The present situation is that neither the Allies nor the Turkish Government are in a position to suppress sedition or disorder in the provinces. Unless we are prepared to undertake a military occupation, it is essential that the authority of the Government in the provinces be restored, and I can think of no measure by which the support of the moderate Turkish elements can be won back as long as the presence of the Greek and Italian troops remains a cause of irritation and unrest.

11. I am, of course, aware that the putting into effect of this proposal would mean the reversal of a decision already agreed upon by the Supreme Council, and that there

[1356]

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are other considerations involved, such as the *amour-propre* of the Greeks and Italians, and the effect which would be produced upon public opinion in these countries by the withdrawal of their troops. Regarding the importance to be attached to these considerations, I can express no opinion. It is because I feel strongly that the only effective way to remove the most serious of the difficulties with which the Allies are confronted in Turkey is by carrying out the measure proposed, that I now put it forward for your Lordship's consideration.

12. The withdrawal of these troops would not, in my opinion, be taken by the Turks as a sign of weakness on the part of the Allies, but as evidence that they—the Allies—were able to control such smaller nations as are pursuing a policy of aggression and annexation, and as an indication that the final terms of peace, however severe would not entail the partition among various claimants of the predominantly Turkish parts of the Empire. The Committee of Union and Progress would doubtless endeavour to make capital out of this withdrawal, but their influence and power to cause trouble would be greatly reduced from the fact that the danger of Greek aggression in Asia Minor no longer threatened.

13. In submitting this proposal for your Lordship's consideration, I venture to express my opinion that, apart from the beneficial effect it would have on the situation now and during the remainder of the Armistice period, the withdrawal of Greek and Italian zones of occupation would greatly increase the possibilities of peaceful conditions being maintained in this country after the signature of peace, when presumably a large part of the forces of the other Allied nations will be withdrawn from Turkey. The permanent establishment of a Greek military occupation in Anatolia would only provoke disorder and unrest, bring about the komitadji hostilities between the two races which prevailed for so long in Macedonia, and be a constant danger to the maintenance of peace between Greece and Turkey.

14. I am keeping in close touch with my French colleague on this subject, and he has expressed his concurrence.

15. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have, &c.,

RICHARD WEBB.

(Acting High Commissioner.)

[122311]

No. 91.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay.

(No. 497.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 29, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 459 of the 11th instant, I have to inform you that the American Ambassador called on Sir R. Graham on the afternoon of the 26th instant to speak about the evacuation of the Caucasus. Mr. Davis said that he had received an answer from the United States Government to the enquiry which he had addressed to them after his conversation with me on the 18th instant, which was embodied in my despatch to you No. 447 of that date and the letter which I had sent to him on the following day, a copy of which is enclosed herewith.

This reply was, that the United States Government had no funds at their disposal from which provision could be made to defray the expenses of the continued presence of British troops in the Caucasus. To obtain such funds they would have to ask Congress for an appropriation for this purpose. In view of the present political situation in America such action would be most inopportune and injudicious and might prejudice the prospects of the Peace Treaty being accepted. Nor could the American Government give any assurance whether, or at what date, they might be able to send American troops to relieve the British forces. Such an assurance would be regarded by the Senate as prejudging their ultimate decision on the question of Mandates, and would be deeply resented. Mr. Davis was, however, instructed by the United States Government to make an official appeal to His Majesty's Government not to withdraw the British forces in the Caucasus at the present moment, as such a withdrawal must result in chaos, and in the massacre of the Christian population, and although the United States Government fully realised the difficulties of His Majesty's Government in the matter, the latter would be held responsible in the eyes of the civilised world.

Sir R. Graham said that this reply meant, in effect, that the United States intended to do nothing, but required His Majesty's Government to continue to bear the

whole burden in spite of the warning which had been given seven months ago that they would not be in a position to do so. I had, in my conversations and correspondence with his Excellency, explained the whole situation, and especially the position of His Majesty's Government, so fully to him that there was no necessity to recapitulate what had passed. No Government were more anxious, or indeed so anxious, to avoid the state of affairs which was foreshadowed as the result of British evacuation, and His Majesty's Government would no doubt do everything that was possible to prevent such a catastrophe arising, but their powers in this respect were strictly limited, and they were placed in a most unfair and unevidable position.

Mr. Davis replied that he realised this perfectly well and could only express his sympathy.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 91.

Earl Curzon to the American Ambassador.

My dear Ambassador,

Foreign Office, August 19, 1919.

YOU may remember that, in our conversation yesterday afternoon about the Armenian question and the Caucasus, I expressed some surprise that, if American opinion was as deeply stirred as I was led to believe on the subject, no official representations had reached me from the American Government, and I was left to gather American sentiment from the reports and appeals and protests of private individuals. I further said that, anxious as we were to do everything in our power to satisfy American opinion and to protect the Armenians, it was difficult to modify our announced and already inaugurated policy of evacuation, unless we knew for certain for how long a period we were requested or expected to remain, and what part the American Government were prepared to play at its close.

Later in the evening Mr. Bonar Law, speaking on the same subject in the House of Commons, used the following words:—

"I can assure my noble friend that, if any sign of help were coming from America, as he suggests, we would only too gladly welcome it. Indeed, I think I might say more, with the consent of my right honourable friend. It is, if I may be permitted to say so, an American problem rather than a British. They are in a better position to deal with it. They have interests as great as ours—I think, greater. I can assure the House that if the President of the United States were officially to say to the British Government, 'We wish you to hold the fort for a little until we can make arrangements,' we would certainly do our best to meet him."

Mr. Bonar Law meant to add, what I may here be permitted to add on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that, in the event of the American Government addressing us in the sense indicated, it would seem only reasonable that the financial burden of retaining our forces in the Caucasus beyond the period already fixed by us should not be borne by Great Britain, but should be assumed by the State which expects to be, or is likely to become, the mandatory for the Armenian people. Our own financial responsibilities in those regions have already been so overwhelming that we should not feel justified in continuing them for a further period.

May I suggest to your Excellency that you should telegraph in this sense to your Government, since the matter is one that calls for very early decision?

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[122650]

No. 92.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received August 30.)

(No. 1745. Urgent.) R.
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 29, 1919.

GRAND VIZIER has addressed to my colleagues and myself note enclosing telegram which he wishes us to send to President of Peace Conference pointing out that delay in making peace is stopping working of the whole machinery of Govern-

ment finances, justice, public safety owing to impossibility of reorganising gendarmerie, commercial industries are all suffering alike from prolonged uncertainty. Crowds of people of Moslems and Christians have been driven from their homes and are equally without resources, and winter is fast approaching. His Highness begs, therefore, that peace may be re-established at earliest possible moment.

After consultation with my colleagues it was decided that French High Commissioner should forward telegram to President of Conference, whilst Italian High Commissioner and myself should inform our Governments, recommending request to their most earnest attention.

The full text of message has been sent to Foreign Office and Paris in my despatch No. 1525 of 25th August.

(Repeated to Peace Conference, No. 179.)

[117353]

No. 93.

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, September 1, 1919.

I HAVE now received the necessary report to enable me to reply to the note which your Excellency was so good as to address to me under date of the 27th May on the subject of the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway.

I would point out in the first place that any claim preferred by the French Company in respect of the period prior to British occupation must be a claim against the Turkish Government and not against His Majesty's Government. From this point of view I presume that the company's claim will be dealt with by the appropriate financial commission which, I understand, it is proposed to establish, so soon as the treaty with Turkey is signed, to deal with these matters.

As regards the period of British occupation, the French company's case would seem to rest on the assumption that the railway has deteriorated during that period. In point of fact, the effect of British occupation has been the exact contrary, very extensive restorations having been carried out by the British military authorities. This is evidenced by the report which I have the honour to append.

Even had the company been in a position to prove that the line had deteriorated under British occupation, their remedy would, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government and in conformity with Article 53 of the annex to The Hague Convention of 1907 on the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, have lain against the future Government of Palestine, which might clearly have been required to restore the line to the position in which it was when the British military authorities took it over.

I trust therefore that in the light of the facts set out above, your Excellency will recognise that His Majesty's Government can admit no claim whatever against themselves in this connection, whether based on the above-mentioned Article of The Hague Convention or not.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 93.

Report on Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway.

Pre-War Position.—The line was 1'00 metre gauge. Workshops were situated at Jaffa, the port by which fuel, rolling-stock, &c., was imported.

The main stations were—

	Kilom.
Jaffa	0'00
Ludd	19'00
Jerusalem	86'6

In addition there were four smaller stations.

In July 1907, the French company possessed—

- 6 locomotives,
- 15 passenger carriages,
- 45 goods wagons.

The annual goods traffic was 43,000 tons.

During the war the sequence of events on this railway was as follows:—

Jaffa-Ludd Section.—This was removed bodily by the Turks and relaid elsewhere. The rolling-stock was also removed. During the subsequent British occupation of this territory a 60 cm. line was constructed from Jaffa to Ludd along the same alignment that the old French line had followed. This 60 cm. line is still in existence as a military line (August 1919).

Ludd-Jerusalem Section.—The Turks altered the gauge of the original line (1'00 metre or 3 ft. 3'37 ins.) to 1'05 metres (3 ft. 5'34 ins.), so as to give Jerusalem direct access to the north (Haifa and Damascus) without change of gauge, by means of the military railway which they had built through Tul Keram and Ludd to Beersheba.

On their retreat the Turks seriously damaged this 1'05 metre gauge line and rolling-stock.

On occupation by British troops the Ludd-Jerusalem section was at first repaired and used as 1'05 metre gauge. 3 ft. 6 ins. gauge rolling-stock was provided from the Soudan railways; this would just run on this gauge. Later the Ludd-Jerusalem line was converted to 4 ft. 8½ ins. gauge so as to give through communication from Egypt without change of gauge. This entailed considerable work, including the widening of rock cuttings. The line still exists in 4 ft. 8½ ins. gauge (August 1919).

Summary of Damage done by Turks during the War.

The Jaffa-Ludd-Jerusalem railway was originally 1'00 metre gauge.

On occupation by British troops after the Turkish retreat the Jaffa-Ludd portion no longer existed in any form. The Ludd-Jerusalem track was found to have been converted to 1'05 metre gauge; the track and rolling-stock of this gauge and the original stations were all badly damaged and the original 1'00 metre gauge rolling-stock could not be traced.

August 15, 1919.

[124460]

No. 94.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 1525.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 25, 1919.

THE Grand Vizier has several times lately spoken with great bitterness and, I am bound to admit, with equal truth of the impossible situation to which the country had been brought by the prolonged duration of the armistice, pointing out that every department of the administration was equally fettered and rendered incapable of action.

2. He has been quite willing to admit that all naval and military activities were rightly and properly checked and suppressed, but he complained of the paralysis endured in the Ministries of the Interior and Finance in particular, and also in the organisation of the gendarmerie.

3. I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a note which I have just received from his Highness enclosing copy of a telegram which he desires may be sent to the President of the Peace Conference.

4. I shall at once consult my colleagues on the matter, but am forwarding the note to your Lordship before doing so, so as not to lose the advantage of sending it by the King's messenger who starts almost at once.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Mr. Balfour in Paris.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 94.

Grand Vizier to Vice-Admiral Calthorpe.

Excellence,

Constantinople, le 24 août 1919.

L'HISTOIRE enregistre rarement une période aussi prolongée entre la suspension des hostilités et le retour définitif à la paix, état normal des sociétés humaines.

Les événements tragiques de Smyrne troublèrent toute l'Asie Mineure, bouleversée déjà par une guerre néfaste. Partout dans l'Empire, le peuple musulman et non musulman, délogé de ses foyers, suivit en masse un mouvement d'émigration et de migration sans pouvoir se fixer nulle part sur les terres dévastées. L'approche de l'hiver augmente actuellement les soucis de leur triste existence. Jamais le genre humain, même dans l'antiquité chaldéenne, n'a enduré une souffrance aussi poignante.

Le Gouvernement Impérial n'attache pas plus d'importance qu'il n'en convient aux troubles signalés en Asie Mineure. Ils sont provoqués par quelques jeunes exaltés, ambitieux ou mécontents, qui trouvent un terrain facile à exploiter dans le sentiment national exaspéré par la question de Smyrne. Ce n'est aujourd'hui qu'un mouvement superficiel et restreint, mais qui, à la longue, pourrait n'être pas sans danger. Le Gouvernement Impérial déploie, pour le réprimer, la même énergie dont il fit preuve dès le commencement de la crise, mais, sûrement, il convient d'en supprimer la cause pour en prévenir les effets. En butte à des difficultés continuelles, inhérentes à l'état actuel du pays, préoccupé à déjouer d'incessantes intrigues, le Gouvernement Impérial perd un temps considérable à remédier à cette situation, alors qu'il aurait pu le consacrer entièrement aux intérêts généraux de l'État et à la prospérité de ses nationaux. Aucune organisation, aucune réforme administrative, judiciaire, financière, aucun progrès moral, aucune amélioration du sort du peuple n'est possible tant que dure cette incertitude. Ce n'est ni la guerre, ni la paix; et, cependant, tous les malheurs de l'une continuent à sévir dans le pays, sans que celui-ci puisse profiter des bienfaits de l'autre.

Aux considérations ci-dessus exposées, il y a lieu d'ajouter les difficultés de toute nature qui entravent l'action gouvernementale, et les mouvements d'indiscipline, qui n'ont pu se dessiner que parce que les conditions de l'armistice ont considérablement réduit les moyens militaires dont les autorités Impériales peuvent disposer. D'autre part, la situation actuelle du pays prive, comme de juste, le Gouvernement Impérial des ressources normales du budget qui n'est point en mesure de subvenir efficacement aux dépenses qu'entraîne la réorganisation de la gendarmerie et de la police, nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre public.

Par toutes ces raisons, je viens prier votre Excellence de bien vouloir faire connaître à la Conférence de Paris la vraie situation en Orient et faire auprès d'elle le plus pressant appel afin que les Délégués ottomans soient autorisés à se rendre à Paris aussi promptement que possible.

À cet effet, j'ai l'honneur de transmettre ci-après à votre Excellence une dépêche adressée à son Excellence M. le Président du Conseil suprême de la Paix, avec prière de vouloir bien la faire parvenir à sa haute destination.

Veillez agréer, &c.

ADMAD FÉRID.

Enclosure 2 in No. 94.

Grand Vizier to M. Clemenceau.

Constantinople, le 24 août 1919.

L'ARMISTICE dure depuis dix mois. Le retard apporté à la signature de la paix pendant si longtemps arrête le fonctionnement régulier de tout le rouage de l'État. Le Gouvernement, privé des ressources normales de son budget, éprouve des difficultés pour faire face aux dépenses qu'entraîne la réorganisation de la police et de la gendarmerie, d'ailleurs limitées par l'armistice bien au-dessous des chiffres nécessaires.

Les finances, la justice, enfin toutes les branches de l'administration, ainsi que l'industrie et le commerce souffrent de cette incertitude prolongée, et les efforts inlassables du Gouvernement tendant à une réforme générale restent stériles. Il s'ensuit un malaise général et une complication dans les affaires de l'État, dont les effets se manifestent à Smyrne et dans d'autres provinces de l'Empire.

Une foule de peuple musulman et non musulman, délogés de leurs foyers, pendant le cataclysme des cinq dernières années suit un mouvement d'émigration et de migration sans pouvoir se fixer sur leurs terres dévastées. L'approche de l'hiver augmente les soucis de leur triste existence. Exaspérée de leur misère, ils peuvent devenir un élément de danger pour l'ordre et la sécurité en Orient.

Comme votre Excellence avait reconnu elle-même par sa note du 27 juin l'inconvénient qu'il y aurait à remettre les négociations à une époque ultérieure, je viens la

prier de bien vouloir autoriser de nouveau la Délégation ottomane à se rendre à Paris dans le délai le plus rapproché pour le rétablissement définitif de la paix, état normal des nations.

DAMAD FÉRID.

[127181]

No. 95.

Note communicated by French Embassy, September 10, 1919.

A DIVERSES reprises et en dernier lieu le 14 janvier 1918, les phares situés dans la mer Rouge et appartenant à la Société des Phares de l'Empire ottoman ont fait l'objet d'un échange de correspondance entre le Foreign Office et l'Ambassade de France à Londres.

Des renseignements parvenus récemment à Paris, il résulte que les autorités britanniques ont engagé des pourparlers en vue de l'allumage du phare de Moka (mer Rouge) avec un nommé Coccaldi, agent dans cette ville de la Société des Phares.

Or, c'est cette dernière compagnie qui, seule, a qualité pour traiter de ces questions.

Aussi le Gouvernement français a-t-il donné pour instructions au chargé d'affaires de France d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à ce que le phare de Moka, ainsi que les trois autres phares de Abou-Ail, de Zebayer et de Djébel Taïr, situés également dans la mer Rouge, soient remis, le plus tôt possible, à l'administration de la Société des Phares de l'Empire ottoman, conformément aux accords antérieurs.

M. de Fleuriau saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 9 septembre 1919.

[127757]

No. 96.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 11.)

(No. 1535.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, August 27, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1668 of the 17th August, relative to the resignations of Nazim Pasha, Minister of War, and Tewfik Pasha, Minister without portfolio, from the Turkish Cabinet, it may be of interest to summarise the development of the internal political situation in Constantinople since the reconstruction of the Cabinet after Ferid Pasha's return from Paris.

2. During the first fortnight of its existence Ferid Pasha's new Government contrived to strengthen its position, at least in appearance. The Cabinet responded to the clamour for elections by definitely deciding, about the 27th July, to hold them, but without altering the old electoral law in any way. This meant that Parliament could not be convened under three or four months, which, for any Turkish Government of to-day, is as good as the Greek Kalends. On this question the Grand Vizier deferred to the majority of his colleagues, hoping in his heart that, if nothing else happened to stop the elections, the *Entente* authorities would forbid them in the interests of public order. Desultory preparations for the elections are now supposed to be in progress, but the question has ceased to attract much general interest since it ceased to be a stick with which to beat the Government.

3. The Cabinet had more difficulty in agreeing on their attitude towards the leaders of the "National Defence" movement in the interior. Izzet Pasha resigned his position as Minister without portfolio rather than agree to drastic action. The struggle ended in the issue of orders about the 30th July for the arrest of four of the active leaders in the movement, viz.: Mustafa Kamal Pasha and Reouf Bey, who are working the Erzeroum district, and two less notorious individuals who are playing a leading rôle in Southern Anatolia. The Government had, of course, no means of executing these warrants, but the show of strength in issuing them produced some effect, which was increased by the publication of eloquent circulars, and by a redistribution of posts in the Ministry of War on lines rather unfavourable to Chauvinists. I enclose a French translation of one of the principal circulars issued by the Minister of the Interior.

4. As your Lordship will see from this circular, the collective note of the High

[1356]

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Commissioners on the 3rd August, announcing the decision to delimit the sphere of Greek military occupation in Southern Asia Minor, contributed to produce a temporary improvement in the *façade* of the Government. Unfortunately, however, no real goods have so far been delivered inside the shop. The Chauvinist movement in the interior has indeed not swept the country, but its organisers can be relied on to work steadily to increase its range. The political agitators and the brigands of every hue, from misguided patriots to simple robbers, who now infest the country, show the most painful indifference to the best circulars of the Minister of the Interior. The civil provincial authorities are still for the most part more amenable to local influences than to that of the Government. Even when they wish to obey the latter they are opposed by the military commandants, who stand in with the Chauvinists, and who therein reflect the policy of everyone of influence at the Ministry of War, or at any rate of everyone who held influence there until the recent change of Minister.

5. The subterranean power of the Chauvinists even in Constantinople is shown by such incidents as the escape of Halil Pasha, reported in my telegram No. 1670 of the 18th August, and the sense of instability which prevails is increased by rumours from the interior, e.g., the report that the "National Defence" forces are about to establish themselves at Eskişehir and cut communications with Eastern Asia Minor.

6. Notwithstanding all this, Ferid Pasha's Government now appears to be again gaining ground. The various "congresses" at Erzeroum and other places, which at one time looked like the prelude to an attempt to set up a separate Government in the interior, have fallen flat. The Central Government have accomplished nothing of themselves, it is true, but, as has been hinted above, the attempts at a national organisation have hitherto left the bulk of the people cold, and that is at least a negative source of strength. Unless Ferid Pasha is swept away by some sort of *coup d'Etat* in Constantinople, by some sudden new development of the movement in the interior, or by a financial crash, he may succeed after all in weathering his difficulties. The Grand Vizier displays in his own person one of the most remarkable characteristics of the Ottoman Empire as a whole, namely, a wonderful faculty of hanging on. It is noticeable that the general tendency of his internal policy at present appears to be in the direction of a mild form of Hamidian despotism. It is possible that he and his Imperial master realise dimly that this is the only system on which it is at all possible to govern Turkey at the present time.

7. Much must depend on whether the new Minister of War works loyally with the anti-Chauvinists, and helps the Grand Vizier and the Minister of the Interior to get the situation of the provinces in hand. Suleiman Shefik Pasha, the new Minister, is widely mistrusted because of his association during the war with attempts at propaganda in Afghanistan, but his advent to the Ministry was accompanied by much more drastic changes than those mentioned in paragraph 3 above, and nothing has happened so far to justify suspicion of his intentions. On the other hand the Central Government would naturally prefer to conciliate rather than to suppress the Chauvinists, with whose ideals no patriotic Turk can fail to have sympathy, however much he may differ from them as to methods. The next development in the situation may be a compromise, which would mean that if Erzeroum submitted to Constantinople, Constantinople would have moved a little closer to Erzeroum.

8. Should Ferid Pasha throw up the sponge or be driven from office, the candidates most in view for the unenviable succession are Tewfik Pasha, Izzet Pasha, Ahmed Riza Bey, and Rechid Bey.

9. Tewfik Pasha appeals to a larger number of the diverse elements in Turkish political life than any other candidate. He has the prestige of long experience. He is in reality worn out and infinitely squeezable. The latter quality recommends him to many who are in sympathy with extreme nationalist ideas, but realise that the circumstances of the time are wholly unfavourable to any open expression of those ideas. People of genuinely moderate views are impressed by the advantages of having at the head of the Government a prudent old man, who is popularly believed, moreover, to carry a good deal of weight with European statesmen, especially in England. Those who desire a British mandate attach great value to this, especially as they believe Tewfik Pasha's personal sentiments to be strongly Anglophile.

10. Izzet Pasha is the candidate of those who think that Turkey's interests would be served by a less subservient attitude towards the *Entente* Powers. He has the reputation of a soldier-diplomat. He is believed to be by personal sentiment heart and soul with the Chauvinist movement, but he appeals to many who are apprehensive of the consequences of that movement because they think that, while supporting the movement, he would direct it and hold in check its wilder exponents. Izzet Pasha

could not, any more than any Turkish Grand Vizier, hope to defy the *Entente* Powers in Constantinople, but he might for a time at any rate satisfy the hotheads in the provinces by offering passive resistance here, while tolerating the growth of the national defence organisation in the interior, with a view not to immediate action, but to eventual resistance to the practicable imposition of unfavourable peace terms.

11. Ahmed Riza Bey, and certain minor candidates like Churuksulu Mahmoud Pasha and Rechid Akif Pasha, may be regarded as variants on Izzet Pasha. Each of them is favoured for particular reasons by his supporters, but if any of them came into power it would be at the head of the Government more or less in sympathy with the national defence movement.

12. The candidature of Rechid Bey derives its principal importance from the fact that the French authorities here appear to favour it and that, according to some accounts, the French Government have actually engineered his return from Switzerland to Constantinople, with the definite object of placing him in power. I cannot believe that he would command any large body of support in this country, or that he would have any greater success than Ferid Pasha, unless, of course, his sponsors were prepared to do for him, what the *Entente* have done for no Turkish Government since the Armistice, namely, to give him positive support by holding out some definite prospect of the maintenance of the integrity of a reduced Turkish Empire, and by helping to replenish the now almost empty exchequer.

13. Turkish public opinion is much exercised over the question of future mandates. The papers are full of controversies as to what, if any, mandate would best suit the country, and what powers should be vested in the mandatory. These discussions react less than might be expected on the internal political situation for the simple reason that everyone, including myself, is baffled as to the intentions of the Conference, and nearly everyone is at sea as to the real convictions of his neighbours. The mass of the people are apathetic on all political questions. The majority of the thinking classes would prefer no mandate at all.

14. Many of those who, while thinking this, consider a mandate inevitable, and most of those who consider a mandate desirable, would like to see it conferred on Great Britain, but are discouraged by the sphinx-like attitude of His Majesty's Government and their representatives.

15. French pretensions are very much less in evidence than they were two months ago, but the possibility of an American mandate is widely canvassed. It is generally regarded with apprehension, because its advocacy is associated in the public mind with Salonica crypto-Jews and other Committee elements, and because the Americans are supposed to have no knowledge of the governance of dependencies or the conditions of the Moslem East. "Let not mine be the head on which the barber learns his trade" is, I am told, the Turkish proverb, and it admirably suits the Turkish attitude in this matter.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 96.

Extract from the "Entente" of August 10, 1919.

Circulaire télégraphique du Ministère de l'Intérieur aux Vilayets et Livas indépendants ou non indépendants.

(Traduction.)

COMME suite aux démarches diplomatiques que le Gouvernement n'a jamais cessé de faire, la Conférence avait décidé, ainsi que je vous en donnais connaissance dernièrement, l'envoi d'une commission mixte à Smyrne. Cette commission, dont la mission consiste à fixer et restreindre la zone provisoirement occupée par les Hellènes, et à faire une enquête équitable sur place au sujet des atrocités sans nombre commises par ces derniers, est arrivée à Smyrne. Le Général Milne qui la préside, ayant manifesté l'intention d'envoyer de suite le Général et les officiers qui l'accompagnent sur les lieux où leur présence est nécessaire, a exigé avec insistance que des communications soient transmises sans retard aux fonctionnaires ottomans, afin de faciliter la tâche de ces officiers; que les bandes qui se trouvent dans les localités hors de la zone d'occupation hellénique soient dispersées, et que défense soit faite aux habitants de participer à

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l'œuvre de ces bandes. Ces exigences du Général Milne démontrent l'urgente nécessité politique que constitue la dispersion des forces réunies sous la nomination de "formation nationales," dispersion que visent les instructions répétées du Gouvernement à ce sujet; les exigences du Général anglais démontrent de même quel grand préjudice occasionnerait au pays tout retard dans l'application des instructions gouvernementales. Le Gouvernement seul peut embrasser l'ensemble de notre situation intérieure et extérieure, ainsi que les exigences politiques qui en découlent et y conformer notre politique intérieure et étrangère. En dehors du Cabinet les autres fonctionnaires civils et militaires, même ceux à qui sont confiés les fonctions les plus importantes, ne sont pas au courant de ces réalités, et ne peuvent, malgré la capacité et l'intelligence dont ils peuvent être doués, saisir et estimer les nécessités de notre politique intérieure et extérieure au même degré que le Cabinet, qui détient le pouvoir, est le seul responsable des destinées de la nation et du pays, et qui aura à rendre compte de ses actions devant l'Assemblée nationale qui doit se réunir prochainement; il est par conséquent logique que les opinions contraires aux décisions du Gouvernement, même si elles sont inspirées par le zèle patriotique, ne sauraient être conformes aux exigences politiques et à l'intérêt général; les formations nationales et le "Congrès" sont là pour démontrer la justesse de la présente déclaration. Voilà pourquoi il incombe comme devoir principal à tous les fonctionnaires civils et militaires de prendre en due considération les instructions relatives à la dispersion des bandes réunies çà et là quel que soit leur but, et de poursuivre l'exécution de ces instructions avec la plus grande activité et la plus grande célérité.

Pour ce qui est de la garantie de l'existence et des droits de la population, la prise des mesures nécessaires incombe exclusivement au Gouvernement. A cet égard, le Ministère de la Guerre a transmis à qui de droit des ordres sévères. C'est pourquoi les considérations d'après lesquelles le Techkilati-Millié et les groupements formés sous d'autres noms seraient basés sur la défense du territoire ne sauraient être admises. Procédant à la prompte divulgation de la chose au moyen des journaux, de proclamations imprimées et autres textes conçus dans un langage compréhensible pour tous, il est nécessaire d'initier à la réalité des faits ceux qui n'en ont pas connaissance, de façon à faire en sorte d'assurer de toute façon que ceux parmi la population qui ne peuvent se rendre compte de la situation et des nécessités politiques ne se laissent pas prendre à ces incitations et excitations essentiellement pernicieuses au point de vue des intérêts du pays et de la nation. Il convient de faire comprendre particulièrement à ceux qui, sans intention mauvaise, et croyant que ces initiatives pernicieuses sont à l'avantage du pays, se livrent à des incitations, qu'ils seront aussi, de par leur patriotisme, mortifiés par les conséquences déplorables qui résulteront pour le pays de ces mouvements, mais qu'il ne saurait découler aucun avantage de leur contrition après que la catastrophe se sera produite. Ils doivent prendre en considération, en s'en pénétrant patriotiquement, les déclarations écrites faites par le Général Milne au nom des États de l'Entente.

S'il s'en trouvait qui, à l'encontre des indications circonstanciées susdites, persistaient dans les incitations et excitations, comme ils auront prouvé ainsi qu'ils se seront entêtés de parti pris et mus par de mauvaises intentions, dans un mouvement contraire à la loi et éminemment pernicieux pour le salut du pays, il est de toute nécessité, et quels qu'ils soient, de les arrêter aussitôt et de les envoyer sous garde à Constantinople à l'effet d'y être soumis aux prescriptions légales qui les concernent.

Le Ministère de la Guerre a fait des notifications dans ce sens aux autorités militaires.

Il est recommandé à tous les fonctionnaires civils de se concerter avec les fonctionnaires militaires pour la mise à exécution intégrale de cette communication.

[124999]

No. 97.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

(No. 5984.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 11, 1919.

RECENT developments in the situation in the Caucasus arising out of the decision to withdraw the British troops from that region lead me to think that it would be well briefly to retrace the course of events, more especially in so far as the Armenians are concerned.

I need not recall to you the circumstances in which we found ourselves forced to occupy Transcaucasia, nor remind you that our original intention was merely to expel

the Turks and the Germans, to secure control of the Caspian Sea so as to prevent an enemy invasion of Transcaucasia, and to hold the railway from Baku to Batoum. As time went on, however, it became clear that the peoples of the several small States which, though formerly subject to Russia, had asserted their independence upon the collapse of that Power, were unfit to stand alone, and would lapse into fratricidal warfare if left to their own devices. They were further threatened with the danger of extinction at the hands of General Denikin's forces to the north of the Caucasus, that officer making no pretence of friendship for the newly-found liberties of Georgia, Daghestan, and Azerbaijan. Owing to our efforts these calamities have been averted and a measure of law and order has been successfully maintained in the occupied regions.

In the early days of the British occupation our presence was regarded with various feelings by the local States and populations, being welcomed by some, but regarded with suspicion by others, notably by the Georgians and the Tartars, on account of our relations with General Denikin, whose supposed ambitions they regarded with genuine alarm. No sooner, however, had our intention to evacuate become generally known than the benefits of our occupation were swiftly and universally realised, and passionate appeals were addressed to us from every quarter to stay.

The policy of withdrawal was urged as early as March last by the Secretary of State for War, and was finally decided upon, with your approval, on the 9th April, on which date you informed me that the Supreme Council at Paris had decided that our forces were to be replaced by Italian troops.

The news of our intended evacuation, and still more the proposed substitution of Italian troops, who had no experience of and no connection with those parts of the East, created a profound and unpleasant impression in the Caucasus. They were received by General Milne, Admiral Calthorpe, Mr. Stevens (His Majesty's consul at Batoum) with unconcealed dismay. They represented that this policy would be a betrayal of the Caucasian peoples, with whose aspirations towards independence we had shown no small sympathy; that the new States, if left unprotected in the early stages of their struggle for independence, would probably lapse into Bolshevism; that there would be much internecine strife, and probably massacres of Christians on a large scale; and finally, that our reputation in the Middle East would suffer a damaging if not a fatal blow. I confess that to a large extent I shared these apprehensions, all the more that I was quite unable to believe in the practicability or likelihood of the substitute of an Italian occupation.

In May rumours began to arrive that the Italians were disposed to reconsider their decision to take our place, and I ventured in my telegram No. 735 of 23rd May to ask you to endeavour to hasten a decision on their part. Meanwhile it was decided on military grounds to postpone our withdrawal, originally fixed for the 15th June, until the 15th July, and subsequently again until the 15th August.

On the 2nd July I was informed by the Director of Military Intelligence that he learned from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, then in Paris, that the Italians had abandoned their intention to go to the Caucasus, and in your telegram No. 1126 of the 6th July you informed me that you too understood this to be the case. It was not, however, until the 1st August that the Italian Ambassador was able to confirm it. No change was, however, made in our decision to withdraw.

On the 6th July you informed me that the Supreme Council had appointed Colonel Haskell, of the United States army, to be High Commissioner for Armenia on behalf of the Allied and Associated Governments. No provision, however, was made for any material force for his support.

About the middle of July the reports from the military authorities began to show that the fears entertained as to the helpless position of the Armenian Christians were not unlikely to be fulfilled, and that fighting had already broken out in the Nakhichevan district. Appeals for help from many and various sources reached me in large numbers, uniformly arguing that if our decision to withdraw were adhered to and no one were to take our place massacres might be expected to occur on an unprecedented scale.

Meanwhile, however, the immediate risk of a collision between the Georgians and Tartars on the one hand and the Volunteer Army of General Denikin on the other had been in a measure averted by the drawing of a dividing line between them, which both sides agreed to respect. In addition to this I deputed Mr. Oliver Wardrop, an official well acquainted with the country and the people, on a political mission to Tiflis, with instructions to use his influence to prevent friction between General Denikin and the Georgian and the Azerbaijan Governments, to appoint subordinate officers as his representatives in the more important towns, and to endeavour by every means at his disposal to avert the anticipated massacre of the Armenians.

On the 9th August I received your suggestion that while our troops were being withdrawn an attempt should be made to interest the United States Government, as the possible future mandatory for Armenia, in the subject of the Caucasus, and that we might even delay the concluding stages of our withdrawal if we could induce them to send military forces to take the place of our troops. An enquiry from the War Office showed that any delay in the evacuation, which had indeed already begun, would present almost insuperable difficulties, owing in the main to the fact that the British troops were overdue for demobilisation and could not be pressed to remain in the Caucasus. I then saw the American Ambassador, and placed the whole matter before him (see my despatch No. 459 of the 11th August). Mr. Davis did not, however, hold out much hope that his Government would intervene. On the 18th August I saw Mr. Davis again and told him that the Powers in France, and we in London, were waiting for the Americans to decide upon the question of accepting a mandate. His Excellency again, however, expressed the opinion that it was improbable that his Government would see their way to taking any action in the sense desired by us. On the 19th August I wrote to the American Ambassador calling his attention to a statement made by Mr. Bonar Law in the House of Commons, to the effect that the Armenian problem was an American rather than a British one, that any offers of assistance from the United States Government would be very welcome, and, further, that if President Wilson were officially to say to His Majesty's Government: "We wish you to hold the fort for a little until we can make arrangements," His Majesty's Government would certainly do their best to meet him. I asked Mr. Davis to find out by telegraph whether his Government would either send troops themselves or would be willing to bear the financial burden of the continued retention of ours in the Caucasus.

Mr. Davis replied on the 29th August that for various technical reasons concerned with the sanction of the Congress the American Government could do neither of these things. His Excellency went on to say that his Government made an official appeal to His Majesty's Government not to withdraw the British forces in the Caucasus on the ground that massacres would inevitably result, and that the United States Government, while realising our difficulties in the matter, considered that we should be held responsible in the eyes of the civilised world.

All hope of practical assistance from America was therefore at an end.

Meanwhile, on the 20th August, I had, through the medium of the War Office, consulted General Milne by telegram as to the possibility of mitigating the consequences of evacuation by all or any of the following steps:—

1. Postponement of the withdrawal of the Indian native troops.
2. The supply of fresh British troops, if these were imperatively required, from our forces at Constantinople.
3. The supply of military escorts to the political officers appointed to the principal towns in the Caucasus.
4. The leaving behind of tanks, armoured cars, and aeroplanes.

On the 21st August General Milne replied that a force of one Indian brigade, one British battalion, and an Indian machine-gun company might be earmarked for this purpose. He was, however, adverse from employing white troops, but it would be possible to arrange that armoured cars and aeroplanes should be left.

About this time a request was received from the Armenian National Delegation that their national forces in the Erivan Republic should be furnished with arms and equipment by His Majesty's Government. I recommended this proposal to the War Office, but it was rejected on the ground that such action would aggravate an already dangerous situation.

On the 31st August I received a visit from Colonel Rawlinson, who stated that he had been sent by General Milne to lay the full facts before His Majesty's Government. He represented that the Moslem neighbours of the Armenian Republic were only waiting for the moment when the last of our troops should have left to invade that State and exterminate the entire Christian population, and that the Armenians were not in a position to offer any resistance. Colonel Rawlinson expressed the opinion that it was our moral duty not to abandon them to their fate, an opinion which, he stated, was shared by General Milne and the troops under his command.

On the same date I received your telegram No. 1309, in the third paragraph of which you stated that at a meeting of the Supreme Council a telegram from Colonel Haskell had been read to the effect that it was absolutely necessary to send troops to

Armenia in place of the British force in order to save the population from destruction, and that M. Clemenceau had announced that for this object his Government was ready to send 12,000 French troops which, it subsequently transpired, would be landed at Alexandretta and Mersina.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[130392]

No. 98.

Colonel French to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 17.)

*General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
August 30, 1919.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a summary of the situation in Syria and Palestine as it appears to me at present.

The visit of the American Commission came to a conclusion on the 24th of July, when the Commissioners embarked at Mersina for Constantinople. While it is impossible to tell what may have been the conclusions they reached, there is good reason to believe that their report will be a document of considerable interest and material assistance, in that it was drawn up by men with keen and unprejudiced minds who had opportunities of discussing the political situation and future of Syria with representative and intelligent men of every section of the community. They were accompanied by Colonel J. K. Watson, C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., who was specially selected by the Commander-in-Chief on account of his linguistic qualifications and also because he had not previously been in Syria and was therefore entirely without bias. His duties with the Commission were to make all the necessary arrangements as regards transport, &c. He had no political duties.

There is no doubt that a considerable proportion of the population hope and believe that the report of the Commissioners may avert the granting of a mandate for Northern Syria to the French, against whom the opinion of most of the influential men of almost all classes is hardening as time goes on. The aversion to the French has been strengthened by the ill-timed and injudicious action of some of their officers, which gave the impression that they were anxious to prevent any Francophobe natives from meeting the American Commissioners. I do not believe that any such actions were encouraged by heads of the administration; they were for the most part mere exhibitions of misplaced zeal on the part of indiscreet subordinates; but such indiscretions have unfortunately been encouraged by a propaganda campaign countenanced by some senior French officials and which has been almost as harmful to French prestige and popularity as these indiscretions.

There were similar instances of political pressure and propaganda in O.E.T. (East), where the administrators are Arabs, but from the evidence available they were not as numerous as in O.E.T. (West).

The whole country is now quiet from a political point of view, but it is the quiet resulting partly from exhaustion which followed the political orgy during the visit of the Commission, and partly from the tension caused by the belief that the decision of the Conference will be known shortly.

The Emir Feisal was seriously perturbed during the time immediately following the visit of the Commission and sent two of his most trusted officers to interview the Commander-in-Chief and to inform him that in his opinion the political persecution practised by the French was with the deliberate intention of creating an incident which would compel armed intervention. The Commander-in-Chief pointed out that it was almost impossible to prevent propaganda, that it usually recoiled on the heads of those who carried it out and that the French had made somewhat similar accusations against the Arabs, and satisfied the Emir by promising to make enquiries into the alleged cases of injustice.

The situation is exceedingly difficult for the Emir Feisal whom I believe to have made honest attempts to hold the balance between the moderate and extreme sections of the Arabs and who desires to fulfil his promises both to His Majesty's Government and to the Zionists; and this very honesty has to a certain extent undermined his influence which for the moment is probably decreasing rather than increasing.

On the other hand, if there were a crisis and he took the lead, as I believe he would, it is probable not only that the Arabs would join him in large numbers, but that he might be joined by considerable numbers of Turks and Kurds who would be

prepared to serve with him as a leader not only of prestige, but of great ideals, under whom it might be possible to win the independence of large areas of the Ottoman Empire.

A long-standing feud between the Ansariah and Ismailien in the neighbourhood of Khadmis led to the despatch of a small French column which appears to have been ambushed and suffered a certain number of casualties. A joint Anglo-French political mission is now visiting the chiefs of the disturbed area and the latest information is that the tribe concerned has accepted the conditions imposed by the Commander-in-Chief, and made submission.

The situation in Palestine has not changed. A report on the visit of Mr. Justice Brandeis has been sent to you vide my despatch of the 11th August. This visit has undoubtedly done a certain amount of good, especially among the more extreme Zionists, and it is to be hoped that Mr. Brandeis will be able to impress on the Zionist leaders in Europe the need for caution and moderation both in deed and in word in face of the genuine and deep-seated dislike of the non-Jewish population of Palestine not only for Zionists but to a certain extent for all Jews.

The relations between the administration and the Zionist Commission have not been entirely satisfactory, mainly in consequence of the fact that the personnel of the Commission has not been strengthened by the presence of men of outstanding ability since its original formation. These relations must to a large extent depend on good personal relations and perfect frankness on the part of both parties. Recently there have been instances where questions have either been referred direct to the Zionist Organisation in Europe without previous discussion with the administration, or where the organisation has approached your Lordship on information received from Jewish sources other than the Zionist Commission. Either procedure is likely to lead to inexact information, waste of time and friction on the spot between the administration and the Commission.

There are other signs that the Zionists in Europe are not kept fully informed regarding the situation in Palestine.

Dr. Weizmann in a letter to Sir L. Mallet which was forwarded under your letter No. 5 of the 2nd July, wrote of "artificial agitation" in Palestine. It is the considered opinion of British officers who know Palestine well that the opposition to Zionism, which is based to a certain extent on the national sentiment of the inhabitants, has grown stronger during the past months, and it is believed that this is well known to the Commission, which has an efficient "intelligence" service. It may be an oversight on his part, but Dr. Weizmann invariably refers in his letter to the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine as "Arabs." He no doubt realises that these "Arabs" consider themselves primarily as "Syrians" and form the greater part of the population, and that it is among the Moslem and Christian Syrians that the idea of nationalism is strongest.

The proposed acquisition by the Zionists of the Kaiserin Victoria Augusta Hospice as a university presents certain practical difficulties which no doubt might be overcome; but it should be pointed out that ever since its construction it has been regarded as a Christian institution with a Christian chapel, while since the beginning of the war it has always been used as a headquarters. To relinquish it as the seat of government, and to hand it over as a Zionist university would, in my opinion, earn for the Mandatory Power the contempt of all classes of the community, none of whom even now quite understand our religious toleration, and I think it will be admitted that the prestige of the Mandatory Power is worthy of some consideration, most of all perhaps by the Zionists.

Finally, I will venture to suggest that there would appear to be a tendency among some of the leading Zionists to complain of what the administration have not done for them and to ignore both what has been done and the practical difficulties of the present and the future. These difficulties are going to be very great, and will demand sympathy, tact, caution and absolute fairness to all sections of the population on the part of both administration and Zionists. Great ideals and enthusiasm are not enough to ensure success, and any ill-considered haste is likely to delay rather than expedite the realisation of a Jewish National Home.

I have, &c.

C. FRENCH, Colonel,
Acting Chief Political Officer, Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

[130700]

No. 99.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 1601.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 3, 1919

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Captain Perring, the relief officer detached from this High Commission for duty at Samsoun, reporting a conversation which he had with Hamid Bey, the Mutessarif of Samsoun, on the 24th August.

2. I would point out that Hamid Bey is rather a remarkable personality amongst Turkish Governors. Before the war he was associated with Colonel Graves and Brigadier-General Deedes in the organisation of the civil Inspectorate of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior, and both these officers speak highly of his ability, energy, and honesty of purpose. In the autumn of 1914 he was appointed Vali of Diarbekir, where, on the outbreak of war, he did everything in his power to facilitate the journey of His Majesty's vice-consul and staff to the coast, in spite of instructions to the contrary from Constantinople.

3. In consequence of his opposition to the policy of deportation and massacre of Armenians, he was dismissed from the post of Vali of Diarbekir early in 1915, and returned to his post in the Inspectorate of the Ministry of the Interior. About three months ago at the urgent request of the Minister of the Interior, he accepted the inferior post of Mutessarif of Samsoun, as it was felt that the situation there required the presence of an exceptionally capable Governor.

4. His recent declarations to Captain Perring are, in my opinion, quite sincere, and of great interest as symptomatic of the effect produced upon Turkish provincial administration by the Greek occupation of Smyrna, and the consequent development of the National Defence movement, which now embraces all classes of Moslems.

5. The growing agitation amongst the Turkish population makes it difficult, if not impossible, for local Governors to carry out some of the requests of our officers for the restitution of Christian property, or the arrest of notorious offenders, who are now figuring as Turkish patriots, and, in the absence of any power to enforce compliance it may, to my great regret, become necessary to restrict our activities in this direction.

6. As regards Hamid Bey's remarks on the effect which would be produced by the announcement of a British mandate for Turkey, it may safely be said that, while he and those for whom he professes to speak are at heart opposed to the control of any Christian power, still they would now welcome such a mandate as a lesser evil than the alternative, which they all so greatly fear, namely, the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire under several foreign flags.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,
Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 99.

Captain Perring to Rear-Admiral Webb.

(No. 231.)

Sir,

Samsoun, August 24, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to report that Hamid Bey, the Mutessarif of Samsoun, came to see me this morning.

2. He requested me not to push so hard for the restitution of certain properties the return of which I have insisted on; he explained that owing to my insistence the Turks were getting very agitated. I promised to leave these for several days, but insisted on his giving me a written guarantee for their not being tampered with, &c. This he gave me.

3. He then requested me to write to you about Emin Bey and to request you not to insist further on his arrest. This, I explained, was an impossibility for me to do; he, however, offered me a guarantee for this man's behaviour, and stated that he would personally see that for the future he would not take part in any political or committee propaganda.

4. He then spoke of the future of his country, and stated that it was obvious America had no intention of accepting the tutelage of Turkey, and, therefore, Great Britain was the only country that they would accept; also that if they had the choice they were unanimous that Great Britain should take over control at once.

[1356]

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5. He complained bitterly of the way the French treated him, but this, of course, I refused to discuss.

6. He informed me that he was in communication with Mustapha Kemal Pasha and explained his motives, saying he would be most glad for me to meet Kemal; he assured me that the whole movement would cease the very day we took over control of Turkey.

7. I promised to forward his expressions to Constantinople, and he stated that both General Deedes and Colonel Graves knew his honesty of purpose.

8. He also requested my help in removing two or three desperate characters who are in prison here, and requested me to put them on board the British steamer for Constantinople; knowing the records of these men, I promised that this should be done.

I have, &c.

J. S. PERRING, *Captain.*

[130723]

No. 100.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 1624.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 7, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information a copy of a report by the Military Control Officer at Afion Kara Hissar, entitled "Summary of Events in Afion Kara Hissar since the occupation of Smyrna by the Greek Troops," and a second report from the Control Office at Eski Shehir on the subject of the National movement in that town, which have been sent to me by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea.

2. This first report, I consider, contains a very impartial and straightforward review of the different phases of the situation which has arisen in Anatolia since the landing of the Greek army at Smyrna, and, with reference to certain matters therein referred to, I have the honour to submit the following observations for your Lordship's consideration.

3. Up to the time of the Smyrna landing the situation was not only generally satisfactory but was, moreover, steadily improving, and armed conflicts between Christians and Moslems did not commence until the decision was taken by the Peace Conference to send Greek troops to Smyrna; the authority of the Central Government was, in fact, fairly well established.

4. Following on the events at Smyrna came a short period of uncertainty and depression, during which the communication of some definite decision by the Allies was awaited, without however any general change taking place in the attitude of the population, except in the areas into which Greek troops had penetrated. Towards the end of June began the organisation and gradual extension of the National Defence Movement, due to the efforts of the corps of officers and the partisans of the Committee of Union and Progress and strong Nationalist groups, working on the feelings of a population which, if not actively in sympathy with its objects, passively approved the organisation of measures to ward off the threatened danger of domination by the Greeks and the partition of the country.

5. A later development, which tends to become more pronounced as time goes on, is the antagonism to the present Government of the leaders of the movement. The present Cabinet is looked upon as weak, unable to uphold Turkish rights, unrepresentative of Turkish sentiment, and under the influence of the Allies. Although no open and general disavowal of the authority of the Cabinet now in power (such as resulted in the eastern vilayets from Mustafa Kemal's activities) has yet been made in more central and western provinces of Anatolia, still the opposition to the Central Government has, nevertheless, shown itself by the expulsion or suppression of the civil authorities at provincial centres such as Ushak and Alashehr, and by certain other acts on the part of local military commanders clearly indicating that they look upon the Valis and Mutessarifs as in a position of merely nominal authority.

6. The present policy of the National Organisation appears to be to wait on events and to do nothing likely to prejudice the change of opinion abroad in favour of Turkey, which is believed to have taken place as a consequence of Greek actions in the Aidin province. It is noteworthy that, except at two or three places within or in close proximity to the zone of operations in the Aidin vilayet, where Christians were

massacred by irregular and uncontrolled bands in retaliation for Greek atrocities, there have been nowhere any instances of massacre of the Christian inhabitants by the Moslems.

7. Thus, the rumour of a massacre at Ushak (the subject of my telegram No. 1604 of the 4th August and your Lordship's telegram No. 1327 of the 9th August) proves to have been without foundation, and though the town was occupied by irregulars belonging to the National Army, measures were taken that the Christian population should not be molested.

8. Though the situation in Anatolia is at present outwardly quiet, I foresee the probability of grave troubles arising should terms of peace be imposed upon this country which will comprise the establishment of Greek authority over any part of Asia Minor, or the division of Anatolia into spheres to be administered by different Powers.

9. I am of opinion that any such decision would be followed by the repudiation by the provinces of the authority of Constantinople, and the setting up of one or a number of Nationalist and largely military congresses to control the country. If such a situation arises the Allies will be faced with a far more serious problem even than that which exists already in the Eastern vilayets, and the execution of such terms as are imposed upon Turkey will necessitate the undertaking of military measures on a very considerable scale.

10. I feel most strongly that the establishment in the future of normal peaceful conditions in this country is entirely dependent upon consideration being given, in settling the terms of peace, to the justifiable and reasonable claims of the Turks that they should not be subjected to the rule of an alien and hostile race like the Greeks, and that that part of the Empire which the Peace Conference decides to leave to them should not be divided up amongst various interested European Powers. The sentiment against any such conditions is universal and very strong, and in order to assure future peace and security it is, to my mind, essential that the general Turkish population should not be left with the conviction that it has been harshly and unjustly treated by the Allies in respect of these two points.

11. It has become more and more clear to me that the only solution of the problem of the future status of Anatolia which will provide an acceptable and stable settlement is that of a mandate, under a Power whose control will be welcomed by the great mass of the Turkish population. There is no arrangement except that of a mandate under Great Britain or, failing her, the United States which the Turks will willingly accept, and although in putting this opinion forward for your Lordship's consideration, I am aware of the many and great difficulties which are involved, it does not appear to me possible or desirable to close one's eyes to the real facts of the situation.

12. In connection with this subject, I would refer your Lordship to my despatch No. 1601 of the 3rd September, on the subject of the Mutessarif of Samsoun.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 100.

Summary of Events in Afion Kara Hissar since the occupation of Smyrna by the Greek Troops.

(Issued by the General Staff "Intelligence" Army of the Black Sea, Constantinople.)

1. *Before Occupation.*—Previous to the occupation of Smyrna, the situation in Afion Kara Hissar was practically all that could be desired. There were, of course, number of officials still in the sanjak who had taken an active part in the Committee of Union and Progress programme.

2. *Mutessarif.*—The Mutessarif at this time was a Greek, one Anastas. His nationality was the cause of a certain amount of unrest. Owing to representations made by the people to the Minister of the Interior, he was sent away on the 9th June 1919, his place being taken by a Turk named Mahmoud Mahir.

3. *Djemat Pasha.*—On the 12th June General Kutchuk Djemat Pasha arrived in Afion Kara Hissar, ostensibly to inspect the 23rd Division. It was discovered later however, that during his visit he had made a tour through many neighbouring villages and had asked the population to offer themselves to fight for Turkey when called upon.

[1356]

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to do so. He also interviewed the Committee of Union and Progress Members in the towns. After his visits a great deal of unrest was noticeable in each place; the local Christians became alarmed; and vague rumours were about of movements being started by the Turks to raise volunteers. An intercepted wire, of some date about the middle of July, disclosed the fact that Djemal Pasha and other officers in the 4th Army were implicated in a movement to call for deputies and set up a Congress at Angora. The situation became so disturbed that the Vali of Konia called for the assistance of the British Control Officer, and, at the same time, informed the Minister of the Interior as to the state of affairs. This led to the recall of Djemal Pasha to Constantinople, and to his being dismissed from the post of Inspector-General of the Yildirim Army group.

4. *Popular feeling until July 1919.*—The popular feeling up to about the beginning of July had been that, if the Allies were to give the Turks definite instructions that the Paris Conference had ordered Greek troops to occupy Smyrna, and if they gave the exact limits of that occupation there would be nothing for the Turks to do but evacuate the area to be occupied, and wait quietly for a just decision.

5. *Arif Bey.*—On the 4th July the Kaimakam, Arif Bey, arrived at Afion Kara Hissar, and became actively engaged in recruiting for the National Army. He openly confessed to writing violent and inflammatory articles in the local press with a view to arousing the people, and stated that he would not rest until there was no Greek soldier left in Smyrna, or he himself was dead.

6. *Change in character of National Movement.*—At the end of July the character of the National movement became more apparent, and the programme changed. Ouchak was surrounded by irregular cavalry, said to be mostly Albanians, the kaimakam was imprisoned, and a commission of eight persons was set up to collect money and food for the National Army. Tahsin Bey, commanding the National troops in that area, practically became Governor, and it was reported that all means of communication with Constantinople were cut. Two notices were posted up, one exhorting the local Christian population to remain calm, as they were in no danger; the other ordering all brigands and outlaws to give themselves up with their firearms and horses; on doing so they would be pardoned and enrolled in the National Army. The kaimakam was ordered to leave for Afion by road, probably to be killed on the way; but a French agent assisted him and the chief of the municipality to leave by train for Afion on about the 10th August.

7. *Break between Civil and Military.*—After about the 25th July the Officer Commanding 23rd Division practically ceased all co-operation with the civil authorities, and refused to communicate with the Governor.

8. *Kutahia occupied.*—It was reported that Kutahia was similarly seized by the National Army about the 9th August.

9. *The Commission and its Effects.*—On the 3rd August an official Commission composed of two members, Ferik Suleiman Pasha and Mehmed Ed Din Zia Bey, a civilian, arrived at Afion. The Governor informed the British Control Officer that they were appointed to bring about better relations between the military and civil authorities. The Officer Commanding 23rd Division, on the other hand, informed him that their duty was to investigate the National movement and see if it contained any Committee of Union and Progress element. The Commission went away apparently convinced that the movement was nothing to do with the Committee of Union and Progress. During their stay they interviewed the worst elements in the town, and insulted the Mutessarif by taking very little notice of him. Their visit certainly encouraged the leaders of the National movement, and discouraged the more moderate Turks.

10. *Anglophile Kurd.*—On the 30th July a Kurd named Nazim Bey ex-Kaimakam of Gawar, Van, arrived from Angora, and appeared to be very anxious to assist the British Control Officer. According to the opinion of Nazim the National movement was organised by the Military Party as much, against the Government as against the Greeks. Later information led the British Control Officer to agree with this view.

11. *Threats against Civil Authorities.*—On the 6th August the chief of the municipality at Afion received a wire signed by Tahsin Bey, commander of the National troops at Ouchak, saying that unless he urged the people of Afion to take part in the movement, or forwarded the names of those who were preventing him from doing so, he would be sentenced to death by the National Army. The Mutessarif dictated a reply to the effect that the people of Afion were loyal to the Government of Constantinople. On about the 8th August the Mutessarif of Afion received a wire from a

certain Suleiman Bey, leader of the National troops at Alachehir, saying that he was condemned to death by the National Army for "chloroforming" the people of his sanjak.

12. *The new Movement in Afion.*—On the 9th August the new movement was begun in Afion. The Officer Commanding 23rd Division and Arif Bey had returned from a tour round Ouchak, Alachehir, Denizly, Dinair, and Sparta the day before. Every man who had been enrolled by Arif Bey was ordered to hold himself in readiness to move off. These volunteers began walking about the town, carrying rifles and bandoliers of ammunition, and the collection of money began.

13. *Obtaining of Funds.*—In Ouchak, where £T. 100,000 is said to have been raised, every man is forced to pay a proportion of his money in five instalments. In Afion, where they hope to raise £T. 60,000, it is to be paid in three instalments. In other words, the town of Afion Kara Hissar is now in the hands of the National Army, though the civil authorities have not yet been interfered with, nor has the communication with Constantinople been cut.

14. *Officer Commanding 23rd Turkish Division.*—On the 10th August the British Control Officer visited the Officer Commanding 23rd Division, who told him that he had hurried back from inspection of his troops because he had heard of the events in Ouchak and Kutahia. The Officer Commanding said that, since his departure, over 100 soldiers had deserted; that his battalions in Afion only numbered 30 men each; that of the 1,500 rifles allowed to his division, only about 1,000 remained; and that the men at present walking about armed in Afion were rearrested deserters, or soldiers looking for deserters. He felt sure that, if the Greeks were forced by the Allies to evacuate Smyrna, every man of the National Army would hand in his rifle and ammunition and return to his home; but that, if the whole world ordered the Greeks to retain an inch of the mainland of Asia Minor, the National Army would continue fighting until the Greeks were cleared out, or the Turks were completely overcome by superior forces. The Officer Commanding also said that he had seen a letter sent to the Sultan from the National Congress now sitting in Erzerum, saying "that the people of Turkey had allowed His Majesty to give the Greeks Smyrna, but that, since the atrocities committed by them had become known, the nation had been obliged to take up arms and save the rest of Asia Minor from a like fate." This was answered by a notice in the papers that the Sultan condemned any such movement; but as the Divisional Commander said "this answer came not from the Sultan, but from the Government in Constantinople, which we no longer recognise."

15. *Payment of Volunteers.*—Men who have volunteered have informed the British Control Officer that they are sent to Dinair, where they receive £T. 10; then to Denizly, where they receive £T. 25 each, a rifle and ammunition; and thence are sent to the front. Recently a number of men have deserted, owing to not having received sufficient pay. This has probably given the impetus to the requisitioning in back towns. In fact, it appears evident that the number of men the Turks can keep in the field depends entirely on the amount of money they can collect with which to pay the Volunteers, and especially their families.

16. *Rations.*—A large quantity of rations are said to be supplied to the Volunteers by the 23rd Division; but no proofs of this report have as yet been obtained.

17. *Anglophile Turks.*—Certain influential and trustworthy Turks, who are said to be Anglophile, have shown that they recognise the uselessness of the National movement, and the damage that it may eventually cause to Turkish interests. It is reported that such people, in spite of their not being in favour of the Nationalist movement, fear that they might be forced to join it. There is, however, a feeling that the British having taken the matter in hand will have a salutary effect in the district.

18. *The French Commander.*—The Commander of the French Senegalese battalion at Afion, Major Labonne, is taking a very active part in the political situation of the district. He has agents everywhere, from whom he receives daily reports, and has also, apparently, unlimited money. For instance, on the 4th June he gave £T. 50 to the Turkish School in Idaday to be distributed as prizes. He is unfortunate in his choice of friends, two of whom are the Officer Commanding 23rd Division, and Touroundjay Zade Youssouf Bey, a civil leader of the National movement. He recently made a tour round Dinair, Denizly, Sparta, Nazily, through Aidin to Smyrna. He was given a special train by the Turks at Dinair, and met by a Turkish band. On the 8th August he gave an interview to the editor of the local paper "Ikaz," which was published next day, and did a great deal of harm. He practically said that the Allies sympathised with the Turkish movement, and permitted it. The next day he complained to the Governor that the editor had so mistranslated his statements as to make the article

entirely incorrect, but he would certainly seem to have too much intelligence to have given the interview innocently. He must have known that the paper is in the hands of the Extremist Party.

23. The conclusions of the British Control Officer stationed at Afion are as follows:—

- (a.) The present movement is showing itself to be as much the Committee of Union and Progress as military; and is directed as much against the present Government as against the Greeks. Events have now gone too far for the Turks to listen to the Allies with regard to the Greek occupation, and nothing will satisfy them but the entire removal of Greek troops. The Turks will no more accept a mandate of the Italians than of the Greeks. The 23rd Divisional Commander has stated that if the Allies left the Italians in any part of Asia Minor the Turks would not do so; and that the people of Buldur, Sparta, &c., were only allowing the Italians to remain owing to *force majeure*, i.e., their greater hatred of the Greeks.
- (b.) The more intelligent Turks are also decidedly opposed to a dividing up of Asia Minor into zones, in each of which a different Power will have a mandate. As they point out when the mandates are withdrawn, each zone will be found to have different laws and methods of administration, which would be fatal to the country as a whole. Neither do they want the French in the country, as French customs are so opposed to Moslem religion.
- (c.) What the Turks would willingly accept is America or Great Britain as the mandatory Power for the whole of Asia Minor; the Power that accepts the mandate to place technical advisers, such as experts in administration, engineering, health, education, &c., in each sanjak. "The simple Turkish villager has always been found anxious for one of the two above Powers to take over the country and save him from his own corrupt officials."
- (d.) Every day's delay in settling the future of Asia Minor encourages the Turk in his movement against the Greeks. They seem now to be quite convinced that all the Allies except the Greeks side with the Turks, and quote as proof the fact that the British have never put British troops to guard the Aidin railway, thus tactfully allowing the Turks to use it as well as the Greeks.
- (e.) The Turkish military leaders seem to wish to show that areas taken over by the National Army, such as Ouchak, are far more tranquil than they were ever before. They are thought to be succeeding in this; and are quite willing for British or French officers to visit such areas to judge for themselves.

August 25, 1919.

Enclosure 2 in No. 100.

Report on the National Movement in Eski Shehir.

THE local situation has reached a climax which can best be described in the words of a pro-British Turkish officer, when he said "We must do one thing or the other." There are two strong parties here:—

1. Those who are content to passively wait and see what the future has in store for them, who place their confidence in the British, and who are endeavouring to restore the welfare of their country along industrial lines. This party comprises the majority of the rich Turkish merchants, their employees, the peasants; in fact, a large percentage of the lower classes.
2. The other party are those who call themselves the National Army. The nucleus of these are the troops lately arrived from Angoro, headed by Atif Bey. They were immediately joined by all the local Committee of Union and Progress and many of their old followers, who had declared themselves "Pacifists" until an armed force appeared on the scenes. The attached translation of a declaration, published in the local newspaper, will help to show to what a state of independence this National Army has reached. The former party, the Pacifists, although in the majority, are the weaker party, and are terrorised by the National Army, whom they call brigands.

Atif Bey literally rules Eski Shehir. The Mutessarif flits from one party to the other, giving promises and guarantees on all sides, which he never can fulfil. Atif Bey boasts that he does not recognise the British. He refuses to give information, but at the same time is in no way openly hostile, except that it is a generally discussed topic that, if the British attempted to take over further control of the interior, or to send more troops than they have there at present, the National Army would destroy the railway line, thus cutting off all communication. The spot selected for this is between Bilerjik and Vezirhan.

Atif's men are camped on a hill just above the village of Karadja Shehir, three miles outside Eski Shehir. There are thirty-five tents in all, but I do not estimate that there are more than 100 men there. However, there are another 100 men (possibly more) in Eski Shehir. Atif Bey with his staff lives in the town.

Extracts from the "Imad" of August 14, 1919.

What the National Army claims.—The blood shed by the murdering Greek army has brought about the formation of a group of national brigands who will always defend themselves honourably. "National Army" means an army that will never die miserably before the Greek arms; an army which punishes the wild Greek, who dishonoured our mothers and sisters, and killed the helpless fathers and grandfathers; an army which breaks the destroying hands of the vagabond Greek who has burnt our houses and villages; an army which, after protesting to the world, will drive out the Greek troops; an army which announces to the world that on Turkish lands only Turks may live. Knowing of the formation of such a divine army, you ought to give up all and to respect it.

After the signing of the armistice for the destruction of our country, a terrible propaganda started. Greeks and Armenians, helping each other, wrote and published against us. By their own wish the Turkish mouths, which wished to defend themselves, were shut. The Greeks occupied Smyrna undefended; murdered its population and burnt the town of Aidin, Berghama, and Menemen.

All these actions we protested against in our press and by meetings; but the rights of the Turks were not heard. The Turks have claimed in a proper way the rights of an honourable nation from their victors but received no answer. They received instead murder, destruction, and occupation. The Turks endured as a respectful nation these illegal actions, and protested against a Government, too weak to protect its right. The Turkish National Army can never be defeated, but will always work in the Aidin vilayet. As they worked, Europe and America were obliged to take into consideration the action of the Turks, and to declare that the occupation of Aidin should be prevented.

Now the Government announce that the occupation of Smyrna is to be prevented; therefore the people and National Army must not defend our country. If in this good news there is something patriotic, something towards the delivery of our nation, then everyone will be forced to obey. But such prevention means that the Greeks will still occupy parts of the Aidin vilayet.

The intention of the National Army is to drive the Greeks from Smyrna and not to limit their occupation.

Our rights were made known to the Greeks, and still they stay in our country. If the following claims of the National Army are performed, then we are satisfied:—

1. The Turks must rule over the Aidin vilayet. The Greeks themselves are witnesses of the anarchy which has driven people from their business.
2. Prevention of the spread of the occupied area will not satisfy us. Not a single Greek must remain in Smyrna. They must pay indemnity for the damage they have done. Otherwise in Anatolia bloody battles will take place.
3. The Government is pleased to prevent the spread of the occupation, but we should be pleased to see all Greeks driven out. Also they must not give the national soldier such titles as homeless, vagabond, or brigand.

August 19, 1919. N.B.—The translation of the document referred to in the following report^a has already been forwarded to the High Commissioner in a letter from the Commander-in-chief.

^a Not printed.

The attached is the translation of a document handed to me this afternoon (19th), bearing the signatures of the 37 leading Turks of Eski Shehir * (The Director of the Municipality, the chief religious head, a lawyer, 16 leading merchants, 2 hodjas, 16 heads of quarters in the town and villages.) I have retained the original. It is unaddressed; is dated the 12th August, 1919, and was handed to me with some secrecy and fear. I stated it would not leave British hands.

I have also just received information that the Director of the Post Office, Eski Shehir, has received orders from the Minister of War that he is not to allow Atif Bey to communicate with Afion Kara Hissar, Angora, or Kutahia. Atif Bey has met the situation by force, and had obliged the Post Office to forward his telegrams.

Information also just received, but not confirmed, states that Kutaya has been held up by a band from the National Army and forced to pay the sum of 80,000 liras under threat.

Lieutenant,
Control Officer, Eski Shehir.

[130728]

No. 101.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 1629.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 8, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1412 of the 9th August, relative to atrocities committed by the Greek troops in the Aidin Vilayet, I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's consideration copy of a report dated the 30th August which I have received from my representative at Smyrna, enclosing an account of the proceedings of the trial by court-martial of Lieutenant-Colonel Alex Schina, who commanded the garrison of Aidin at the time of its capture by the Turks.

2. M. Athinoyenis, the Greek lawyer, who wrote the account of the court-martial, was the leading Pan-Hellenist propagandist and intriguer in Smyrna before the Greek landing. His statements, therefore, are far from impartial.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 101.

*Representative of British High Commissioner, Smyrna and Aidin Vilayet, to
British High Commissioner, Constantinople.*

(No. 158.)

August 30, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 104 of the 30th July concerning events at Aidin, I have the honour to enclose herewith an account of the proceedings of the trial by court-martial in Smyrna of Lieutenant-Colonel Alex Schina, who commanded the garrison of Aidin at the time of its capture by Turks.

This account has been supplied by M. Athinoyenis, a Greek lawyer, retained for the defence. It will be seen that the point of view set forth in the proceedings is an entirely Greek one.

JAMES MORGAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 101.

*Report of the Trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Schina, Commander of the Greek Garrison
of Aidin, accused of having deserted his Post in presence of the Enemy.*

THE trial began on the 18th July, 1919, and lasted three days; twenty-two witnesses were heard. The following facts were brought out in the course of the trial:—

1. The strength of the garrison at the time of the attack against the town (15th, 16th, and 17th June) consisted of 1,200 men. There were also eight machine guns and two mountain guns.

2. At the time of the occupation defendant had posted guns for the safety of his

small garrison by the Meander passes and bridges to prevent invasion from Tchina. Subsequently, however, he was ordered from Paris, through the chief of the army of occupation, to recall these guards; he was also prevented from sending out patrolling detachments and guarding the railway line between the Meander and Aidin, which was absolutely necessary for his communications, it being signified to him that the line would be guarded by diplomatic means.

Many restrictions had been imposed by him as regards the disarming of the population, whereas it was known that the Mussulman population of the town disposed of 6,000 Mauser rifles, 4,000,000 cartridges, and many machine guns.

3. While such restrictions were imposed on him a local rising was being prepared, the 57th division of the Turkish army had transferred its headquarters from Aidin to Tchina, was mobilising four classes in the districts of Nazli, Tchina, Bagharassi, and Sokia, and which, added to the other four classes already under arms, brought up the whole strength of the division to 10,000 men.

This force, which disposed of machine guns, mountain guns, &c., was being reinforced by irregular volunteer bodies in the districts of Tchina and environs under Italian occupation.

4. The attack on the garrison of the town commenced on the 15th (28th) June (Saturday). Both the regular and irregular army crossed the Meander easily, and with their heavy and other guns began the attack.

The next day, the 16th (29th) June, the guns began to fire into the town when immediately the revolution broke out. Big red flags were hoisted on the mosques, and the machine-guns posted on them attracted the Greek soldiers from behind. Strong Turkish forces, on the other hand, arriving from Tchina attacked the town from the south, while over 4,000 fighting Turkish inhabitants organised centres of resistance in the town, and harassed the fighting garrison from behind.

On Sunday another Turkish force was noticed coming up from the east, while the inhabitants of about forty Turkish villages north of Aidin came up to attack from the north side. Thus the attack came from four directions. The attacking force was estimated to be 15,000. The garrison struggled until late in the night, occupying their posts in the town and expecting the reinforcement repeatedly asked for, especially of ammunition, which had begun to run short.

Meanwhile a fire broke out which assumed serious dimensions. In consequence of the incident the commandant concentrated his men on Sunday night on the Heights Kapedji and Thrallis, dominating the town, to effect a stronger resistance from there.

During the concentration and posting of the Greek army on the heights of Thrallis and Kapedji a route had been kept from the town there for the movements of the army, and the use of it had been prohibited to the civil population, who were free to leave the town by other routes.

This incident gave rise to a misunderstanding, in consequence of which part of the population remained in the town against their wish, while many others remained in it thinking that owing to the protective attitude of the Greek army towards the Turkish population of the town there was no reason for fear in the event of the Turkish army's return.

Unfortunately the provisions of the civilians who remained behind did not come true, for after the occupation of the town by the Turks the whole body of young boy scouts and 1,500 of the population were slain, among whom, I. Goumaris, representative of the Bishop of Heliopolis (Aidin), while 800 more have been carried away to Denizli, where they are still detained. Such a catastrophe of the civil population weighed heavily in the conscience of the judges of the court-martial, and seriously compromised the situation of Lieutenant-Colonel Schina.

6. On Monday morning, the 17th (30th) June, commenced the surrounding of the town. On the previous day prisoner had received orders: "On no account abandon the town of Aidin; reinforcements are being sent, but will not arrive before Sunday, the 16th (29th) June." Seeing, however, that even on Monday the reinforcements had not arrived, and that the encircling of the town was being completed, the telegraph communications with Smyrna had been interrupted, and half-an-hour previous to the interruption the Turkish telegraph clerk in Smyrna transmitted a false telegram saying that the chief had decided to give no answers to his demands, he thought fit to get out of the town and proceed to the line of his communications, viz., on the railway line, in hope of meeting sooner the reinforcements and commence the counter-attack.

The sortie had been carried out in order, the sick, wounded, and even the prisoners of war, had all been taken away with them. On the 16th June ammu-

[1356]

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nition reached Erbeili station, while at the same time important Greek forces were concentrating in the Cayster valley. On the 20th June the forces under Schina operating the counter-attack from Erbeili entered Aidin, the Turks having retreated to Omurlou and Tchina. During the three days' occupation of the town took place the savage massacre of the population and the complete destruction of the Christian quarter. The survivors assert that at the head of the invading Turkish army and irregulars was the commandant of the 57th division, who remained in the town as Military Governor until half-an-hour before the return of the Greek army, and certain families declare that they owe their salvation to the fact that they were shouting "We are Italians!"

7. The hearing having been concluded, the Crown Prosecutor demanded the sentence of death should be delivered. The counsel for defence supported the view that the destruction of Aidin was due to political suggestions of third parties, who assured the Turks that such an act would greatly serve the Turkish cause; that the disaster could not be prevented by a small military force whose fighting value was further lessened by imposition of restrictions, and that the wrong of "desertion" had not been consummated, since three days after the same forces, replenished with ammunition, returned to their posts, and asked for the acquittal of A. Schina. The Court decided that the desertion had been consummated, but admitted certain extenuating circumstances, and, instead of sentence of death, delivered sentence of penal servitude for life.

[130729]

No. 102.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 1630.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 8, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a report by Captain Hadkinson, relief officer attached to this High Commission, relative to the events which occurred at Aidin during the last few days of June.

2. A copy of this report has been forwarded to the Commission of Enquiry at Smyrna.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 102.

The Truth about Aidin.

(From information supplied by an English eyewitness.)

ON the 23rd June, 1919, after a skirmish between the Greek troops and the Turkish irregulars, the Greeks succeeded in repulsing the Turks, pillaged and set fire to two Turkish villages, called Emir Keuy and Kadi Keuy, composed of about 150 inhabitants each. The Turks, to revenge themselves, set fire to some Greek properties near these two villages.

On the 28th June Colonel Chefik Bey, ex-commander of the Aidin division, who had retired beyond the Meander with about 1,000 men, when Aidin was occupied by the Greeks, and who now commands both the regular and irregular troops of that district, sent an ultimatum to the Greek Colonel Skinas, summoning him to evacuate the town of Aidin by the 2nd July, latest. In answer, Colonel Skinas sent, on the 27th June, a detachment of 150 men up to the bridge of the Meander, four or five miles distant from the town, but they were soon put to flight by the Turks who attacked them. On the morning of the 28th another detachment was sent, but fared likewise. In the afternoon of the same day shots were heard close to the town, and the Greek troops, who had occupied an elevated position, were seen firing with rifles and machine guns from three different sides on the Turkish quarter, pretending that some shots had been fired at them from there. The Greek troops, after having plundered and massacred the inhabitants of several Turkish houses, set fire to them and began bombarding that quarter with guns, as also the village of Cherkez Keuy, situated towards

the south and quite close to the town. All the Turks who tried to escape from the flames were shot with machine guns and rifles by the Greek soldiers and civilians to whom rifles had been distributed. The firing having become very heavy, witness took shelter in the Convent of the Sisters of Charity where already several Christians, Mussulman, and Jewish families had taken refuge. Although subsequently the firing decreased a great deal, still it continued right through the night.

On Sunday morning, the 29th June, the firing commenced at daybreak, and it was soon discovered that the Turks were nearing the town. The fire had by this time taken gigantic proportions and had spread on one side towards the Bazaar, and on the other towards the Greek quarter of Nazli Keupra. The firing, the screams, and the noise were dreadful to hear. At 11 p.m. the news was received that the Greek troops were unable to hold out any longer and were preparing to retreat. Whereupon the population got maddened and rushed to beg Colonel Skinas to be allowed to follow the army. Four or five hundred civilians managed to pass the lines and run for their lives, but the rest were brutally driven back and threatened with bayonets if they advanced. The conduct of the Greek colonel in refusing his help to these miserable creatures, and still more his retreat before 1,500 Turkish irregulars at the utmost is incomprehensible, the more so as he was at the head of a well equipped force of over 3,000 men with guns and ammunition. The excuse Colonel Skinas gave was that he was short of ammunition. It cannot be said for sure to what extent this was true, but the fact is that such waste in that line has rarely been seen, for the result of all the firing was forty-seven Turks in all, between killed and wounded.

As soon as the shameful retreat of the army was realised, and the consequences clearly foreseen, several hundred of the inhabitants took refuge in the convent. The Superior, Sister Marie Ruedin, as well as all the other sisters behaved in an admirable manner, and did all they possibly could for the people. Seeing that the Turks were advancing, a delegation was sent from the convent to tell them that it was under French protection, and that they should not harm the people who had taken refuge there. This they agreed to do, and to this end, placed two sentinels at the door to guard the premises. When the Turkish irregulars reached the town, and saw their houses looted, burning, and a quantity of Turkish corpses lying in the streets, their fury knew no bounds. They fell on the Greek quarter, set fire to the houses, and robbed and massacred whomever they saw. As by this time the fire was rapidly approaching, and witness and others saw that they would have to leave the convent, they asked the two sentinels to allow the population to leave, so as to take refuge in the Armenian church close by. Fifteen or twenty were allowed to pass, but after that the rest were prevented from doing so, exception only being made for the Mussulmen women and children. Unfortunately a small door in the convent yard was broken in by several Turkish irregulars, and six or eight persons killed by them before the Turkish governor was able to interfere. Eventually the remainder of those who had taken refuge in the convent were allowed to escape, but not before they handed over all they possessed in the shape of money and jewellery, &c. Whilst the last refugees were leaving the convent, eight or ten were killed by the irregulars before it was possible to stop them. The Armenian church having also begun to burn, everyone took refuge in the Konak, or Government building, to where they were escorted by the Turkish Colonel, Chevat Bey. On Monday the 1st July, Mr. Hodder, a British officer, came to the Konak and had all the refugees removed to Nazli and Denizli, where they could be provided for, it being impossible to procure provisions in Aidin.

The French gendarmerie, who were at Aidin from the beginning, behaved in a most praiseworthy manner.

A few days after these regrettable incidents, Colonel Skinas was arrested, subsequently court martialled, and sentenced to twenty years.

Guerilla fighting is still going on, and will continue so long as there is one Turkish or Greek soldier left. The Turks openly say they will welcome any nation, and gladly accept its administration, but on no account will they remain under Greek control.

Some days ago, forty Turks were surrounded by a superior number of Greek troops. They were summoned four times to surrender, but they fought like lions until everyone of them was killed. Wounded Greek soldiers are being daily brought down to Smyrna.

One cannot help remarking that the Greeks are doing their level best to make themselves obnoxious, unpopular, and hated by the Turks. Their continual processions with flags, portraits of Venizelos in all the houses, shops and cafés, their ridiculous patriotic songs, sung all day long by the street scum, and by the soldiers

[1856]

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under the very nose of the Turks, cannot but create ill-feeling, and a wider breach between these two races.

A few days ago fresh Greek troops just landed, whilst marching through the town of Smyrna were singing as follows: "Now that the foustanelle (Greek kilt) has come to Smyrna, the fez will disappear, and the blood of the Turk will flow. Now that we have taken Smyrna, let us fly to Aghia Sofia. The mosques will be razed to the ground, and the Cross will be erected thereon." And after such provocative behaviour the Greeks are surprised and furious that they alone want themselves in Smyrna.

[130732]

No. 103.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 1633. Very Confidential.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, September 8, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1525 of the 25th August, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Grand Vizier has again complained of the very great difficulties which were being created for the Turkish Government by the indefinite duration of the armistice, and said the only way by which it seemed to him it might be possible to shorten it would be by coming to a secret understanding with Great Britain. I at once replied that such an idea was quite out of the question; we would never dream of taking any step except in conjunction with our Allies, and what would they say if they found that His Majesty's Government had indulged in any conversations with the Turkish Government?

2. His Highness said he had taken into consideration these things, but his idea was somewhat different. Great divergences of opinion had come to the surface over the treaty with Germany, where the negotiations were fairly plain sailing, and where great international rivalries were not brought into question. I must admit, he said, that from the moment of his assuming office he had never once sought to play off one Power against another according to the traditional policy of the Porte (and this is certainly true), but it was Great Britain that had fought with and had conquered Turkey and it was Great Britain that had the greatest interest in Turkey. Had not the Prime Minister just said so, stating in his speech of the 18th August that vital British interests were involved in the Turkish settlement with which Great Britain was most intimately concerned? That expression of opinion had appealed to him most strongly, for, in his opinion, Turkish interests were absolutely dependent upon Great Britain and upon no other Power.

3. His Highness referred to the proposal he had made on the 30th March last (see despatch to Foreign Office No. 453 of the 3rd April), and said incidentally that, so far as our Allies hearing of any negotiations was concerned, they had never heard of that communication, so why should they of any others; to which I rejoined that he must remember that no *note* had ever been given to the proposal his Highness referred to.

4. He repeated his statement that he in no way or form was seeking to sow dissension or distrust among the Allies, nor wished to do anything that could lead to such a situation, which he would be the first to deplore, as he was perfectly certain that the results could only be all the worse for Turkey. His object was to clear the air and to arrive at an understanding of the claims of the Allies, but more especially of Great Britain, so that when the Turkish question came up for discussion a large part of the obstacles in the way of settlement might be already removed beforehand, and the Turkish delegates would know approximately what ground they had to stand on. He instanced the conclusion of the treaty with Persia, which could not but redound to the happiness and prosperity of that land, and his highest desire, under any circumstances, would be to unite Turkey and Great Britain by some similar instrument.

5. I refrained from expressing to Ferid Pasha my conviction that the Turkish terms would be nothing less than a matter of dictation, even if the Allies have some difficulty in arriving at the exact wording which they will dictate, and I contented myself with pointing out that Persia during the war had observed an attitude of friendly neutrality; that the conclusion of so harmless and reasonable a treaty had provoked much criticism in Western Europe, and that the slightest suspicion, even of any separate negotiation, could not possibly fail to create exactly that dangerous situation of mistrust and rivalry which his Highness so clearly and wisely understood it was imperative to avoid. Therefore, whilst I appreciated the advantages that were

offered to all parties concerned by the one side of his proposal, yet they were so outweighed by the disadvantages on the other that I could only advise him to withdraw the suggestion.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner.

[130943 A]

No. 104.

Aide-mémoire in regard to the Occupation of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia pending the decision in regard to Mandates.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, September 18.)

1. STEPS will be taken immediately to prepare for the evacuation by the British army of Syria and Cilicia, including the Taurus tunnel.

2. Notice is given, both to the French Government and to the Emir Feisal, of our intentions to commence the evacuation of Syria and Cilicia on the 1st November, 1919.

3. In deciding to whom to hand over responsibility for garrisoning the various districts in the evacuated area, regard will be had to the engagements and declarations of the British and French Governments, not only as between themselves, but as between them and the Arabs.

4. In pursuance of this policy, the garrison in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line and the garrisons in Cilicia will be replaced by a French force, and the garrisons at Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo will be replaced by an Arab force.

5. After the withdrawal of their forces, neither the British Government nor the British commander-in-chief shall have any responsibility within the zones from which the army has retired.

6. The territories occupied by British troops will then be Palestine, defined in accordance with its ancient boundaries of Dan to Beersheba, and Mesopotamia, including Mosul, the occupation thus being in harmony with the arrangements concluded in December 1918 between M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George.

7. The British Government are prepared at any time to discuss the boundaries between Palestine and Syria, and between Mesopotamia and Syria. In the event of disagreement in regard to the above boundaries, the British Government are prepared to submit the question to the arbitration of a referee appointed by President Wilson.

8. In accordance with the principles of the Sykes-Picot agreement, the French Government shall not object to the Arab State granting to the British Government the right to construct, administer, and be the sole proprietor of a railway line connecting Haifa with Mesopotamia on a trace to be decided on after survey anywhere as far north as the latitude of Deir-az-Zor. The British Government shall have the right to construct oil-pipe lines as well as the railway line. The British Government shall, in addition, have a perpetual right at all times to improve the facilities of these railway and oil-pipe lines, and to transport troops along the railway, and these rights shall be exercisable even in time of war, without infringement of the neutrality of the French Government or of the Arab State. In the event of disagreement as to the trace of the railway line and oil-pipe lines, the British Government are prepared to submit this question to the arbitration of a referee appointed by President Wilson.

9. The British Government notify the French Government and the Emir Feisal of their intention immediately to carry out a survey with the object of finding, if practicable, a trace for the railway line and pipe lines entirely within the British mandate, in order to enable them to avoid the necessity of exercising the rights of construction referred to above.

10. Until the boundaries of Palestine and Mesopotamia are determined, the British commander-in-chief shall have the right to occupy outposts, in accordance with the boundary claimed by the British Government.

11. The French Government having accepted responsibility for the protection of the Armenian people, the British Government will consent to the immediate despatch of French troops via Alexandretta and Mersina for this purpose.

Paris, September 13, 1919.

[132278]

No. 105.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 1645.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 7, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship the following documents relative to the condition of Turkish prisons in Constantinople and to certain measures which the Allied High Commissioners have considered it desirable to take in consequence:—

Proposition au sujet des prisons turques de Constantinople.

Note from the Armistice Commission to the Sublime Porte.

Note from the Sublime Porte to the British member of the Armistice Commission.

2. As your Lordship is aware, the unsatisfactory conditions prevailing in Turkish prisons have, since the beginning of the Armistice, seriously occupied the attention of this High Commission, and attempts have repeatedly been made to induce the Turkish Government to introduce reforms in prison administration and to improve the lot of the prisoners. Much of what had been done previous to June last is described in "Reports on Conditions in Turkish Prisons" ("Miscellaneous, No. 6 (1919)"), and since that date further strong representations have been made to the Turkish Government on the subject, whilst the Allied Sanitary Commission has carried out inspections and reported on conditions. Improvements effected by these measures have, however, been only temporary, and the continued insanitary and overcrowded state of the prisons has been a matter of grave concern to myself and my French and Italian colleagues.

3. The security of the prisons is also highly unsatisfactory, and the Turkish Government is apparently incapable, on account of the prevalence of corruption amongst the prison officials and warders, of preventing continued escapes of prisoners taking place. The disappearance of Halil Pasha and Talaat Bey is the most glaring instance, but during the six weeks previous to their escape over forty of the worst criminals had succeeded in getting away from other prisons. Quite recently forty-two others escaped in a single night from the central prisons by tunnelling underneath a wall.

4. On account of this unsatisfactory state of affairs both as regards sanitary conditions and security, the Allied High Commissioners instructed the Armistice Commission (consisting of the three military attachés) to investigate and report what measures it was desirable to take in order to effect an improvement. The report of this Commission ("Proposition au sujet des prisons turques de Constantinople") and the recommendations therein made were approved, and the Inter-Allied Commission for prisons has now been constituted.

5. It is hoped that the activities of this Commission will effect a general improvement in prison conditions, but the chief obstacle to any real reforms being carried out in the Government services of this country is, as I have already had the honour of pointing out to your Lordship with reference to the present inefficient state of the gendarmerie, the inability of the Turkish Government to provide the necessary funds.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 105.

Proposal respecting Turkish Prisons in Constantinople.

APRÈS délibération, les membres alliés de la Commission de l'Armistice ont été à l'unanimité d'avis:

1. Qu'il fallait laisser au Gouvernement turc l'entière responsabilité de la garde et de l'hygiène de toutes les prisons;
2. Qu'en ce qui concerne les détenus politiques, il était indispensable de n'intervenir que dans la mesure où les intérêts alliés sont en jeu.

Tenant compte de ces réserves primordiales, ils ont arrêté les propositions suivantes, qu'ils ont l'honneur de soumettre à la réunion des Hauts-Commissaires:

1. Détenus de droit commun.

Désigner une Commission des Prisons comprenant un officier de chacune des Puissances alliées qui sera chargé de l'inspection de toutes les prisons. Cette commission étudiera en détail la question et envisagera toutes les mesures à prendre propres à améliorer la situation actuelle; elle sera accréditée, d'une part, auprès du chef de la Police interalliée et, d'autre part, du Directeur de la Police ottomane; elle dépendra d'une façon générale de la Commission interalliée de l'Armistice, qui la guidera et provoquera auprès des autorités compétentes les décisions que la Commission des Prisons elle-même serait impuissante à obtenir.

La Commission des Prisons aura pour directives:

- (a.) Rechercher une prison spéciale susceptible d'être facilement gardée et d'être mise dans des conditions hygiéniques acceptables; dans cette prison seraient réunis les criminels les plus dangereux; les gardiens devraient être choisis parmi les meilleurs les plus consciencieux, et la Commission tiendrait la main à ce qu'ils soient payés régulièrement par le Gouvernement ottoman.
- (b.) Cette prison, ainsi que toutes les autres, serait fréquemment inspectée par la Commission des Prisons afin de vérifier la bonne exécution du service; l'aide de la police interalliée, pour qu'elle soit visitée par des rondes et patrouilles, serait demandée.
- (c.) Les améliorations de toute nature seraient demandées au Gouvernement ottoman et leur exécution suivra de très près, mais en observant un ordre d'urgence strict et en ne faisant que des réalisations progressives, afin qu'à chaque instant la tâche ne dépasse pas les moyens limités dont la Commission dispose.
- (d.) La Commission des Prisons fournira chaque semaine un compte rendu détaillé aux membres alliés de la Commission de l'Armistice, qui tiendront au courant la réunion des Hauts-Commissaires.

2. Détenus politiques.

La Commission des Prisons tiendra la Commission de l'Armistice au courant des détenus politiques incarcérés; tous ceux d'entre eux auxquels les Alliés peuvent reprocher des actes coupables commis à l'égard de leurs nationaux ou de leurs prisonniers seront immédiatement proposés pour la déportation, soit à Moudros, soit à Malte.

BARTHELEMY.

VITALI.

J. M. SMITH.

Enclosure 2 in No. 105.

Note from the Armistice Commission to the Sublime Porte.

DANS leur réunion de jeudi, 21 août 1919, les Hauts-Commissaires des Puissances alliées ont décidé de confier à leurs Délégués militaires auprès de la Commission ottomane d'Armistice la Haute-Direction de l'Inspection des Prisons.

Les trois Délégués militaires soussignés se sont adjoints pour cette inspection les officiers désignés ci-dessous:

Capitaine Montazeau.

Lieutenant Wilson.

Lieutenant Attilio Raimondi.

Ils demandent à la Sublime Porte de vouloir bien les accréditer, ainsi que leurs adjoints, auprès de la Direction de la Police turque de Constantinople et adresser à qui de droit des ordres pour que toutes les autorités turques leur donnent toutes facilités, tous renseignements et accèdent à toutes les demandes; en particulier, des cartes personnelles leur permettant d'entrer dans toutes les prisons à toutes heures et de les visiter, devront être remises.

Il y aurait tout avantage à ce que la Sublime Porte veuille bien mettre à leur disposition un officier ou fonctionnaire turc bien au courant des prisons de Constantinople et de leur service.

BARTHELEMY.

VITALI.

J. M. SMITH.

Enclosure 3 in No. 105.

Note from the Sublime Porte to the British Member of the Armistice Commission.

EN se référant à la demande que les Délégués militaires des Hauts-Commissaires des Puissances alliées auprès de la Commission ottomane d'Armistice ont bien voulu adresser à la Sublime Porte, la présidence de ladite Commission a l'honneur d'informer M. le Délégué britannique que, d'ordre de son Altesse le Grand-Vizir, les communications nécessaires ont été déjà faites au Département Impérial de l'Intérieur concernant l'inspection des prisons par les Délégués des Puissances alliées et leurs adjoints.

Les cartes personnelles requises sont transmises ci-jointes.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères,
le 4 septembre 1919.

(Signature.)

[132187]

No. 106.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 22.)

(No. 1847.)

MR. BALFOUR presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith copies of a memorandum dated the 11th August, 1919, on the subject of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia.

Paris, September 19, 1919.

Enclosure in No. 106.

Memorandum by Mr Balfour respecting Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia dated August 11, 1919.

I.

THE effect which the Syrian question is producing on Anglo-French relations is causing me considerable anxiety—an anxiety not diminished by the fact that very little is openly said about it, though much is hinted. The silence which the French press maintains about the Prime Minister's declaration that under no circumstances will Britain accept a Syrian mandate, is itself ominous. All know it, none refer to it; and it has done little or nothing to modify the settled conviction of the French Government and the French Colonial Party that British officers throughout Syria and Palestine are intriguing to make a French mandate in these regions impossible.

These misunderstandings are no doubt in part due to the same cause as most misunderstandings—namely, a very clear comprehension by each party of the strength of his own case, combined with a very imperfect knowledge of, or sympathy with, the case of his opponent. In this particular instance, for example, I have never been able to understand on what historic basis the French claim to Syria really rests. Frenchmen's share in the Crusades of the Middle Ages, Mazarin's arrangements with the Turk in the seventeenth century, and the blustering expedition of 1861, lend in my opinion very little support to their far-reaching ambitions. I could make as good a case for Great Britain by recalling the repulse inflicted by Sir Sydney Smith on Napoleon at Acre, and a much better case by asking where French claims to Syria or any other part of the Turkish Empire would be, but for the recent defeat of the Turks by British forces, at an enormous cost of British lives and British treasure.

If, however, we start from the French assumption, that they have ancient claims in Syria and the Middle East, admitted as it has been in all the recent negotiations, then we must in fairness concede that they have something to say for themselves; and it is well to understand exactly what that something is.

Suppose, then, we were to ask M. Clemenceau to speak his full mind in defence of the attitude of resentful suspicion adopted almost universally by his countrymen, I think he would reply somewhat in this fashion:—

"In Downing Street last December I tried to arrive at an understanding with England about Syria. I was deeply conscious of the need of friendly relations between the two countries, and was most anxious to prevent any

collision of interests in the Middle East. I therefore asked the Prime Minister what modification in the Sykes-Picot Agreement England desired. He replied, 'Mosul.' I said, 'You shall have it.' Anything else? He replied, 'Palestine.' Again, I said, 'You shall have it.' I left London somewhat doubtful as to the reception this arrangement would have in France, but well assured that to Great Britain at least it would prove satisfactory.

"What, then, was my surprise when I found that what I had given with so generous a hand was made the occasion for demanding more. Mosul, it seems, was useless unless Palmyra was given also. Palestine was no sufficient home for the Jews unless its frontiers were pushed northward into Syria. And, as if this was not enough, it was discovered that Mesopotamia required a direct all-British outlet on the Mediterranean; that this involved, or was supposed to involve, the possession by England of Palmyra; so that Palmyra must follow Mosul and be transferred from the French sphere to the British.

"All this was bad; but worse remains to be told. In the early days of the Peace Conference it was agreed that, speaking generally, conquered territory outside Europe should be held by the conquerors under mandate from the League of Nations. Who under this plan was to be the mandatory for Syria? This, perhaps, could only be finally settled when other Turkish problems were dealt with. But who was not to be mandatory could be settled, so far as England was concerned, at once. Accordingly, the Prime Minister took occasion formally to announce that under no circumstances would England either demand the mandate or take it; she valued too highly the friendship of France. Nothing could be more explicit. Yet at the very moment when the declaration was made, and ever since, officers of the British army were occupied in carrying on an active propaganda in favour of England. Rumours were spread broadcast regarding France's unpopularity with the Arabs, and though the rumours were false everything was done to make them true. There could be but one object in these manoeuvres, namely, to make the British mandate, which had been so solemnly, and doubtless so sincerely, repudiated in Paris, a practical necessity in the East. England's pledged word would be broken, because England had so contrived matters that it could not in fact be fulfilled. Syria would thus go the way of Egypt, and an incurable injury would be inflicted on Anglo-French relations."

This, or something very like it, represents, I am convinced, the present frame of mind of M. Clemenceau. The French Foreign Office, the French Colonial Party, the shipping interests of Marseilles, the silk interests of Lyons, the Jesuits and the French Clericals, combine to embitter the controversy by playing on French historical aspirations with the aid of mendacious reports from French officials in Syria. Relations between the two countries on this subject are getting more and more strained, so that it does most seriously behove us to consider the method by which this cloud of suspicion can best be dissipated, and an arrangement reached which shall be fair to both countries and of benefit to the Eastern world.

It must be admitted, in the first place, that we have not "staged" our plan—so far as we have a plan—with any notable success. We have made a dramatic renunciation, but it has fallen flat. We have made a *beau geste*, and none have applauded. This is, of course, in part due to the fact that we are not proposing to give the French anything which they do not believe to be already theirs, and that what it is proposed to give them now is less than what they would have obtained under the Sykes-Picot Agreement. But it is also due in part to the fact that, if I am rightly informed, the British officers in Syria have not always played up to the British Ministers in Paris. This is vehemently and most sincerely denied by General Clayton. But friends of mine from Syria confirm the view, and I know personally of one case in which a British officer, though well acquainted with the Prime Minister's pledge, thought himself precluded by his instructions from giving an Arab deputation, which came to ask for British protection, the clear and decisive answer which, by destroying all hopes, would have effectually removed all misunderstandings. It is easy to guess what interpretation the French would put on an incident which must certainly have come to their ears, and is doubtless only one of many.

How came such things to happen? In the main, I have no doubt, owing to the loudly-advertised policy of self-determination preceded by a Commission of Enquiry—a Commission that began by being international, and ended by being American. This Commission, by the very term of its reference, was to find out what the Arabs of Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia desired, and to advise the Powers accordingly. We

gave it our blessing, and directed our officers to supply it with every assistance. But this obviously involved, as an inevitable corollary, that the whole future of these regions was still in the balance, and that their destiny depended chiefly on the wishes of their inhabitants. No British officer could possibly think otherwise; yet, if he thus spoke and acted, there is not a Frenchman in Syria—or elsewhere—who would not regard him as anti-French in feeling, and as an intriguer against France in practice.

II.

This brings into clear relief what I fear is the unhappy truth, namely, that France, England, and America have got themselves into a position over the Syrian problem so inextricably confused that no really neat and satisfactory issue is now possible for any of them.

The situation is affected by five documents, beginning with our promise to the ruler of the Hedjaz in 1915; going on to the Sykes-Picot Agreement with France of September 1916; followed by the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918; and concluding with the Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919; and the directions given to the Commission sent out to examine the Arab problem on the spot—directions which, it must be observed, were accepted by France, Britain, and America, though the Commission itself was, in the end, purely American in composition. These documents are not consistent with each other; they represent no clear-cut policy; the policy which they confusedly adumbrate is not really the policy of the Allied and Associated Powers; and yet, so far as I can see, none of them have wholly lost their validity or can be treated in all respects as of merely historic interest. Each can be quoted by Frenchmen, Englishmen, Americans, and Arabs when it happens to suit their purpose. Doubtless each will be so quoted before we come to a final arrangement about the Middle East.

These difficulties are well illustrated by the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. What its authors aimed at was the creation of two clearly-defined areas, one carved out of Syria and the other out of Mesopotamia—the first which should be French, as Tunis is French; the other English, as Egypt is English. Between them was to lie a huge tract occupied in part by nomad Bedouins, in part by a sedentary Arab-speaking population, urban and agricultural, who should be independent in the sense that they would live their own life in their own way, but who would be under the patronage, and for certain purposes under the control, either of France or of England, according as they belonged to what in the agreement was described as area A or area B. The scheme was not thought out, it had obvious imperfections; but if honestly and sympathetically worked by the superintending Powers it might easily have proved a success. For, as I read history, such an overlordship is not alien to the immemorial customs and traditions of this portion of the Eastern world.

On the other hand, the scheme does seem to me quite alien to those modern notions of nationality which are enshrined in the Covenant and proclaimed in the declaration. These documents proceed on the assumption that, if we supply an aggregate of human beings, more or less homogeneous in language and religion, with a little assistance and a good deal of advice, if we protect them from external aggression and discourage internal violence, they will speedily and spontaneously organise themselves into a democratic state on modern lines. They will, in language borrowed from the declaration, establish "a national government," and enjoy "an administration deriving its authority from the initiative and free choice of the native population."

If by this is meant, as I think it is, that when the Turkish tyranny is wholly past the Arabs will desire to use their new-found freedom to set up representative institutions, with secret voting, responsible government, and national frontiers, I fear we are in error. They will certainly do nothing of the sort. The language of the Covenant may suit the longitude of Washington, Paris, or Prague. But in the longitude of Damascus it will probably get us into trouble, unless, indeed, we can agree to treat it with a very wide latitude of interpretation.

How, indeed, when dealing with this series of documents, is latitude of interpretation to be avoided? Consider the following analysis:—

In 1915 we promised the Arabs independence; and the promise was unqualified, except in respect of certain territorial reservations. In 1918 the promise was by implication repeated; for no other interpretation can, I think, be placed by any unbiassed reader on the phrases in the declaration about a "National Government," and "an Administration deriving its authority from the initiative and free choice of the native population."

But in 1916 (Sykes-Picot) the independence even of the most independent portion of the new Arab State (i.e., areas A and B) was qualified by the obligatory presence of foreign advisers; as, indeed, it is under the mandatory system of 1919. Now, by an "adviser" these documents undoubtedly mean—though they do not say so—an adviser whose advice must be followed; and assuredly no State can be described as really independent which has habitually and normally to follow foreign advice supported, if the worst comes to the worst, by troops, aeroplanes, and tanks.

In our promises with regard to the frontiers of the new Arab States we do not seem to have been more fortunate than in our promises about their independence. In 1915 it was the Sherif of Mecca to whom the task of delimitation was to have been confided, nor were any restrictions placed upon his discretion in this matter, except certain reservations intended to protect French interests in Western Syria and Cilicia.

In 1916 all this seems to have been forgotten. The Sykes-Picot Agreement made no reference to the Sherif of Mecca, and, so far as our five documents are concerned, he has never been heard of since. A wholly new method was adopted by France and England, who made with each other in the Sykes-Picot Agreement the rough and ready territorial arrangements already described—arrangements which the Allied and Associated Powers have so far neither explicitly accepted nor explicitly replaced.

By implication, indeed, they have rejected them. The language of the Covenant assumes or asserts that in the regions we are discussing, as in other portions of the Turkish Empire, there are in the advanced chrysalis state "independent nations" sufficiently "developed" to demand "provisional recognition," each of which is to be supplied by the Powers with a mandatory till it is able to stand alone. Where and what are these "independent nations"? Are they by chance identical with Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine? If so, the coincidence with the Sykes-Picot arrangement is truly amazing, for no such idea was present to the minds of those who framed it. They started from the view that France had ancient interests and aspirations in Western Syria; that Britain had obvious claims in Bagdad and Southern Mesopotamia; that Palestine had a unique historic position; and that if these three areas were to be separately controlled, it was obviously expedient that none of the vast and vague territory lying between them, which had no national organisation, should be under any other foreign influence. In other words, when they made the tripartite arrangement they never supposed themselves to be dealing with three nations already in existence, ready for "provisional recognition," only requiring the removal of the Turk, the advice of a mandatory, and a little time to enable them to "stand alone." It never occurred to them that they had to deal at all with nations in the modern and Western sense of the term. With the Arab race, Arab culture, and Arab social and religious organisation (to say nothing of Jews, Maronites, Druses, and Kurds) they knew they had to deal. But this is a very different thing.

Now where the Covenant of 1919 is in contradiction with the Agreement of 1916 it is presumably the Covenant which must be held to represent our policy. We are seemingly committed, therefore, to the view that the whole area we are considering already consists of an independent nation or nations; and that all we have to do, after having got rid of the Turk, is to supply every independent nation with one, but not more than one, suitable mandatory.

Without further considering whether the political picture drawn by the Covenant corresponds with anything to be found in the realms of fact, let us ask on what principle these mandatories are to be selected by the Allied and Associated Powers.

On this point the Covenant speaks as follows:—

"The wishes of these communities (i.e., the independent nations) must be a principal consideration in the selection of a mandatory."

The sentiment is unimpeachable; but how is it to be carried into effect? To simplify the argument, let us assume that two of the "independent nations" for which mandatories have to be provided are Syria and Palestine. Take Syria first. Do we mean, in the case of Syria, to consult principally the wishes of the inhabitants? We mean nothing of the kind. According to the universally accepted view there are only three possible mandatories—England, America, and France. Are we going "chiefly to consider the wishes of the inhabitants" in deciding which of these is to be selected? We are going to do nothing of the kind. England has refused. America will refuse. So that, whatever the inhabitants may wish, it is France they will certainly have. They may freely choose; but it is Hobson's choice after all.

The contradiction between the letter of the Covenant and the policy of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the "independent nation" of Palestine than in that of the "independent nation" of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American Commission has been going through the form of asking what they are. The four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.

In my opinion that is right. What I have never been able to understand is how it can be harmonised with the declaration, the Covenant, or the instructions to the Commission of Enquiry.

I do not think that Zionism will hurt the Arabs; but they will never say they want it. Whatever be the future of Palestine it is not now an "independent nation," nor is it yet on the way to become one. Whatever deference should be paid to the views of those who live there, the Powers in their selection of a mandatory do not propose, as I understand the matter, to consult them. In short, so far as Palestine is concerned, the Powers have made no statement of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no declaration of policy which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate.

III.

Since the literal fulfilment of all our declarations is impossible, partly because they are incompatible with each other and partly because they are incompatible with facts, we ought, I presume, to do the next best thing. And the next best thing may, perhaps, be attained if we can frame a scheme which shall, as far as possible, further not merely the material interests but the hopes and habits of the native population; which shall take into account the legitimate aspirations of other peoples and races, in particular, of the French, the British, and the Jews; and which shall embody, as completely as may be, the essential spirit of the various international pronouncements, whose literal provisions it seems impossible in all cases to fulfil.

To this end I venture to lay down the following propositions:—

1. The fundamental conception underlying the Sykes-Picot Agreement should be maintained—namely, a French sphere centring round Syria, a British sphere centring round the Euphrates and the Tigris, and a home for the Jews in the valley of the Jordan.
2. The Sykes-Picot Agreement should, however, be brought into closer harmony with the Covenant by the abandonment of the special privileges in the "blue" and "red" territories where France and England were given rights not easily distinguishable from complete sovereignty. These should be absorbed in the general body of areas A and B, as ultimately defined.
3. Moreover, the economic monopoly assigned by the Sykes-Picot Agreement to France and Britain respectively shall be abandoned. France and Britain will become mandates, and the fundamental principles laid down by the Covenant for the Government under mandate of territories outside the Turkish Empire shall, as far as possible, be maintained.
4. The French zone of Syria shall extend in the direction of Anatolia at least sufficiently far to include Alexandretta and its hinterland. Whether France obtains more of Cilicia than this must depend on the arrangement of Armenian mandates and the claims of Italy under the Treaty of London.
5. The British zone in Mesopotamia shall extend at least as far as Mosul. Even if this general scheme be provisionally adopted as a basis of discussion, there evidently remains a large number of difficult questions of delimitation which still await solution. In solving them I think the following principles should be borne in mind.

In the first place, I would lay it down that frontiers should be determined by economic and ethnographic considerations rather than strategic.

If other things are equal, by all means choose a good military frontier rather than a bad one. But do not let us further impede the already slow and difficult movements of diplomacy by providing needless safeguards against so remote a possibility as a war with France. It will probably never take place; if it does take place, it will probably be waged with weapons whose character and use we cannot foresee: in any case it will

not be decided in Syria. Let us therefore for the moment forget these local views of strategy and take a more practical view of the position.

We have three coterminous areas to consider—Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. Their frontiers may be doubtful, but the great central core of each is disputed by no one. Syria includes Lebanon, Damascus, Aleppo, and the eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean north of Palestine. Palestine is essentially the valley of the Jordan, with the adjacent coast and plains. Mesopotamia is essentially the region watered by the Tigris and Euphrates. What we have got to do is to make such international arrangements, economic and territorial, as will enable each region to develop itself to the best advantage without giving occasion for jealousies or disputes. The task ought not to be impossible, but it will require to be worked at by experts who have far more knowledge than I possess or can obtain. What follow are casual notes on such points as occur to me.

Palestine.

If Zionism is to influence the Jewish problem throughout the world Palestine must be made available for the largest possible number of Jewish immigrants. It is therefore eminently desirable that it should obtain the command of the water-power which naturally belongs to it, whether by extending its borders to the north, or by treaty with the mandatory of Syria, to whom the southward flowing waters of Hamon could not in any event be of much value.

For the same reason Palestine should extend into the lands lying east of the Jordan. It should not, however, be allowed to include the Hedjaz Railway, which is too distinctly bound up with exclusively Arab interests.

Mesopotamia.

So far as I know the only two economic needs of Mesopotamia which are likely to cause trouble with the mandates of Syria are rights of water and rights of access. On both subjects I am ignorant, and on neither is there much expert knowledge available in Paris. Nevertheless, I venture the following observations:—

In this part of the world fertility is in proportion to irrigation. If, therefore, for other reasons, a river is anywhere taken as a frontier, elaborate provisions will have to be made by treaty for dividing the water between the cultivators on its two banks, who (by supposition) are under different mandates. Such a scheme might be difficult to devise and yet more difficult to enforce. It would therefore be best, where possible, to avoid using rivers as frontiers.

The question of access to Mesopotamia is a more complicated affair. By sea the only obstacles are: (1) the distance from European markets; (2) the unhealthiness of the Persian Gulf; (3) the dues of the Suez Canal.

Nothing can change the first; we are not likely to modify greatly the second and third. And for these reasons engineers are much preoccupied with schemes for giving to Mesopotamia direct access by pipe and railways to a Mediterranean port.

So far as I can learn, the subject as a whole has so far been very imperfectly studied. I am not sure that, as regards pipe lines, it has been studied at all. A great deal, indeed, is known and much has been done with the Bagdad Railway; and its eastern section—if it were connected with Alexandretta, and the port of Alexandretta were improved and modernised—would provide the natural outlet to the commerce of Northern Mesopotamia.

But, it will be objected, Alexandretta is going to be French; and we know enough of French methods to be aware how successfully the most "open door" can be half-closed by the ingenious zeal of local officials.

I do not deny that this is an argument of some substance; and if the sea route is too costly to protect us from this species of blackmail, we must consider the possibility of finding an alternative land route wholly within our own control. On this point I shall say something in a moment.

In the meanwhile, however, let me observe that the force of this criticism is easily exaggerated. The pinch of French methods is felt not in the case of through traffic, but in such cases as Morocco, where the local officials control the whole machinery of railway distribution. There, no doubt, French traders have a strong interest in hampering their foreign rivals, and their malpractices, aided by official methods, are extremely difficult to check.

But the case is quite otherwise when we are dealing with through traffic and with

a port which, like Alexandretta, must largely depend on through traffic. Here the interests of those who own the port and railways are identical with those of the importers and exporters in the foreign country which they serve. There is no opening for differential treatment; and, if the familiar expedients by which through traffic to such places as Switzerland and Bohemia is protected in transit are insufficient in the case of Mesopotamia (and I cannot conceive why they should be), it would always be possible to retaliate at the Bagdad end, a fact which would probably render retaliation unnecessary.

I think the people who shrink from the idea of allowing a British protectorate to depend in part on a foreign-owned railway are in the main moved by arguments which are either sentimental or military. With the sentimental argument I sympathise, but I would not let it control our policy. I would neither allow it drive us into wasting millions on unprofitable projects, nor into an interminable series of petty squabbles with our neighbours. But this does not mean that we shall refuse to consider alternative methods of connecting Mesopotamia with the Mediterranean by rail and pipe-line through all-British protectorates. On the contrary, it is of the first importance that we should know without delay whether any such prospects are physically possible and economically sound. The mere fact that we were considering them would keep the appetites of French concessionnaires at Alexandretta within reasonable limits. At the same time, such conversation as I have had with experts has not raised my hopes. The route by Palmyra is circuitous. It could be tapped by a short French line to Tripoli. Palmyra itself belongs naturally to the sphere of Damascus, if it belongs anywhere; and the French will take more trouble to prevent our having it than it will ever be worth, either to them or to us. Such, at least, are my first impressions.

On the other hand, a direct line south of Palmyra and wholly in the British sphere (B) would have a longer continuous stretch of desert to cross before reaching Palestine; and in Palestine itself the succession of mountain ridges running parallel to the coast render the construction of a transverse railway line difficult and costly.

On these subjects, however, I speak without any sort of authority. I doubt whether they have ever been adequately examined.

[132930]

No. 107.

His Highness Emir Feisal to the Prime Minister of Great Britain.—(Communicated to Foreign Office September 24.)

Your Excellency,

London, September 21, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency my reply to the *aide-mémoire* of which you kindly gave me a copy on Friday, the 19th September, 1919, and of which you said a copy was given to M. Clemenceau on the 13th instant, and another to Mr. Polk on the 15th:—

1. This proposed arrangement is detrimental to the rights of the Arabs and in direct opposition to what they expected from the British and French Governments in particular, and from the civilised world in general. After having taken part in this war against the Caliphate itself, and after exposing the Holy Land to the ravages of war in support of the principles avowed by the Allies more than once in speeches and proclamations, the Arabs at least expect that their rights should be taken into consideration.

2. The Arabs, at whose expense the agreement had been concluded without their knowledge, can never recognise such an engagement or take the responsibility of accepting what would be detrimental to their rights, and what would lead to the dismemberment of their country for no fault or crime on their part.

3. The 1916 Treaty, which has been made the basis of this agreement, is not officially known to the Arabs. It could never be the basis of any agreement after the Allied and Associated Powers had decided to cancel all secret treaties. Furthermore, my father having learnt for the first time from the Paris Arabic paper "El-Mustakbal" of the existence of this secret treaty, which was divulged by Jamal Pasha in Damascus for propaganda purposes, he protested vehemently to His Majesty's Government. He received the following reply:—

"Bolsheviks found in Petrograd Foreign Office record of old conversations and provisional understanding (not formal treaty) between Britain, France, and Russia made early in war to prevent difficulties between Powers in prosecuting war with

Turkey. Jamal, either from ignorance or malice, has distorted its original purpose, has omitted its stipulations regarding consent of native populations and safeguarding their interest, and has ignored fact that subsequent outbreak and success of Arab revolt and withdrawal of Russia had for long time past created wholly different situation."

This has also been confirmed as far as the consent of the population is concerned by the joint proclamation of Great Britain and France of November 1918, also by the Covenant of the League of Nations, of which the ink is not yet dry, and by the last communication of Colonel Meinertzhagen in the presence of M. Lafourcade, the purport of which is that Great Britain will not force a mandate on any nation.

4. The Commander-in-chief of the Allied forces in Syria notified us officially, and also more than once through the political officers in Syria, orally and by written statements, that he was responsible for the administration of the whole country to the Allies and to the Peace Conference through the British War Office. This fact was confirmed by Colonel Meinertzhagen, chief British political officer, at a meeting in Damascus on Tuesday, the 9th September, 1919, in the presence of the French High Commissioner, M. Lafourcade. The occupation has existed for the past year, and there seems to be no sufficient cause to now alter the arrangement for the short period which you say will now only elapse until the Peace Treaty with Turkey is signed.

5. The Arabs decline to recognise an agreement concluded without their knowledge at a meeting at which they were not represented. They also decline to recognise a decision they did not take part in at a time when all concerned were equally held responsible to the Commander-in-chief of the Allied forces.

6. It is officially and unofficially understood that the present measures of administration in Syria are temporary. It is also understood from the attached *aide-mémoire* that this new agreement is also temporary "pending the decision in regard to mandates." What is the meaning, then, of exchanging a temporary arrangement with another of the same temporary character, and what is the difference between the two that one should replace the other and be carried out at a very inopportune time when it is much easier to keep the *status quo* unchanged until the final decision? I should like to give a caution to the responsible statesmen who manage the affairs of nations that the execution of this policy will undoubtedly lead to untoward events in the Arab provinces, and this must be a great responsibility on those who have concluded this unjust and hated agreement.

7. The third clause of the attached *aide-mémoire* says:—

"In deciding to whom to hand over responsibility for garrisoning the various districts in the evacuated area, regard will be had to the engagements and declarations of the British and French Governments, not only as between themselves, but as between them and the Arabs."

As I have no copies of these engagements and declarations, particularly between the French Government and the Arabs—engagements which tend to dismember the country, I should be greatly obliged if you would kindly furnish me with authorised copies. I am only aware of engagements between Great Britain and the Arabs which are not, however, in exact harmony with this last agreement, and of declarations by both Governments giving self-determination to the nations (November 1918).

8. Although this agreement is said to be of a temporary nature, I strongly protest against what the *aide-mémoire* says with reference to the boundaries and their limitations. The mention of the boundaries, and the fact that Great Britain is prepared to discuss their limitations, is an absolute proof of the intention to dismember the Arab provinces, and is an unjustified interference to thus determine the future of the country before the final decision by the Peace Conference.

9. I would like to ask His Britannic Majesty's Government, who have declared that Great Britain will not accept a mandate over Syria, what would Great Britain say to her previous engagements to the Arabs and her promise "to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs"? Would Great Britain say to the Arabs that she has nothing to do with them now, and that her interests are not the same as they were? Would Great Britain, who has always declared that she would defend the rights of nations, and who has often fought in defending weak nations, leave the Arabs at the mercy of greedy imperialistic ideas? I leave the decision in this question to your Excellency's conscience and to the public opinion of the generous British nation.

10. Should it be found necessary to withdraw the British forces from Syria, why not withdraw all European troops and leave the responsibility to the Arab Government,

who are prepared to be responsible to the Allied and Associated Powers for the interior security of the country until such time as the Peace Conference shall decide the future of Syria.

11. These are the preliminary observations I wish to bring to your Excellency's notice. In conclusion, I ask that this proposed engagement between the French and British Governments shall be entirely cancelled, as it is contrary to the ideals of the League of Nations, and is also contrary to our other engagements, which were based on national honour. It is, moreover, an unjust return to the policy of ambitious Imperialism which after this war should be swept away for ever. The Arabs will consequently be obliged to defend their unity and existence with their utmost available power and zeal. They will not fail to find the means to publish to the whole world how engagements have been thrown to the wind and how different lines of policy have been taken, although it may be said in defence of this change that it is of a temporary character. The condition of mind of the inhabitants of the country will undoubtedly lead them to believe that this arrangement is a preliminary to the actual dismemberment of the country. They will not accept any argument or excuse. I cannot understand how the Commander-in-chief, who is aware of all these facts, could consent to expose the country he liberated to internal disorder. It would surely be much more advisable to leave the *status quo* as it is, or withdraw all European troops until the final decision. I have submitted these observations to your Excellency to relieve myself of all responsibility to you and to the whole civilised world.

I have, &c.

[Unsigned.]

[132731]

No. 108.

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Crouce.

(No. 6206.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 24, 1919.

THE French Ambassador called on Lord Hardinge on the 22nd instant. In the course of conversation he alluded to Syria and the conflict of public opinion on the subject of the action of British officers in that country. Lord Hardinge therefore seized upon this opportunity of putting to him very clearly the views which I had already expressed to his Excellency. He told him that no country could have acted more loyally towards the French Government in regard to Syria than we had, that every complaint which had been shown to have any justification had been at once set right, but that, nevertheless, in spite of the *bona fides* of the British Government, a campaign of calumny had been organised in the French press, and apparently the French Government did nothing whatsoever to check it. This, Lord Hardinge pointed out to him, was making a very bad impression upon me and His Majesty's Government at a moment when we were trying to induce the Emir Feisal to recognise our engagements towards France by which we considered ourselves bound, and which were in reality not in conflict with our engagements with King Hussein. For this action on our part we were incurring the mistrust of Feisal and of the Arab community, and it would be as well that the French Government should realise the disinterestedness of our action and take some steps to put an end to the press campaign against Great Britain.

M. Cambon said in reply that it was a great mistake to imagine that the French Government could take control of such papers as the "*Débats*" and the "*Écho de Paris*," two very independent journals. He maintained that the complaints of the press were justified, and he related certain facts, such as the taking over of the railways constructed by French capital in Syria, the elimination of all French employés, and the refusal to allow repairs to be carried out on these lines. Another instance he gave was the seizure of the customs sheds at Beirut, which had put an end to all activities in the port, but he admitted that this had now been arranged. Lord Hardinge pointed out to M. Cambon that this was ancient history, and that what he was saying only served to confirm what he, Lord Hardinge, had already said, that if any complaint of the French authorities was justified it was immediately put right by the military authorities on the spot, and that being the case, surely the French Government could have passed the word round to the press to cease their attacks on British policy in Syria in view of an arrangement being practically settled. But, Lord Hardinge added, this was not the only quarter in which a campaign of hostile propaganda was being carried on against Great Britain, for the same thing was being done in Tehran, where an active campaign was

in progress, headed by the French and American Ministers, against the Anglo-Persian Agreement. Lord Hardinge reminded M. Cambon that on two occasions his Excellency had declared to me the complete political disinterestedness of the French Government in Persia, and that I had taken note of these declarations. Consequently it was all the more astonishing to me that the French Minister should be assuming a hostile rôle towards His Majesty's Government in the Persian capital at this moment. Lord Hardinge added that he trusted that M. Cambon would bring these facts to the notice of his Government, and that M. Bonin would receive a severe reprimand.

M. Cambon admitted that my statement, that he had twice declared the disinterestedness of France in Persia, was absolutely correct and that the position remained precisely the same in that respect.

As for the remarks made in the French press against the agreement, he said that there was a certain feeling of surprise that no warning had been given to the French Government that such an agreement was in prospect, and that the absence of such a warning to an Ally had been wounding to their susceptibilities, but that he could not believe that there was any serious opposition in the French press to the agreement. As for M. Bonin, he knew nothing at all about him or what he was doing, but he would not fail to bring his activities to the notice of his Government in the hope that a stop might immediately be put to them. He added that he had been promoted from the Consular Service and was apparently suffering from *Morbus consularis*.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[133506]

No. 109.

His Highness Sherif Feisal to the Prime Minister of Great Britain.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, September 25.)

Your Excellency,

London, September 23, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency the following additional note to my reply submitted yesterday, and dated the 21st September, 1919.

His Excellency the Commander-in-chief of the Allied armies in Syria asked me yesterday to discuss with him the question of carrying out the evacuation of the country by the British forces. I brought to the notice of his Excellency that I would decline to discuss the subject, and gave my reasons for it.

I beg now to remind your Excellency that when the British General in Command at Beirut obliged the Arab troops to evacuate the sea-coast, he wrote to Shukri Pasha, the Arab General, that this change was simply of a military and temporary character until the future of the country was settled at the Peace Conference.

It was the British forces that lowered the Arab flags. Our confidence in the honour of the British Army, and the statement of his Excellency the Commander-in-chief in a telegram he sent to me in which he assured me of the nature of this arrangement, and the fact that it was understood that the whole country was to remain under the Commander-in-chief until the final settlement induced me to agree to the evacuation of the sea-coast by our troops, and the removal of the Arab flags hoisted on Government buildings and elsewhere by the inhabitants.

For these reasons, I asked one of two things: either the return of the Arab forces to the places they occupied on the sea-coast, in which case I take the whole responsibility of keeping public security and peace until the final decision, or the maintenance of the *status quo* until the final settlement.

I have, &c.

[Unsigned.]

[135233]

No. 110.

Rear-Admiral Webb to Earl Curzon.—(Received September 30.)

(No. 1676.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, September 11, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copy of an interesting report from one of the relief officers, Lieutenant Slade, R.N.V.R., who has recently been on a tour along the south coast of the Black Sea.

2. This report touches on many important points.

[1356]

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3. In the first place it shows the complete lawlessness of the interior, where order is supposed to be maintained by gendarmes who have themselves only just abandoned the profession of brigandage. Favour appears to be shown to brigands in the first place, and in the second to Moslems; there is none left for the Christians, who are treated to the full rigour of the law.

4. Next, attention is called to the destitute and homeless condition of the Christian population which threatens to become disastrous next winter. It was in December last that I first had the honour of pointing out the urgent necessity of deciding whether the Armenians should be assisted to return to their old homes, or to emigrate to the new Armenia which was to be founded, but so far no resolution has been taken, and the people have solved the question in large part of themselves by returning as best they could to the places where they used to live.

5. The means at the disposal of this High Commission have, of course, been inadequate to deal with so great a problem, which, indeed, would seem to be a task for the Turkish Government prompted by the mandatory Power.

6. American assistance has done some good, but it must be remembered that this has only taken the form of selling foodstuff and agricultural machinery at cost price, and that even this activity is now ceasing. It has not been done on any great scale, nor has it penetrated far into the interior. Nothing has been done in the way of rebuilding villages, and this is doubtless due to the more pressing need for reconstruction nearer home.

7. Armenia is still as vague an expression as ever, and thus no action has been possible in the way of centralising Armenians in their new country.

8. With regard to the Greeks, I think their situation is less desperate than that of the Armenians. They appear better able to look after themselves; they are largely favoured by the facts that they mainly live in proximity to the sea coast, and that they profit by the lively solicitude of the Hellenic Kingdom; and they are not, even after the occupation of Smyrna, the object of such complete detestation to the Turks as are the Armenians.

9. The third point referred to by Lieutenant Slade is the question of the women and children. This has occupied my closest interest and attention. I found that the recovery of the women from their Moslem husbands entailed so much difficulty that the advantages attained were sometimes outweighed by the resentment aroused and the consequent danger to which the relics of the Armenian community were exposed.

10. It frequently happens that Islamised women and children are, as a matter of practical well-being, better off in their present condition than if they were, by persuasion or compulsion, restored to the care of their communities, for in the majority of cases their families no longer exist.

11. In such cases and especially when Islamised women have borne children to Moslem husbands and declare themselves contented with their lots, I am driven to the conclusion that, from the point of view of humanity as distinct from that of religious feeling, our best course is to leave them as they are for the present, while remaining always attentive to the slightest call for assistance or relief.

12. The fourth point is the restitution of property. Only a few days ago I called together the officials in this High Commission who are best fitted by their experience to give an opinion on this question, together with several of the relief officers, who happened at the moment to be in Constantinople.

13. Your Lordship is aware that the action of the relief officers in obtaining restitution of Armenian and Greek property is based on a verbal understanding with the Turkish Government, who undertook to pass a law which should regularise their decisions, but unfortunately this law has not yet been passed.

14. The restitution is effected by the decision of small Mixed Commissions, formed locally under the direction of the British relief officers and the representative of the Turkish Minister of the Interior who accompanies him on tour. These are composed of one Moslem and one Christian member, with a substitute for each in case of absence, sickness, &c., assisted by a judicial adviser when possible.

15. The members of the commissions are appointed by the local authorities from among the Moslem and the Christian notables of the locality, and the rôle of the relief officer and his Turkish co-adjutor is confined to starting the work on proper lines and supervising its progress during their periodical visits.

16. It has been noticeable throughout that the measure of success attained by each commission depended directly upon the personality and experience of the relief officer. But whereas at first there was quite a ready acquiescence on the part of the

Turks in the decision of the commission, now even the most competent of the relief officers find their efforts greatly hampered. I attribute this to two causes.

17. In the first place, the Turks imagined that they were coming under a British mandate, and thought it wise to comply with the orders of a relief officer, and perhaps at the outset they had slight pricks of conscience that they were occupying property to which they had no real right, and they believed also that there was some law which cancelled the provisions enacted by the iniquitous "Emvali Metrouké," (Abandoned Property Law), and which had the full sanction of the Turkish Constitution and Parliament. They are now coming to perceive that neither of these are, in fact, the case.

18. The second cause is the movement headed by Mustafa Kemal, which is generally known as the "Muda-faa-i-Houkuk-i-Millieh" or "Defence of the National Rights." I think it may undoubtedly be stated that this party owes its present vitality to the fact of the Greek occupation of Smyrna and to the sanguinary occurrences consequent thereon. I have already reported in sufficient fullness on this party, and it is not unnatural that they should regard our action in Anatolia as interference solely on behalf of the Christians of Anatolia and thus as an anti-Moslem attitude, not as tending to the general amelioration of the methods of administration.

19. One of the results of this movement is consequently to be seen in the serious revival of anti Christian feeling among the unrepentant Moslems of Anatolia, and in a hardening of their opposition to all our efforts on behalf of suffering Christian population.

20. The unanimous opinion at the meeting I have referred to in paragraph 12 was that this was the case and that it was imprudent to press, in present circumstances, for the restitution of property. It was decided, therefore, that henceforth, until the promised law should be passed, the greatest circumspection should be observed and that the relief officers should mainly limit themselves to reporting as the facts came to their knowledge. Lieutenant Slade's remarks furnish fresh proofs of the wisdom of this decision.

21. Meanwhile I am doing all in my power to hasten the passage of this law, but the obstacles are not easy to overcome.

22. I next pass to the matter of the punishment of Turkish offenders. I have already dealt with this question many months ago, and I can only adhere to the opinion which I then expressed. There are now undoubtedly many thousands of Mussulmans in this country who deserve to be treated with the most extreme penalties of the law, but, to my everlasting regret, it appears impracticable to do this; Turkey must therefore be punished as a nation, and it is only the greatest criminals, those who from the centre instigated, organised, and finally ordered the massacres and deportations, whom, as a matter of practical politics, it is possible and desirable to punish in their persons. At the same time I feel the keenest sympathy with the disgust and indignation of Lieutenant Slade that so infamous a creature as, for example, the boatman who drowned the Armenian children in the harbour of Trebizond should escape the penalty of his crimes unscathed. But once one departs from the principle I have enunciated, it becomes immediately impossible to draw the line. There are, undoubtedly, many thousands quite as guilty as this boatman, if not more so.

23. On prisons I have had the occasion to report to your Lordship continually. I shall endeavour to obtain some remedy for the state of the Ordou prison, but I fear it will be inadequate and purely temporary. No proper amelioration is to be hoped for until one single mandatory Government is appointed with the full and complete approval of the League of Nations and backed by the fullest and most complete possible goodwill of the Turkish Government and people, who must be convinced of the sincerity of the mandatory in his intention to provide not only the Christian but the Moslem also with an administration beneficent, firm, but, above all, just.

I have, &c.

RICHARD WEBB,

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 110.

Lieutenant Slade to Rear-Admiral Webb.

Sir,

Constantinople, September 5, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in accordance with your instructions, I left Constantinople on the 10th August in H.M.S. "Gardenia" for tour along the south coast of the Black Sea.

[1356]

2 G 2

1. *Public Security.*

This is very bad east of Guersé. Nearly all the brigands have been pardoned and have surrendered, but are permitted (according to the Government conditions of surrender) to retain their weapons, with the result that these brigands are much freer than before, they no longer being outlaws. Hand grenades are now carried in addition to rifles and about 500 rounds of ammunition.

So bad is the security around Kerassunde that the Christians are unable to collect the nut crop, which was worth before the war 3,000,000*l.* per annum.

The gendarmes are nearly all recruited from ex-brigands (quite 80 per cent.), and therefore do not take any drastic action against their late companions, but they devote most of their energies to rounding up odd Christians who are still at large.

2. *Relief.*

I found that something will have to be done for the village of Patrios, near Ineboli. The population had already had relief of 60 tons of flour and 1,000 yards of calico, which is now consumed. The homes still lack windows and doors, and as the winter is approaching the outlook is poor. The population lives by fishing, but boats, nets, lines, hooks are lacking, and the little money earned by the few males that are left goes to keep the wolf from the door. Perhaps the Greek Agricultural Commission, which I understand has many thousands to spend, could extend its energies by buying raw material for building boats, nets, &c.

It is impossible to imagine the condition of Armenian widows and orphans in the interior with the winter ahead and who live in villages which are cut off by snow three months of the year. This will be the second winter they have passed since their return from exile. To distribute adequate relief to these scattered villages 200 and 300 kilometres from rail or sea will be impossible.

If the population (Armenian) could be brought to the coast and housed they could be easily relieved, protected by the navy, and be handy for shipping to Armenia when the order is given. There are 200 Armenian houses (if not more) in Trebizond, another 50 or 60 in Kerassunde, Ordou, Unia, Fatsa, Ineboli, Sinope, &c., say 100 more, which would, or could, hold nearly 4,000. Again, Salonica, Egypt, Mudros, &c., must have many hundreds of huts that are of no further use, or if they are not available, Kastamouni vilayet can supply 100,000 cubic metres of pine per annum. The port for this is Ineboli, and would make a splendid Armenian camp.

The above is submitted as a suggestion in the hope that a better one will be made and carried out, because if Armenia is to be populated with Armenians, something will have to be done before the winter if the remnants of an old race are to be saved.

3. *Islamised Women, Children, &c.*

A great many were collected, but there are some 100 (known to be in the vilayet of Samsoun), and many hundreds in the vilayet of Trebizond. This latter vilayet being in such a bad state, I think it better to make no attempt to retake the children unless prompt and drastic measures be taken against those who will not surrender them.

It is quite useless to employ the police or gendarmarie, as they are naturally in sympathy with the offending Turk, and were themselves the chief offenders during the times they escorted and massacred the Armenians on their way to exile.

4. *Restitution of Property.*

Completely stopped except in Samsoun, where there is a resident officer.

I managed to clear up a few big cases, but only by losing a great deal of temper and rattling chains.

The house property has not been restored east of Unia, the reason being that the Minister of Interior gave orders in his telegram of the 21st July, 1919, to the Vali of Trebizond that no house property is to be returned until the law is made. This law has already taken ten months, and is, I understand, still being drafted.

I consider that nothing more can be done till the law is passed.

5. *Agriculture and Notes on Trade.*

Crops good. No notes on trade.

6. *Statistics.*

Already in our hands.

7. *Turkish Offenders.*

Scores still at large, but who come under the head of small fry.

The boatman who drowned the Armenian children in Trebizond harbour is still there.

Rapers, murderers, robbers, &c., are all over the place, and to give all these the justice they deserve would mean condemning over fifty on the coast alone.

8. *Prisons.*

Ordou prison was so bad that it was unfit for cattle. I ordered a new one to be found, but it will not be done.

Prisoners are many weeks overdue, chiefly owing to there being no judicial authorities being appointed. Rizé and Ordou are examples.

9. *National Defence.*

In a flying visit to the Black Sea South Coast it is impossible to make a full statement on the above. My impression was that Rizé, Trebizond, Kerassunde, and Ordou were the chief bases for supplies and sympathy. These towns are full of "tchétés" (brigand bands), and all the grain, especially maize, is, instead of being exported, sent into the interior to Erzeroum, and there is an importation of cereals to places which, in peace time, export, and are quite self-supporting.

Another point observed was the extraordinary quantity of Turkish officers in Trebizond. I found on enquiry that many of these officers land in mufti, change into uniform on shore, and go to Erzeroum. I personally saw the "Alti-Ai" discharge a large cargo of officers and civilians who had, to say the least, a Turkish military bearing.

All the cars (thirty-two) which were in Trebizond have gone to Erzeroum; Captain Crawford confirmed this. I personally went to see the motor-lorries, of which there must be 200, which were left by the Russians. About 70 per cent. were good, but none had magnetos or carburettors, but this appeared to me to be a "blind," and I believe the Turks have all the parts.

About fifteen men were at work on the lorries.

Of course security does not exist, and nothing can be done in the vilayet of Trebizond or Erzeroum until the National Defence is crushed.

Detailed reports on places visited are attached.*

I have, &c.

P. SLADE,

Lieutenant R.O.

September 4, 1919.

[137378]

No. 111.

Mr. Balfour to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 1902.)

MR. BALFOUR presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith copy of a paper for transmission to Constantinople on the subject of the action taken against branch of Wiener Bankverein in Constantinople.

Paris, October 3, 1919.

Enclosure in No. 111.

Wiener Bankverein au Contrôle financier interallié, Constantinople.

Messieurs,

Vienne, le 11 août 1919.

NOUS avons examiné, avec la plus grande attention, les rapports de notre succursale nous informant des mesures prises par le Contrôle financier interallié, depuis

* Not printed.

le mois de janvier, au sujet de notre succursale de Constantinople, et venons par la présente attirer votre attention sur les faits suivants :

Les mesures prises par le Contrôle financier interallié à l'égard de notre succursale ne reposent légalement sur aucune des mesures de guerre économique édictées par les Puissances alliées au cours de la guerre, ni sur aucune des stipulations de la Convention d'Armistice entre ces dernières et l'ancienne Monarchie austro-hongroise ; elles ne peuvent pas, davantage, être justifiées par les dispositions du Traité de Paix, dont la discussion se poursuit actuellement à Saint-Germain. Rien dans les législations relatives à la guerre économique et rien dans les dispositions des conventions susmentionnées, ni, d'ailleurs, dans celles du Traité de Paix signé avec l'Allemagne, ne prévoit ni autorise la liquidation ou la fermeture des succursales de banques autrichiennes sises en Turquie, pays anciennement allié à l'Autriche-Hongrie. En présence du fait indéniable que des mesures de cette nature ne reposent sur aucune loi ou ordonnance, ni sur aucune convention existante ou prévue, les entraves portées à l'activité de notre succursale ne pourraient, tout au plus, avoir que le caractère des mesures purement temporaires, motivées par des considérations d'ordre militaire et devant, par conséquent, prendre fin aussitôt la paix conclue entre les Puissances alliées et la République d'Autriche. Mais si tel était leur caractère, on s'expliquerait difficilement pourquoi le Contrôle financier interallié ordonne à notre succursale de procéder à la fermeture totale de certaines de ses agences et pourquoi il l'oblige à inaugurer des opérations de liquidation destinées à marquer la fin définitive de l'activité de notre succursale.

Nous avons l'honneur d'attirer l'attention du Contrôle financier interallié sur le fait que le Gouvernement allemand s'est adressé, avant la conclusion de la paix, aux Puissances alliées par l'entremise de la Commission d'Armistice de Spa, pour demander des éclaircissements sur le même procédé adopté à Constantinople par le Contrôle interallié à l'égard des succursales et des banques allemandes établies dans ce pays et pour protester contre des mesures qui ne reposent sur aucune base légale. Il a été répondu au Gouvernement allemand "que les autorités interalliées en Turquie n'ont aucunement ordonné la liquidation de banques allemandes et autrichiennes à Constantinople, mais se sont bornées à instituer le contrôle de ces banques afin d'empêcher que celles-ci se livrent à des opérations contraires aux intérêts des Alliés." Nous constatons avec regret qu'entre cette déclaration, émanant des Puissances alliées, et les mesures coercitives et au plus haut degré préjudiciables, prises par le Contrôle interallié à l'égard de notre succursale, il existe une contradiction flagrante. Cette contradiction nous autoriserait à penser que le Contrôle financier interallié serait allé au delà non seulement de ce qui pouvait être justifié par les lois et conventions existantes, mais aussi de ce qui était la vraie intention des Puissances alliées.

Dans ces conditions, et en présence du dommage irréparable que nous ont déjà causé et que pourront surtout causer à l'avenir les mesures édictées par le Contrôle financier interallié, nous nous voyons, à notre regret, obligés—avec toute la déférence que notre établissement a toujours témoignée envers les autorités régulièrement constituées—de protester formellement et énergiquement contre toutes les ordonnances et injonctions du Contrôle financier interallié tendant non seulement à surveiller temporairement la gestion de notre succursale, mais à empêcher cette dernière de continuer le cours régulier de ses affaires et à l'obliger même à faire des préparatifs pour sa prochaine liquidation définitive. Nous nous voyons obligés, pour la sauvegarde de nos intérêts, d'informer le Contrôle financier interallié que nous nous réservons de demander, devant tout tribunal pouvant être constitué pour régler les réclamations de cette nature, les dommages et intérêts qui nous sont dus pour le préjudice extrêmement sensible que nous ont causé, jusqu'à ce jour, les mesures mentionnées—mesures dont nous nous réservons, d'ailleurs, de faire examiner les origines. Nous tenons à constater, d'ores et déjà, que le montant de ces dommages et intérêts serait encore considérablement accru, si, à l'encontre des déclarations formelles des Puissances alliées, notre succursale se voyait obligée à procéder à sa liquidation et à fermer définitivement ses guichets.

Nous prions le Contrôle financier interallié de bien vouloir nous accuser réception du présent acte protestatif et d'agréer, &c.

Wiener Bankverein,
ADLER.

[132930]

No. 112.

Earl Curzon to His Highness Sherif Feisal.

October 9, 1919.

Your Highness,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of the preliminary observations which you have been so good as to offer on the *aide-mémoire* presented by the Prime Minister to M. Clemenceau and yourself on the subject of the military occupation of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, pending the decision of the Peace Conference in regard to mandates, copies of which have also been communicated to Mr. Polk, representing the United States of America, and Signor Tittoni, representing the Kingdom of Italy.

As your Highness would appear to be under a misapprehension as to the character of the *aide-mémoire*, I should like at the outset to make it clear that the said document in no sense represents an agreement between the French and British Governments. It contains proposals put forward by the British Government on its own initiative for the military occupation of the ex-Turkish territories pending a final settlement as to their future by the Peace Conference. These proposals—to which they adhere—were worked out by the British Government as soon as they had decided that it was impossible for them to continue the occupation of Syria by British troops. They invited you to come to Europe, and made instant arrangements for your transportation before ever they were communicated to the French Government or the Conference, and they were placed in your hands for your consideration directly you arrived.

Your Highness would appear to regard the proposed arrangement for the relief of British troops by French and Arab forces as being in some way contrary to the obligations entered into by His Majesty's Government with your illustrious father, his Highness Sherif Hussein, King of the Hedjaz. In order that there may be no misunderstanding on this point, I append the correspondence between your illustrious father, King of the Hedjaz, and His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, which contains the conditions upon which the Arabs entered the war against Turkey. The series contains the whole correspondence on the subject in the possession of His Majesty's Government. The document which your Highness handed to the Prime Minister at our conference a few days ago is only a summary of conditions at one time desired by King Hussein, but never at any time entertained, and still less accepted by them. It has therefore no bearing on the question under discussion.

From the annexed correspondence it will be apparent to your Highness that His Majesty's Government made it clear from the outset that, in their opinion, "the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries within which they were prepared to recognise the independence of the Arabs, and in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her Ally, France." These quotations are from a letter dated the 25th October, 1915, from Sir Henry McMahon to his Highness Sherif Hussein. On the 5th November his Highness Sherif Hussein replied to this letter, stating that he renounced his insistence on the inclusion of the vilayets of Mersina and Adana in the Arab kingdom, but declared that the provinces of Aleppo and Beirut and their sea coasts were purely Arab provinces. To this letter His Majesty's High Commissioner in Cairo replied on the 14th December welcoming his Highness's agreement to exclude the vilayets of Mersina and Adana from the boundaries of the Arab territories. He went on, however, to say that :—

"... with regard to the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirut, the Government of Great Britain have taken careful notice of your observations, but as the interests of our Ally, France, are involved, the question will require careful consideration and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course."

The necessity for this further communication, however, was obviated by a reply from his Highness Sherif Hussein, dated the 1st January, 1916, in which His Highness wrote as follows :—

"As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications, and all this was only done so as to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment was desired by the will of the blessed and supreme God. It was this same feeling and desire which impelled us

to avoid what might possibly injure the Alliance between Great Britain and France, and the agreement made between them during the present war and calamities; yet, we find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that at the first opportunity after this war is finished we should ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beirut and its coasts."

His Highness went on to express the opinion that:—

"The people of Beirut would decidedly never accept such isolations, and they may oblige us to undertake new measures which might exercise Great Britain certainly not less than our present troubles, because of our belief and uncertainty in the reciprocity of our interests, which was the only cause that caused us never to negotiate with any other Power but you. Consequently, it is impossible to allow any derogation which gives France or any other Power a span of land in those regions."

On the 25th of January, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo replied that:—

"... as regards the northern parts, we note with satisfaction your desire to avoid anything which might possibly injure the Alliance of Great Britain and France. It is, as you know, our fixed determination that nothing shall be permitted to interfere in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of the war to a victorious conclusion. Moreover, when the victory has been won, the friendship of Great Britain and France will become yet more firm and enduring, cemented by the blood of Englishmen and Frenchmen who had died side by side fighting for the cause of right and liberty."

This was the last communication which passed on this subject before the combined operations began, which terminated in November 1918 in the total defeat of the Turkish forces.

From this correspondence two things are clear. First, that the British Government are bound by their undertakings to King Hussein to recognise the establishment of an independent Arab State comprising within its borders the four towns of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo; and second, that they made it absolutely clear to your illustrious father before the entry of the Arabs into the war that they regarded France as having special rights in the area west of these four towns. His Majesty's Government would further point out that in 1916 when, for the purposes of the common campaign, it became necessary to arrive at an agreement with France and Russia as to the occupation of Turkish territories in the event of the downfall of Turkey, His Majesty's Government insisted on reserving the independence of the Arabs in the districts which they had promised to reserve to them in their correspondence with King Hussein. They did not communicate this agreement to King Hussein, because it was in complete conformity with the undertakings they had already entered into with him.

The attitude of His Majesty's Government, therefore, throughout these negotiations has been entirely consistent and clear. They have entered into obligations to both their Allies, to the French and to the Arabs. These obligations do not conflict but are complementary to one another. His Majesty's Government attach the greatest importance to the friendship and co-operation of both their Allies, and it is their intention to live up to their undertakings to each.

I come now to your Highness's query as to why it is necessary for the British occupation of Syria to be brought to an end immediately instead of being prolonged till the conclusion of peace with Turkey. The reason is to be found in the tremendous effort put forward by the British Empire in the war against Turkey and its allies. His Majesty's Government recognise gladly and fully the indispensable assistance rendered to the Allied cause by King Hussein and yourself, and by the valiant Arab troops under your command. The courage and activity of your Highness's troops were an essential element in the campaign which led to the overthrow of Turkish despotism. But His Majesty's Government cannot forget that infinitely the larger share of the burden of the defeat of Turkey was carried by the British Empire. From first to last they sent to the Eastern theatre of war a total of over 1,400,000 troops, at a cost exceeding 750,000,000*l.* These burdens were additional to the far greater sacrifices which they were compelled to make in Europe in order to secure the overthrow of the German power which lay behind the Turkish Empire. The peoples of the British Empire have lost over 950,000 lives, and they have incurred a debt of 9,000,000,000*l.* in

securing the freedom of the nations of Europe and of the peoples who formerly languished under the Turkish yoke. It was at this cost that the peoples of the British Empire assisted the Arab peoples, and the oppressed nationalities of Europe, to throw off the yoke of the oppressor and to make a start on the highroad to prosperity, independence, and influence in the world.

In addition, however, to its efforts made during the war the British Empire has maintained garrisons throughout the occupied territories for a year from the signature of the Armistice. It has sustained the onerous and expensive burden of maintaining law and order in countries just liberated from alien rule in the hopes that the Peace Conference would come to a rapid and peaceful solution of the difficult problems connected with the future of the Middle East. But it is unfair to the British taxpayer to ask him to bear any longer the burden of occupying provinces for which the Empire does not propose to accept permanent responsibility. As long ago as March last His Majesty's Government made a formal declaration to the Peace Conference and to yourself that in no circumstances would it undertake a mandate for Syria. There is now, owing to the delay of the United States of America in deciding whether or not it is prepared to take a hand in safeguarding the well-being and progress of the peoples of the Middle East, no prospect of any final peace being made with Turkey until well on into next year. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government have decided that it is impossible for them to maintain their troops any longer in Syria, and they have notified the Conference accordingly that they propose to withdraw them on the 1st November, 1919.

In an additional note dated the 23rd September, your Highness raises the question of the conditions upon which the coast towns were evacuated by the Arab forces during the advance. His Majesty's Government is loth to think that your Highness considers that you complied with the orders of the Commander-in-chief under whose command you were—orders which he had ample strength to enforce—as the result of a bargain. That your Highness understood that the British occupation would last until the final conclusion of peace I can readily understand, since that view was shared by His Majesty's Government at that time. His Majesty's Government have prolonged the British occupation far longer than they or anyone else ever contemplated as probable, but in view of the overwhelming burden which rests upon them it is certainly within their rights to insist that that occupation must be brought to an end.

In making the aforementioned notification to the Peace Conference of their intention to withdraw their troops forthwith, His Majesty's Government also submitted the proposal for the interim occupation of the ex-Turkish territories contained in the *aide-memoire*. They do not see that any other proposal is practicable for the interim period. There is no authority of weight who believes that the people of Syria can stand alone at the present time. To attempt this solution, which you suggest, would simply be to prejudice the free and rapid progress and ultimately the independence of the Syrian and Arab peoples. Further, it is essential that until the peace is made with Turkey some first-class European Power should hold the territory to the south-east of Anatolia. In submitting their proposal as set forth in the *aide-memoire* His Majesty's Government have scrupulously regarded the obligations they have incurred to both their Allies, to the Arabs and to the French, obligations which, as already explained, were made clear to King Hussein before ever he entered the war. They have, not without difficulty, secured to your Highness the establishment of an independent Arab State in that part of Syria, including Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, promised to the Arabs in the correspondence with King Hussein.

In so far as the occupation by France of the rest of Syria is concerned, they would ask your Highness to remember that the Arabs owe their freedom in a large measure to the supreme sacrifices made by the French people in the late war. It is true that the French contribution in Syria itself was not great, for France was deeply preoccupied in the war on other fronts. But on these greater and vital battlefields of Europe they lost 1,400,000 in dead, and incurred a debt not far short of that incurred by Great Britain in overthrowing the power which sustained the Turkish tyranny, and without whose support the Turkish military power could not have continued the war more than a few weeks.

His Majesty's Government therefore earnestly trust that you will agree to the proposals for the occupation of Syria made in the *aide-memoire* for the interim period up to the conclusion of peace with Turkey. The considerations you raise as to the future of the Syrian and Arab people will properly be urged at the Peace Conference itself, of which you are yourself a distinguished member, and which will have complete power to deal with the whole Arab question, and which will have to take into account

not only your own views and those of the Arab people, but the various undertakings and declarations of the Great Powers.

His Majesty's Government have not the slightest doubt that the best course for the Arab people is to accept the temporary arrangement proposed, and to enter into friendly working arrangements for its execution with their Allies, Great Britain and France. As previously suggested, they strongly urge that your Highness should discuss these arrangements at once with the French Government. His Majesty's Government will be only too glad to do all in their power to promote a cordial and satisfactory understanding between their two Allies in regard to the occupation during the interim period. They would, however, be failing in their duty to their Arab Ally if they did not declare in the most earnest as well as in the most friendly manner that they can conceive of no policy more fatal to Arab aspirations and prosperity, both at the forthcoming Peace Conference and afterwards, than the method of military resistance hinted at in your Highness's letter. As the sincere friend and well-wisher of the Arab people, Great Britain invites them to accept the arrangement proposed. I further trust that this letter will help to render profitable the further conversations with your Highness to which I look forward with pleasure and in which I trust a means will be found to effect a complete reconciliation of the relations between this country and its French and Arab Allies.

I beg your Highness to believe that the British Government are actuated by the same sympathy with and admiration for the Arab nation which prompted them to support his Highness Sherif Hussein in his revolt against the Turks, and which characterised the entire course of their relations with your Highness in the glorious and triumphant struggle in which, with the co-operation of your Highness, they have so long been engaged.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[139326]

No. 113.

His Highness Sherif Feisal to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. — (Communicated to Foreign Office, October 10.)

London, October 9, 1919.

Your Excellency,

YOU were kind enough to tell me when I saw you at the Guildhall two days ago that the delay in replying to my note of the 21st September, 1919, had been due to the recent crisis, and that you hoped to send your answer shortly.

I appreciate your Excellency's kindness in telling me this, but since a very serious crisis is upon us I venture to anticipate your letter and to lay before you certain proposals.

I have already explained my views about the arrangement which was made recently in Paris, and I do not propose to do more than repeat that they have not altered.

Whatever the merits or the demerits of the arrangement, the fact remains that it is regarded by the bulk of the inhabitants with the utmost dismay, and the withdrawal of British troops from Syria is likely to lead to a catastrophe to the whole Arab world and to the common cause which the Allies are defending.

I am extremely anxious to avoid the creation of any serious situation that may cause a strain in the friendly relations existing between the Allies and the Arabs, and perhaps render a permanent settlement on a friendly basis impossible, and I wish to do all in my power to maintain that bond which was written with the blood shed by all for the triumph of right and justice.

In order to prevent any unfortunate event which may but aggravate the situation, I beg to submit to your Excellency the following proposals:—

1. That the arrangement arrived at in Paris should be cancelled, or at least its execution suspended.
2. That the whole question be placed before the Peace Conference for final settlement without delay and be considered by the Peace Conference itself, or by a Conference appointed by it (consisting of British, French, and Arab representatives under the presidency of an American chairman), which will discuss the serious question at issue, and render its report to the Peace Conference.

[139473]

No. 112*.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon. — (Received October 10.)

(No. 457.)

My Lord,

Ramleh, September 22, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a report by Major H. Garland, M.B.E., M.C., acting director of the Arab Bureau, dealing with the capture at Bajil of Lieutenant-Colonel H. F. Jacob's mission to the Imam Yahya.

I have, &c.

M. CHEETHAM.

Enclosure in No. 112*.

Note on the Seizure of Colonel Jacob's Mission at Bajil.

(Compiled from Reports from Hodeidah and Aden by Arab Bureau.)

IN August last Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob was sent by His Majesty's Government on a political mission to the Imam Yahya at Sanaa, in the Yemen. Sanaa lies about 150 miles by road north-east of the Red Sea port of Hodeidah. The first part of the route passes through the coastal lowlands known as the Tihamah, a region inhabited by tribes who have always had strong religious and political differences with the Imam, and who, since the departure of the Turkish troops from the Yemen, have resisted the Imam's attempts to extend his influence over their country.

It is sufficient for our present purposes to state that the Tihamah tribes are opposed to the Imam because he belongs to a different Islamic sect (Zeidi); that they also dislike him for his parsimony; and that for religious reasons they are inclined to turn for a suzerain to the Idrisi of Asir, who is of their own sect (Shafai), rather than to the Imam Yahya.

The particular tribe through whose territory Colonel Jacob's mission had first to travel on leaving Hodeidah is the Quhrah, a turbulent people, skilled in highway robbery, whose inherent hostility to foreigners had been for several years amply fanned by the active propaganda of Mahmud Nadim, the ex-Turkish Governor of the Yemen province, who remained in the employment of the Imam after the evacuation of the Turkish military forces from that country.

For a long time the Imam has been carrying on negotiations with the Quhrah with a view to bringing them under his authority. Many exchanges of views have taken place and, in spite of their hatred of the Imam, the tribesmen appear to have been at times prepared to accept his domination on their own terms. An agreement was in fact alleged to have been patched up in May last. Some of the negotiations have been dealt with in the Arab Bulletin (see p. 95 of Volume 1919).

Immediately before Colonel Jacob's arrival at Hodeidah, the political officer at that place reported (15th August, 1919) as follows:—

"The Quhrah do not appear to have finally sided with the Imam, as they refused to proceed to Ubal to meet Mohammed Ahmed Mashur, of Hujjeilah, who had been to Sanaa to discuss their relations with the Imam and had returned with the latter's reply. The Quhrah have protested against the collection of tithes by the Imam's agent at Hujjeilah."

The political officer, Hodeidah, further reported that on the 15th August a conference was held at Bajil (a Quhrah town on the Sanaa route) between Sheikh Ali Salami, the Imam's lieutenant, who had arrived from Sanaa, and the Quhrah chiefs. The conference was presumably convened by Ali Salami in order to arrange for the passage of the British mission. A temporary settlement of the dispute was said to have been effected at the meeting.

[1356]

2 H*

On the 20th August some 90 Imamie soldiers, sent from Sanaa to escort Colonel Jacob's mission, arrived at Bajil, after having been detained at Ubal by the Quhrah.

The mission arrived at Hodeidah on the 16th August, and at once reported to Aden that the Imam's escort had failed to get through to the port. However, the two leading Quhrah sheikhs, Abdul Hadi and Ismail Bhagawi, arrived at Hodeidah on the 19th, and, after some parleying, Colonel Jacob and party set out for Bajil, accompanied by these two sheikhs and a few Quhrah tribesmen, with the intention of picking up the Imam's escort at Bajil.

Whilst at Hodeidah Sheikh Abdul Hadi and Ismail Bhagawi were interviewed. They stated that there had been considerable discussion between the Quhrah sheikhs and the Imam's representatives, and that eventually a truce had been patched up.

On the 22nd August the telegraph operator at Bajil (who appears to be an agent of the P.O., Hodeidah) reported that there had been a further meeting of Quhrah chiefs, at which Abdul Hadi and Bhagawi had not been present, and it had been finally decided to oppose the passage of the mission. When the decision was communicated to Abdul Hadi and Bhagawi they endeavoured to persuade the other sheikhs to change their attitude, but without success.

It appears that Mahmud Nadim had led the Tihamah tribes to expect an international commission, but they found that a merely British one had arrived, and they suspected that it had been sent for the purpose of placing the Tihamah under the Imam; this prompted their adverse decision.

The caravan with the mission's heavy baggage, which had left Hodeidah independently, got as far as Ubal, and returned to Bajil without serious molestation.

On the 23rd August the P.O., Hodeidah, received a report that the Quhrah would not only refuse to allow the mission to proceed to Sanaa, but would also detain it at Bajil until such time as the British Government liberated and returned to the Yemen the Turkish forces which had been evacuated some months previously.

Although Abdul Hadi and Ismail Bhagawi treated the members of the mission in a friendly way throughout and appeared to do their utmost to get the party through to Sanaa, it was thought by our agents that they were secretly in league with their more truculent confrères.

In a report dated the 24th August the telegraph operator at Bajil said he believed it was the intention of the Quhrah to detain the mission until their dispute with the Imam was satisfactorily settled.

It was reported that on the night of the 23rd-24th August the Quhrah planned an attack on the lives and property of the mission, but were restrained by Sheikh Abdul Hadi. Mahmud Nadim appears to have made attempts to persuade the tribesmen to release the mission and to undo the harm that he had caused by his anti-British and anti-Christian propaganda.

On the 27th August Colonel Jacob telegraphed from Bajil to Hodeidah as follows:—

"The chiefs have prevented our return by removing our camels. On the 26th a telegram was received from the Imam stating that he is taking all necessary steps to settle difficulties and assures us that there is no cause for anxiety on our part.

"Owing to the blockade, there is marked distress in the Tihamah. Everywhere the people blame us alone, and my position and influence have been adversely affected by this.

"In spite of previous orders from Paris and regardless of whatever may be settled with the Imam, I cannot urge too strongly the immediate raising of blockade.

"We have paid the piper and we alone should call the tune. Our prestige will be enhanced immeasurably by such a concession. The blockade was intended to hit the Turks, although the Arabs were prime losers.

"I am temporarily held up by the Quhrah sheikhs from going to the Imam, but the ex-*vali* is coming down from the Imam to treat for the continuance of our journey to Sanaa.

"The presence of a British envoy to the exclusion of those of the Allied Powers is regarded by the people here as an attempt on our part to advance the cause of the Imam to their own detriment. Negotiations are still proceeding. All members of the mission are well."

The Red Sea blockade had, however, been raised by the Blockade Council from the

20th August independently of these events. Had it been raised a month earlier the fate of the British mission might have been different.

A further letter written by Colonel Jacob on the 1st September got through to Hodeidah, and the following paragraphs are quoted from it:—

"There is no cause for immediate alarm, though it was necessary to describe the situation of last night, which appeared to be critical. If Hodeidah is reinforced by you, well and good, but I would deprecate any advance from there in our relief, for I think we can get back if we exercise patience. The advance to Sanaa is quite impossible. The Imam threatens to send down a mighty army, but I am glad to say that Mahmud Nadim has advised him not to do so. If I could have got up to Sanaa I think I could have shown Imam that force was unwise, and that his only chance of success was to act by conciliation. The only course now open to me is to assure the Shawafi (Tihamah tribes) that I do not intend to place their country under Imam against their will. They talk of wanting to come under British protection, and failing this under the Idrisi. They want Hodeidah to be opened to trade and our troops removed. But I have told them that the second proposal is out of my province, but that I will represent their wish to the British Government.

"I think the best course is to open negotiations from Hodeidah with Quhrah sheikhs and Seyyid Abdul Kadi, who is a restraining influence here."

Major Reilly, who accompanied Colonel Jacob, also wrote on the 1st September as follows:—

"Yesterday our party was disarmed by these blighters. The Aden troop men gave up their arms very unwillingly under orders. As there were so few of them it was decided that there was nothing else to do.

"Later we heard a report that it was intended to let the Moslem members of the party go and do in the rest of us, and that this black deed would take place last night.

"The chief cause of resentment against us appears to be the blockade, the injustice and futility of which we have constantly represented from Aden. The whole country is obviously impoverished. Bajil is full of half-starved people, some absolute skeletons.

"They also resent the bombardment of Hodeidah, the exclusion of the inhabitants, and of course our supposed determination to force the Tihamah under the Imam.

"I suppose they want to make the best possible conditions for themselves before they let us go. They will not let us go on to Sanaa I am sure. It only remains for us to try to get back, and this they will not let us do at present. They probably want money, coupled with political concessions. The raising of the blockade would ease the situation very much."

On the morning of the 30th August an Arab force, about 250 strong, attacked Hodeidah, entered the town, and looted the supply depôts. Other attacks were reported to be imminent. The attack was presumably made by the Abs tribe, who live on the Tihamah south of Hodeidah, and they were probably instigated by treacherous Quhrah sheikhs.

The Political Resident, Aden, expresses an opinion as follows:—

"A full report of the situation at Hodeidah is expected shortly and in its absence it is hard to say what is the real cause of the Arab raids on Hodeidah. It is, however, surmised that these attacks are initiated by some of the Anti-Imam Tihamah tribes, *e.g.*, Quhrahs, partly to intimidate Colonel Jacob's mission, whose aim they consider to be the furtherance of the Imam's cause to their own detriment, and partly they may be ascribed to the general famine conditions prevalent in those parts. As I have already noted above, the famine conditions in the Tihamah are very acute, and raids and robberies are being reported from most places."

Colonel Jacob telegraphed on the 8th September from Bajil as follows:—

"Quhrah Shafai sheikhs strongly object to our journey to Sanaa and have

kept us prisoners since the 21st August and deprived the twenty-five Aden troops, who are my escort, of their arms on the 31st August.

"Imam and Mahmud Nadim are treating for our ascent, but Imam has not agreed to Qubrah terms of May last relating to the government of their tract from Obal to the sea.

"Return to Hodeidah stopped by majority of Qubrah owing to threatened attacks [?] by Abus on Hodeidah.

"Abdul Hadi, head Sheikh of Qubrah, is friendly and has taken charge of our rifles and money. He and Abdul Kadir, of Marawa, now in Bajil, are working for our release.

"Qubrah are supposed to be collaborating with Abus to form a Shafai bloc opposed to Imam.

"Their terms to me will probably include (1) our raising of blockade already effected, (2) evacuation of Hodeidah, (3) guarantee against Zeidi encroachment, (4) grants of stipends.

"Present attitude of Qubrah is prompted by earlier manifesto of Imam and Mahmud Nadim with special reference to the necessity of deputations from all Allied Powers."

Arab Bureau Note.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the seizure of the mission was due to purely local causes, which may be enumerated in the following order of importance:—

1. The Qubrah's fear that we intend to place them under the Imam against their wishes.
2. The blockade and the resultant food scarcity.
3. Our occupation of Hodeidah.
4. Anti-British propaganda carried on by Mahmud Nadim.

The principal cause is almost certainly the tribe's objection to Imamic domination. Besides their personal dislike of the Imam they have had bitter experience of the excesses of his Zeidi troops in their villages. They also fear the imposition of taxes, which, owing to the present conditions, they would be quite unable to pay.

The reports received from Bajil afford ample testimony to the effectiveness of our blockade, and it will come as a surprise to some officials that a blockade of the fruitful Yemen could be so successful. On the other hand, since the departure of the Turks, the Qubrah have probably been subjected to a land blockade by the Imam and thus prevented from obtaining supplies from the highlands.

Colonel Jacob has deprecated the use of military force to secure his release, and there is little doubt that premature operations would endanger the lives of the mission. There are indications, however, that the Imam is preparing troops to attack the Qubrah, although he has been advised to delay all military action until Colonel Jacob and party have safely returned to Hodeidah.

It is thought that negotiations by the political officer of Hodeidah with the Qubrah sheikhs, will offer the easiest, least risky, and quickest means of securing the release of the party.

H. GARLAND, Major,
Acting Director, Arab Bureau.

Ramleh, September 18, 1919.

I consider the cancellation or suspension of the Paris arrangement as a vital preliminary to a successful solution. Unless this is done the crisis in Syria may be precipitated and events happen which will render friendly discussion most difficult. I trust, therefore, that these demands, which are essential to the interests of all, will meet with your approval, and that I may rely on the help of the British Government to bring them about.

I beg that your Excellency will be kind enough to let me have your reply at the earliest possible moment.

I have, &c.
FEISAL.

[139326]

No. 114.

The Prime Minister of Great Britain to His Highness Sherif Feisal.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, October 10.)

10, Downing Street, Whitehall, S.W. 1,
October 10, 1919.

Your Highness,

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 9th October, in which you suggest that the proposals for the occupation of Syria after the British withdrawal should be cancelled or at least suspended, and that the whole question should be placed before the Peace Conference, or before a Sub-Conference appointed by it, for final settlement without delay.

I do not think it is necessary for me to discuss again the reasons which have prompted His Majesty's Government in putting forward the proposals contained in the *aide-memoire*, as these have been fully set forth in the letter already communicated to you by the Foreign Secretary. For the reasons therein set forth it does not seem to me that the proposal you now make is practicable. His Majesty's Government have made up their mind that it is impossible for them to continue the occupation of Syria by British troops. Six months ago they announced to the Peace Conference and to yourself that under no circumstances would they accept a mandate for Syria. Their occupation of the country, which involves them in a heavy burden of expense, has been prolonged far beyond their own expectation, in the hopes that the Peace Conference would deal with the question without delay. There is now no prospect of the Peace Conference being able to undertake the discussion of the Turkish problem for some months, and the regrettable illness of President Wilson, without whose participation final decisions can be arrived at, is likely to delay rather than to hasten the settlement of the problem. It is therefore impossible for His Majesty's Government to withdraw the proposals which they have made for dealing with the Syrian problem in the interim period until the Peace Conference can settle it.

They would, however, be very glad to arrange an immediate meeting between yourself, a French, an American, and a British representative to adjust, in a most amicable and satisfactory manner to all concerned, the problems involved in the impending withdrawal of British troops from Syria on the 1st November.

As already announced, I am looking forward to hearing your Highness's remarks in person at a further interview on this question on Monday next, at 4 o'clock, at 10, Downing Street.

I have, &c.
D. LLOYD GEORGE.

[140423]

No. 115.

Reply to English Memorandum of September 13, 1919, respecting Syria (communicated by M. Clemenceau October 10, 1919).—(Received October 13.)

ENTRE les Français et les Anglais en Asie Mineure la seule base d'entente est l'accord de 1916, application des déclarations de Sir Edouard Grey de 1912. Les conversations de décembre 1918 entre M. Lloyd George et M. Clemenceau sont restées sans effet, puisqu'il ne pourrait être fait état de concessions éventuelles sur Mossoul et la Palestine que si des contre-parties étaient accordées, au lieu des nouvelles concessions qui sont demandées.

[1356]

2 H 2

La situation de la France en Syrie et ses rapports avec les Arabes dans sa zone ne peuvent qu'être identiques à la situation de l'Angleterre en Mésopotamie et à ses rapports avec les Arabes dans sa zone. Ce parallélisme parfait résulte de l'accord au bas duquel les deux pays ont mis leur signature. Le fait que l'Angleterre a occupé au cours de la guerre, au nom des Alliés, la zone anglaise et la zone française constitue une situation de fait qui ne peut pas plus modifier le droit en Asie que cela ne serait possible en Europe.

2. Entre les Alliés, les questions de Syrie et de Mésopotamie seront réglées définitivement en même temps que le sort des territoires de l'Empire ottoman, de Constantinople, de l'Asie Mineure et de l'Arménie. Les droits traditionnels et les intérêts de l'Angleterre et de la France dans leurs zones respectives ne sauraient recevoir aucune atteinte.

3. La décision du Conseil suprême du 15 septembre 1919 n'a sanctionné que l'acceptation par le Président du Conseil français des propositions du Premier Ministre anglais quant à la relève des troupes britanniques par des troupes françaises à la date du 1^{er} novembre en Cilicie et dans la Syrie côtière.

Il a été expressément spécifié que cette décision ne comportait aucun engagement français sur aucun point de l'aide-mémoire anglais : cela sans préjuger de la solution définitive des mandats ou des frontières des zones anglaise ou française, qui seront examinés comme parties du problème général oriental.

4. La position de la France et de l'Angleterre par rapport aux régions arabes est définie essentiellement :

(1.) Par l'article 1^{er} de l'accord de 1916, qui déclare que la France et l'Angleterre sont disposées "à reconnaître et à protéger un État arabe indépendant ou une Confédération d'États arabes dans les zones A et B";

(2.) Par la nécessité reconnue par la Conférence de confier à une Puissance européenne "un mandat sur les Arabes," jugés encore incapables de se gouverner eux-mêmes aussi bien en Syrie qu'en Mésopotamie.

Les accords spéciaux entre Anglais et Arabes ne lient pas la France, à laquelle les textes des accords de Sir Henry MacMahon avec le Roi Houssein en juillet et octobre 1915 n'ont été communiqués qu'en février 1919, ainsi qu'il résulte des extraits des procès-verbaux eux-mêmes (d'ailleurs vagues, incomplets et non signés par notre représentant) communiqués par M. Lloyd George. Ces accords ne sauraient, d'ailleurs, modifier les termes explicites de l'accord dernier qui est celui de 1916.

5. Les dispositions du Gouvernement français, décidé à appliquer d'une manière libérale les engagements d'assistance à l'égard de l'État arabe inclus dans son mandat, lui permettraient de s'entendre directement avec l'Émir Feysal, si celui-ci ne continuait pas à bénéficier de la protection anglaise, par suite d'une conception qui fausse nos accords. Il appartient à la France de s'entendre elle-même avec les Arabes de sa zone, comme à l'Angleterre dans la sienne, sur les données générales convenues et sans que l'une des Puissances intervienne dans le mandat de l'autre.

6. La relève des troupes anglaises par des troupes françaises ne peut s'opérer sans risques et sans désordre que si elle a lieu simultanément.

L'interdiction de la zone intérieure syrienne et des villes d'Alep et Damas aux troupes françaises serait aussi contraire aux accords de 1916 que si l'on exigeait que les troupes arabes occupent les villes de la zone B à l'exclusion des Anglais. Comment la France pourrait-elle substituer sa responsabilité à celle du commandement anglais et avoir même une possibilité d'exercer son mandat, si elle n'avait pas la faculté d'intervenir en cas de troubles ? Et comment pourrions-nous traiter avec Feysal si ce sont les Anglais qui en font leur client et se posent vis-à-vis de lui en garants de l'engagement de nous interdire la zone intérieure ? C'est à nous qu'il appartient de nous entendre avec Feysal en acceptant de limiter notre occupation s'il s'engage et réussit à maintenir l'ordre dans les villes de Damas, Homs, Hama et Alep. La protection assurée par l'Angleterre à l'indépendance de Feysal dans la zone française est une intrusion inconciliable avec nos accords dans notre mandat syrien.

7. Les frontières entre la Palestine et la Syrie ont été fixées par l'accord de 1916 après une étude minutieuse tenant compte des intérêts des deux régions. Les faire remonter au-dessus de la latitude de Tyr et presque jusqu'à la banlieue de Damas priverait la Syrie d'un certain nombre de ses régions les plus fertiles et de ses populations les plus courageuses, dans des conditions que n'accepteraient ni les chrétiens ni les Arabes.

Cependant, quelques rectifications pourraient être consenties après un examen sur

place par une Commission mixte de Délimitation tenant compte des raisons géographiques et ethniques.

Les autres limites entre le mandat anglais et le mandat français sont aisées à fixer, car elles sont imposées par la nature. Dans le cas où la concession sur Mossoul serait consentie, la France conserverait au sud et au nord les limites de 1916, à l'est le bassin du Kabour et de ses affluents.

8. Le tracé du chemin de fer de Caïffa à la zone B n'oblige nullement à modifier les termes de l'article 7 de l'accord de 1916. Celui-ci répond à la préoccupation anglaise et a prévu que, dans le cas de difficultés techniques de construction, la ligne pourrait traverser un périmètre déterminé de la zone A française.

Si l'on avait la faculté de remonter jusqu'à la latitude de Deir-es-Zor, on pourrait à volonté ôter toute valeur au chemin de fer, d'Alexandrette et l'on perdrait de vue le but unique de l'entente faite sur ce point, qui était de relier par une ligne, sous la souveraineté anglaise, Caïffa à Bagdad—le passage sur un point de la zone française n'étant prévu que pour éviter une impossibilité technique. Bien entendu, la partie de la zone du mandat français traversée éventuellement ne passerait pas sous le contrôle anglais, toutes facilités de constructions, exploitations et améliorations restant données au Gouvernement anglais, et le Gouvernement français étant décidé à remplir dans un esprit large les engagements pris en 1916.

9. La question des pétroles et des pipe-lines pour leur transport est liée à la très importante concession de Mossoul ; le Gouvernement français a indiqué et confirme que la contre-partie essentielle réclamée par l'industrie et le Parlement français est la stricte égalité dans l'exploitation des pétroles de Mésopotamie et du Kurdistan. Ce point a une importance capitale en raison de la privation absolue et des besoins de la France en pétroles.

Sous cette réserve, l'accord sur l'abandon éventuel de Mossoul et toutes facilités pour la construction de pipe-lines traversant le mandat français pourraient être acquis.

[140355]

No. 116.

Notes by Colonel Cornwallis.—(Communicated to Foreign Office October 13.)

COLONEL DE MERU and Colonel Fagalde called on the Emir Feisal this evening and spent about an hour with him.

Colonel de Meru opened the conversation by saying that his visit was entirely unofficial, and that he had come to pay his personal respects, and, if his Highness wished, to have a friendly discussion on the present situation. His Government had the greatest respect and liking for his Highness, and were only too anxious to come to a friendly understanding with himself and his people. He thought that this might be brought about if his Highness visited Paris where he would be sure of a cordial welcome.

The Emir said that he was equally anxious to arrive at an amicable settlement. He had hoped much from the conversations which had taken place between himself and M. Clemenceau during his last visit to Paris, but unfortunately the pledges which he had received had not been fulfilled, and a series of incidents, which he recounted at some length, in Syria itself, had tended to widen the breach between the two peoples. The Paris press, too, had shown itself singularly hostile, and he felt that the estrangement was not due to any action on the part of the Arabs, but rather to the attitude taken up by the French themselves. He did not, however, wish to lay particular stress on this, since doubtless there existed on both sides misunderstandings which were capable of explanation.

He then went on to refer to something which he considered as much more important, namely, the recent arrangement arrived at in Paris. He recapitulated most of the arguments which he had already brought before His Majesty's Government, and complained bitterly of an arrangement which had been made without his being consulted, and which in effect partitioned the country contrary to the wishes of the majority of its inhabitants.

Colonel de Meru emphasised the military and provisional nature of the arrangement, but, when pressed, agreed that the mention of the Sykes-Picot boundary had been unfortunate and likely to lead to misconception. He asked the Emir whether he intended to fall in with the arrangement, and whether the appointment of General Gouraud in place of M. Picot, who was generally recognised to be unsuitable, would be acceptable.

The Emir replied that he had a personal respect for General Gouraud, who had presented him with the Légion d'honneur, but that the question as a whole was one which affected him not in his private capacity but as the representative of his people. He felt that the arrangement would be fatal to Arab interests, and, as he had already pointed out to the British Government, he could not accept it nor could he proceed to the discussion of the final solution until it was cancelled or suspended.

Unless this was done, he must return to Syria at once, and the future alone would show the effect of so high-handed a decision.

As matters had now reached somewhat of an impasse, I intervened unofficially and pointed out that if it could be arranged for the interested parties to meet without delay and discuss the whole question with a view to arriving at a settlement which could be submitted to the Peace Conference for ratification, the question of the relief of troops would lose its political importance and assume a purely military character. As such, it ought to be accepted by the people of Syria, who would keep quiet when they knew that a conference would immediately take place in Europe.

The Emir admitted that there was some truth in this, but maintained his contention that he was not being treated as an Ally, and insisted that the discussion of the Paris arrangement must precede that of the final settlement.

To this Colonel de Meru saw no insuperable objection, and said that he would lay the whole matter before his Government. He earnestly hoped that a solution could be found, and assured the Emir that the French Government was actuated by motives of sympathy and friendship.

The Emir thanked him, and said that he too was only too anxious to approach this question in a spirit of friendliness.

The interview was, I think, a success. It was, of course, entirely unofficial, but the French officers came away considerably impressed with the Emir, and will doubtless pass their impressions on to their Government. Colonel de Meru remarked that Feisal had a considerable amount of right on his side, and that the only way of avoiding a very difficult situation was to meet him half-way. His opinion was that the Emir should be consulted about military measures which affected his own command.

If this can be done, a peaceable solution may be possible.

I would suggest a meeting, preferably in London, between British and French military representatives and Feisal to discuss the question of the withdrawal and relief of troops.

This would not alter the existing policy as regards the withdrawal, but it would mollify Feisal and make him feel that he was being treated with consideration. If a renewed assurance could at the same time be given by both Governments that the change was dictated by military considerations, and a promise made that the future of the country would be discussed without delay in conference as already proposed, I hope that Feisal would not only agree to the arrangement but would help to ensure that it was carried out without opposition.

The meeting of military experts would in a sense be chiefly useful as a sop to Feisal's *amour-propre*, but it would also facilitate the carrying out of the withdrawal in detail and would materially increase the possibility of discussing the final settlement in a spirit of friendliness.

The two French officers certainly showed themselves fully alive to the dangers of the situation and to the necessity of pacifying Feisal and of acting in a manner which will avert the immediate crisis. But for their tact and good sense, to-night's meeting might have been a failure.

London, October 11, 1919.

K. CORNWALLIS, Colonel.

[140172]

No. 117.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 1160.) D.
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 13, 1919.

FOLLOWING from Prime Minister for M. Clemenceau:—

"(Secret.)

"Now that the strike is over, I have been able to resume negotiations with the Emir Feisal. We are most anxious that the arrangements for the occupation of Syria after the withdrawal of British troops should work smoothly. This is not likely unless

the military representatives concerned have previously agreed upon them. Both Emir Feisal and Field-Marshal Lord Allenby are in London, but both are leaving for the Near East in two or three days. I would therefore strongly urge you to send General Gouraud to London to-morrow to discuss with them the military arrangements for the occupation of Syria from 1st November on the lines laid down in the *aide-mémoire* I gave you when I was last in Paris.

"The Emir Feisal is very anxious that an American representative should be present, and we are instructing the British Ambassador, if the French Government has no objection, to communicate with Mr. Polk on this subject."

[141131]

No. 118.

Earl Curzon to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 619.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, October 14, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 497, at the request of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst the Italian Ambassador called on him on the 7th October. Lord Hardinge reminded his Excellency that on the 25th August Sir R. Graham had pointed out to him that he could not understand the Italian attitude in regard to Egypt, nor why the Italian Government was the only one of the Allied and Associated Powers who had not recognised the British protectorate over Egypt. Lord Hardinge told the Marquis Imperiali that by a strange coincidence Lord Allenby had telegraphed on the very same day from Cairo that the Italian agent and consul-general had informed him that he had been charged by the King of Italy to assist the British authorities in every way possible, and had added that Italy would shortly recognise the protectorate.

Lord Allenby was shortly proceeding on his return journey to Cairo, and it was a matter of considerable importance to His Majesty's Government that the recognition of the protectorate of Egypt by Italy should no longer be delayed, in order that a united front might be shown by the Allies as regards the affairs of Egypt. Lord Hardinge therefore had been instructed by me to ask his Excellency why his Government were delaying recognition, which France and the United States had already given, especially as it was one of the conditions imposed in the Peace Treaty upon Germany and Austria. Further, he asked what was the object of the Italian Government in delaying recognition. His Majesty's Government recognised that the Italian Government had repudiated the action of those Italians in Egypt who had given support to the Nationalist movement, and wondered therefore that the Italian Government do not take the obvious action of recognising the protectorate and thus show their disapproval of this movement.

Lord Hardinge reminded his Excellency that Great Britain and France had by treaty promised equitable compensation to Italy in Africa in the event of these two Powers extending their possessions in that continent. Lord Hardinge wished, however, to point out to him that Italy was just as much bound to carry out her promise to recognise our protectorate in Egypt as we were to make good our offer of Jubaland and Kismayu—a territory of 50,000 square miles—and that if the Italian Government persisted in their unreasonable delay in recognising our Egyptian protectorate, we could hardly be expected to be in any hurry to hand over to her so large a slice of British territory in Africa.

The Marquis Imperiali argued that the cases were not analogous. He said that there was a treaty obligation on our part to grant compensation in Africa, but there was no treaty obligation on the part of Italy to recognise the British protectorate in Egypt. To that Lord Hardinge replied that, in view of the fact that the Treaties of Peace concluded with Germany and Austria, of which Italy was a signatory, compelled those two Powers to recognise the British protectorate over Egypt, it was surely a moral obligation that the Powers which made this a condition of the Peace should themselves do what they were forcing Germany and Austria to perform. The Ambassador admitted that this was a very difficult argument to meet, and he said that he would report what Lord Hardinge had said to him to his Government by telegraph.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[141637]

No. 119.

M. Clemenceau to the Earl of Derby.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, October 15.)

Mon cher Ambassadeur,

Paris, le 14 octobre 1919.

VOUS avez bien voulu me communiquer deux télégrammes de Mr. Lloyd George et Lord Curzon tendant à l'envoi du Général Gouraud à Londres pour participer à une Conférence sur la Syrie qui se tient aujourd'hui, en présence de l'Émir Feysal, qui souhaiterait également y voir assister un représentant américain.

En fait, le Général Gouraud est à Strasbourg, et ne pourrait matériellement se rendre à Londres en temps utile.

Je n'aurais pu, d'ailleurs, l'autoriser à participer à cette réunion; c'est au Gouvernement français qu'il appartient de négocier avec le Gouvernement anglais, et le Général Gouraud n'aurait pu délibérer que sur les modalités d'exécution de décisions prises par le Gouvernement français relatives à la décision prise le 15 septembre par le Conseil suprême, décision limitée à la relève des troupes britanniques par les troupes françaises en Cilicie et Syrie (zone bleue).

Quant à la demande de l'Émir Feysal de voir participer un délégué américain à ses conversations avec le Gouvernement anglais, je ne lui reconnais aucun droit de prendre une pareille initiative. Si le Gouvernement américain exprimait de lui-même un désir de cette nature, je n'y ferais pas opposition. Toutefois, il ne pourrait être question de régler la question de Syrie elle-même dans des réunions officieuses de ce genre. C'est à la Conférence seule qu'il appartient de prendre une décision définitive sur la question de Syrie et de Mésopotamie, en même temps que sur le sort de l'Empire ottoman.

Je continue à regretter que l'Émir Feysal ait été appelé par le Gouvernement anglais sans consultation préalable avec le Gouvernement français, car cela ne contribue pas à faciliter les solutions.

Il faut replacer la question sur son véritable terrain.

Ainsi que je l'ai indiqué, le 9 octobre, dans ma réponse au mémoire du 13 septembre de Mr. Lloyd George, la position de la France en Syrie et ses rapports avec les Arabes de sa zone ne peuvent qu'être identiques à la position de l'Angleterre en Mésopotamie et à ses rapports avec les Arabes dans sa zone.

C'est à la France qu'il appartient de s'entendre directement avec l'Émir Feysal. Or, comment une entente sera-t-elle possible avec l'Émir si celui-ci, qui prétend à la souveraineté de toute la Syrie, reste le protégé des Anglais? Cette protection encourage l'ambition de l'Émir et ses résistances, et risque de créer dans la zone arabe, au moment où les troupes françaises remplaceront les troupes britanniques dans la zone bleue, une surexcitation d'autant plus dangereuse que les forces arabes recrutées en hâte ont été armées par les Anglais de fusils, de mitrailleuses et d'autos blindées.

La théorie qui consiste à couper la Syrie en deux zones imperméables l'une à l'autre est contraire non seulement à l'accord de 1916, mais à la nature des choses et au simple bon sens. Je comprends fort bien l'embarras où se trouvent les négociateurs anglais, qui, sous le coup des nécessités politiques, ont été amenés à prendre au Hedjaz au Nedjd et avec la France des engagements, sinon opposés, du moins difficiles à ajuster.

Mais la solution ne peut consister à sacrifier les droits et intérêts français et à nous placer dans une position équivoque vis-à-vis des Arabes, en gauchissant les accords de 1916 au moment où se termine l'occupation de fait anglaise de la Syrie résultant de la guerre, et en nous demandant d'accepter une situation rendue dangereuse par les promesses faites aux Arabes et les moyens militaires qui leur ont été imprudemment prodigués et qui ne peuvent servir que contre nous.

Il n'y a, en réalité, qu'une issue digne du grand pays loyal et allié qui a traité avec nous; c'est de nous remettre la situation sans arrière-pensée. Que le Gouvernement anglais dise nettement à Feysal de s'entendre avec nous, qu'il se conforme à la lettre et à l'esprit de nos accords (dont l'article 1^{er} dit que les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à "reconnaître et protéger un État arabe ou une confédération d'États arabes dans les zones A et B") et il pourra abandonner sans crainte la responsabilité de la situation présentes, en s'inspirant à la fois de ses traditions libérales et généreuses envers les musulmans, du respect de ses engagements, et d'une énergie réfléchie.

C'est sur ces données que je suis prêt à m'entretenir avec l'Émir Feysal à son passage à Paris, s'il exprime le désir de me voir et d'arriver à un arrangement.

Veuillez, &c.

G. CLEMENCEAU.

[142982]

No. 120.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 1170.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, October 16, 1919.

PLEASE inform M. Clemenceau that Emir Feisal accepts his invitation to see him in Paris, and proposes to cross to France on Monday next.

[142627]

No. 121.

Emir Feisal to the Prime Minister of Great Britain.—(Received October 18.)

Your Excellency,

London, October 11, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 10th October. I have also received a communication from the Foreign Office, to which I shall reply in detail.

Allow me to submit a formal protest in the name of the Arab nation against any change which may be desired to introduce into the present form of government in Syria. As I have already stated in my previous correspondence and interviews, I consider that no changes should be allowed before the final decision of the Peace Conference as to the future form of government.

My protest is based on three main points:—

1. I withdrew my agents and troops, without bargain, from the coast, and at the same time the Commander-in-chief made a declaration through me to the Syrian people that he intends occupying their provinces by his troops and forming a provisional administration depending directly on him acting on behalf of the Allies, which administration shall continue to exist until a final decision is given by the Peace Conference as to the future government of this country. This pledge must not be thrown aside for reasons which are outside our power and knowledge, and for which we are not responsible in any way. If the Peace Conference has delayed its final decision it is not the fault of the Arabs, and it is not an offence for which they deserve the punishment of repudiating a pledge most solemnly made. If it is absolutely necessary that the British troops should be withdrawn, the Syrians naturally expect that the French troops will be withdrawn at the same time and the coast handed over to the Arabs as it was before the British occupation, thus awaiting the final decision of the Peace Conference. This will also conform to the promise made by Great Britain to the Syrian Committee in Cairo on the 11th June, 1917.

2. I understand that His Majesty's Government, in withdrawing their troops, have regarded the obligations they have incurred to both their Allies, the French and the Arabs.

In addition to the engagement referred to in the preceding paragraph, I beg to again call attention to the telegram addressed by the High Commissioner in Egypt to the King at Mecca, which runs as follows:—

"Bolsheviks found in Petrograd Foreign Office record of all conversations and provisional understanding (not formal treaty) between Britain, France, and Russia, made early in war to prevent difficulties between Powers in prosecuting war with Turkey. Jamal, either from ignorance or malice, has distorted its original purpose, has omitted its stipulations regarding consent of native populations and safeguarding their interest, and has ignored fact that subsequent outbreak and success of Arab revolt and withdrawal of Russia had for long time past created wholly different situation."

This telegram was sent to the King in reply to his protest against the secret treaty between Great Britain and France which Jamal Pasha divulged in Damascus for propaganda purposes. It was quoted in my letter to you dated the 21st September, 1919, and has remained unanswered.

Has the different situation affecting your agreement with France, and referred to in the above telegram, been since modified in any way? Has the opinion of the people been taken as to the new proposed occupation?

The stipulation regarding the consent of the people was confirmed in November 1918 by the formal declaration made conjointly by Great Britain and France, whether the occupation is temporary or otherwise.

[1356]

3. The over-excited feeling now prevailing in the Arab provinces, as well as all Moslem provinces of the Ottoman Empire in Asia, and caused by unwise foreign interference, is no longer a secret. Any person having the slightest knowledge of what has been going on in the Syrian provinces is undoubtedly convinced that there will be trouble, and in different quarters, if the *status quo* of the present administration is changed.

I therefore beg you, in the name of humanity and public peace, in the name of the Arab nation, in the multitudinous interests of Great Britain and France in the Eastern world, as I have already asked previously, that no new doors should be allowed to be opened for further troubles and to leave the present situation as it is.

I beg also that hasty measures be taken to assemble a commission of the interested Allied Powers and brethren-in-arms to consider the interests of each nation, according to the requirements of justice, for the aim of which we have fought together.

If, however, the British Government remains unchanged in her decision to withdraw her troops after due consideration of this exposé of my case, I shall be glad to accept your kind offer for me to meet representatives from Great Britain, America, and France to consider the problem involved in the impending withdrawal of British troops from Syria and to give a final decision regarding the same, so that these problems may be solved in a way which will keep public peace and safeguard the interests of all.

Anticipating that this conference may be assembled with the least possible delay, I have, &c.

FEISAL.

[143008]

No. 122.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon — (Received October 19.)

(No. 1109.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, October 19, 1919.

PLEASE inform Emir Feisal that M. Clemenceau will be very pleased to receive him at 10 o'clock Tuesday, 21st October, at Ministry of War.

[143928]

No. 123.

His Highness Emir Feisal to the Prime Minister of Great Britain. — (Received October 21.)

Your Excellency,

Carlton Hotel, London, October 19, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency that, while I was awaiting the arrival of representatives of the French and United States Governments to discuss with Field-Marshal Allenby and myself the question of the advisability, or otherwise, of the withdrawal of British troops from Syria until such time as the Peace Conference shall have taken a final decision on the Syrian question, I was called by his Lordship the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Earl Curzon of Kedleston, who informed me that the French Premier wished to see me before any decision was taken. I accepted the invitation with greater pleasure in that I am desirous of establishing cordial relations between all the Powers concerned in the Near East, and I am proceeding to Paris to-morrow. My endeavour will be to persuade the French Government to maintain the *status quo* and to agree to the meeting of the special conference proposed by your Excellency. My object is to prevent the troubles that will inevitably break out upon the withdrawal of the British forces from Syria, on the lines laid down by the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which the Syrians have never acknowledged and against which they will continue to protest. If I succeed I shall be much gratified. On the contrary, if I fail I shall communicate with your Excellency with a view to returning to London and asking for the holding of a conference of representatives of the British, United States and Arab Governments. I believe that America will not hesitate to accept our call to discuss this very important question.

Will your Excellency allow me to urge once more that the Syrian question shall henceforth be separated from the Turkish question and be discussed on its own merits? Indefinite postponement might easily, in my opinion, lead to highly undesirable consequences. President Wilson's illness has assuredly caused us all great regret, but

I feel sure that the United States Government, in spite of this unfortunate mischance, will approve of my proposal, because the state of affairs in the Near East is such as to render a speedy settlement imperative.

I have, &c.

FEISAL.

[143507]

No. 124.

Mr. Kerr to Foreign Office. — (Received October 21.)

I ENCLOSE for your information and for purposes of record a copy of the despatch which the Prime Minister sent to M. Clemenceau on Saturday.

10, Downing Street, Whitehall,
October 20, 1919.

Enclosure in No. 124.

The Prime Minister of Great Britain to M. Clemenceau.

M. le Président du Conseil,

October 18, 1919.

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of the 14th October in reply to my telegrams of the preceding day, and also of the memorandum you have submitted in reply to my *aide-mémoire* of the 13th September which has just reached me. I must state at the outset that the tone of your telegram took me entirely by surprise. It represents, so far as I can judge, a complete change from the friendly tone you adopted in our discussions on this subject in Paris. I must in particular resent your statement that you—

"... thoroughly understand the difficulty in which English negotiators find themselves after being driven by political necessities to enter into engagements both with the King of the Hedjaz and with France which, if not in opposition the one to the other, are at any rate difficult to adjust."

I can hardly conceive of a more offensive imputation made by one Ally to another, after five years of comradeship in arms, considering that the engagements were entered into with the King of the Hedjaz with the sole object of making possible the revolt of the Arabs against the Turks at a critical stage of the war. The Anglo-French Agreement of 1916 was not concluded by the present Government but by its predecessor, and was entered into by Sir Edward Grey, whose scrupulous integrity is recognised by the whole world. Your statement implies a charge of duplicity against the man who carried the British Empire into the war against Germany by the side of France, and remained in office the steadfast friend of France during those critical years before America entered the war. He is the last man against whom a French Prime Minister should bring such a charge. It is all the more singular that you should have made this imputation in view of the fact that, so far from the engagements entered into by the British Government to the Arabs and the French Government being contradictory, the French Government is itself explicitly bound by the terms of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916 to accord to the Arabs the very rights guaranteed by the British Government to King Hussein.

2. As the French Government appears to be under a complete misapprehension both as to the facts and as to the policy of His Majesty's Government in this matter, I propose to record the history of the Syrian question. In order that that history may be complete, I append the correspondence in full which passed between the British High Commissioner in Egypt and King Hussein in 1915 and 1916. From this correspondence you will see that, while the authority of the Turks over their whole Empire was still intact, the British Government scrupulously protected the interests of its French Ally in Syria. It was of the utmost importance to encourage the Arab movement of revolt in order to help break down the Turkish wall, which prevented effective communication between the Allies of the West and the Russian armies. The condition upon which alone the Arabs would agree to throw in their lot with the

[1356]

Allies was an agreement that there should be an independent Arab State or Confederation of States including the whole Arab population. As you will see, the Arabs pressed for the inclusion within the area of the independent Arab State of the whole of Syria and Cilicia. His Majesty's Government, however, refused to consider this proposal. They stated, on the 25th October, 1915, that they did not consider that that portion of Syria lying west of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo could be said to be purely Arab, and that the interests of France were there involved. This area, therefore, had to be excluded from the zone within which they were prepared to recognise the existence of an independent Arab State. Thus they stated in a letter to King Hussein of the 14th December, 1915, that—

"... with regard to the vilayets of Aleppo and Beirout, the Government of Great Britain have taken careful notice of your observations; but as the interests of our Ally (France) are involved, the question will require careful consideration, and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course."

I would call your attention, however, to the reply which the Sherif Hussein made on the 1st January, 1916:—

"As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications, and all this was only done so as to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment was desired by the will of the Blessed and Supreme God. It was this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what might possibly injure the alliance between Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the present war and calamities; yet we find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that at the first opportunity after this war is finished we should ask (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beirout and its coast."

His Highness went on to say:—

"The people of Beirout would decidedly never accept such isolation, and they may oblige us to undertake new measures which might exercise Great Britain certainly not less than our present troubles, because of our belief and uncertainty in the reciprocity of our interests, which was the only cause that caused us never to negotiate with any other Power but you. Consequently it is impossible to allow any derogation which gives France or any other Power a span of land in those regions."

In the end King Hussein, yielding to the insistence of His Majesty's Government, and subject to the reservation quoted above, entered the war on the Allied side.

3. I turn now to the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916. The negotiations between the British and the Arabs and the British and the French were carried on simultaneously during the autumn of 1915. On the 21st October Sir Edward had a discussion with M. Cambon on the subject, and asked that the French Government should appoint a representative to discuss the frontiers of Syria with a representative of the British Government. On the 23rd November M. Picot, who was the representative appointed by the French Government, met Sir Arthur Nicolson, who pointed out to him our attitude towards the Arabs and our dealings with the Sherif. No agreement was arrived at at that meeting, but at a later meeting, on the 21st December, M. Picot informed Sir Arthur Nicolson that, after great difficulties, he had obtained permission from his Government to agree to the towns of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus being included in the Arab dominions to be administered by the Arabs under French influence. He said, further, that his Government realised the importance of the Arab movement and wished to make any sacrifices possible in order to separate the Arabs from the Turks. You will observe that these negotiations with France were completed some months before the Arabs revolted and before the correspondence between His Majesty's Government and King Hussein on the subject of the Arab boundaries was concluded. These records, a summary of which I handed you before, but which I attach for convenience of reference, are purely British records. But that the French Government was aware at that time of the undertakings of Great Britain to King Hussein in regard to the boundaries of the area within which the British Government was prepared to recognise the independence of the Arabs is clear, not merely from these records, but still more from the fact that the limits laid down in the

Anglo-French Agreement of 1916, within which there was to be an independent Arab State or confederation of Arab States, are identical with those laid down in the correspondence with King Hussein, and include the four towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo.

4. I come now to the text of the agreement itself. Article 1 reads as follows:—

"France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or confederation of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (A), France, and in area (B), Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (A), France, and in area (B), Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or confederation of Arab States."

I observe that, both in your telegram and in your memorandum, you state that under the Anglo-French Agreement France and Great Britain were to protect ("protéger") an independent Arab State. This is not correct. The word used in the Agreement is "soutenir" (uphold), which bears an entirely different significance. I would further remind you that the alteration of the word "protéger" to "soutenir" was deliberately made in August, 1916. The proposal of alteration was set forth in a letter from M. Cambon to Viscount Grey on the 25th August, in which he says,

"Il me semble que les mots 'soutenir' et 'uphold' rendraient plus exactement notre pensée,"

and was agreed to in a reply of Lord Crewe's of the 30th August, 1916. According to the correct text, therefore, the French Government is bound by its undertakings to Great Britain to uphold ("soutenir") an independent Arab State in the area which includes the above-mentioned four towns, Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, and within that area to "supply advisers and foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or confederation of States." Under the mandatory system, of course, the provisions of the 1916 agreement about priority of exploitation would be superseded by the system of the open door.

5. I would further direct your attention to the previous paragraph of Sir Edward Grey's letter of the 16th May, 1916, to M. Cambon, in which, on behalf of the British Government, he accepted the agreement:—

"I have the honour to inform your Excellency in reply that the acceptance of the whole project as it now stands will involve the abdication of considerable British interests, but, since His Majesty's Government recognise the advantage to the general cause of the Allies entailed in producing a more favourable internal political situation in Turkey, they are ready to accept the arrangement now arrived at, provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfil the conditions and obtain the towns of Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo."

You will observe that the acceptance of the agreement by Great Britain was made conditional upon the Arabs obtaining the four towns Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. If that condition is not fulfilled, the whole agreement clearly falls to the ground. There was also the further condition that the Arabs should fulfil their part. In view of the fact that the Arabs remained in the war until the end and played an indispensable part in the overthrow of Turkey, there can be no question that this condition has been fulfilled.

6. Two other declarations or engagements which have bearing on this question are the Anglo-French Declaration of 1918, and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The text of the Anglo-French Declaration of the 8th November, 1918, runs as follows:—

"The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in urging in the East the war let loose on the world by German ambition, is to ensure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and to establish national Governments and administrations, which shall derive their authority from the initiative and free will of the peoples themselves."

"To realise this, France and Great Britain are in agreement to encourage and assist the establishment of native Government in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, as also in those territories for whose liberation they are striving and to recognise those Governments immediately they are effectively established."

"Far from wishing to impose on the peoples of these regions this or that institution, they have no other care than to assure, by their support and practical aid, the normal workings of such Governments and administrations as the peoples shall themselves have adopted; to guarantee impartial and even justice for all, to facilitate the economic development of the country by arousing and encouraging local initiative, to foster the spread of education, to put an end to those factions too long exploited by Turkish policy—such is the part which the two Allied Governments have set themselves to play in liberated territories."

The clause relating to the Turkish Empire in the Covenant of the League of Nations reads as follows:—

"Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory."

7. The only other historical date which I think it necessary to record as affecting the problem under discussion are the understandings arrived at between yourself and myself in December last year in regard to Palestine and Mesopotamia, and the declaration made by the British Government in March of this year in regard to the mandate for Syria. The understanding of last December was that the French Government would agree to the inclusion of the Mosul area in Mesopotamia, would also agree to relinquishing the idea of an international state in Palestine, and that so far as they were concerned, would agree to a British mandate over both. The reasons for this arrangement, as I understand them, were threefold: (a) that Mosul was geographically and economically part of Mesopotamia; (b) that international Government had proverbially proved a failure, and that the sentiments of the inhabitants of Palestine, whether Arab or Zionist, appeared to favour a British mandate; (c) that in view of the fact that the British Empire had practically alone overthrown Turkey, and had employed a total of 1,400,000 troops and incurred an expenditure of 750,000,000*l.* in a campaign which led to the conquest of Syria, the French Government which, owing to the concentration of its forces on the Western front had been unable to participate in the Turkish campaign in more than a small degree and had even opposed its prosecution, was prepared to make these modifications in the 1916 Agreement, to meet British desires without attaching, as has since been alleged, any conditions thereto.

8. The declaration of Great Britain's disinterestedness in Syria was made to the Council of Four at a meeting held in March last. Lord Allenby, the Commander-in-chief in these parts was present at the meeting and went back to Egypt and Syria immediately afterwards to inform his subordinates. Instructions were further sent to him at later dates from Paris and London instructing him to make it clear that under no circumstances could Great Britain accept the mandate for Syria. Similar statements were made to the Emir Feisal at the time of the Paris meeting and later. To these declarations the British Government unreservedly adheres.

9. It was in the light of these facts, declarations, and undertakings, that I brought forward the proposals as set forth in the *aide-memoire* of the 13th September. The British Government had hoped that the Peace Conference would be able to deal quickly with the Turkish problem, and in the earlier half the year they had thought the best road to a peaceful settlement would be the continuance of the military occupation of Syria by British troops, assisted by French and Arab troops under the supreme command of Lord Allenby until the Turkish peace was made. In the summer a proposal for substituting French for British troops in Western Syria broke down partly through disagreement about boundaries, and partly because of doubt as to the consequences on local peace and order. Despite their strong desire to promote a Franco-Arab understanding it has been brought home to the British Government at every turn that there was strong opposition among the population of Syria to the exercise by France of a mandate over that country—opposition which His Majesty's Government did their best to discourage. The long-standing existence of this opposition is clearly indicated in the correspondence with King Hussein in 1915. The report of the American Commissioners who have recently traversed the country taking evidence, proved that it is still formidable. It has throughout, however, been the desire of the British Government that an amicable working arrangement should be

arrived at between the French, British, and the Arabs, the three peoples concerned, and they did all in their power, as you will remember, to promote that understanding as long as the Emir Feisal was in Paris. Unfortunately, though they had entirely disinterested themselves in Syria, and therefore had no interests of their own to serve, their efforts came to nought. In the early autumn, however, of this year it became clear that the decision of the United States as to whether she would assume a mandate for any part of Turkey would be long delayed, and it became necessary for Great Britain, which had borne almost the whole brunt of the war against Turkey, to cease to make itself responsible for the occupation of Syria. It was essential that she should demobilise her troops and limit her responsibilities. Pressure both of public opinion and of financial necessity left no other course open to the British Government. Accordingly they brought forward their proposals for the replacement of British troops in Syria by French and Arab troops in the following terms:—

Extract from Aide-memoire of the 13th September, 1919.

"3. In deciding to whom to hand over responsibility for garrisoning the various districts in the evacuated area regard will be had to the engagements and declarations of the British and French Governments, not only as between themselves, but as between them and the Arabs.

"4. In pursuance of this policy the garrisons in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line and the garrisons in Cilicia will be replaced by a French force, and the garrisons at Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, will be replaced by an Arab force."

The British Government further declared its willingness to accept the arbitration of the President of the United States on the question of the boundaries between Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine. This last, and certain other proposals in the *aide-memoire*, I agreed at your request, to adjourn until the Peace Conference could take up the whole question of the future of the Turkish territories. The proposals, however, in so far as they related to the occupation of Syria during the interim period, were reported to the Conference on the 13th September and no objections were raised. These proposals were in all respects in complete accord with the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916, as modified by the Prime Ministers in 1918. They accord to France full control of the so-called blue area until such time as the Peace Conference determines the future of these territories. They accord to the Arabs the control in the area in which they were promised an independent Arab State both by British engagements and by the French Government under the 1916 Agreement. Further, in area (A), excluding Mosul, France will alone have the right of supplying advisers at the request of the Arab State.

10. As these proposals vitally affected the Emir Feisal and the Arabs, and could not be carried into effect without his co-operation, I telegraphed as soon as they were formulated inviting him to come to Paris at once to discuss them with the British and French Governments. At the same time I notified you and the other members of the Conference that I had done so. In reply, you stated that you did not see the purpose of the Emir Feisal's journey at that time, and when he arrived you stated that you did not wish to see him. Accordingly, with your consent, I invited him to come straight to London with the object of inducing him to accept the proposal about occupation as assented to in Paris. To these proposals the Emir Feisal raised the strongest objection, partly on the ground that the Arabs objected to the exercise by France of any mandate over Syria, and that these objections had already been made clear by the people themselves to the American Commissioners, who had been sent to ascertain the wishes of the people; and partly on the ground that the Arab people, as represented by him, were bitterly opposed to the partition of Syria and the Arab territory in any shape or form. Despite very great difficulties, the British Government put the strongest pressure on the Emir Feisal to accept the arrangement and to come to terms with the French Government. How strong were the Emir's objections and how loyally the British Government carried out its understandings with the French Government will be apparent from the correspondence which passed between the Emir and the British Government during the last few weeks, copies of which I append hereto. That the British Government was not forgetful of France's rights and claims is shown from the following extract:—

"In so far as the occupation by France of the rest of Syria is concerned, they would ask your Highness to remember that the Arabs owe their freedom in a large

measure to the supreme sacrifices made by the French people in the late war. It is true that the French contribution in Syria itself was not great, for France was deeply pre-occupied in the war on other fronts. But on these greater and vital battlefields of Europe they lost 1,400,000 in dead, and incurred a debt not far short of that incurred by Great Britain in overthrowing the power which sustained the Turkish tyranny, and without whose support the Turkish military power could not have continued the war more than a few weeks."

11. As a result of our representations, I reached the conclusion that if a round table conference of military representatives were held to discuss, not the policy, but the method of carrying out the military arrangements for the replacement of British troops by French and Arab troops in their respective areas, the change in the occupying authority could probably be carried through by friendly agreement between the three parties concerned and with the consent of all. I therefore telegraphed to you asking you to send General Gouraud to London immediately to discuss the military arrangements with the Emir Feisal and Field-Marshal Lord Allenby. You can now understand how surprised I was to receive your refusal and still more the statement of the reasons which led you to adopt this course. After labouring incessantly to bring about a friendly settlement which would secure to France the whole of her rights, which would re-establish friendly relations between herself and her Arab neighbours, and leave her completely free to deal with them under the agreement of 1916, I found my efforts met with an attitude of suspicion and opposition wholly unwarranted by the facts, as the documents attached to this letter will show. I earnestly trust that the destruction of this attempt at settlement by consent will not prejudice the conclusion of an amicable agreement between Arabs and the French.

12. The British Government are so impressed with the importance of bringing about an understanding between the Arabs and the French that they did not communicate your message to the Emir Feisal in the somewhat insulting form in which it reached them. Had they done so, there would, in their opinion, have been but little chance for a peaceable settlement of the Syrian question. They informed him that you had invited him to Paris and pressed upon him in the strongest manner that he should accept your invitation and come to terms with the French Government direct. He has, I am glad to say, decided to act upon this advice.

13. The British Government knows that when the Emir Feisal does come to Paris, you will, notwithstanding the tone of your message, treat him with the courtesy and consideration which one of the Allies deserves. They would remind you that he initiated a revolt against Turkish rule at a time when the Allied fortunes were at a very low ebb; that he was loyal to the alliance to the end; and that he and his followers played an indispensable part in overthrowing Turkey, which was the prelude to the collapse of the German combination. The Emir Feisal is the representative of a proud and historic race with whom it is essential that both the British and the French should live in relations of cordial amity. He is further a member of the Peace Conference, of which you are yourself the distinguished president. The British Government is bound to him by solemn engagements, and the area he controls lies opposite both to the French and British spheres. His father is also a great Mohammedan leader. His Majesty's Government cannot conceal the anxiety they have felt at the apparent determination of the French press to deal with the Emir Feisal and the Arab problem with a high hand. If this were indeed the policy of the French Government, the British Government are afraid that it would inevitably lead to serious and long-continued disturbances throughout the Arab territories which might easily spread to the whole Mohammedan world. The Emir Feisal is now anxious to co-operate with the Allies. They earnestly hope that during the course of the negotiations in Paris nothing will occur to drive the Emir Feisal into hostility or induce him to enter into relations with those hostile elements which exist in the Middle East, and are the enemies alike of France and Britain.

14. His Majesty's Government would further state that the Emir Feisal regards himself as entitled by solemn agreement to set up an independent State within the zone laid down in the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916, and including the four towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. The French Government is no less bound than the British Government, as the documents I have quoted in this letter will show, to uphold ("soutenir") this Arab State in these districts, though they alone have the right to supply it with advisers at its request.

15. They must further state that inasmuch as the Emir Feisal is one of Britain's Allies they cannot disinterest themselves in the question of whether or not the obliga-

tions which they have undertaken towards him, and which the French Government have also undertaken in the 1916 Anglo-French Agreement, are carried out or not. The British Government is under solemn obligation both to the Arabs and to the French Government. As I have pointed out in this letter, its obligations do not conflict with one another, but are complementary. It is clearly their right, as it is their duty, to concern themselves with the fulfilment of the treaties by which they are bound. As you will have seen, they have insisted to the Emir Feisal that he can expect no support from the British Government for anything more than he is entitled to under his treaty rights, and they have pressed him in the strongest possible manner to come to a friendly agreement with the French Government as soon as possible. They are confident that their French ally will carry out its obligations in the spirit and in the letter, and come to a friendly settlement with the Emir Feisal.

16. In conclusion, His Majesty's Government would call attention to the fact that both the British and the French Governments are bound by the Anglo-French declaration of the 8th November, 1918, and by the covenant of the League of Nations. They have pledged themselves to take into account the wishes of the population in the final settlement of the Turkish problem. The Emir Feisal and the Arab people regard these declarations as binding undertakings, and it is clearly their present intention to plead before the Peace Conference, which will have final authority in the settlement, that the wishes of the people shall be the determining factor in the selection of the mandatory. As it is the desire of the British Government that France shall exercise the mandatory power, it is clearly of the utmost importance that the French Government should spare no pains to establish a friendly understanding with the Emir Feisal and the Arab population of Syria.

17. The British Government, therefore, await with anxiety the result of the negotiations between the French Government and the Emir Feisal in Paris. The arrangement for the withdrawal of the British troops and for the occupation of Syria thereafter, as set forth in the *aide-mémoire* of the 13th September will, of course, stand.

18. There are other matters in your memorandum which call for comment. But inasmuch as they relate to the final settlement of the problem of the Turkish Empire, which are reserved for the Peace Conference, and not to the interim period which is now alone under discussion, I do not propose to consider them now. A separate memorandum from the Foreign Office on certain of these points, however, will follow in a few days.

19. His Majesty's Government trust that this despatch will put an end to the unwarranted suspicion which exists in the mind of the French Government as to the British attitude and intentions. They venture to believe that it will make it clear that they have pursued a policy of loyalty and co-operation from the start. You will observe that in many important particulars the memorandum which you gave me was inaccurate in matters of fact, and unfounded in its insinuations. During the last six months, His Majesty's Government has been subjected to a series of accusations from the French Government in regard to its policy and its actions in Syria, which they believe in every case have been proved to be without substantial foundation. Even in the note under reply the French Government repeat their statement in regard to the supposed British action in arming the Arabs. They believed that in the British despatch of the 6th September, addressed to the French Ambassador in London, they had finally disposed of this charge. As this despatch does not seem to have produced any effect, they can only repeat the essential parts of it:—

"Even since the successful advance of the Arab forces last year, and the disappearance of the Turkish Power, it has been in contemplation to raise and equip a suitable force of gendarmerie for the maintenance of law and order in the various regions that now acknowledge Arab authority. The organisation and equipment of this force has been steadily proceeded with ever since, and the plans of the Commander-in-chief contemplate the arming of one Arab mixed brigade and 6,000 gendarmes. It is, however, his intention to secure the exchange of a modern rifle, machine-gun or gun for every similar weapon of British pattern furnished to the Arab forces. The effect of this step, therefore, will not be to increase Arab armaments, but solely to ensure uniformity between the different sections comprising Field-Marshal Allenby's command.

"In point of fact no rifles, machine-guns, or guns have hitherto been transferred to the Arabs under this scheme.

"Field-Marshal Allenby contradicts categorically the statement which

appeared in 'Le Temps' of the 18th August to the effect that arms and ammunition had been landed at Beirut by British ships and delivered to the Arabs. I should be grateful if the French Government could see their way to publish a *démenti* of this statement."

The British Government would earnestly plead that interested propaganda should not be allowed to estrange Anglo-French relations, and that a hearing should not be given to these unfounded accusations against the British Government and its agents. There is a point at which such accusations, and still more their appearance in the French press, will inevitably provoke a demand for publicity. His Majesty's Government do not think it would conduce to the good relations between Great Britain and France if they were forced to publish the whole series of accusations made against them by the French Government, in no very friendly or conciliatory language, during the past six months, together with the replies which show these accusations to have been unfounded. Certainly nothing would be more calculated to encourage the enemies of that Anglo-French Alliance which was the principal cause of the Allied victory in the war. But they will not shrink from this duty if it is thrust upon them.

I have, &c.

D. LLOYD GEORGE.

[144506]

No. 125.

Earl Curzon to Earl Granville.

(No. 258.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 21, 1919.

M. VENIZELOS, in the course of his present visit to England, paid me a call at the Foreign Office, and indulged in a long conversation about the views and aspirations of his country.

He pleaded the cause of the Greeks as against the Turks or the Bulgarians in the whole of Thrace, producing a long series of historical maps, which showed that only once in bygone centuries had the Bulgarians occupied the territories in question, and placing before me stacks of figures which demonstrated the numerical preponderance of the Greek population. He felt deeply hurt by the attitude of the American Government on this subject, and he pleaded earnestly for the support of Great Britain.

I did not venture any observations on a matter which still lay on the lap of the Peace Conference, and contented myself with admiring the formidable argumentative arsenal with which the Greek statesman had provided himself.

He then entered into a prolonged exposition of his views with regard to the future of Constantinople, arguing that at all costs the Turk must be removed, both as a symbol of his defeat and because his continued presence in Constantinople would be a challenge and danger in the years to come. America, he said, was now, in consequence of the illness of President Wilson, not in the least likely to take a mandate for the city. Great Britain would decline to take a mandate. The Turks themselves would not tolerate France as a mandatory. There remained only an international administration, with a High Commissioner under the League of Nations.

I pointed out to him that, while there were many in this country who shared these views and would use all their influence to carry them out, very powerful opinions had been expressed on the other side in Paris and elsewhere by the spokesmen of India and the Secretary of State for India. They had stated that the expulsion of the Turk from Constantinople would be regarded as an intolerable insult to Islam, and would be followed by disturbances and rebellions in all parts of the Eastern world. They had even said that it would shake our position in India. Such views could not be altogether ignored.

M. Venizelos retaliated by the observation that he believed, from such information as he possessed, that these forebodings were far from being shared by Lord Hardinge and myself, both of whom had been Viceroy, and that he did not see why the present Government of India should be any more right than those who had so long presided over the fortunes of that country.

I thought it only fair to remark that the situation had changed during the progress of the war itself, and that sentiments had been aroused which, a decade ago, had not existed.

Nevertheless, the Greek Prime Minister pooh-poohed the idea that any serious trouble could possibly arise from the expulsion of the Turk, and he argued that the war would be thrown away if the opportunity was lost to get rid of this running sore.

In his view, another reason for the setting up of an international administration in Constantinople was that this was the only form of Government which could successfully withstand, at some future date, the ambitions of a resuscitated Russia. If either the British or the French were to assume the mandate, they would certainly find themselves involved, some day or other, in a bitter conflict with the secular aspirations of the Russian people. On the other hand, an international administration would be in a position to resist Russian encroachment.

When I asked whether M. Venizelos had considered the possibility of combining with the institution of some such administration the retention of the Sultan and his court in Constantinople, he said that he had not the slightest objection to such a solution. He thought the capital of Turkey ought to be removed to Brussa, on the other side of the Straits; but there was no reason why the Sultan should not retain his palaces and buildings, and even reside from time to time in Constantinople, if he cared to do so. It should be quite possible also to draw a ring round the principal mosques, which might remain under Turkish administration. The real business of Government would be conducted in Asia Minor, but the simulacrum of power and prestige (so long as it was unaccompanied by authority) might be allowed to remain in Europe.

I could not help thinking that, in the long argument which he developed on these lines, the Greek Prime Minister had in view, more than anything else, a hope for the expansion of his own people. British, French, or Russians in Constantinople might close the door for ever to the ambitions of Greece, but it might well be that, at some future date, an international administration (always a difficult thing to maintain) would be glad to hand over the reins of power to those who would be the numerical majority both in the city and in its neighbourhood. This idea was not expressed, but M. Venizelos is so ardent a patriot and so far-sighted a politician that I could not but feel sure that it lurked in his mind, even if it did not find expression on his lips.

I had expected him to say something about the position of the Greeks in Smyrna, and had made up my mind that, if he did so, I would be candid in my reply. He did not, however, perhaps fortunately, raise the subject, and I abstained from entering upon so troubled a field.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[144283]

No. 126.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 1836. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 10, 1919.

THE change of Government reported in my telegram, No. 1908, of the 3rd October, marks a complete change in the political situation in this country. The moment is, therefore, appropriate to review the course of events, since I had the honour to address your Lordship on the situation as a whole in my despatch No. 1535 of the 27th August.

2. In that despatch I pointed out that, notwithstanding every source of weakness, Ferid Pasha appeared upon the whole to be gaining ground; that, unless swept away by some spectacular new development, such as a *coup d'Etat*, a sudden intensification of the movement in the interior, or a financial crash, he might weather his difficulties altogether; and that he and the Sultan seemed to be moving in the direction of a mild form of despotism.

3. Nothing could be more remarkable than the calm which prevailed upon the surface of things in Constantinople early in September. The pressure of the national movement was still remote. The Cabinet held together with an appearance of stability and solidarity almost without precedent since the Armistice.

Ferid Pasha was cheerful. The Ministers of War and the Interior worked in harmony. Though they were both persons with somewhat spotted pasts, there was nothing in their overt action which could be regarded as other than an honest attempt to bring the dissidents in the interior under control of the Central Government.

4. About the 11th September a change came over the spirit of the Grand Vizier and the Minister of the Interior. They would not admit that a grave situation had

[1356]

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arisen in the provinces, but they were obviously perturbed by what they heard, and by the increasingly menacing telegrams with which the organisers of the national movement bombarded Constantinople. Their dismay was increased when the rebels seized telegraph offices and cut off communication between the Government here and all important provincial centres, except Eskişehir and Broussa. The Grand Vizier began to urge with ever-growing insistence that the Allies owed it to him either themselves to arrest the growth of the national movement, or in the alternative, to allow the Government to use what small forces it could dispose of to resist the rebels.

5. In the light of the fuller information now available, it is easy to sum up broadly what was really happening in the interior. The Congress at Sivas was a definite step in advance of that at Erzeroum. The latter professed to represent the Eastern vilayets only, but the Congress at Sivas, which assembled on the 4th September, claimed to represent the whole country, including, very significantly, Turkey in Europe. It adopted various resolutions, issued various manifestos, and assumed the functions of Government in the areas controlled by the "national forces."

6. The Congress declared all Ottoman territory within the boundaries fixed by the Armistice to be one indivisible whole. That territory, it said, was everywhere inhabited by a vast preponderance of Moslems, and all the Moslems in it were brethren. The national forces and the national will would be directed to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman dominions, and to uphold the Caliphate and the Sultanate. No projects for the creation of an independent Greek or Armenian State in Ottoman territory would be tolerated, and while the equal rights of non-Moslems would be respected, they would be allowed to enjoy no special privileges. Measures had been taken, it was stated, to uphold the national rights in case the Turkish Government were constrained by outside pressure to cede territory. The *Entente* Powers were called on to abandon any idea of partitioning the territory within the Armistice boundary. Foreign economic help would be welcomed, so long as there was no encroachment on independence. A speedy peace based on those equitable principles was earnestly desired. The Central Government must rest on the national will and the National Assembly must be convoked without delay. Existing national associations were now merged in a single Association for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, of which all the declarants' Moslem countrymen were natural members. The association was independent of party. A representative committee of the association would direct the general organisation of the national movement, which had everywhere been unified and strengthened.

7. Such was the main "programme" of the Congress issued on or about the 11th September. In other utterances of one sort or another the Congress or its executive declared that Ferid Pasha's Government was anti-national, unconstitutional, and a barrier between the people and the Sultan; that the immediate object was to get rid of that Government which would in the meanwhile be ignored and boycotted; that the safety of non-Moslems was guaranteed; and that foreigners would be respected and treated as guests so long as they refrained from any action contrary to the national interests. An oath was taken by those present to the effect that they would pursue in the Congress no individual objects other than the good of the country, that they would not work for the revival of the Committee of Union and Progress, and that they would not seek to serve the ends of any political party.

8. Meanwhile the national forces extended their operations west and south. It can hardly be doubted that attempts were made to establish some sort of liaison with the anti-Greek movement in the country surrounding the Smyrna area, and to draw into the main national movement the various bands of a semi-Bolshevik type in the Ismid area. These manifold physical activities continued after the Congress had definitely declared war on the Central Government. By the end of September the latter exercised no effective authority in Asia outside a circle on the circumference of which lay Ada-Bazar, Eski-Shehir, Kutahia, and, say, Panderma.

9. Ferid Pasha's position was more desperate than he would admit. It was perhaps even more desperate than he realised, but he was determined to save the situation if he could. He seized eagerly on a hint given by me, in consultation with my French colleague, and General Milne, that he would do well to endeavour to treat direct with Mustapha Kemal. He at once projected a personal progress into the interior. His project was more grandiose than what we, on our side, had in mind, but it was not difficult to combine his idea and ours in a common formula. In order to prepare the way, he obtained from the Sultan, on the 20th September, a

rescript, designed to rebut the suggestion that the Government were concealing from His Majesty the wishes of the people, and to impress on the country the need for confidence in the Government, and for presenting an united front to Europe. I enclose a translation of this document. It created a certain impression here, and this impression was heightened by steps taken to elicit loyal counter-expressions from representative bodies, including one association of retired military officers. The *Entente* Liberal Party, or some of its fractions, appear to have made up their minds, too late, to rally to the Government.

10. Events moved so rapidly that the Grand Vizier lost all confidence in the idea of a settlement by negotiation alone, and reverted with insistence to the necessity for making some display of force. An attempt to strike at the heart of the national movement by secretly and rapidly despatching Ghalib Bey, Vali of Kharput, to assume control at Sivas, supported by a force of gendarmerie, had failed, because the national leaders succeeded in decyphering the telegraphic instructions. They threatened Malatia, where Ghalib Bey paused to recruit his force, so successfully as to drive him and the local Governor, a Bedrkhan, into flight across the British lines. The new military scheme was to send a force of 2,000 men from here to Eski-Shehr to hold the Nationalists in check and at least to prevent Constantinople from being threatened.

11. As this would have been a purely military operation, it lay principally with General Milne to say whether it should be allowed or not. He was at first definitely opposed to it, as he had been opposed to similar proposals made earlier, and the Grand Vizier was so informed on the 21st September. A few days later, however, it appeared that it might be desirable to give the Government a free hand rather than leave them absolutely at the mercy of the National movement, and it was conveyed to Ferid Pasha in a discreet and non-committal manner, that if he could put forward a concrete proposal, it would be considered in consultation with General Milne and the French and Italian High Commissioners. Ferid Pasha's hopes were unfortunately raised too high. Further examination of the question convinced us that we could not countenance the proposal to send troops, and Ferid Pasha was so informed on the 29th September, as reported in my telegram No. 1889.

12. This communication was the *coup de grâce* to Ferid Pasha's Government. That there was no improvement in the situation in the interior had already been proved by the extension of the national movement to Konia, whence the Vali, its most vigorous opponent in Asia Minor, had been compelled to fly on the 24th September. The allegiance of Broussa had also become more than shaky. What faint hope remained, not any longer of subduing the movement, but of holding it in check by a display of force at Eski Shehr and then treating with its organisers, was finally destroyed by the communication made by me on behalf of my colleagues and myself on the 29th September. Ferid Pasha resigned on the 1st October.

13. On the 3rd October, the military authorities at Broussa surrounded the Government House and delivered to the Vali, whom Ferid Pasha had sent there in haste, five days earlier, an ultimatum ordering him to leave the Government House at once, and to leave Broussa the next day.

14. Thus was effected another of those minor revolutions which have occurred at intervals in Constantinople since 1908. Power has passed from a party which, however anxious to save as much as possible of the Empire, saw salvation in submission to, and collaboration with, the *Entente* authorities, to a party whose avowed object is to contest any attempt on the part of the *Entente* to impair the integrity and independence of Turkey, and who in their programme, have made it quite clear that their "Turkey" comprises as a minimum all territory not occupied at the time of the Armistice, while leaving it vague in how much more of the old Turkish Empire they hope to uphold the rights of the Caliphate and the Sultanate.

15. The pretensions of the new rulers of Turkey might well have seemed ludicrous nine, or even six, months ago. They are sufficiently reasonable to-day to justify in Turkish minds the hope that the Peace Conference will let Turkey off lightly rather than try conclusions with the national movement. There can be little doubt that an army of occupation would now be needed to impose terms which would have been regarded as merciful in the hours of ruin and dejection following the Armistice. The hopes of the organisers of the national movement are strengthened by the feeling that there is no real union among the Allies; that neither France nor Italy desire to be hard on Turkey; that the British Government have come round to the same point of view, partly under the influence of Islam in India, and that the antics of an American journalist named Brown, who attended the Sivas Congress and acclaimed its ideals, represent the judgment of the American people.

16. It must not be assumed that the party now in power will necessarily take up an aggressive attitude towards the Allies in Constantinople itself. In defining the character of the new Cabinet in my telegram No. 1908, I have probably if anything over-emphasised its nationalist complexion. The new Grand Vizier is regarded by some as being to-day more of a palace *persona grata* than anything else. Reshid Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, is a person of the greatest flexibility. The Minister of the Interior is rather a dark horse. He is a brother-in-law of the Heir Apparent, whose chauvinist sentiments are well known, but he was formerly a colleague of Kiamil Pasha, and he has the name of being sober and rather conservative. The Minister of Finance has been retained, and will doubtless impress on his new colleagues that the only possible financial policy is to try to cajole the *Entente* Powers into making advances or a loan. In these circumstances, it seems probable that the Cabinet will do its best to keep the *Entente* sweet.

17. On the other hand, the Government will certainly remain in power only so long as in internal affairs and in the main tendency of their foreign policy they dance to the piping of the authors of the national movement. The Minister of War, though he has a clean record as a soldier, has been in that movement from the start. From the 4th October onward the press has been allowed to advertise and glorify the doings of the Sivas Congress. Noble-looking portraits of Mustafa Kemal and Reouf Bey adorn the local Turkish papers. It is confidentially anticipated that they will be restored to their military ranks. It is also announced in the Nationalist papers that Jevad Pasha, who, as Chief of the General Staff, helped enormously to organise the movement until he was removed from his post, and the officers of the same kidney will also be reinstated.

18. Numerous changes in the civil administration are to be expected, and it can hardly be hoped that the same readiness to comply with the wishes of the Allied authorities will be shown in the future as in the past. It will have to be very carefully considered, in the light of the events of the next couple of weeks, how far the policy hitherto followed by this High Commission of practically dictating the removal of undesirable officials and advising the Government in a more limited number of cases as to appointments can be adhered to without challenging issues which His Majesty's Government might be unwilling to see through.

19. It is impossible not to regret that the brewing of these, the most considerable events which have happened in Constantinople during the Armistice, should have coincided with a period during which His Majesty's Government have presented the appearance of wishing to disinterest themselves in the affairs of the non-Arab parts of the pre-war Turkish Empire. The recent withdrawal of the British force from the Samsoun area, however easily explained to ourselves, appears in native eyes in the light of the surrender of a British position under the menace of the national movement. Events such as these are small in a world-perspective, but they are sufficiently important on the little local stage to impress the various native elements, all unanimous in imagining that every act of His Majesty's Government contributes to some deep unvarying central purpose.

20. The native Christians are much alarmed by the course of events. They see in the Mustafa Kemal movement a regeneration of the spirit which triumphed in 1908 under the motto: "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Justice," only to breed the Adana massacres of the year 1909; and which, again triumphing in January 1913, worked steadily up to the "boycott," deportations, and massacres of the years 1914 to 1916. They had hoped that the Allies, and more particularly Great Britain, were determined that the Turkish element would be deprived for ever of the power to work their will on the non-Moslem population. The more sober and less timorous admit the indisputable fact that for the moment the Nationalist movement has been attended by an improvement rather than otherwise of public security, but they point out with unerring logic that they are left at the mercy of a party who stand for a perpetuation of the conditions in which all their previous miseries arose. Armenian lives may be safe to-day between Samsoun and Erzeroum, but they are safe by the good will and pleasure of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his associates.

21. The disillusionment of the Christians is the greater because of the brave show which His Majesty's Government especially has made since last November of redressing their grievances and repairing their wrongs. Seeing what they see to-day, they are filled with apprehension, not only for the near future, but for the long future after the peace. They begin to feel that the Peace Conference, impressed by the Nationalist movement and anxious to avoid further trouble with it, will, after all, decide to leave the main body of Turkey intact and independent. In that event, all that the Allies, and especially Great Britain, have done for the Christians in the

last ten months will only expose them to the greater wrath of their rulers in the time to come.

22. Those Moslem elements which really disapprove of the policy which brought Turkey into the war against the *Entente*, are also puzzled and depressed by the attitude of the Allies. They had never been able to get it out of their heads that the war was fought on our side, not against the Turkish people, but against the Committee of Union and Progress, a view for which I believe they find some authority in the utterances of at least one *Entente* statesman. They refuse (and in this they are at one with the Christians), to regard the organisers of the national movement as anything but a new manifestation of the Committee. It completely baffles them to see that we have not attempted to back them up against the Nationalists, but have, in effect, backed the latter by leaving the Nationalist forces free to act while we have checked every proposed move of the Central Government to combat them effectively. These phenomena are again easy to explain to our own satisfaction, but our arguments carry no conviction with Orientals.

23. Great Britain has played the leading rôle in the war against Turkey, and Great Britain is still the cynosure of all eyes in this country. It is instructive to consider how our attitude is viewed, not by Christians and well-affected Moslems, but by the organisers of the Nationalist movement themselves. Centrally placed in Asia Minor, they are better in touch with the situation as a whole than any other element. To the north, they see British troops leaving Samsoun. To the north-east, they see us abandoning the Caucasus, and leaving behind between Ararat and the Caspian a fruitful field for Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkish propaganda. To the south-east, they see us slowly drawing in our horns in south-eastern Kurdistan. To the south, they see us preparing to disinterest ourselves in Cilicia and Syria. To the west, they see a more hopeful situation in the Smyrna area, for the occupation of which they still hold Great Britain more responsible than the other Allies. To the north-west, they see British forces motionless before their own advance, and British officers ready to enter into negotiations with them.

24. These people cannot conceive of a British lion too simple to mistrust them, too indifferent to care what they do, too economical to fight. They are conscious that they are themselves fundamentally anti-British, because it is Britain which defeated them, and because their hope of future greatness lies in an appeal to a Moslem world in which England is the greatest ruler, and of which she is therefore represented as the greatest oppressor. In presence of the phenomena enumerated in the preceding paragraph, they probably supposed that some strange weakness of brain or sinew has overcome us, and that further exhibition of vitality on their part will produce further manifestations of weakness on ours.

25. The unfortunate coincidence of Major Noel's presence at Malatia while the Sivas Congress was sitting, and while Ghalib Bey was organising his abortive coup, coupled with an *en clair* telegram sent by Major Noel to this High Commission and intercepted by the Nationalists, convinced the latter that we had some unholy compact with the late Government involving British designs on Kurdistan. This belief inflames the anti-British feeling, but Nationalist comfort can also be drawn from it, because here again the British lion has the appearance of having abandoned his imaginary project on the first display of Mustafa Kemal's teeth.

26. If I have laboured these aspects of the present position, it is not that I think that the clock can be now put back. I emphasise them partly in order that it may be realised at home that the Allies are confronted with a new situation which may probably call for new methods on their side of dealing with current questions. I emphasise them still more in order to show that Turkish chauvinism, feeding as it does on the delay in announcing Peace terms for Turkey, is still a growing force. It would be more difficult to-day than it would have been eight months ago to impose on Turkey a distasteful Peace Treaty without fresh resort to force.

27. Whether the organisers of the national movement can properly be called Committee men or not is a question of labels. They may differ from the Committee to some extent in personality. Indeed, they are just now at pains to advertise their past differences with, and present horror of, people like Enver and Talaat. They may differ in minor points of sentiment. They may differ even more in method. Their fundamental character is, however, the same. They want Turkey for the Turks. They want no foreign interference or foreign protection. Ottoman Christians are their cattle, and they want to do with their own what they will. They want to fight Europe, and, above all, England, with the weapons of pan-Islamism and pan-Turanianism. They aspire to sign, not the death warrant of the Empire, but a lease of new life.

28. I cannot too strongly repeat and emphasise that the time has gone by when it was possible to assume that any Turkish Government must accept any peace which the Allies might choose to offer, and when it was legitimate to prefer, if anything, that the reins of power here should be in the hands of the Committee of Union and Progress for the sake of the moral effect of poetic justice of making those who ruined Turkey subscribe to her death warrant. Every day the Armistice is prolonged sees the Turk recovering more and more from the overwhelming sense of disaster which General Allenby's victorious advances, followed by crushing Armistice terms, instilled into him. The prolonged delay and the events which followed the Armistice gradually gave him breathing time and opportunity to collect and reorganise himself. The occupation of Smyrna by the hated and despised Greek galvanised him into action, and that action has gone on steadily, day by day, week by week, until to-day the Allies are confronted with an entirely different Turkey to that which signed the Armistice.

29. Every week that the Peace terms are delayed, sees further acquisition to the power of resistance which Turkey means to oppose to any "humiliation" which such terms may impose.

30. The great majority of the intelligenzia and the officer class (the only ones which count in Turkish politics) is in sympathy with the Nationalists, and it is probable that the leaders of the movement will, in order to justify themselves in the public eye, maintain a very unaccommodating attitude with regard to Peace conditions of even moderate severity. The possibility (which every week's delay tends more and more to transform into probability) that Turkey will reject the proposals of the Allies, must therefore be taken into serious consideration, necessitating a review of what means the Allies will, in that event, be prepared to employ, in order to secure the execution of the Peace terms they mean to impose.

31. There is, moreover, the danger that if things drag on as at present, the Nationalist leaders, as a means of maintaining their political supremacy and prestige, may force the pace by presenting the Allies with demands with regard, for instance, to Smyrna, which will bring matters to a head.

32. It has to be borne in mind that although the Allies dispose of a formidable weapon in the pressing financial needs of Turkey, the Nationalists on their side possess a valuable hostage—to which European public sentiment cannot remain indifferent—in the exposed situation in which the Christian population in Turkey will be placed should trouble arise.

33. The delay in dealing with the Turkish situation, is, therefore, breeding new complications, rendering the imposition of severe Peace terms more and more difficult, and involving the necessity for more and more armed forces being employed on the part of such Ally or Allies as may be charged with the duty of imposing the terms of Peace.

34. That such duty will in greater or less measure devolve on Great Britain appears to me inevitable, and it thus results that it is directly in our own interests that the Peace Terms should be settled and announced with the least possible delay and certainly within the next few weeks.

I have, &c

(For High Commissioner).

RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure in No. 126.

IMPERIAL PROCLAMATION.

Texte de la Proclamation Impériale transmise par Son Excellence Ali Fouad Bey, Premier Secrétaire de la Cour Impériale, à Son Altesse le Grand Vizir, pour être communiquée aux Départements de l'Etat et, par circulaire, à tous les vilayets et sandjaks.

NOUS avons pris connaissance, ces derniers temps, des dépêches qui nous sont parvenues de l'Anatolie au sujet de la situation et des phases des opérations qui y ont eu lieu. Cet état regrettable est dû à l'influence produite sur l'opinion publique par l'occupation de Smyrne, les incidents tragiques qui l'ont suivie et les rumeurs qui circulent au sujet du sort réservé à l'Anatolie et aux vilayets orientaux. L'impression profondément douloureuse que nous ressentons dans notre cœur par suite de

ces incidents et de ces rumeurs, à l'unisson avec nos peuples, et, en outre, le devoir de faire le possible pour la sauvegarde des droits de l'Empire et de la nation, tout en étant naturel pour tous, ceux du Gouvernement et de la nation doivent consister à entreprendre des démarches politiques raisonnables, à travailler à l'unité des courants d'opinion publique et à la sauvegarde de nos droits. La politique poursuivie par notre Gouvernement, qui a eu pour résultat d'attirer en notre faveur l'attention des Puissances civilisées de l'Europe sur les atrocités de Smyrne, l'envoi par ces Puissances d'une commission mixte qui a déjà entamé une enquête impartiale, laquelle a pu faire ressortir nos droits aux yeux du monde civilisé, et, en outre, les mesures de toutes natures que notre Gouvernement n'a pas négligé de prendre contre les rumeurs qui circulent au sujet de l'Anatolie et des provinces orientales de l'Asie Mineure, d'une part; et, d'autre part, les agissements susceptibles—malgré l'absence de toute idée ou proposition tendant à porter atteinte à notre unité nationale—de troubler l'ordre et la sécurité à l'intérieur du pays et de compromettre le prestige du Gouvernement, ainsi que toutes les tentatives pouvant mettre la discorde parmi la nation, ne sauraient s'allier avec les intérêts fondamentaux et vitaux de notre Etat.

La modification de la situation réelle du pays tentée par certains et l'allégation par eux d'un prétendu désaccord entre le peuple et le Gouvernement, qui peut fourvoyer l'opinion publique européenne, sont de nature à léser les intérêts supérieurs du pays.

Cet état de choses regrettable à tous les points de vue, en entravant et retardant les élections que nous aurions désiré effectuer un moment plus tôt dans les conditions prévues par la loi, ne peut que retarder de même la réunion du Parlement, indispensable dans les circonstances actuelles, et aggraver les difficultés avec lesquelles le Gouvernement est aux prises.

Ce que j'attends aujourd'hui de chacun, c'est d'apprécier la délicatesse de la situation, de garder le calme et le sang-froid, de se conformer entièrement aux lois et aux ordres du Gouvernement, de s'abstenir de tout acte susceptible de troubler l'ordre et la sécurité du pays, afin que, de cette façon, la délégation qui est sur le point d'être convoquée par la Conférence pour la discussion de la paix, puisse se présenter devant elle en harmonie parfaite avec la nation.

J'ai espoir dans la grâce du Tout-Puissant pour obtenir une paix sauvegardant l'intégrité et l'unité de notre Empire, qui a été depuis six siècles et demi l'un des facteurs importants de l'équilibre européen, et assurant le rang et le prestige de la nation ottomane.

L'esprit de justice des grandes Puissances, et les tendances à la modération de l'opinion publique européenne et américaine, qui saisit chaque jour davantage la vérité, renforcent cet espoir.

La consolidation du Gouvernement en le préservant de toutes les difficultés intérieures, la subordination à la lettre aux lois sur tous les points du territoire et la sauvegarde des droits de nos sujets, constituent le fond même de nos vœux. Et je demeure assuré que le Gouvernement prendra pour guides nos vœux impériaux sous ce rapport.

J'ordonne de porter à la connaissance de ma nation et de répandre sur tous les points de notre territoire notre façon de voir et nos vœux sincères, de même que la confiance que j'ai en sa fidélité et en son patriotisme.

MEHMED VAHIDEDDIN.

Le 24 Zülhidjé 1337 (20 septembre 1935).

[144305]

No. 127.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 22.)

(No. 1858.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 6, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I received a visit this morning from Mustafa Reshid Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government which has just been formed.

2. The personality of the Pasha is well known to you, so that it is unnecessary for me at the present time to give any description of him.

3. The conversation contained nothing of any special interest, beyond that I took the opportunity to impress upon him, as clearly as words can do so, that it was the intention of His Majesty's Government to maintain as good relations as were compatible

[1356]

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with the present anomalous position with whatever Turkish Government might be in power, that the constitution of the Government was a matter of complete indifference to me, but that there were two points which we shall insist on, and those were the strict observance of the terms of the armistice and the maintenance of public order; the latter especially applied to the Christian populations, but also to the absence of political strife or the employment in political affairs of methods of violence.

4. His Excellency assured me that I need feel no uneasiness on these points, as the new Government were fully alive to the importance of them. He said that the situation presented by the indefinite prolongation of the armistice placed the most extraordinary difficulties in the way of the administration, which, he said, looked to the Allies, but above all to Great Britain, for assistance and advice. He said that, above all, the financial situation was most critical. I informed him of the steps which had been taken by the ex-Grand Vizier in this matter, and that I and my colleagues were still awaiting the replies of our Governments to the telegrams which we had sent setting forth the facts of the situation.

5. I enquired what was the position of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who, from being a rebel, appeared now, according to the press, to be one of the pillars of the present Government. His Excellency replied that the Pasha could hardly be described in these terms, but that his feelings of patriotism had driven him into open opposition to the last Government, which he had believed not to be acting in the best interests of the country, especially over the matter of the occupation of Smyrna. I replied that I could hardly imagine that any human being could do more than had been done by Ferid Pasha. Reshid Pasha said that the whole of the present difficulties sprang from the Smyrna incident. The great duration of the armistice would have mattered but little had it not been for that untoward occurrence. He did not think that his Government would have any serious trouble in arranging matters with Mustafa Kemal.

6. In this connection, however, I hear from independent sources that the relations between Mustafa Kemal and the new Government are still a matter of negotiation.

I have, &c.
(For High Commissioner),
RICHARD WEBB.

[144381]

No. 128.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.--(Received October 22.)
(No. 1885.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 10, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the summary of a telegram sent by Mustapha Kemal Pasha to the Government here, which was given to me by the French High Commissioner.

2. There is every reason to believe that it is authentic, and it is of considerable interest, as showing the lines which Mustapha Kemal intends to follow. He is still a good deal of an enigma, and though he states, with a certain amount of truth, that he has nothing to do with the Committee of Union and Progress, yet I think it is probable that many members of the Committee have enrolled themselves in his party, and, if events are allowed to pursue their present course, I believe it will not be long before the one will be indistinguishable from the other.

3. It is regrettable to see that he desires to follow the old Turkish plan of executing vengeance upon his political enemies, and, as I have reported in my telegram No. 1941 of the 10th October, I arranged with my colleagues that when we returned the call of Mustapha Reshid Pasha, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, we should severally inform him that the Allies would view with entire disfavour any attempt upon the life and liberty of the late Government or the employment of any methods of violence. His Excellency protested vehemently that there was no intention of doing anything of the kind, but when I observed that I could expect no other answer from a man of his education, yet could he give me that answer in the name of the Government as a whole, he was very much less positive, and said that if anything of this kind were done he himself would at once retire.

4. My anxiety on this point is increased by the fact that the kaimakam of Eski Shehr was recently murdered by two individuals, who would have appeared to have been of the Mustapha Kemal Party, and who succeeded in effecting their escape. In the meantime, the ex-Grand Vizier, as well as Ali Kemal Bey, one of his Ministers of the

Interior, have requested authorisation to leave the country, and, in concert with my colleagues, I am arranging to accord them facilities.

5. I should add that Mr. Ryan also saw a copy of the telegram which forms my enclosure, and in this copy he noticed a reference to the withdrawal of the British troops from Samsoun. Damad Ferid had not been able, Mustapha Kemal said, to prevent these troops from landing on Turkish soil, while he, by his competent management of affairs, and without fighting, had succeeded in obtaining their withdrawal.

I have, &c.
(For High Commissioner),
RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure in No. 128.

Summary of Telegram.

REUNION immédiate de la Chambre.

Avant que la Chambre ne soit réunie, ne prendre aucun engagement concernant le sort de l'Empire et de la nation turcs vis-à-vis de n'importe qui.

Envoyer à la Conférence des hommes capables de comprendre la volonté de la nation et de défendre les droits et les intérêts nationaux.

Cela est l'essentiel.

Nous avons d'autres demandes accessoires, par exemple :

Prendre dès maintenant toutes mesures pour que Damad Férid Pacha, Suleyman Chefik Pacha, Ali Kemal Bey et Adil Bey ne puissent ni s'enfuir ni se cacher, en vue de les renvoyer, dès l'ouverture de la Chambre, devant la Haute-Cour.

Les Gouverneurs généraux de Karpouth, de Konia, le Gouverneur de Malatia et le Directeur général des Postes devront être immédiatement traduits devant la cour martiale.

Les fonctionnaires civils et militaires, qui ont été destitués ou emprisonnés à cause du mouvement national, doivent être libérés et rétablis dans leur poste; de même les gens du peuple qui ont été incarcérés doivent être relâchés.

Les Gouverneurs généraux de Castamouni, d'Angora et de Trébizonde, qui ont été réfractaires au mouvement national, doivent être destitués et exclus à tout jamais des fonctions publiques.

Les sympathies des étrangers nous sont complètement acquises. Nous sommes en contact avec les Américains. Nous devons maintenir les amitiés avec les Français et les Italiens et observer les Anglais.

Faites-nous connaître votre manière de voir.

[144897]

No. 129.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 1266.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 22, 1919.

IN the course of my conversation with the French Ambassador last week, he mentioned, in tones of pious regret, a very insulting message which M. de Fleuriau, after an interview of an entirely different character, had been instructed to leave in the Foreign Office with regard to the alleged armament of the Syrian forces of the Emir Feisal. This note I had declined to receive, and it had been returned to M. de Fleuriau. The Ambassador admitted that its tone was of an unusual character, and he expressed no surprise at its rejection; but he informed me incidentally that it had the distinction of having been composed by M. Clemenceau himself.

This afforded me an opportunity of entering at some length into the successive notes of a not dissimilar character which had been handed in by the French Government in the course of the last six months, culminating in the recent exchange of high explosive shells between M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George.

The Ambassador, speaking from the standpoint of the old diplomacy, deeply deplored that these matters should be taken out of the hands of the respective Foreign Offices, and that language should be employed which did not strictly conform to the old traditions. He greatly disliked this form of fusillade, which, he thought, excited tempers and rendered settlement difficult.

[1356]

I suggested to him that an even greater cause of the friction that had arisen between our two countries in respect of the Middle East was the nature and language of the communications which the French Government had thought fit to make. The French language was a medium, I said, singularly well adapted to innuendo and invective, and the scribes in the French Foreign Office had taken full advantage of the openings thus afforded to them. We, on the other hand, were a stupider people with a less flexible instrument; but I asked the Ambassador to contemplate what would have been his feelings had he received from me during the past six months a series of messages of the character and tone to which I had referred? I could imagine the speed with which he would have come to the Foreign Office and the vigour of the protest he would have made. Throughout this campaign in France, whether it had taken the form of official notes or of articles in the press, issued with the connivance, if not under the direct inspiration, of the French Government, I had never once retaliated. I had never seen a pressman on the subject, I had not even suggested an article. But, I said, if I turned my attention to the matter, even through the doubtful and clumsy medium of the British tongue, I thought I could make myself nearly as disagreeable as the French, and the Ambassador must not be surprised, if this campaign were continued, should he one day find himself the recipient of a note that was a conscious, though feeble, imitation of the French style.

Alluding to the recent interchange of messages and telegrams about the visit of the Emir Feisal to London and Paris, I said that we were quite prepared to challenge the verdict of public opinion, and to publish the entire papers at any moment when they might be called for. It would then be seen how conspicuously loyal we had been throughout in our obligations to the French, how unfounded were the charges of which we had been the victims, and how monstrous were the calumnies by which we had been assailed. In the event of the matter being pushed to extremes by the French Government, we should not hesitate to make public the whole of these papers, and to leave the verdict to be pronounced by the public opinion of the world at large.

Once again the Ambassador deplored to me the alleged necessity for delaying the solution of the Turkish problem in deference to the illness of President Wilson and the scruples of the United States. He could not see now—he never had been able to see—why the matter should not be taken in hand and settled. He hoped that this might still be done soon.

It was apparent from our conversation that his Excellency was not kept fully informed by his Government, and was not presented with the text of many of the communications that passed. His point of view, therefore, was not inspired by inside knowledge. It represents, however, an attitude from which I have never known him to waver during the nine months in which I have had the pleasure of conversing with him in the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[144898]

No. 130.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Kennard.(No. 658.)
Sir,*Foreign Office, October 22, 1919.*

THE Italian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and raised three points.

He was very much concerned at the opposition of Sir Eyre Crowe, in the Supreme Council in Paris, to the proposal to include Italian troops amongst those occupying the Aidin district, and wished me to telegraph instructions to him to take up a less rigid attitude on the point, which involved Italian *amour-propre*, and on which the majority, if not the whole, of the other Allied representatives were against him.

I said that I was familiar only from telegraphic reports with the attitude taken up by Sir Eyre Crowe, but that I thought it was due to the essential difference between the military position in Asia Minor of the Italians on the one hand and of the Greeks on the other. The Greek troops had been invited to Smyrna with the knowledge and by the act of the Supreme Council. I myself thought that this was the greatest mistake that had been made in Paris, and that it was the starting point of most of the troubles which had since ensued. But, whether the step was right or wrong, the Greek troops had appeared upon the scene with sanction from the

Powers, and they could justify their presence by that authority. On the other hand, the Italians, by their descent upon Adalia, Scala Nuova, and other places without the invitation or authority of the Paris Council, had alienated public opinion and put themselves in the wrong. It was not surprising, therefore, that our representative should not be inclined to encourage, still less to expand, an intrusion which had taken place under such conditions.

The Ambassador replied by attributing the Adalia move to the mistaken policy of Baron Sonnino, who had now fallen, but said that a sufficient justification for it could be found in a statement which had been made by Mr. Balfour in the Foreign Office in the autumn of 1917 at a Conference concerning the future Allied spheres in Asia Minor—a Conference in which M. Cambon and the Italian Ambassador himself had taken part. It was true that the actual arrangements proposed at this Conference had come to nothing, but it had been followed by a letter from Mr. Balfour, which admitted in the most ungrudging terms the Italian claims in Asia Minor, and which the Italian Government looked upon as their justification for anything they had since done in that region.

As I had never seen this communication, I could not, without further study, express any opinion about it.

The next point raised by the Ambassador was with regard to the latest proposal with regard to Fiume, which had been brought to Paris by Signor Tittoni within the last few days.

As I had not yet seen this proposal, I was unable to discuss it.

The Ambassador, however, represented that it was the supreme and maximum act of concession to which his Government could agree. He felt sure that it would be accepted by all the Allies, with the possible exception of America; and he urged me strongly—if, after reading it, I approved of its character—to telegraph to Lord Grey to use all his influence in favour of its being accepted in Washington.

His Excellency, without alluding to the recent incident between our two Governments arising out of the Fiume communiqué in the Italian press, descanted upon the sensitive and agitated condition of his countrymen, who suspected hostility and opposition at every turn; and he earnestly pleaded that, in the course of the forthcoming visit of General Diaz, some statement of a generous nature with regard to the aspirations of Italy should be made by the Prime Minister or some other Government spokesman, in order to restore matters to a proper footing.

Speaking of the long delay in the negotiation of the Turkish Peace, he expressed a strong desire that it should be taken in hand without further delay, and he flattered me by the remark that, if the matter were left in his hands and mine, he was confident that we could, so far as our respective countries were concerned, settle the whole thing in a week.

I asked him whether he thought that, if a suggestion were made to take up the question at an early date in London, Signor Tittoni would find any difficulty in coming here.

He answered in the negative, and seemed thoroughly to realise the importance of an early solution.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[144817]

No. 131.

Memorandum communicated by M. Venizelos, October 23, 1919.

THE Supreme Council of the Peace Conference decided at the sitting of the 18th July to despatch to Smyrna a Commission, which was to investigate the occurrences of the previous two months.

By a letter (Annexe (A) herewith enclosed) to the President of the Conference, M. Venizelos proposed that that part of the investigation which concerned the conduct of the Greek forces of occupation should be effected with the participation of a Greek representative.

The Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, by a resolution under date of the 21st July (Annexe (B), herewith enclosed), decided to notify M. Venizelos that he was at liberty to designate the Greek officer who was to be authorised to follow the work of the Commission of Inquiry in Asia Minor, without, however, being entitled to vote or take part in drawing up the Commission's report. The Annexes (C) and (D) contain the decisions of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference relative to the compo-

sition of the Commission of Inquiry in question, as also the instructions given to the latter.

In spite of the fact that the resolution under date of the 21st July of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference only satisfied in a very limited degree the susceptibilities of the Greek army, M. Venizelos, who was the first to insist upon the institution of such a commission, desiring, above all others, that an impartial enquiry should completely elucidate the occurrences in Asia Minor since the landing of the Greek troops there, accordingly designated Colonel Alexander Mazarakis, of the Greek General Staff, for the purpose of participating in the work of the Commission of Inquiry on the lines of the decision of the Supreme Council.

The commission was constituted at Constantinople in the month of April, even without the presence of the Greek delegate, and set to work there. Later on it was decided that the presence of the Greek delegate at the examination of witnesses should not be allowed, on the ground that the presence of the latter might have an influence on certain of the witnesses.

This decision, diametrically opposed to the resolution of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, constituted a violation of its decisions, under which only the work of the commission could be effectuated, and it was the cause of a protest sent by M. Venizelos to the President of the Peace Conference under date of the 22nd August (Annexe (E)).

Since that occasion, M. Venizelos has repeatedly solicited, without success, a decision of the Supreme Council of the Conference in respect of the unfair procedure followed by the Commission of Inquiry in disallowing the presence of the Greek delegate at the examination of witnesses, and, in general, at the work of the commission, from which he ought not to be excluded except when the conclusions were to be drawn up, at the end of its work.

This violation of the decisions of the Supreme Council brought about a fresh letter of protest addressed by M. Venizelos to the President of the Peace Conference, under date of the 14th September, and as the Greek delegate was not even furnished with copies of the evidence given by the various witnesses, M. Venizelos, through a later letter of protest addressed to the President of the Peace Conference asked that a proposal should be laid before the Supreme Council for a new inquiry to be effected with the assistance of the Greek delegate.

At the moment when the Commission of Inquiry is concluding its work, the Greek Government can only formulate a solemn protest against such a treatment. They consider themselves justified in thinking that the procedure followed by the Commission of Inquiry is entirely unjustified. It is both contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference and to the principles of equity. It is a negation of justice to refuse to communicate evidence to an interested party and disallow the representative of that party to discuss and criticise it. This procedure applied even to an enemy army would be considered unfair. It is something more than that when applied to an Allied army.

The Greek Government cannot admit the results of an inquiry conducted on these lines. They feel sure that the Allied and Associated Governments represented in this commission will not fail to consider as null and void the outcome of such a commission, and to order a new inquiry conducted in accordance with the general principles of equity and in conformity with the resolutions of the Supreme Council under date of the 21st July, which, as a matter of fact, only conceded to the Greek Government the minimum of rights, securing themselves against a one-sided investigation.

Only the invalidation of such an investigation could restore things to their rightful place and, with a view to the repetition of this inquiry, under guarantees and safeguards, will secure to the Greek Government the full exercise of their rights, at least as they were recognised by the Supreme Council.

25, Knightsbridge, London, S.W. 1,
October 16, 1919.

Annexe (A).

M. Venizelos to M. Clemenceau.

Paris, le 19 juillet 1919.

M. le Président,
LE Conseil suprême de la Conférence a décidé, dans sa séance d'hier, l'envoi à Smyrne d'une commission chargée de faire une enquête sur les faits qui se sont passés depuis deux mois en Asie Mineure.

Cette commission sera composée de quatre représentants des principales Puissances alliées et associées.

Je prie votre Excellence de me permettre de lui exposer les raisons pour lesquelles il ne serait, à mon sens, ni juste ni conforme aux usages jusqu'ici suivis dans des cas analogues que la partie de l'enquête ayant trait à la conduite de l'armée grecque d'occupation pût se poursuivre sans la participation d'un représentant de la Grèce.

Nul plus que le Gouvernement hellénique ne désire qu'une enquête impartiale fasse la pleine lumière sur les événements qui se sont déroulés dans ces dernières semaines en Anatolie, car il a le ferme espoir que, si certains excès regrettables pourront être constatés à la charge de plusieurs militaires grecs dont la punition exemplaire s'ensuivra immédiatement, il sera en même temps établi les circonstances de provocation et de trouble général au milieu desquelles ces excès ont été commis et l'étendue des cruautés dont les populations chrétiennes ont été, une fois de plus, victimes de la part des Turcs.

Mais ce serait infliger à l'armée grecque une diminution morale imméritée, si, la considérant dans son ensemble comme responsable des faits incriminés, on ne lui permettait pas d'être représentée dans l'enquête ordonnée.

Ce serait méconnaître le titre en vertu duquel elle se trouve en Asie Mineure où elle s'est rendue sur l'invitation des Puissances alliées et associées et avec le mandat qu'elles lui ont fait l'honneur de lui confier.

Ce serait oublier qu'à la différence des forces turques, elle appartient à un État ami et allié, qu'elle est unie aux armées des grandes Puissances par des liens de confraternité d'armes et de souvenir des luttes glorieusement livrées en commun pour une même cause, que partout où elle a été appelée à combattre à leurs côtés, en Macédoine comme en Russie, elle s'est distinguée par une vaillance, une discipline et une tenue qui lui ont valu l'estime et la considération de tous.

L'armée grecque revendique fièrement ces titres pour demander, aux Puissances alliées et associées de lui épargner la blessure qu'elle ressentirait très vivement si l'enquête prescrite sur des faits isolés et n'engageant que des responsabilités personnelles devait, par suite de l'absence d'un représentant grec, paraître avoir été instituée contre elle.

J'ai l'honneur, M. le Président, de soumettre cette demande à votre bienveillant examen et, confiant à vos sentiments de justice, je me flatte de l'espoir que vous voudrez bien la recommander à l'adoption du Conseil suprême de la Conférence.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

VENIZELOS.

Annexe (B).

Résolution du 21 juillet 1919.

Il est décidé de faire connaître à M. Venizelos qu'il est libre de désigner un officier grec qui sera autorisé à suivre les travaux de la Commission d'Enquête en Asie Mineure; cet officier n'aura pas droit de vote dans la commission et ne pourra pas prendre part à la rédaction de ses conclusions.

(Annexe C.)

Résolution du 22 juillet 1919.

LA Commission militaire interalliée d'Enquête en Asie Mineure sera composée comme suit:—

Empire britannique	...	Un officier général à désigner par le Général Milne.
France	...	Un officier général à désigner par le Général Franchet d'Esperey.
Italie	...	Général Dallolio.
États-Unis d'Amérique	...	L'officier ne pourra être désigné qu'après réception de la réponse de Washington.

Il est décidé que cette commission devra commencer sans délai ses travaux; elle se réunira aussi rapidement que possible à Constantinople.

Annexe (D).

Résolution du 25 juillet 1919.

IL est décidé d'accepter le texte suivant des directives destinées à la Commission d'Enquête interalliée se rendant en Asie Mineure.

L'enquête de la commission devra prendre pour point de départ les faits qui ont accompagné et suivi l'occupation par les troupes grecques des régions de Smyrne, d'Aidin, d'Aivali et territoires adjacents, faits qui ont été rapportés notamment dans la plainte du Cheik-ul-Islam, adressée à la Conférence.

L'enquête devra porter sur tous faits se rapportant à ces événements depuis la date de l'occupation jusqu'à ce jour.

La commission définira les responsabilités et soumettra, le plus rapidement possible, son rapport au Conseil suprême des Puissances alliées et associées avec les conclusions qu'elle croira devoir formuler.

Annex (E).

M. Venizelos to M. Clemenceau.

Paris, le 22 août 1919.

M. le Président,

DANS sa séance du 18 juillet, le Conseil suprême de la Conférence a décidé l'envoi à Smyrne d'une Commission d'Enquête de quatre membres représentant les Puissances alliées et associées.

Aussitôt informé de cette décision, je m'empressai d'exposer à votre Excellence, par lettre du 19 juillet, les raisons pour lesquelles il ne me paraissait ni juste ni conforme aux usages que la partie de l'enquête ayant trait à la conduite de l'armée grecque pût se poursuivre sans la participation d'un représentant de la Grèce.

Le surlendemain, 21 juillet, le Conseil suprême me faisait connaître que j'étais libre de désigner un officier grec qui serait autorisé à suivre les travaux de la Commission d'Enquête, sans qu'il eût, toutefois, ni droit de vote ni la faculté de prendre part à la rédaction de la conclusion de la commission.

Bien que cette mesure ne donnât que très partiellement satisfaction au légitime amour-propre de l'armée hellénique, je l'acceptai, n'ayant pas l'habitude de créer des embarras aux grandes Puissances. Je décidai, en conséquence, de désigner, pour suivre les travaux de la Commission d'Enquête, le Colonel d'État-Major, M. Alexandre Mazarakis et, par lettre du 31 juillet, je portai cette décision à la connaissance du Secrétariat général de la Conférence, en le priant de bien vouloir la notifier aux membres de la Commission d'Enquête.

La commission se constitua à Constantinople la semaine dernière et y commença immédiatement ses travaux par l'audition de certains témoins. Le représentant du Gouvernement hellénique s'empressa de demander que le Colonel Mazarakis fût dès lors invité à se rendre à Constantinople pour suivre ses travaux. La Commission d'Enquête estima, toutefois, qu'il était préférable de ne pas faire assister de délégué hellénique aux interrogatoires, car sa présence pourrait intimider certains témoins; on se bornerait à lui communiquer après coup les dépositions et à le tenir au courant des travaux de la commission.

C'était déjà donner l'interprétation la plus restrictive à la résolution du Conseil suprême en date du 27 juillet et diminuer encore le rôle assigné au délégué hellène qui, privé du droit de vote, se voyait, en outre, enlever la faculté d'assister au moins aux travaux de la commission.

Malheureusement, une nouvelle diminution l'attendait. Le représentant du Gouvernement hellénique à Constantinople vient en effet de l'informer que la Commission d'Enquête lui a fait savoir mercredi dernier, 20 août, qu'à la suite des nouvelles instructions reçues de Paris, un officier turc sera admis au même titre que l'officier grec et avec exactement les mêmes privilèges à suivre ses travaux.

Je ne puis, M. le Président, qu'exprimer la très douloureuse surprise que j'ai ressentie à l'annonce de ces nouvelles mesures et faire appel à votre sentiment de justice pour en obtenir le redressement.

Placer l'officier grec sur un pied d'égalité avec un officier turc dans une enquête se poursuivant en pays occupé par l'armée hellénique, ce n'est pas seulement infliger à cette armée une injuste humiliation et oublier qu'elle s'y trouve comme mandataire des Puissances alliées et associées, c'est perdre de vue l'état de guerre existant encore entre

la Grèce et la Turquie; c'est méconnaître les services rendus par la Grèce à la cause commune, les torts graves de la Turquie à l'égard de l'Entente et ses crimes contre les populations chrétiennes; c'est, enfin, supprimer toute distinction entre vainqueurs et vaincus et confondre, dans un injuste et décevante égalité, les amis et les ennemis.

Je dois, en outre, M. le Président, insister sur la nécessité de modifier la mesure adoptée par la commission de procéder à l'audition de témoins en l'absence de l'officier grec. L'enquête déjà commencée à Constantinople et qui va se poursuivre à Smyrne, bien que réclamée tout d'abord, mais vainement, par le Gouvernement hellénique, n'a été décidée par le Conseil suprême qu'à la suite d'une plainte adressée à la Conférence par le Cheik-ul-Islam. Il a plu au Conseil suprême, en y faisant droit, de placer l'armée hellénique d'occupation en posture d'accusée. L'officier grec admis à suivre les travaux de la commission apparaît, dès lors, comme son légitime défenseur. Il est inconcevable qu'il ne soit pas autorisé à assister aux interrogatoires des témoins. La commission craint que sa présence n'intimide certains témoins. Je demande ce qu'on penserait du juge qui, sur un pareil motif, écarterait du prétoire l'avocat de l'inculpé. Dans les pays civilisés, loin d'écarter le défenseur de l'instruction, les lois en imposent la présence comme une garantie essentielle pour l'inculpé, car elle lui permet de contrôler les dires des témoins, de leur demander des explications complémentaires, de procurer, si besoin en est, de nouveaux témoignages, de contribuer, en un mot, à prévenir les erreurs auxquelles le juge instructeur pourrait être induit.

Vous ne trouverez pas exagéré, M. le Président, que je réclame l'application de ce droit commun dans l'enquête qui a été décidée à Smyrne, et je demeure convaincu que le Conseil suprême, reconnaissant l'absolue justice de cette demande, s'empressera d'y faire droit.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

VENIZELOS.

[144535]

No. 132.

Mr. Kerr to Mr. Kidston.—(Received October 23.)

Mr. Kidston,

10, Downing Street, October 21, 1919.

I ENCLOSE copies of messages which passed between the Prime Minister and M. Clemenceau, preceding the Prime Minister's aide-mémoire of the 13th September.

P. H. KERR.

Enclosure 1 in No. 132.

Message from Prime Minister to M. Clemenceau.

IT looks to me as if the question of mandates for Turkey would take longer to settle than we had anticipated, in view of the delay in American decision. The British Government, however, cannot any longer undertake to maintain an army of over 400,000 men to garrison the Turkish Empire. This involves the question of what will happen in the parts of the Turkish Empire we withdraw from. When the Syrian question is discussed, the British Government wish to lay certain proposals before the Supreme Council in regard to it. With this object, I propose to come to Paris on Friday next to discuss this and the Armenian question and could see you at any time on Saturday or Sunday, but I shall have to leave on Tuesday in order to keep an engagement in London on Wednesday. As the British and French Governments are both pledged to the Emir Feisal that he shall be present when the settlement of the Syrian question is reached, I have taken the responsibility of inviting him to Paris. As he may not be able to reach Paris before next Tuesday, I hope that you will see no objection to his paying me a visit in London.

September 11, 1919.

[1356]

2 M

Enclosure 2 in No. 132.

Message from M. Clemenceau in reply to Mr. Lloyd George's Message.

I AGREE with you that the settlement of the mandates in Turkey by the Allied and Associated Powers must be delayed until the American Government is in a position to acquaint us with its views on this subject. We have decided to wait until the Conference examines in its entirety and with full knowledge the settlement of the Eastern question.

The general difficulties which can result from the final settlement of the Ottoman questions, and, as regards the maintenance of order, from the retreat of the British troops from the territories of the Turkish Empire, are assuredly within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Council. It is not possible to isolate the question of Syria from the other questions connected with the final liquidation of the Ottoman Empire, and to submit it to the Supreme Council independently from those connected with Constantinople, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia. The Supreme Council is only actually informed (and that by the Americans themselves) that imminent danger threatens the Armenians, in addition to the fact of the retreat of the English troops from the Caucasus and of the Turkish nationalist movement in Asia Minor. The American, British, and Italian Delegations have declared that they are not in a position to send troops to protect the Armenians. The French Government has, therefore, offered to send 12,000 men as from the 10th September through Cilicia to effect this purpose. The reply to our proposal awaits the British opinion. Mr. Balfour, who told me that he had consulted you and who is favourable to the proposal, has told me, that you also had given your assent in principle. He added that Marshal Sir Henry Wilson was sick in London and could not come to Paris to settle this question, and further asked me to send him an officer. I accordingly sent Colonel Fagalde, our second military attaché in London. As to the question of the relief of the British troops in Syria, this really only concerns the French and British Governments, because of their agreements in 1916, and ought to be settled directly between them without any intermediary. This question, which is a purely military question, does not prejudice the final settlement of the Syrian question, which will be determined at the same time as the general settlement of the Eastern question by the Allied and Associated Powers. In these circumstances the journey of the Emir Feisal at this moment, and before a previous understanding between ourselves, would not appear to have any definite object in view.

September 11, 1919.

[146031]

No. 133.

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 674. (Part 2).)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Rome, October 26, 1919.

IN assuring his Excellency of your desire to maintain most cordial relations with Italian Government I said that I should personally always endeavour to smooth over any difficulties or misunderstandings that might arise between us. I would not, however, conceal from his Excellency fact that certain acts of Italian Government, such as despatch of Italian troops to Adalia, had created bad impression in London. His Excellency at once admitted that this had been a mistake which he would never have committed had he been in Baron Sonnino's place. There was, I continued, another matter on which I would venture to give him word of friendly advice, namely, not to mix up question of Italy's recognition of our protectorate of Egypt with other questions in which Italy was interested in Africa. Apart from unfavourable interpretation which might be [group undecypherable] placed on such a procedure, Italy as signatory of Treaty of Versailles could not avoid recognition which that treaty had imposed on Germany. Signor Tittoni begged me to assure you that he did not propose to attach any conditions to his recognition of our protectorate, though there were certain questions touching status of Italian subjects in Egypt to which he would like to call attention, though not, he repeated, as conditions.

Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs, on whom I called yesterday evening, went over much the same ground as Signor Tittoni. He was even more outspoken in deploring change which has come over Anglo-Italian relations of late, and remarked no

British Ambassador had ever on his arrival in Italy been faced with such a difficult situation as the present. One reason, he added, that had made Italian people so ready to declare war on Austria was their desire to be on side of England, and yet in spite of all that she had done Italy was now treated with less sympathy and consideration than other States who had no claim on our gratitude. She was apparently forgotten or not wanted, and when Prime Minister in his Sheffield speech spoke of collaboration in Asia Minor he never once mentioned Italy. I reminded him of explanation which, as Signor Tittoni had told me, you had given Italian Ambassador about this omission, but it failed to satisfy him any more than did Sir E. Crowe's explanation about non-participation of Italian troops in Aidin district.

(Repeated to Peace Conference.)

[142426]

No. 134.

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon.

Foreign Office, October 27, 1919.

Your Excellency,

I HAVE the honour to refer to the communication which M. de Fleuriau was good enough to make to me on the 9th ultimo, relative to the four lighthouses situated in the Red Sea, and to the question of their being handed over to the Administration of the Société des Phares de l'Empire ottoman.

As your Excellency is doubtless aware, the lighthouse at Mocha is not under the control of His Majesty's Government. The request made by M. de Fleuriau is assumed therefore to refer to the lighthouses at Abou Ail, Jebel Zubeir, and Jebel Teir, which were taken over as a war measure, and have been controlled throughout the period of the war by His Majesty's naval and military authorities at Aden.

His Majesty's Government have had the subject of the actual ownership of these three lighthouses, as well as that situated at Mocha, under serious consideration. The examination of the various documents in the possession of this Office has shown that although the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration obtained a concession in 1881 from the Ottoman Government to erect lighthouses at different points in the Red Sea, the concession remained inoperative for reasons which it will be unnecessary to enter into. On the renewal of the general lighthouse concession in 1894, an exception was made in the case of the Red Sea lighthouses, and although various proposals were put forward by the Administration in 1897 for the construction of the lighthouses, nothing was undertaken till the year 1899, when the Sublime Porte decided upon the erection for their own account of the lights at Mocha, Abou Ail, Jebel Zubeir, and Jebel Teir.

It is to be observed that the convention concluded between the Lighthouse Administration and the Turkish Ministry of Marine, dated the 8th May, 1899, which has special reference to the construction and management of these lighthouses stipulates:—

- (a.) That the whole cost of the installations was to be borne by the Ottoman Government.
- (b.) That the administration is not responsible for any damage caused to the lighthouses and that all expenditure incurred for repairs, &c., had to be defrayed by the Ottoman Government as also the annual cost of upkeep and management, which was estimated at £T.15,000.
- (c.) Article 6 of that convention further excludes the Lighthouse Administration from any participation in the dues which may be levied on shipping making use of these lights, and states that the total sum of such dues shall be handed over to the Turkish Government.

It would thus appear that whatever may have been the rights which accrued to the Ottoman Lighthouse Administration under their concession of 1881, these rights were set aside by the subsequent arrangements made by the Turkish Government, and that the only interest of the Administration consisted in the provision of a staff to work the lights at the expense of and for the account of the Turkish Government.

This is emphasised by article 4 of the convention of the 14th April, 1913, which extended the period of the general concession, and which affirms that the maintenance of the Red Sea lighthouses is to remain in the hands of the Ottoman Government.

In view of all these facts, His Majesty's Government cannot regard these particular lights as other than the undoubted property of the Turkish Government, and in these

[1356]

circumstances they are of the opinion that the question of the ultimate disposal of the four lighthouses is one which will have to be settled by the terms of the Treaty of Peace to be concluded with Turkey.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[146620]

No. 135.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 1810.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 18, 1919.

WITH further reference to my letter No. 1645 dated the 7th September, on the subject of Turkish Prisons, I have the honour to forward herewith to your Lordship copies of the following documents:—

- (1.) Report by the Inter-Allied Prisons Commission, dated the 20th September.
- (2.) Note presented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Military Attachés of France, Great Britain, and Italy, on the 27th September.
- (3.) Reports by the Inter-Allied Prisons Commission, dated the 11th October and the 7th October.

2. I am glad to be able to report that the appointment and activities of the Inter-Allied Prisons Commission have already produced a marked improvement in the conditions of the Turkish prisons in Constantinople. The members of this Commission frequently visit the various prisons, make recommendations as to improvements in accommodation and administration, and, by constantly keeping the prison authorities up to the mark, ensure that effect is given to their recommendations.

3. Two new prisons are in course of construction, and, owing to Allied representation, the completion of these is now being hurried on by the Turkish Government. One should be ready very shortly, and the second should be sufficiently constructed in two months' time to be able to accommodate the majority of prisoners at present housed in unsuitable buildings. These buildings, when completed, will enable prisoners under sentence or detention to be housed or guarded under conditions approximating in a reasonable degree to that obtaining in more civilised countries.

4. The Turkish Director-General of Prisons and the Prison Governors have on the whole accepted the appointment of the Commission in a good spirit, and have shown themselves willing to act on the advice of the Commission and to do their best to effect improvements.

5. Lieutenant A. J. Wilson, whom I have nominated as British Delegate, has been of the greatest possible assistance. He is, in particular, well qualified for this mission, having had considerable experience in the Cyprus Military Police, and being acquainted with the local languages, and his zeal and energy have been most commendable.

6. Although it is gratifying to be able to report that conditions have improved, I would point out to your Lordship that the absolute lack of funds at the disposal of the Turkish Government, which has formed the subject of several reports by me (see my despatch No. 1775 of the 29th September), is a most serious handicap to the carrying out of improvements on a permanent and systematic scale. Moreover, it is quite certain that, should the Prisons Commission cease its activities, conditions would immediately become as unsatisfactory as they were before its appointment.

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner).

RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure 1 in No. 135.

Report by the Inter-Allied Prison Commission.

(Traduction.)

Messieurs,

NOUS avons l'honneur de vous informer que nous avons visité les prisons ci-dessus mentionnées. Nous vous soumettons le rapport général suivant :

1. Prisons de Sultan-Ahmed.—Stamboul.

2. Prisonniers.—Cette prison renfermait, du 10 septembre, 173 condamnés: 124 hommes, 12 femmes, 37 jeunes délinquants. Il n'y a pas moins de 58 prisonniers

hommes condamnés pour meurtre, et la rigueur des sentences varie entre la détention perpétuelle et neuf mois d'incarcération.

3. Personnel.—Cette section de la prison est gardée, à l'intérieur, par 27 gardiens civils; 45-50 gendarmes sont répartis, à l'extérieur, comme sentinelles aux entrées et aux postes d'observations. La paye mensuelle de ces gardiens est de 400 à 500 piastres plus les cartes de guerre avec la ration des prisons. Evidemment ce salaire est tout à fait insuffisant et que ni ordre ni discipline ne peuvent être maintenus, à moins que les salaires ne soient considérablement augmentés, et que, de plus, le personnel soit, autant que possible, changé, car nous sommes convaincus que les gardiens actuels peuvent être facilement corrompus.

Avant que le mal ne soit déraciné, on ne peut escompter de progrès réels.

L'officier attaché à la prison et des gardiens eux-mêmes déclarent naïvement qu'ils ont peur des prisonniers et que ces derniers ont la haute main et font ce qu'ils veulent.

4. Logement et Sécurité.—Le logement de la section prison des hommes consiste en deux dortoirs. Le premier étage, entre les dortoirs, contient treize chambres cubiques et nous recommandons que ces chambres qui, présentement, ont besoin de réparations et de portes, soient aménagées en cellules avec des portes en fer.

Pour le moment, les dortoirs renferment un grand nombre de prisonniers et les gardiens ont presque peur d'y pénétrer; ils négligent sûrement l'accomplissement de leurs rondes de nuit. Si ces treize chambres cubiques étaient transformées en cellules, elles pourraient contenir chacune quatre à six prisonniers qui seraient là en lieu sûr, et ainsi les détenus les plus dangereux pourraient être isolés et les gardiens recouvrer leur autorité. Ces mesures réduiraient les chances d'évasions. Nous recommandons que dans ce dortoir après avoir rempli les cellules, on ne laisse que le moins possible de prisonniers, et que ces prisonniers qui y seront laissés soient choisis parmi ceux ayant encouru des peines légères et qui sont bien notés.

5. La section prison des femmes semble bien entretenue et propre, comparée aux autres parties de la prison.

6. Il y a une section où sont confinés trente-sept jeunes détenus dans un quartier où l'espace manque, et où, autant que nous avons pu le remarquer, la discipline fait défaut.

7. La section où se trouve les prisonniers en prévention est entièrement inhabitable, à presque tous les points de vue :

(a.) Les logements en très mauvais état sont très malsains.

(b.) Il apparaît que la sécurité laisse à désirer, la prison étant contiguë à des maisons privées, et avec la surveillance actuelle, qui est presque nulle, rien n'empêche un prisonnier de s'enfuir, et il semble que tout prisonnier décidé peut s'évader pour peu qu'il le veuille.

Nous recommandons le transfert à la Prison générale des condamnés de tous ceux des détenus en prévention sur qui pèse une inculpation grave; ils y seraient mis dans les cellules mentionnées au paragraphe 4.

Il y a 114 prévenus dont :

2	en	prévention	depuis	7 à 8	mois	pour	meurtre.	
2	"	"	"	6	"	7	"	(1 est un chrétien).
2	"	"	"	5	"	6	"	"
11	"	"	"	4	"	5	"	"
1	"	"	"	3	"	4	"	"
34	"	"	"	2	"	3	"	"
28	"	"	"	1	"	2	"	"
34	"	"	"	moins	d'un	mois.		

Nous recommandons l'application des mesures préconisées au paragraphe 11 ci-après.

8. Hygiène.—L'état sanitaire des prisons est vraiment déplorable; les fouilles actuelles devront être comblées et de nouvelles latrines construites dans les cours des prisons.

Présentement, les latrines sont toutes situées à l'intérieur des bâtisses, qui manquent d'air, et la puanteur qui s'en dégage se repand dans les prisons. Comme mesure immédiate, nous insistons pour la fourniture aux prisons d'un désinfectant et d'une abondante quantité d'eau suivant notre demande contenue dans notre Rapport No. 1/19 du 11 courant.

2. Galata-Séraï.

9. Nous visitâmes la prison le 11 septembre 1919 et y trouvâmes soixante-dix détenus en prévention. La prison est antihygiénique à tous les points de vue, et notre seule recommandation est qu'elle soit immédiatement fermée et que les fosses d'aisances soient comblées dans l'intérêt des voisins, dont la santé est en danger par suite de la saleté de la prison.

En particulier, la Commission demande que les femmes, actuellement détenues à Galata-Séraï, soient transportées d'urgence à Sultan-Ahmed.

10. Aucun effort sérieux n'est fait pour juger ces détenus, et il y en a qui ont été incarcérés sans jugement depuis le 15 mai 1919. Il y a :

12	prisonniers arrêtés depuis 3 à 7 mois.
10	" " " 2 à 3 mois.
15	" " " 1 à 2 mois.
22	" " " 2 semaines à 1 mois.
5	" " " 1 semaine à 2 semaines.
6	" " " 2 jours à 1 semaine.

11. Nous portons à votre attention le cas de Nicargisoglon Nishan, arménien de Constantinople, et de sa femme, qui furent arrêtés le 23 mai 1919, accusés d'un vol de literie. Ils sont en prévention depuis quatre mois, sans avoir été appelés au tribunal.

12. Il est intéressant de noter que durant le mois d'août sur 33 prisonniers arrêtés en août pour diverses inculpations, détenus seulement quelques jours, et puis jugés, douze furent acquittés. On en peut déduire que le tribunal ne fait pas comparaître les détenus par ordre de date d'arrestation; qu'un prévenu gardé sans jugement pendant quatre mois est détenu injustement et selon toute probabilité des soupçons, sans preuves évidentes, sont la cause de la détention prolongée, sans jugement, d'un homme puni ainsi injustement.

Nous pensons que cette difficulté peut être facilement écartée en recommandant que la détention d'un prévenu n'excède pas une semaine en durée. A la fin de la première semaine de détention le prévenu (homme ou femme) devrait comparaître devant le juge pour une première déposition; un délai d'une semaine pourrait être encore accordé à la partie adverse pour la production de nouvelles charges, et il appartiendrait au juge de décider si le prévenu doit être remis en prison ou relâché sous caution.

3. Prison de Scutari.

13. Nous visitâmes cette prison le 18 septembre 1919, et y trouvâmes vingt-neuf prévenus. La prison se compose de deux chambres excessivement malsaines, et nous vous soumettons qu'il est impossible de rien faire pour assainir la prison et qu'il faut la fermer. Il y a :

23	prévenus détenus depuis 3 à 4 mois.
4	" " " 2 à 3 mois.
3	" " " 1 à 2 mois.
17	" " " moins d'un mois.

14. *Nouvelle Prison civile.*—La nouvelle prison à Sultan-Ahmed sera une belle bâtisse et à tous les points de vue propre à servir de prison. Elle est en construction depuis bientôt trois années, et d'après les travaux en cours elle ne sera pas achevée avant une année. Nous recommandons l'augmentation de la main-d'œuvre afin qu'au moins une partie de la prison puisse être utilisée pour la détention des prévenus de Sultan-Ahmed et de Galata-Séraï qui devront être transférés sans plus tarder.

15. Une autre nouvelle prison est en construction à Scutari et c'est aussi une belle bâtisse. Elle est presque achevée, à l'exception d'une aile renfermant la mosquée et les bains. Nous recommandons instamment qu'elle soit achevée immédiatement et que les prisonniers de Scutari y soient transférés. Il semble que rien n'empêche d'en retarder l'occupation plus de quelques jours.

En résumé, la Commission des Prisons présente les propositions suivantes :

1. *Choix des Prisons.*—La seule prison possible est la prison centrale de Sultan-Ahmed.

2. Aménagement.

- (a.) Fermer par des grilles les treize cellules dont il est question au § 4—Logement et Sécurité.
- (b.) Placer dans ces cellules les condamnés et prévenus dangereux.
- (c.) Les autres condamnés et prévenus seront répartis dans la Prison centrale et au besoin à Galata-Séraï et Scutari.
- (d.) Nous demandons qu'aucun détenu âgé de plus de 16 ans ne soit joint aux enfants et que, de plus, les jeunes détenus soient répartis dans les chambres suivant leur âge.

3. *Régime.*—Les heures de promenade et les visites devront être réglementées. Elle seront fixées après entente avec la Direction de la Prison.

4. *Gardiens des cellules.*—Douze gardiens seront choisis parmi les meilleurs et affectés à la garde des détenus dangereux. Ils devront être nourris et leur traitement nominal d'au moins £T. 10-12 par mois. Ils devront, en outre, être armés.

5. *Travail des Prisonniers.*—Il serait désirable que les prisonniers, actuellement oisifs, soient occupés sur un travail selon leurs aptitudes.

MONTAZAU.
A. J. WILSON.
T. RAIMONDI.

Le 20 septembre 1919.

Enclosure 2 in No. 135.

Note respecting the Prisons of Constantinople presented to the Minister of the Interior, by the Military Attachés of France, Great Britain, and Italy, September 27, 1919.

1. La construction de la nouvelle prison à Scutari doit être achevée instamment. Actuellement, elle manque très peu pour être mise en état de recevoir des prisonniers et le travail nécessaire est une affaire d'une semaine au plus, et on donne les ordres pour le hâter.

Aussitôt que cette prison est en état d'être utilisée, autant que possible des condamnés les plus dangereux doivent y être transférés de la Prison centrale de Sultan-Ahmed. Cette prison de Scutari sera dorénavant utilisée comme prison pour les condamnés.

2. La construction de la nouvelle prison de Sultan-Ahmed ne sera achevée avant une année si l'on n'augmente pas la main-d'œuvre et on ne travaille pas avec plus d'énergie. Il est de toute façon nécessaire que des mesures soient prises pour achever sans délai ou au moins pour recevoir les prévenus des prisons de Sultan-Ahmed et Galata-Séraï, l'état de ces derniers étant déplorable.

3. Sur le premier étage de la section pour les hommes, dans la prison actuelle de Sultan-Ahmed, il y a treize chambres. Ces chambres sont à présent inutilisables, vu le manque en cellules avec des portes de fer. Ce travail est de première urgence. Aussitôt que ces chambres seront en état d'être occupées, elles seront utilisées pour les condamnés qui ne peuvent pas être reçus à la nouvelle prison de Scutari, ainsi que pour les détenus les plus dangereux.

4. Les femmes détenues dans la prison de Galata-Séraï doivent être transportées d'urgence à Sultan-Ahmed.

5. La prison de Galata-Séraï est infecte et la détention de prisonniers dans cette bâtisse, même pour quelques jours, est inhumaine, vu ses déplorables conditions sanitaires. La Commission des Prisons est autorisée à chercher une autre bâtisse qui pourra servir comme prison pour Péra et Galata, et alors la prison de Galata-Séraï sera évacuée et les prisonniers transférés à la bâtisse désignée à la remplacer.

6. Il aura lieu à remplacer le directeur de la prison de Scutari par un fonctionnaire plus capable. La Commission des Prisons ayant inspecté, le 18 septembre, la prison en question, a proposé quelques changements. Lors de sa deuxième visite, qui a eu lieu le 23 septembre, il a été constaté que rien n'avait été fait pour mettre en exécution ses recommandations, et même à 10 heures 45, le directeur n'était pas encore venu à la prison. Cette prison se trouve dans un état déplorable, ce qui est une honte pour une administration civilisée.

7. Son Excellence le Ministre est prié de donner à qui de droit les ordres nécessaires pour donner suite aux recommandations de MM. les attachés militaires dans l'appendice ci-jointe.

8. Il est nécessaire de nommer douze nouveaux gardiens pour la prison de Sultan-Ahmed, qui seront chargés de la surveillance générale et la garde des prisonniers les plus dangereux. Ces nouveaux gardiens recevront en guise de traitement douze livres par mois, ils seront nourris par l'Etat et porteront des armes.

Il serait à désirer que le Directeur général de la Police fût prié de choisir ces nouveaux gardiens parmi les recrues qui fréquentent actuellement l'Ecole de la Police.

Notes.

1. Minister of Interior promises this would be done in a fortnight.
2. Work will be pushed forward so as to get one part ready first.
3. Prisons Commission will go into this question with Director General of Prisons.
4. Orders given.
5. Agreed.
6. Reprimand this time. Next time he will be dismissed.
7. Minister of Interior promised to do this.
8. New warders have now been appointed. Wages amount to about Ltq. 24 inclusive per month. Agreed to give them a trial.

(Id.) I. M. S.

September 26, 1919.

APPENDICE.

MM. les attachés militaires demandent à son Excellence le Ministre que les prisonniers détenus, dont les noms, etc., sont indiqués plus bas, soient mis en liberté à moins que leurs procès ne soient pas terminés et les jugements rendus jusqu'au 7 octobre au plus tard.

La Commission interalliée des Prisons sera chargée de surveiller l'exécution, par les autorités compétentes, des ordres donnés par son Excellence le Ministre.

Dans les Prisons de la Cour martiale.

1. Ilias D. Casteas. Arrêté à Gallipoli le 22 juillet, "étant en possession d'un revolver militaire." Transféré, le 10 août, à la prison de la Cour martiale. Aucune mesure n'a été prise pour le juger.
2. Yanni Panayotti. Arrêté à Silivri le 3 juillet. "Brigandage." Transféré à la prison de la Cour martiale le 19 juillet. Rien n'a été fait pour le juger.
3. Yanni Triantafillo Spano. Arrêté à Constantinople le 7 août, "étant en possession d'un revolver, qu'il a braqué sur un individu."
4. Caralambo Marko Nikolaraki. Arrêté à Constantinople le 13 juillet, "ayant prononcé des paroles injurieuses à l'égard de la police." Aucun procès.
5. Yanni Gregoire Constantinides. Arrêté à Constantinople le 24 juillet, "ayant prononcé des paroles injurieuses à l'égard de la police." Aucun procès.
6. Yorghis Yoannou. Arrêté le 12 juillet à Constantinople, "s'étant servi des propos injurieux à l'égard de la police." Aucun jugement.
7. Antoine Constandinides. Arrêté le 12 juillet à Constantinople, "pour s'être servi des propos injurieux à l'égard de la police." Pas de procès.
8. Dimitri Oghlou Costi. Arrêté le 10 août, "pour avoir insulté la police et braqué un revolver." Aucun procès.
9. Ohannes Veleli Artin. Arrêté le 7 août, "pour avoir braqué un revolver." Aucun procès.
10. Triantafillo Oghlou Yanni. Arrêté le 7 août, "pour avoir braqué un revolver." Aucun procès.
11. Yanni Oghlou Yorghis. Arrêté le 12 juillet, "s'étant servi des propos injurieux à l'égard de la police." Aucun procès.
12. Spiro Oghlou Evaghelli. Arrêté le 24 août, "pour avoir facilité des évasions et avoir troublé la sécurité." Pas de procès.
13. Micargis Oghlou Mishan et sa femme (dans la prison de Galata-Sérai). Arrêté le 23 mai, "accusés d'un vol de literie." Pas encore appelés au tribunal.

Enclosure 3 in No 135.

Report by the Inter-Allied Prisons Commission.

(Traduction.)

Messieurs,

Constantinople, le 11 octobre 1919.

NOUS avons l'honneur de vous informer que nous avons régulièrement visité les prisons de Constantinople la semaine dernière jusqu'au 11 octobre, et nous vous soumettons le rapport suivant :

2. *Prison de Sultan-Ahmed.*—La prison est tenue plus proprement et le muidir paraît faire son possible pour en améliorer les conditions d'entretien. Nous avons de nouveau à nous plaindre des latrines, qui sont dans un état antihygiénique quoique un léger progrès ait été réalisé. Nous avons parlé au Directeur général des Prisons à ce sujet, recommandant d'ordonner le nettoyage, la désinfection et l'usage des cabinets situés dans la cour, et de réserver à un usage nocturne ceux de l'intérieur, qui devront également être nettoyés et désinfectés. Il promet de faire exécuter nos recommandations et nous espérons pouvoir, d'ici peu, vous annoncer un progrès.

3. Un essai est maintenant tenté de faire travailler les prisonniers, et un certain nombre d'entre eux sont employés à des réparations dans la prison. Le Gouvernement général nous a promis d'occuper immédiatement quelques prisonniers à des travaux de tailleur, d'ici trois semaines tous les détenus devant recevoir une tâche. Considérant le fait qu'un mois auparavant aucun prisonnier ne travaillait, la situation actuelle marque un grand progrès, quoique, sans doute, il y ait encore de la marge pour le progrès.

4. Les gardiens ont reçu un ceinturon, qui les distingue des détenus. Nous sommes informés que prochainement ils auront un uniforme convenable.

5. La construction de la nouvelle prison derrière le Palais de Justice avance favorablement.

6. *Prison de Galata-Sérai.*—Cette prison antihygiénique est à peu près dans les mêmes conditions, quoique le directeur fasse de son mieux pour les améliorer. Quelques prisonniers ont été transférés à Sultan-Ahmed.

7. *Prison de Scutari.*—La nouvelle prison sera prête pour l'occupation dans quelques jours et la prison actuelle sera fermée.

A. MONTAZAU.

A. J. WILSON (Lieutenant).

RAIMONDI.

Report by the Inter-Allied Prisons Commission respecting the Prison centrale (Sultan-Ahmed).

1.—Prison des Détenus condamnés.

(a.) *Discipline.*—Etant donnée la disposition des locaux et les gardiens actuels, la discipline est difficile à obtenir—aussi laisse-t-elle encore à désirer.

Cependant, il y a une tendance à l'amélioration, ne serait-ce que dans la tenue des gardiens, qui autrefois ne se distinguaient guère des prisonniers.

Il serait désirable que, conformément au règlement, les habits civils des détenus leur soient enlevés et qu'il leur soit remis un uniforme.

(b.) *Hygiène.*—Le régime de la distribution de l'eau a été fortement amélioré. La prison est alimentée pendant à peu près toute la journée.

Il existe, cependant, une installation de bains qui ne peut fonctionner, faute d'une quantité suffisante d'eau. Il serait indispensable que cette installation soit en mesure de fonctionner un ou deux jours par semaine, et les détenus astreints à y aller.

Une autre question extrêmement importante est la désinfection des latrines, celles employées se trouvent à l'intérieur des bâtiments occupés.

Si leur transfert à l'extérieur n'est pas décidé, il est indispensable de fournir en quantité suffisante un désinfectant qui devra y être chaque jour.

(c.) *Travaux exécutés.*—Quelques travaux ont été exécutés dans cette partie de la prison (en particulier des écoulements d'eaux ont été réalisés).

[1356]

2.—*Prison des Détenus en Prévention.*

(a.) *Discipline.*—Elle semble encore plus relâchée que dans la prison des détenus condamnés. Cela tient d'ailleurs en grande partie aux locaux extrêmement défectueux servant de logement aux prisonniers.

Les préparatifs d'une tentative d'évasion (amorce de tunnel) avaient été découverts la veille de la visite, mais il semble que les gardiens n'ont été pour rien dans cette découverte. Les travaux auraient été indiqués par un autre détenu.

Le service de surveillance pourrait, cependant, être exécuté de façon sérieuse, car il est effectué par treize gardiens. Le service de jour est assuré par la totalité et celui de nuit (pendant huit heures) par quatre gardiens.

(b.) *Hygiène.*—Mêmes observations que pour l'autre partie de la prison.

(c.) *Travaux.*—L'aménagement d'une nouvelle salle située à proximité des baraques actuelles est en cours. L'occupation de ce local facilitera la surveillance et améliorera les conditions d'hygiène actuellement déplorable.

3.—*Prison des Femmes.*

Rien à signaler pour la discipline et la propreté.

Le 4 octobre, les quatre prisonnières de Galata-Séraï, dont le transfert d'urgence avait été demandé, n'étaient pas encore arrivées à Sultan-Ahmed.

(Signé) MONTAZAU.
RAIMONDI.

[146626]

No. 136.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 1915.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 18, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 10th October relative to recent developments in the general situation in this country, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of an intelligence report from Konia which has been communicated to me by General Headquarters, Army of the Black Sea, and which illustrates the position in the interior on the eve of the fall of Ferid Pasha's Government.

2. I enclose also a cutting from the "Stamboul" newspaper of the 6th October which gives a fairly accurate account of the development of the movement in the Interior, and a cutting from the "Moniteur oriental" containing examples of communications which have passed between Moustapha Kemal Pasha and Constantinople. It will be observed that the Sultan was induced to send a message of satisfaction to his loyal subjects in the provinces.

3. The present position may be described as one of unstable equilibrium between Constantinople and the provinces. Mustapha Kemal Pasha and his associates show no intention of winding up the provisional quasi Government in Anatolia, but appear rather to intend to maintain it in being as a control on the Central Government. On the other hand, they appear to have waived, at any rate for the time being, some of their demands on the latter, as, for instance, the demand that certain members of the late Government should be impeached and meanwhile kept under surveillance.

4. The Government have published a new electoral decree, the object of which is to expedite the completion of the elections. It is hoped that it may be possible to convoke Parliament by the middle of November.

5. The executive created by the Sivas Congress consists of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, Bekir Samy Bey, Ahmed Rustem *alias* Alfred Bilinsky, Rechid Pasha, and Reouf Bey.

6. Bekir Samy Bey, is a Circassian who has held high administrative posts. He was presumably called in to give an air of Constantinopolitan respectability to a movement which might otherwise suffer the reproach of being the creation of swash-buckling adventurers.

7. Ahmed Rustem Bey, is a well-known renegade of Polish extraction, who crowned a disreputable career by becoming a Turkish Ambassador in Washington, having to quit that post at the request of the United States Government.

8. Rechid Pasha, is Vali of Sivas. He was appointed to that post by Ferid Pasha's Government. He had, at that time, the name of being opposed to the Committee of Union and Progress, as he resigned the post of Vali of Kastamuni during

the war, rather than carry out the deportation of Armenians, and had since remained without employment. Ever since his arrival at Sivas, however, he has shown great complaisance to the Chauvinist element.

9. Reouf Bey, is a well known naval officer. He was Minister of Marine in Izzet Pasha's Cabinet (October–November 1919), and was the foremost of the delegates who signed the Armistice. He is reported an ardent supporter of the Committee of Union and Progress.

I have, &c.
(For the High Commissioner),
RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure 1 in No. 136.

Control Officer, Konia, to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

(L.B. 45.)

Konia, September 25, 1919.

RESIGNATION of Vali.

Confirmation of my wire L.B. 136 of the 25th September is herewith attached.

The Vali, Djemal Bey, called to see me this morning. He was in a very much agitated state, and informed me of a conspiracy to assassinate him and bomb his residence. He next pointed out to me that his position had become untenable, and asked for my advice as to his resignation. Taking everything into consideration, I advised him, quite unofficially, to quit as speedily as possible. My reasons for doing so are as follows:—

1. The Government authorities have been entirely cut off from communication with the Central Government for over a week.
2. The town of Konia is to-day practically surrounded by the Nationalists—the ring grows closer daily—and by remaining at his post the Vali could not prevent the town from falling into their hands.
3. His presence here would incite his supporters to resistance, and the net result would be bloodshed and anarchy, which might spread to the Christian elements.
4. By the Vali's resignation and departure it is hoped that this projected resistance will die down, and that when the Nationalists occupy Konia they will do so in an orderly manner. Thus bloodshed may be avoided, and the instructions contained in paragraph (E) of your telegram of the 23rd September, 1919, will have been complied with.

I beg to submit that the above was the only sane advice I could give the Vali, not only in his personal interest, but also for the general welfare of the Konia population, both Moslem and Christian.

I have made arrangements with the local railway authorities to facilitate the Vali's journey. As there is a possibility of the Nationalists endeavouring to capture or kill him on the journey, one of the railway officers is travelling on the train, on duty from Konia to Eski Shehir, at my suggestion.

Before concluding, I would say the following in Djemal Bey's favour: During his valiship in Konia he has striven energetically to maintain law and order, and abide by the instructions received from his Government. He has made a considerable effort to content the Christian population. In his dealings with me I have not found he has acted with that low cunning which one so often encounters in the Turkish official.

The Nationalists may now be expected to take possession of the town within the next day or two.

In view of the above, I trust that my action has your approval.—CONTROL OFFICER, KONIA.

Enclosure 2 in No. 136.

Extract from the "Stamboul" of October 6, 1919.

LE MOUVEMENT ASIATIQUE ET SES RÉPERCUSSIONS.

RAREMENT on vit départ de ministre déclancher revirement pareil à celui déterminé par la retraite de Damad Férid Pacha. Sans aller cependant jusqu'à envisager, comme quelques-uns, toutes les difficultés intérieures comme résolues sous

[1356]

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l'effet de quelque baguette magique, on ne peut s'empêcher de reconnaître l'étendue du changement survenu du jour au lendemain. Peut-être va-t-on un peu trop vite et trop loin sous ce rapport, mais il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'une détente s'est produite. En sorte que l'on est porté à penser que la seule présence de Férid Pacha constituait l'unique obstacle à un compromis entre la capitale et l'Anatolie.

L'entente entre le pouvoir central et le chef du mouvement asiatique : voilà l'objectif visé maintenant par tous. Est-elle réalisée ? Hier matin, le "Vakit," dans un entrefilet encadré de motifs fleuris, l'annonçait formellement, spécifiant qu'elle avait été obtenue à la suite d'un échange de communications télégraphiques entre le Cabinet et les chefs du mouvement anatolien. Il y avait la garantie de l'intégrité et on félicitait les deux parties.

Cependant, l'"Akcham," ayant été demander confirmation de la chose au Ministre de l'Intérieur, en a reçu la réponse suivante :

Je prie les journaux de ne pas se livrer à des publications prématurées avant que le Gouvernement ait exposé sa manière de voir. Dieu aidant, nous en viendrons à une amélioration, et j'en suis convaincu ; mais il faudra que vous patientiez un ou deux jours. Nous expliquerons ce que nous nous proposons de faire par la déclaration que nous allons publier.

Ce journal croit savoir, de son côté, que le Cabinet a donné connaissance aux chefs du mouvement de la teneur de sa déclaration. Il pense qu'elle obtiendra son assentiment. Cela fait, le désaccord se trouverait dissipé de lui-même. Et l'organe considère comme gagnée, dès lors, la cause de l'intégrité nationale plaidée en Europe.

A Constantinople.

Dans la capitale, la détente s'affirma par une grande liberté accordée aux journaux dans l'appréciation des événements. Dès samedi, l'"Alemdar" publiait une façon de plaider en faveur des promoteurs du mouvement anatolien, dont il déclarait que les intentions pures auraient été ou celées ou travesties par le chef du dernier Cabinet. Le mouvement n'aurait rien d'unioniste, bien que des gens de ce parti se fussent empressés de s'y faufiler dans l'espoir de pêcher en eau trouble. L'objection poursuivie par lesdits promoteurs serait la libération de Smyrne, la garantie de la récupération des vilayets orientaux de l'Asie Mineure, bref l'intégrité territoriale.

Il voit deux indices permettant d'affirmer que le mouvement n'est pas unioniste : (1) le fait que Békir Sami Bey, un adversaire de l'Union et Progrès, a présidé l'un des deux congrès tenus par les délégués—celui de Sivas ; (2) le serment exigé des affiliés, qui doivent s'engager à ne servir la cause d'aucun parti, et surtout de l'Union et Progrès, mais à sacrifier leur sang et leur vie pour mettre le pays à l'abri de toute atteinte de l'ennemi.

En même temps, les journaux des provinces, retenus jusqu'ici par la poste, sont maintenant distribués par elle, et l'on peut prendre connaissance de ce qui s'est passé en Asie Mineure au cours de ces derniers mois.

Les précautions prises à cet égard par l'ancien chef du Gouvernement auraient consisté jusqu'à ne pas présenter à Sa Majesté les dépêches télégraphiques parvenant d'Anatolie et jusqu'à lui dépeindre sous de fausses couleurs la nature du mouvement asiatique. Ce qu'apprenant, le sénateur maréchal Fouad Pacha se serait présenté plusieurs jours de suite au palais impérial et aurait été reçu par le Sultan, à qui il aurait expliqué le caractère du mouvement, les décisions prises par les congrès et donné connaissance des proclamations.

C'est ainsi que le souverain aurait été mis au courant de la situation.

Il y a peut-être lieu d'opérer un rapprochement entre ce fait et le refus du Sultan de recevoir, avant-hier, l'ex-Ministre de l'Intérieur Adil Bey et l'ancien Cheikh-ul-Islam Sabri Effendi.

En Asie Mineure.

Par les documents rendus publics, on sait qu'il a été tenu deux congrès pour régler la marche du mouvement en Asie Mineure : un premier, partiel, qui se tint à Erzeroum, et décida d'en convoquer un général à Sivas, pour le 10 juillet. Mais celui-ci ne put se réunir que plus tard sous la présidence de l'ancien Vali Békir Sami Bey, et fut ouvert par le Général Moustapha Kémal Pacha en personne.

Le congrès d'Erzeroum était constitué par les délégués des provinces orientales.

Parmi les résolutions prises à ce congrès nous citerons celles qui concernent directement les vilayets d'Erzeroum, Sivas, Diarbékir, Mamouret-ul-Aziz, Van et Bitlis.

dénommées provinces orientales, ainsi que Trébizonde et le sandjak de Djanik (Samsoun). Ces provinces ne peuvent sous aucun prétexte être séparées l'une de l'autre. Les différentes races islamiques habitant ces régions professent vis-à-vis l'une de l'autre des sentiments de fraternité.

Toute occupation ou intervention dans ces régions devant être considérée comme ayant pour but la formation d'une Arménie ou d'une Grèce (Roumlouk vé Erménilik), on procédera à sa défense. Dans le cas où le Gouvernement, sous une pression extérieure, consentirait à céder ses provinces, un Gouvernement provisoire sera institué par le Techkilati-Millié et la région sera administrée en conformité des lois présentement en vigueur.

Le Congrès de Sivas, à son tour, a pris en septembre les résolutions suivantes, rendues publiques par manifeste. Les sept premières sont identiques aux principes admis par le Congrès d'Erzeroum.

Les autres portent en résumé qu'à cette époque historique fut proclamé le principe que les nations doivent elles-mêmes décider de leur sort. Il est obligatoire pour le Gouvernement central qu'il soit assujéti à la volonté de la nation. Aussi doit-on prendre sans retard les dispositions requises pour assurer la convocation, le plus tôt possible, du Parlement.

Le congrès a décidé aussi que l'organisation nationale formée par la fusion des différents comités poursuivant un même but sera dénommée "Association pour la défense des droits de l'Anatolie et de la Roumélie." Un comité d'administration est formé.

Moustafa Kémal Pacha a lancé de Sivas une circulaire qui peut être résumée ainsi :

" Dans une dépêche, datée du 13 septembre, adressée au vali de Trébizonde Ghalib Bey, le Damad Férid Pacha disait que des groupes de bolchevistes, abordant au littoral ottoman, ont pénétré en Anatolie par voie de Samsoun et de Trébizonde, et lui demandait quelles mesures il avait prises pour empêcher la propagande des idées bolchevistes dans le pays.

" Pour démontrer la fausseté de cette assertion, nous nous contentons de signaler à l'attention générale l'attitude de Férid Pacha, qui poussa la criminalité au point d'altérer le sens du mouvement national. Nous constatons avec regret que le Gouvernement central, par ses mensonges, cherche à incriminer la nation devant l'Europe occidentale. Ce fait met en évidence qu'un certain nombre de personnes, ayant vendu leur conscience à l'intérêt étranger, cherchent à étouffer la voix de la nation.

Alors que toute la nation exprime sa méfiance à l'égard du Gouvernement, celui-ci détient toujours le pouvoir et, dans le but de défendre l'intérêt étranger, prive la nation de son droit de parole et l'empêche de s'adresser à son Souverain.

" Alors que la sécurité la plus complète règne partout, ce Gouvernement, prétextant l'absence de sécurité, cherche à provoquer des massacres entre les citoyens d'une même nation. Par conséquent, l'"Association de la défense des droits de l'Anatolie et de la Roumélie" saisit cette occasion pour déclarer encore une fois que personne ne veut reconnaître un tel Gouvernement et désire qu'un nouveau Ministère composé de personnes honnêtes soit constitué."

Dans une adresse au Sultan des commandants des 15^e, 20^e, 3^e et 13^e corps d'armée déclarent en substance qu'alors que la nation et l'armée, toutes les deux fidèles au trône impérial, se sont réunies dans le but d'assurer le salut de la patrie et du trône, le fait qu'un Gouvernement de traîtres vendus à l'ennemi prépare des complots de nature à provoquer une guerre civile a enlevé toute confiance dans le Gouvernement, qui cherche à cacher la vérité et considère les manifestations de la nation comme des manœuvres unionistes. Le mouvement national est indemne de toute influence politique ; et l'armée impériale, également indemne de tout sentiment politique, appuie les patriotes dont le but est d'assurer le salut de la patrie et du trône.

L'adresse termine en demandant la formation d'un nouveau Cabinet, réclame l'ouverture d'une enquête au sujet des traîtres et déclare que l'armée ne pourra se séparer de la nation, qui a décidé de suspendre toute communication avec la capitale jusqu'à la formation du nouveau Cabinet.

Konia.

La ville de Konia a participé au Techkilati-Millié le soir du 26 septembre écoulé, après que le Vali Djémal Bey eut été invité à quitter son poste. Ce soir, sur l'initiative du Colonel Chakri Bey, commandant intérimaire du corps d'armée de Konia, les notables, les ulémas et les négociants se sont réunis au konak pour élire un Vali intérimaire. Le

religieux Vehbi Effendi a été désigné. Tous les assistants ont signé le procès-verbal de cette élection.

Puis ont été désignés les membres des délégations chargées d'annoncer la participation de Konia au Techkil-Millié, aux missions de l'Entente et au commandant des forces nationales à Yéni-Chéhir.

Correspondance avec Kémal Pacha.

Le Damad Chérif Pacha, Ministre de l'Intérieur, aurait longuement correspondu hier par le télégraphe avec Moustafa Kémal Pacha.

Déclarations du Prince-héritier.

Le "Sabah" publie ce matin, en résumé, les opinions émises par le Prince-héritier pour le retour d'un état de choses normal.

"En examinant la question—à dit son Altesse—on comprend aisément que l'incident a été amené d'abord par l'inaptitude du Cabinet à gouverner le pays dans ce moment délicat et ensuite par les raisons suivantes :

"Depuis la conclusion de l'armistice, une administration saine donnant confiance à la population de la capitale et des provinces n'a pas été instaurée.

"Non seulement le Gouvernement n'a pris aucune disposition pour rassurer la nation au sujet de Smyrne, Andrinople et des provinces orientales, menacées à chaque instant, mais le Ministère de l'Intérieur a qualifié le brigandage ("Tchétedjilik, yaghmadjilik") les efforts déployés par la nation en vue de défendre les intérêts de la patrie. Ces faits ont mécontenté la nation."

D'autre part, la déclaration du Grand-Vézir relativement à l'octroi aux Arméniens des provinces orientales d'une large autonomie, a produit une pénible impression dans ces régions, où l'on a cru que la patrie allait être cédée à d'autres.

Aussi, ont-elles fini par perdre tout espoir dans le Gouvernement, et la nation a dû chercher elle-même les moyens d'assurer le salut de la patrie :

1. Le Souverain et Calife, qui est le point d'appui de la nation et du Gouvernement, doit, sans inclination pour un parti quelconque, chercher à assurer l'équilibre de l'opinion générale et des courants nationaux.

2. Dans un moment si critique, aucun Gouvernement ne devant assumer la responsabilité, il y a lieu de procéder immédiatement aux élections afin de consulter la nation.

3. Formation d'un Cabinet de concentration avec le concours d'hommes d'État expérimentés.

4. La publication d'une amnistie générale.

L'Amnistie générale.

L'amnistie générale, dont il est question depuis deux jours, ne concernerait que les organisateurs et participants du mouvement national.

L'Entente libérale.

Au dire de nos confrères turcs, d'importantes résolutions ont été prises au cours de la séance de samedi dernier du parti de l'Entente libérale. Sadik Bey, président, et Ismail Bey, de Gumuldjina, vice-président, qui ne se rendaient pas depuis quelque temps au siège central, ont pris part à cette séance. Y étaient également présents le sénateur Maréchal Fuad Pacha, le sénateur Zeïnel Abeddine Effendi, et Vasfi Effendi.

Le secret est gardé. Il aurait été décidé de ne rien divulguer avant la mise à exécution de ces décisions. Sadik Bey s'est rendu, vers le tard, à la Sublime-Porte où il a présenté au Grand-Vézir le manifeste du parti.

Les Communications télégraphiques.

Contrairement à ce qui a été annoncé, les communications télégraphiques avec les provinces n'ont pas été reprises. La Sublime-Porte a reçu seulement une dépêche de Castamoni.

Nous disions, d'autre part, que le Ministre de l'Intérieur a correspondu par télégramme avec Moustafa Kémal Pacha ; c'est ce dernier qui a demandé cet entretien. Vers le tard, une dépêche a été également reçue du mutessarif de Carassi.

Enclosure 3 in No. 136.

Extract from the "Moniteur oriental" of October 9, 1919.

PROCLAMATION DE MOUSTAFA KÉMAL PACHA A LA NATION.

NOTRE grande nation qui s'était réunie pour assurer la sauvegarde de nos droits naturels et pour parer aux catastrophes de l'étranger et de l'intérieur, était mis en péril par la rancune haineuse de quelques traîtres. Ce Gouvernement illégal, qui ne s'appuyait pas sur la nation, était susceptible de nous faire du mal par la situation officielle qu'il conservait. C'est la raison pour laquelle nos amis comme nos ennemis nous voyaient désunis et désagréés.

Aujourd'hui, grâce à l'assistance divine, et grâce à la volonté de fer montrée par notre grande nation, les traîtres sont tombés, et l'État et la nation se trouvent groupés autour d'un même objectif de délivrance et d'union. Deux faits sont à considérer :

1. Notre Souverain Calife a destitué le Cabinet Férid Pacha dès qu'il a eu connaissance des désirs légitimes de la nation.

2. Le nouveau Cabinet présidé par Ali Rıza Pacha a admis les principes de légitimité (quelques mots enlevés par la censure) de notre idéal national, et l'accord est complet entre le Gouvernement et la nation.

En conséquence, à partir d'aujourd'hui, nous appuierons de notre sympathie le nouveau Gouvernement, et les restrictions et défenses apportées sur la correspondance officielle seront levées. En aucun cas, nous ne nous immiscerons dans les affaires du Gouvernement, et prouverons ainsi une fois de plus que notre activité avait pour but la sauvegarde de la nation.

En regard des devoirs du Gouvernement, il incombe à la nation une grande tâche nationale, qui est celle d'assurer l'accomplissement dans l'ordre de tous les devoirs. Notre plus grand principe était d'ailleurs de servir la nation et non d'entraver la loi. Aussi, envisagerons-nous avec joie le moment où nous n'aurons plus qu'à assurer le calme et la tranquillité, ainsi que nous l'avons toujours fait. Notre nation qui ne s'est jamais départie de son calme et de sa dignité durant les moments difficiles et pénibles qu'elle a endurés, gardera toujours ces qualités, et fera voir au monde civilisé qu'elle est digne de conserver cette terre glorieuse et sacrée.

MOUSTAFA KÉMAL.

Moustafa Kémal Pacha au Sultan.

Moustafa Kémal Pacha, Commandant en Chef des forces nationales, vient d'envoyer au Sultan la dépêche de remerciement suivante :

Au nom de toute la nation, nous osons déposer aux pieds de votre auguste Majesté nos sentiments de gratitude et de respect pour avoir daigné ordonner la destitution de l'ex-Cabinet, qui n'a pas reculé d'étouffer la voix nationale qui s'élevait de partout pour monter jusqu'à votre Majesté, trompant ainsi jusqu'à la fin son Souverain et la nation. La parole et le firman est à votre glorieuse Majesté.

MOUSTAFA KÉMAL.

Le 7 octobre 1335.

Au nom du Conseil représentatif de l'Association d'Anatolie et de Roumélie pour la défense des droits.

Le Grand-Vézir à Moustafa Kémal Pacha.

Votre dépêche du 7 octobre 1335, à l'adresse de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan et adressée par la fidèle nation, a été soumise à Sa Majesté; elle a été l'objet de la satisfaction du Souverain pour les sentiments de fidélité exprimés. Sa Majesté fait des vœux pour l'État, et que la nation entre bientôt dans la voie du salut et de la prospérité.

Le 8 octobre 1335.

ALI RIZA.

Moustafa Kémal Pacha au Grand-Vézir.

J'ai lu la proclamation publiée par le nouveau Cabinet et adressée aux autorités provinciales par le Ministère de l'Intérieur. Le malentendu créé par l'ancien Cabinet qui s'est attaqué à l'union nationale, laquelle doit son origine aux moments les plus critiques de notre existence, a fait que jusqu'à présent le Gouvernement n'a pu s'appuyer sur la nation afin que celle-ci puisse profiter de cet appui.

La déclaration du nouveau Cabinet mettant fin à ce malentendu et annonçant sa décision de se conformer aux desiderata et vœux nationaux par une gestion dans ce sens, a uni à partir d'aujourd'hui la nation et le Gouvernement de façon inséparable. Je fais des vœux pour le raffermissement de l'union nationale, qui a été un de nos principaux buts.

Le 8 octobre 1335.

MOUSTAFA KÉMAL.

[146629]

No. 137.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 1918. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 18, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1962 of the 17th October, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of the report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Enquiry into the Greek occupation of Smyrna and the surrounding districts, under the headings:—

- (1.) Established points (statement of incidents which occurred on and after the occupation);
- (2.) Responsibilities;
- (3.) Conclusions.

2. The original report has been forwarded by the commission direct to the Peace Conference.

3. The various enclosures in the copy of the report supplied to me have been retained in this High Commission for reference.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Sir Eyre Crowe in Paris.

I have, &c.

(For the High Commissioner),

RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure in No. 137.

Report of the Inter-Allied Commission of Enquiry into the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and surrounding Districts.

(1.)

Exposé des Faits survenus depuis l'Occupation, qui ont été établis au cours de l'Enquête entre le 12 Août et le 6 Octobre 1919.

DEPUIS l'armistice, la sécurité des chrétiens n'était pas menacée dans le vilayet d'Aidin.

Les populations hellènes avaient été incontestablement persécutées en 1914 et au cours de la guerre et traitées sans aucune bienveillance, pendant les premiers mois

qui suivirent l'armistice, par le Vali Noureddin Pacha; mais depuis l'entrée en fonction du Vali actuel, Izzet Bey, tous les habitants, sans distinction de races, étaient traités avec impartialité.

Malgré la présence de quelques bandes de brigands dans la région, on peut affirmer que le calme était revenu.

Les craintes de massacre de chrétiens n'étaient pas justifiées. Des enquêtes prouvent que les proclamations, appelant les musulmans au massacre des Grecs, qui, quelques semaines avant le débarquement, sont tombées entre les mains des autorités grecques et ont été envoyées à Athènes, n'ont pas été écrites par les officiers de gendarmerie turque dont les signatures figurent sur ces pièces. Ces pièces ne sont pas certainement authentiques.

2. Les conditions de sécurité dans le vilayet d'Aidin et à Smyrne en particulier ne justifiaient point l'occupation des forts de Smyrne par application de l'article 7 des clauses de l'armistice. (Voir au procès-verbal de la 37^e séance les réserves faites à ce sujet par le Général représentant italien.)

La situation intérieure du vilayet ne motivait pas davantage le débarquement de troupes alliées à Smyrne.

Au contraire, depuis le débarquement des Grecs, la situation est troublée à cause de l'état de guerre existant entre les troupes grecques et les irréguliers turcs.

3. Les forts de Smyrne furent occupés, le 14 mai 1919, par des forces alliées (britanniques, françaises, italiennes et grecques) sur l'ordre de l'Amiral Calthorpe, de la marine de Sa Majesté britannique, l'un des Hauts-Commissaires alliés en Turquie pour l'exécution des termes de l'armistice. L'ordre d'occupation portait qu'elle se faisait en exécution de l'article 7 de l'armistice entre la Turquie et les Puissances alliées.

4. Dans la nuit du 14 au 15 mai, à la suite de proclamation, un rassemblement de plusieurs milliers de Turcs a eu lieu dans le quartier turc du côté du cimetière juif, mais ce rassemblement n'avait pas pour objet d'organiser la résistance par la force au débarquement des Grecs. Son but était de prouver la majorité et la prédominance des habitants turcs sur les éléments étrangers.

5. L'occupation de Smyrne par les troupes grecques fut ordonnée par la Conférence de la Paix. Les ordres pour l'occupation furent donnés par l'Amiral Calthorpe, représentant cette Conférence.

La ville de Smyrne fut occupée, le 15 mai 1919, par les forces grecques, assistées des forces navales de l'Amérique, Grande-Bretagne, France, Grèce et Italie.

Les forces navales britanniques, françaises, italiennes et américaines débarquèrent de petits contingents armés pour garder leurs consulats respectifs.

Les forces navales grecques débarquèrent un groupe destiné à garder les points de débarquement des troupes grecques. Cette force était insuffisante pour préserver l'ordre et exécuter sa mission.

Les forces grecques se composaient de trois régiments. Le débarquement eut lieu à la pointe et sur le quai en face de l'Hôtel Kramer. Les troupes commencèrent à débarquer à 8 heures du matin.

6. Aucune résistance au débarquement n'a été organisée par les autorités turques, les coups de fusils tirés par les Turcs furent des actes isolés.

7. Plusieurs centaines de prisonniers de toutes sortes se sont échappés des prisons voisines de la Caserne quelques heures avant l'occupation.

Les autorités turques n'ont pas pris de mesures efficaces pour prévenir ou empêcher ces évasions.

Quelques-uns de ces prisonniers furent se procurer des armes au dépôt d'armes situé près de la Caserne.

8. Le commandement supérieur grec n'a pris aucune mesure préalable pour assurer l'ordre pendant la marche des troupes hellènes à travers la ville. Des détachements de marins grecs avaient seulement été placés dans le voisinage immédiat des deux points choisis pour le débarquement. Conformément aux ordres du représentant de l'Entente, les troupes turques étaient maintenues dans leurs casernes.

Aucune liaison n'avait été établie pour permettre au commandement grec de faire parvenir ses ordres aux autorités turques et pour se renseigner sur l'état d'esprit de la population.

9. Les autorités grecques, militaires, civiles et religieuses n'ont rien fait pour essayer de calmer la foule.

La cérémonie faite par le métropolite pour bénir les troupes à leur débarquement n'a pu avoir qu'une influence fâcheuse.

La foule, massée sur le parcours des troupes, a eu une attitude de nature à

[1356]

20

déchaîner la colère des habitants turcs et à entraîner des actes de violence de la part de fanatiques isolés.

10. Les ordres relatifs au débarquement n'ont pas été strictement exécutés. Ils ont été modifiés sans l'approbation du commandement, à la suite de l'intervention du commandant de l'"Averoff," qui avait été prévenu de la formation de nombreux rassemblements turcs du côté de Caratina.

Les compagnies d'evzones qui devaient débarquer à Caratina pour occuper les hauteurs qui dominent la ville du côté du sud ont été ramenées au Quai de la Douane, où elles ont débarqué derrière les autres fractions du régiment. Pour les itinéraires à suivre, les commandants des colonnes se sont conformés aux indications des guides qui leur ont été donnés. Ils ne savaient pas que les troupes turques étaient consignées dans leurs casernes près du Konak.

11. Les premiers coups de feu ont été tirés vers le coin de la place du Konak à l'entrée de la rue qui conduit à Cocarial.

Il est impossible d'établir avec certitude par qui furent tirés ces premiers coups. Les troupes grecques n'ont pas ouvert le feu et ont seulement riposté à ces premiers coups.

12. A la suite de ces premiers coups, une vive fusillade a éclaté. Les soldats grecs qui se trouvaient dans les jardins de la place du Konak ont dirigé un feu violent contre les fenêtres de la Caserne et du Konak.

Il a été impossible de savoir exactement si quelques coups de feu ont été tirés de certaines fenêtres de la Caserne après le commencement de la fusillade.

Aucune trace de balle n'a été trouvée sur les murs des bâtiments qui font face à la Caserne.

Quelques rares coups de feu paraissent aussi avoir été tirés par les Turcs en certains points des quais et de la ville, en particulier du côté du Consulat hellénique, où, d'après les rapports grecs, le détachement de garde fut obligé de se défendre à coups de fusil contre une attaque turque.

13. Sur le chemin qu'ils ont parcouru entre la place du Konak et le bateau "Patris" où ils furent enfermés, les premiers convois de prisonniers, comprenant des officiers et soldats, ainsi que le Vali et des fonctionnaires, furent l'objet de brutalités de la part de la foule que les accompagnait et même de quelques soldats grecs qui les escortaient.

Tous ces prisonniers furent volés. Tous devaient crier "Zite Venizelos!" et marcher avec les mains levées. Quelques-uns furent massacrés.

A part une ou deux exceptions, les officiers grecs n'ont exercé sur leurs hommes aucune action pour empêcher les violences.

14. Le 15 mai et jours suivants, les troupes grecques ont arrêté arbitrairement environ 2,500 personnes, parmi lesquelles un certain nombre d'enfants de moins de 14 ans. Le personnel et les élèves de quelques écoles furent même enfermés sur le "Patris." Bon nombre de ces prisonniers furent maltraités, pillés et détenus pendant plusieurs jours dans des conditions d'hygiène inacceptables.

15. Pendant les journées du 14 et du 15 mai, de nombreux actes de violence et de pillage furent exercés en ville contre les personnes et les habitations turques. Les fez furent arrachés et les Turcs n'osèrent plus sortir avec cette coiffure. De nombreuses femmes furent violées. Quelques assassinats furent commis. Ces violences et pillages furent exercés le plus souvent par la populace grecque de la ville, mais il a été prouvé que des soldats y prirent part et que l'autorité militaire ne prit que tardivement des mesures efficaces pour y mettre fin.

16. Le nombre des tués et blessés le jour de l'occupation de Smyrne par les troupes grecques est estimé de façon différente par les autorités turques et grecques. Ces nombres sont environ les suivants :

Grecs : soldats, 2 tués, 6 blessés ; civils : 20 tués, 20 noyés, 60 blessés.
Turcs : 300 à 400 victimes (tués ou blessés).

17. Après que la nouvelle du débarquement des forces grecques à Smyrne fut connue dans les villages des environs, les habitants grecs commencèrent à piller les maisons turques et à voler le bétail turc ; quelques Turcs furent également tués dans différents villages.

18. Le colonel commandant les troupes d'occupation grecques avait reçu dès le 21 mai le télégramme envoyé de Paris le 20 mai par M. Venizelos, qui réglait les conditions d'occupation du sandjak de Smyrne et du caza d'Aivali ainsi que de certaines régions situées en dehors du sandjak de Smyrne.

19. M. le Commodore Fitzmaurice, représentant de l'Entente à partir du 28 mai,

n'a reçu que le 1^{er} juin les instructions lui faisant connaître ses attributions vis-à-vis des autorités helléniques en ce qui concerne l'extension de la zone d'occupation.

Depuis le départ de l'Amiral Calthorpe (21 mai) jusqu'au 28 mai, le représentant de l'Entente était le Vice-Amiral français Sagan du Vauruy.

20. Le Haut-Commissaire du Gouvernement hellénique, arrivé à Smyrne le 21 mai, agi contre les ordres contenus dans le télégramme du 20 mai, en autorisant le colonel commandant les troupes à donner, le 23 mai, un ordre d'opération visant : (a) l'occupation d'Aidin ; (b) l'intervention dans les régions de Magnésie et de Cassaba, sans avoir, au préalable, demandé l'autorisation au représentant de l'Entente.

Le Haut-Commissaire grec a reconnu, devant la Commission, sa responsabilité à ce sujet.

21. Pour justifier l'extension de la zone grecque le Haut-Commissaire hellénique s'est appuyé :

(a.) Sur les renseignements non vérifiés reçus par l'autorité militaire, d'après lesquels la sécurité publique aurait été menacée dans les régions surveillées ;

(b.) Sur une interprétation donnée par l'autorité militaire à des conversations tenues avec le Colonel anglais Smith, qui n'avait aucune qualité pour remplacer le représentant de l'Entente.

Le Colonel Smith n'avait pas eu connaissance du télégramme envoyé le 20 mai par M. Venizelos au Colonel Zafiriou. Il n'a jamais donné à celui-ci aucune autorisation, même verbale, de se porter à Aidin-Magnésie et Cassaba. Il avait seulement exposé au Colonel Zafiriou l'utilité d'envoyer quelques troupes le long de la voie ferrée jusqu'à Triandu pour protéger la ligne, si le Colonel Zafiriou avait l'autorisation de pousser ses troupes en avant.

Le Colonel Smith ajouta que toute occupation au delà de Triada pourrait occasionner des désordres.

Il rendit compte de cette conversation à son supérieur.

22. La marche en avant et l'installation des troupes grecques aussi bien dans la direction de Magnésie que dans la direction d'Eudemich, d'Aidin et jusqu'à Nazili s'est d'abord faite dans des conditions satisfaisantes, malgré l'émotion soulevée dans le pays par la nouvelle des événements de Smyrne. Le commandement grec toléra l'action de civils grecs armés qui, sous prétexte d'aider les troupes grecques, se livraient au pillage et commettaient toutes sortes d'excès.

Une cour martiale constituée à Smyrne, dès le 16 mai, par le commandement grec avait prononcé (à la date du 15 août) 74 condamnations, dont 3 à mort pour les seuls événements des 15 et 16 mai. Parmi ces condamnés figurent :

48 Grecs.
13 Turcs.
12 Arméniens.
1 juif.

23. L'excitation produite dans le pays par les événements de Smyrne augmente progressivement pour les raisons suivantes :

(a.) Une grande incertitude régna au sujet des limites du territoire à occuper par les forces grecques jusqu'au 2 juin, date à laquelle le Commodore Fitzmaurice, de la marine britannique, fut chargé de déterminer les limites de l'occupation.

(b.) L'avance rapide des troupes grecques vers l'intérieur du pays augmenta le trouble des populations. Les notables turcs commencèrent à quitter la région occupée. Les réguliers turcs et la gendarmerie désertèrent. Des civils grecs s'armèrent ouvertement. L'activité des brigands augmenta en même temps que le nombre des actes de violence, les vols et les pillages.

(c.) Les perquisitions faites par les troupes grecques, aidées par des civils armés, dans les maisons turques pour la recherche des armes, portèrent au plus haut point le mécontentement de la population, car la violation du domicile musulman constitue une mesure particulièrement vexatoire, susceptible de provoquer une grande irritation.

Cette excitation créa dans tout le vilayet d'Aidin une apparence de désordres, qui tendait à justifier l'extension des limites de l'occupation par les forces grecques.

24. Les armes dont les civils grecs étaient porteurs leur ont probablement été fournies depuis l'armistice par la contrebande opérant entre les îles et la côte.

Il n'y a pas lieu de retenir l'accusation portée par les Turcs contre la Croix-Rouge grecque au sujet du débarquement, à Smyrne, d'armes contenues dans des caisses portant les marques de cette institution.

Il est seulement prouvé que, au cours du mois de février, un grand nombre de caisses furent, à plusieurs reprises, déchargées du bateau grec "Adriaticos" et échappèrent au contrôle de la douane. Des témoins turcs, entendus, ont affirmé que certaines de ces caisses renfermaient des armes et des munitions.

Les autorités grecques n'ont autorisé que dans les premiers jours de mars le contrôle des caisses par les fonctionnaires turcs du service de la douane.

- 25. Ayassoulouk a été occupé le 25 mai.
- Deunendjik a été occupé le 25 mai.
- Baladjik a été occupé le 25 mai.
- Aidin a été occupé le 27 mai.
- Eudemich a été occupé le 1^{er} juin.
- Nazili a été occupé le 3 juin.

26. Divers coups de main exécutés sur des postes grecs par des bandes ou des insurgés turcs ont amené, de la part des Grecs, des représailles dont quelques-uns pouvaient être justifiées par la situation militaire. Toutes ces représailles ont été faites brutalement. Quelques assassinats furent commis de part et d'autre.

27. L'évacuation de Nazili a été faite dans la nuit du 19 au 20 juin sur l'initiative du commandant du bataillon d'occupation. Cette évacuation n'a pas été faite conformément aux ordres du représentant de l'Entente donnés depuis le 14 juin, d'après lesquels les autorités locales turques devaient être prévenues à l'avance du départ des troupes grecques.

28. Les autorités militaires grecques expliquent ce mouvement en disant que le commandant du bataillon craignait une attaque et que, pour ne pas renseigner l'ennemi sur son mouvement de retraite, il n'a pas prévenu les autorités turques de son départ. Les ordres relatifs à l'évacuation de Nazili n'ont été donnés par le commandement supérieur que le 19.

29. Après ce départ, les autorités turques n'ont pas eu le temps de créer un service d'ordre pour remplacer la gendarmerie désarmée et désorganisée pendant l'occupation grecque. Elles n'ont pas été en mesure de s'opposer au pillage et au massacre de quelques familles grecques par des bandes turques entrées à Nazili quelques heures après l'évacuation par les Grecs.

30. Les habitants arrêtés à Nazili par les Grecs comme suspects, au nombre d'une trentaine environ, ont été amenés avec les troupes en retraite.

L'un d'eux fut tué en route, sous prétexte qu'il ne pouvait marcher.

Parmi les autres, quelques-uns purent s'échapper, mais le plus grand nombre fut tué au village de Kiosk au cours d'une bagarre survenue pendant la traversée de ce village, pendant laquelle un officier grec a été tué.

31. Après l'évacuation de Nazili par les troupes grecques, les attaques des Turcs contre les postes grecs et les soldats isolés se sont multipliées.

Dans toute la région d'Aidin, la population était armée, aussi bien les Turcs que les Grecs.

32. Les troupes grecques ont exécuté aux environs d'Aidin des reconnaissances armées. Au cours de ces reconnaissances quelques villages furent brûlés.

Le 27, une de ces reconnaissances a été repoussée par les bandes qui l'ont poursuivie jusqu'à l'entrée d'Aidin. Le combat a continué le 28. Les assaillants ont fait usage de canons de 105, dès le 28. Les grecs ont reculé.

Le commandement et les témoins grecs affirment que des coups de feu ont été tirés par les habitants turcs sur des fractions de troupes grecques en retraite, au moment où elles traversaient le quartier turc, situé au sud de la voie ferrée. Quelques-uns des incendies qui ont éclaté dans ce quartier turc, dans la matinée du 29, ont pris naissance au cours du combat.

D'autres incendies éclatèrent aussi dans ce quartier sur divers points isolés.

Un grand nombre de Turcs, hommes, femmes, enfants qui essayaient de sortir du quartier en flammes ont été tués sans raison par les soldats grecs qui gardaient toutes les issues conduisant de ce quartier vers la partie nord de la ville.

Le commandement et les troupes grecs ont incontestablement perdu tout sang-froid.

Les Grecs évacuèrent la ville dans la nuit du 29 au 30 après avoir commis de nombreux attentats et des crimes. Un grand nombre de civils grecs qui voulaient s'enfuir en accompagnant les troupes dans leur retraite en ont été empêché par le commandement.

33. L'incendie du quartier grec est dû aux bandes turques du chef Yuruk Ali,

qui y sont entrées dans la matinée du 30 juin, et l'ont brûlé complètement après avoir pillé les maisons, dont elles ont tué les occupants.

Sans distinction d'âge ni de sexe, un grand nombre d'habitants grecs, rencontrés dans les rues, furent impitoyablement tués par les bandes.

Les habitants qui échappèrent à la mort, mais non pas au vol, furent ceux qui, au nombre de 2,000 ou 3,000 environ, purent se réfugier, avant l'arrivée des bandes, dans le couvent des religieuses françaises, d'où elles se rendirent au Konak sous la protection du Colonel Cheffik Bey, commandant la 57^e division ottomane.

De même, quelques notables qui avaient pu se rendre au Konak eurent en partie la vie sauve, mais quelques-uns furent exécutés.

Il n'a pas été possible d'établir avec certitude le chiffre des victimes grecques ou turques.

Le représentant du Gouvernement grec, entendu par la Commission le 7 septembre, estime que le nombre des victimes grecques est de 2,000 environ ; 900 cadavres étaient déjà retrouvés à cette date. Un témoin anglais estime ce nombre à 400 environ.

Un officier français qui a fait une enquête sur place quelques jours après les événements évalue le nombre des victimes à :

1,500 à 2,000 Grecs,

1,200 à 1,500 Turcs,

en reconnaissant, toutefois, que l'évaluation des victimes turques a été très difficile à faire.

34. Les troupes grecques, à l'aide des renforts envoyés par le Général Nider, ont repris Aidin le 4 juillet. Elles ont incendié le quartier turc situé à l'ouest de la ville, où se trouvent aussi des usines grecques.

35. L'ensemble des incendies allumés entre le 29 juin et le 4 juillet ont certainement détruit les deux tiers de la ville d'Aidin, dont la population s'élevait à 30,000 habitants, parmi lesquels environ 8,000 Grecs.

Les maisons non brûlées ont toutes été pillées.

36. Avant la rentrée des Grecs à Aidin, la plus grande partie de la population turque a quitté la ville et les environs pour se réfugier dans la zone italienne ou dans la région de Nazili-Denizli, où elle est encore.

Un millier de Grecs ont été emmenés dans la zone turque, où ils étaient encore dans une situation matérielle très pénible au moment de la visite de la Commission à Nazili, le 11 septembre.

37. La réoccupation d'Aidin a été ordonnée par le Commandement supérieur grec, malgré les ordres formels du représentant de l'Entente.

Les autorités grecques ont agi sur ordre formel envoyé de Paris par M. Venizelos, le 2 juillet. Cet ordre n'admettait à ce sujet aucune intervention du représentant de l'Entente.

38. La plupart des villages situés le long de la voie ferrée entre Baladjik et Aidin ont été détruits par les incendies allumés au cours des opérations militaires qui se sont déroulées dans la région.

39. Actuellement, le calme est à peu près rétabli, sauf dans la zone très voisine du front où se livrent encore des combats d'avant-postes, qui causent des pertes et qui entraînent des mesures militaires, dont souffrent les habitants.

Il en est de même dans la région d'Eudemich, où l'occupation grecque s'est faite dans de bonnes conditions.

40. L'occupation du vilayet d'Aidin par les forces grecques a causé de grandes pertes matérielles au point de vue des récoltes et propriétés.

Les unes, impossibles à estimer, sont dues aux pillages, aux vols et à la destruction du bétail, dont une partie a été utilisée comme nourriture par les troupes grecques.

Les autres, de moindre importance, furent la conséquence des opérations militaires et des rencontres qui eurent lieu entre les forces grecques et les bandes turques.

D'autres enfin, très considérables, sont dues à l'incendie des maisons, des villages, et de la ville d'Aidin. On peut estimer que les pertes provenant de l'incendie d'Aidin représentent approximativement une valeur de 8,000,000 de livres sterling.

Lorsque les habitants turcs abandonnèrent leurs maisons et s'enfuirent des districts occupés par les Grecs, ils laissèrent leurs récoltes sur pied ou les abandonnèrent. Les pertes en haricots, racines à liqueur et en figues peuvent être estimées à 1,200,000 livres.

La récolte des olives souffrira également et les conditions ne s'amélioreront pas avant le mois de novembre.

41. Pergama a été occupée le 12 juin. Cette ville étant dans le nord du sandjak de Smyrne, les Grecs avaient le droit de l'occuper d'après les ordres de l'Entente donnés par le télégramme du 20 mai.

La Commission n'a pas été à Pergama.

D'après les renseignements dignes de foi qui ont été recueillis, il résulte que les irréguliers turcs qui ont repris Pergama ont tué les habitants turcs qui avaient bien accueilli les Grecs. Ils ont également massacré et souvent torturé tous les soldats grecs fait prisonniers au cours de cette affaire de Pergama.

42. Le 17 juin, après l'évacuation de Pergama, les troupes grecques rassemblées à Ménémén se sont livrées, sans raison sérieuse, à un véritable massacre de Turcs inoffensifs. Les autorités municipales affirment que plus de 1,000 habitants turcs ont été tués, mais ce nombre paraît exagéré. D'après l'enquête faite dès le lendemain de l'événement par un officier français le nombre des victimes turques serait de 200 tués et 200 blessés.

Ce massacre n'a pas été organisé par le commandement grec, il fut le résultat d'une panique qui s'est emparée de jeunes troupes non aguerries, fatiguées, encore sous l'impression causée par les événements de Pergama, et que les officiers n'ont pas su calmer.

43. Le commandement militaire grec affirme que la répression grecque a été la conséquence d'une attaque des Turcs qui, d'une maison près de la gare et du Konak, auraient tiré des coups de feu sur des soldats grecs.

De nombreux témoignages ont été entendus à ce sujet. Ceux des Grecs sont imprécis et quelquefois contradictoires.

La Commission estime que l'affirmation du commandement grec ne peut être regardée comme exacte.

44. L'occupation de Magnésie, en dehors des limites du sandjak de Smyrne, a eu lieu le 25 mai, sans autorisation du représentant de l'Entente et sans que cette haute autorité ait été prévenue.

Pour des raisons militaires, cette occupation a été poussée et maintenue jusqu'à Ahmedli, à l'est, et jusqu'à Papazli, au nord-est de Magnésie. Les troupes grecques avaient même momentanément occupé Ak-Hissar, mais n'y sont pas restées.

L'occupation de la zone de Magnésie s'est faite au début sans difficultés. Les rapports sont devenus moins bons entre la population et les troupes grecques à la suite de mauvais traitements subis par quelques habitants, des dégradations et des vols commis dans certaines propriétés et à la suite des perquisitions faites pour la recherche des armes.

Les autorités civiles turques sont restées à Magnésie, à l'exception du mufti, qui, convoqué à Smyrne par les autorités grecques, s'est enfui à Constantinople.

La situation actuelle est calme. Des rapports corrects existent entre le général commandant la division d'occupation et les autorités turques.

45. Après l'armistice, des bandes grecques de Mytilène ont fait quelques incursions dans les environs d'Aivali, volant et tuant quelques musulmans. Des représailles furent exercées par certains Turcs de la région. Ces actes de brigandage réciproques n'empêchaient pas la situation d'être normale et satisfaisante.

Dès les premiers jours de l'occupation d'Aivali, l'autorité militaire a enrôlé et armé des démobilisés et civils grecs. Ils se sont assez mal comportés et furent notamment accusés d'avoir incendié deux villages. Ils furent, peu après, désarmés et licenciés.

La population turque est très faible à Aivali, où il n'y a, actuellement, qu'une vingtaine de musulmans.

Le pays est tranquille, mais le commerce est presque complètement arrêté.

46. Les réfugiés turcs qui ont quitté les territoires occupés par les Grecs paraissent retenus loin de leur domicile, soit par manque de confiance dans les Grecs, soit par les irréguliers turcs, qui les retiennent peut-être pour raisons politiques.

Le nombre de ces réfugiés est extrêmement considérable. La Commission n'a pas pu l'évaluer exactement.

Dans certaines régions, comme dans la vallée du Méandre, des villages entiers, même parmi ceux qui n'ont pas été brûlés, ont été abandonnés.

47. Au sujet du transport de Grecs dans la province de Smyrne signalé par la plainte du Cheik-ul-Islam Moustafa Sabir à la Conférence de la Paix, l'enquête a montré que :

(a.) D'après le télégramme envoyé le 7 (20) mai par M. Venizelos, l'occupation grecque avait en partie pour but de rendre possible le rapatriement dans le sandjak de Smyrne et le caza d'Aivali des réfugiés se trouvant en Grèce.

(b.) Dans quelques régions, en particulier du côté de Pergama et de Phocée, des réfugiés grecs sont venus s'installer, et l'exode des populations turques a facilité leur installation.

(c.) En présence des troubles qui ont accompagné l'occupation, les autorités helléniques ont donné l'ordre d'arrêter le rapatriement en masse. Quelques familles aisées, dont les moyens d'existence étaient connus, ont seules été autorisées à rentrer.

D'autres réfugiés ont certainement pu rentrer en débarquant en dehors des ports où les autorités grecques exercent un contrôle, mais leur nombre ne saurait être grand.

L'accusation portée par le Cheik-ul-Islam n'est donc pas complètement justifiée.

Les membres de la Commission d'Enquête,

L'Amiral Bristol, Délégué des États-Unis d'Amérique.

Le Général Bunoust, Délégué de la France.

Le Général Hare, Délégué de la Grande-Bretagne.

Le Général Dall'Olio, Délégué de l'Italie.

Constantinople, le 7 octobre 1919.

(2.)

Établissements des Responsabilités.

1. L'enquête a prouvé que, depuis l'armistice, la situation générale des chrétiens dans le vilayet d'Aidin était satisfaisante. Leur sécurité n'était pas menacée.

Si l'ordre d'occupation de Smyrne a été donné par la Conférence de la Paix à la suite de renseignements inexacts, la responsabilité première des événements incombe aux individualités ou aux Gouvernements qui ont établi ou transmis, sans les vérifier, des renseignements de ce genre, tels que ceux dont il est parlé au No. 1 des points établis. (Le général représentant italien renouvelle à ce sujet les réserves qui sont insérées au procès-verbal de la 37^e séance.)

2. La cause initiale des événements doit être recherchée dans les haines de religion. Les Grecs n'ont rien fait pour en empêcher les manifestations. Leur occupation, loin de se présenter comme l'exécution d'une mission civilisatrice, a pris immédiatement l'aspect d'une conquête et une croisade.

3. La responsabilité des faits qui se sont passés à Smyrne les 15 et 16 mai, ainsi que dans les environs immédiats de la ville au cours des premières journées qui ont suivi ce débarquement, incombe au commandement militaire supérieur grec ainsi qu'à certains officiers qui ont manqué à leur devoir.

Le Gouvernement grec a reconnu cette responsabilité par les sanctions qu'il a prises.

Une part de responsabilité incombe, toutefois, aux autorités turques de Smyrne qui n'ont pris aucune mesure pour empêcher l'évasion et l'armement des prisonniers de droit commun avant l'arrivée des Grecs.

4. Dans la personne de la haute autorité civile qui le représente à Smyrne, le Gouvernement hellénique est responsable des troubles graves qui ont ensanglanté la zone intérieure du pays pendant l'avance des troupes grecques, parce que :

(a.) L'autorité susvisée ne s'est pas conformée aux instructions du Conseil suprême données par le télégramme du 7 (20) mai de M. Venizelos. Sans avoir demandé aucune autorisation au représentant de l'Entente, elle a permis au commandement militaire de donner, le 10 (23) mai, l'ordre d'envoyer des troupes à Aidin-Magnésie et Kassaba en dehors des limites du sandjak de Smyrne.

(b.) La même autorité a volontairement laissé les populations dans l'ignorance de l'étendue de l'occupation. Elle a ainsi contribué à augmenter la surexcitation des habitants musulmans et, par suite, les désordres.

5. La responsabilité des autorités supérieures grecques est engagée par le fait qu'elles ont permis la circulation de civils armés dans le pays.

Pour quelques-unes de leurs opérations militaires ou de police, elles ont même toléré l'emploi de ces civils armés en même temps que celui de troupes régulières.

6. La cause première des troubles qui se sont produits dans la vallée du Méandre résulte de l'occupation même, faite sans justification.

Les faits regrettables qui ont accompagné la marche et l'établissement des troupes grecques, sont la conséquence de l'état de guerre dans lequel s'est trouvé le pays dès que ces troupes ont avancé.

Les haines qui existent depuis des siècles entre Turcs et Grecs en ont incontestablement augmenté la fréquence et la sauvagerie.

Les Grecs ne sauraient, en toute justice, en être rendus seuls responsables.

Les mêmes considérations s'appliquent aux événements qui se sont déroulés dans les régions de Pergama et aux environs de Magnésie et d'Eudemich.

7. Les Grecs sont, au contraire, seuls responsables du massacre de Ménémén. Ce massacre n'a pas été préparé. Mais le commandement grec connaissant l'état de surexcitation de ses troupes à la suite de l'affaire de Pergama aurait dû et pu prendre des dispositions pour remettre en main des troupes auxquelles l'ennervement, la fatigue et la peur ont fait commettre, sans aucune provocation, un véritable massacre de civils turcs sans défense.

Les officiers grecs présents à Ménémén ont complètement manqué à leurs devoirs.

8. Bien que la situation actuelle soit meilleure, le calme n'est pas encore rétabli dans le vilayet d'Aidin.

Presque toutes les transactions commerciales avec l'intérieur de l'Anatolie sont arrêtées.

Cette situation est incontestablement le résultat de l'occupation et de l'état de guerre qui persiste entre les irréguliers turcs et les troupes grecques, bien que celles-ci n'étendent plus leur zone d'occupation.

Les chefs du mouvement national turc, qui agissent de concert avec d'anciens chefs de bandes de brigands, n'ont pas toujours une autorité suffisante sur leurs forces, pour les empêcher de se livrer quelquefois à des incursions. Il en résulte qu'une part de responsabilité leur incombe en ce qui concerne la situation actuelle du pays.

Derrière leur responsabilité apparaît celle du Gouvernement turc, qui, jusqu'à ce jour, n'avait aucune autorité sur les chefs du mouvement national.

Les Membres de la Commission :

R. H. HARE.
MARK S. BRISTOL.

A. DALL'OLLIO.
BUNOUST.

Constantinople, le 11 octobre 1919.

(3.)

Conclusions présentées par la Commission.

1. La situation créée à Smyrne et dans le vilayet d'Aidin par l'occupation hellénique est fautive parce que :

(a.) L'occupation, qui n'avait en principe pour but que le maintien de l'ordre, présente en réalité toutes les formes d'une annexion.

Le Haut-Commissaire grec exerce seul une autorité efficace.

Les autorités turques qui sont restées en fonction n'ont plus aucun pouvoir réel. Elles ne reçoivent plus d'ordre de Constantinople et, par suite de la disparition presque complète de la police et de la gendarmerie turques, elles n'ont plus les moyens nécessaires à l'exécution de leurs décisions.

(b.) L'occupation impose à la Grèce des sacrifices militaires considérables, hors de proportion avec la mission à remplir, si cette mission est temporaire et ne doit avoir pour but que le maintien de l'ordre.

(c.) Elle est incompatible, dans sa forme actuelle, avec le retour de l'ordre et de la tranquillité dont les populations, menacées par la famine, ont grand besoin.

2. La Commission estime :

(a.) Que, si l'occupation militaire du pays ne doit avoir pour but que le maintien de la sécurité et de l'ordre public, cette occupation ne doit pas être confiée aux troupes grecques, mais aux troupes alliées sous l'autorité du commandement supérieur allié en Asie Mineure ;

(b.) Que l'occupation par les Grecs seuls ne doit être maintenue que si la Conférence de la Paix est résolue à prononcer l'annexion complète et définitive du pays à la Grèce.

Dans ce cas, la liberté d'action devra être laissée au commandement grec vis-à-vis des forces turques.

(c.) Que l'annexion pure et simple, envisagée ci-dessus, serait contraire au principe proclamant le respect des nationalités, car, dans la région occupée, en dehors de la ville même de Smyrne et d'Aivali, la prédominance de l'élément turc sur l'élément grec est incontestable.

Il est du devoir de la Commission de faire remarquer que le sentiment national turc, qui a déjà manifesté sa résistance, n'acceptera pas cette annexion. Il ne cédera qu'à la force, c'est-à-dire devant une expédition militaire, que la Grèce seule ne pourrait conduire avec quelque chance de succès.

3. Dans ces conditions, la Commission propose les mesures suivantes :

(a.) Faire relever, le plus tôt possible, tout ou partie des troupes grecques par des troupes alliées beaucoup moins nombreuses.

(b.) Si, pour sauvegarder l'amour-propre grec, il est décidé qu'une partie des troupes grecques coopéreront à l'occupation, répartir ces troupes à l'intérieur de la région occupée pour leur éviter tout contact direct avec les forces nationales turques.

(c.) Dès que l'occupation par les Alliés sera réalisée, exiger du Gouvernement turc la réorganisation de la gendarmerie, sous la direction et le commandement d'officiers interalliés.

Cette gendarmerie devra être mise, le plus tôt possible, en état d'assurer l'ordre dans toute la région et de remplacer dans ce but les détachements alliés.

(d.) En même temps que la réorganisation de la gendarmerie, le Gouvernement turc devra restaurer l'administration civile.

4. Les chefs du mouvement national ayant affirmé à plusieurs reprises que leur opposition n'est dirigée que contre les Grecs, les mesures proposées doivent leur enlever tout motif de résistance armée et rendre au Gouvernement central de Constantinople l'autorité qu'il n'a plus.

Rien ne devra plus empêcher le licenciement des troupes irrégulières.

Dans le cas contraire, l'Entente saura enfin le cas qu'elle peut faire des protestations de loyalisme faites par les Turcs, soit par les chefs du mouvement national, soit par les membres du Gouvernement.

Les membres de la Commission :

L'Amiral Bristol, Délégué des États-Unis d'Amérique.
Le Général Bunoust, Délégué de la France.
Le Général Hare, Délégué de la Grande-Bretagne.
Le Général Dall'Olio, Délégué de l'Italie.

Constantinople, le 13 octobre 1919.

[146646]

No. 138.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 1935.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 20, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter, dated the 14th October, which I have received from my representative at Smyrna, relative to the activity of the Italians in Smyrna and its environs.

2. I would invite the particular attention of your Lordship to this report, in that it emphasises once again the desirability of the early withdrawal from Asia Minor of both the Greek and Italian troops (as set out in my telegram No. 1831 of the 17th September and in my despatch No. 1785 of the 1st October).

3. Their presence in these regions cannot possibly be claimed to be conducive to law and order, but has shown itself to be the exact opposite.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

[1355]

2 P

Enclosure in No. 138.

Representative of British High Commissioner, Smyrna and Aidin Vilayet, to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

(No. 272.)

October 14, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to report that Italian activity, whether military, naval, political, commercial, social, or otherwise, is making itself quite noticeable in this town and district.

Some of this activity may be attributed to the fact that they want to create or make a pretence of creating a large stake in the country in order to bargain subsequently in case some other Power is confirmed in the possession of Smyrna.

Their methods and their way of acting are very little removed from those of the Greeks, who are the more irritated against them in that they recognise in them adversaries of the same mentality.

There is no doubt that the decision to allow the Greeks to land in Smyrna was most distasteful to the Italians, and although they no doubt had to consent to it in Paris, they have worked actively against the Greeks within and without the Greek zone ever since.

In the Greek zone they are quick to seize upon any attempt on the part of the Greeks to assert authority, and outside the zone there is little doubt that they keep the Turks informed of what is going on at Paris and here and encouraging them in their resistance against the Greeks. The deplorable conditions of the Aidin Railway and the districts adjoining it are due almost as much to Italian intrigue as to Greek disobedience.

That the Italians have become the carriers of the German and Austrian trade and that they readily lend themselves to be channels for Austrian and German penetration again into Turkey seems to be undoubted. By taking possession of all the best ports in the Adriatic and by seizing what was before the war the finest shipping line in the Near East, namely, the Austrian Lloyd, the Italians have obtained a preponderating influence in local commercial maritime affairs. The former offices of the Austrian Lloyd have been converted into those of the Lloyd Triestino, and the goodwill of the Austrian Company has passed to the Italian one.

In addition to acquiring the Austrian Lloyd steamers and connection, the Italians run the following lines of their own: Servizi Marittimi, Puglia, Marittima Italiana, Lloyd Sabaudo.

Banking.—Previous to the war, the Italians had no bank in Smyrna, and have now acquired the Hungarian Bank with its goodwill, and have turned it into the Banco di Roma. How far the Banco di Roma will be a cloak for Austrian or German finance remains to be seen.

Schools, Churches, Hospitals.—One of the most prominent buildings of the town is the Italian School, which existed before the war, and is the finest school building in the town. Since the Armistice, the Italians have taken under their protection an Austrian Church and the Austrian Hospital, much to the displeasure of the French delegate, who claims that all churches, hospitals, &c., in the Near East should be of French protection. The French delegate has succeeded in having a French flag hoisted along with the Italian over the former Austrian hospital, and on the day when a memorial service was held in the former Austrian Church was unable to attend through a diplomatic illness.

The Italians had no hospital in Smyrna before the war.

A new feature is the opening of an Italian Red Cross Delegation in Smyrna and the establishment of Italian dispensaries in various parts of the town where free drugs are dispensed and relief given. A good deal of this medical propaganda is done in the Moslem quarters. The opening of the Italian Red Cross establishment is undoubtedly a counterblast to the establishment, previous to the Greek landing, of Greek Red Cross missions in various parts of the country. These missions were looked on with great suspicion by the Turks, and presumably by the Italians, who did not let slip any opportunity of following up any Greek move by a countermove.

Boy Scouts.—Following on the establishment of Greek boy scouts, the Italians also formed an Italian Boy Scout Corps. French, Armenian, and Jewish boy scouts soon followed suit.

Italian Protection.—Since the day of the Greek landing, the Italian delegate has issued hundreds of papers of Italian protection to Moslems in this town, and also to Armenians, Jews, and a few Greeks. Any Moslem with the slightest pretension to having any connection with Italy or Tripoli, or even with the Italian "zone"

in Asia Minor, can obtain without the slightest difficulty a paper of Italian protection. No previous residence is needed, nor is it thought necessary to await the annexation of the Italian zone in Asia Minor in order to convert Moslems who were born there but are now resident in Smyrna into Italian citizens. The Greeks undoubtedly feel very sore at the Italian pretension that these papers of special protection have any value, but as the Greek in Egypt or in Asia Minor or Macedonia finds little difficulty in issuing papers of Greek nationality to any Greek-speaking Christian, he can have little to complain of in the Italian action in this matter.

As regards Armenians, the Italians, like the French and ourselves, issue to them papers of special protection, but a fee is payable by Armenians who obtain such papers from the French or Italians, whereas we deliver these papers gratis. This practice should, I think, be altered.

Italian Naval and Military Forces.—Since and before the Greek landing, the Italians have always kept at least one of their largest naval units in Smyrna, and the number of their military officers and private soldiers is out of proportion to any work that has to be done there. I am informed that a short time ago a number of Italian soldiers marched through the main streets of the town carrying a large Italian flag inscribed "Vivi Italia ed Asia Minore!"

Newspapers.—Before the war, there was no Italian newspaper. Now a special propaganda newspaper called the "Levant" has been started by them. A propaganda bureau has been started in the Parallèle Street, Smyrna.

Italians and Greeks.—Both these nations, recognising each other as enemies, spend a good deal of time in spying on one another, and in bringing to the notice of others the delinquencies of the other or the attempts of the other party to obtain any form of advantage. At the same time both parties realise that they can exploit their enmity to obtain from the other Powers concessions in order to prevent them coming to open conflict, which would be, perhaps, the best solution of Greco-Italian rivalry in Asia Minor and would not be an unmixed evil.

Italians and Turks.—The Italians are, in my opinion, very afraid of the Turks, and realise that they are dependent on Turkish favour and goodwill for remaining in the Italian zone. On this account they allow the Turk a free hand in their zone, and also actively help him in order to curry favour with him. It would, perhaps, be an evil day for the Italians if the Turks were to carry out their threat of driving the Greeks out of Smyrna, because the Turk would then probably turn on the Italian and drive him out of Scalanova and Adalia.

JAMES MORGAN.

[146648]

No. 139.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 1938.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 18, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a report from Captain Perring, my representative at Samsoun, concerning the conditions prevailing in that area.

2. I do not agree with his opinion, as expressed in paragraph 2, as to the movement originating with Enver; other reports rather go to show that Mustapha Kemal has no dealings with him whatever.

3. I have approved paragraph 5.

4. I fully concur with paragraph 6. There is no doubt that in the early days of the armistice small detachments, had they been available, might have been sent into the interior with perfect safety, but the situation now is completely reversed, and detachments would undoubtedly be attacked. The withdrawal of the Samsoun force has, of course, been made the most of by Mustapha Kemal.

5. I also have the honour to put forward herewith a translation of a message, dated the 25th September, sent by Mustapha Kemal to Brigadier-General Solly Flood (who General Milne recently despatched to Easki-Shehir) for transmission to me.

6. The threat against foreigners, which may possibly have been suggested by Major Noel's misunderstood activities, is noteworthy, as also is the distinction drawn between the sectional nature of the Erzeroum Congress and the national character of that at Sivas.

[1356]

2 P 2

7. I would further draw the attention of your Lordship to the mention of European Turkey in the title at the foot of the document.

I have, &c.
(For the High Commissioner),
RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure 1 in No. 139.

Captain Perring to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

Sir,

Samsoun, October 1, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Mustapha Kemal movement has now completed its organisation in the eastern vilayets and the movement is spreading rapidly west—viz., the adhesion of the Castemouni, Angora vilayets. At the present moment order and security are better than under the administration of the Central Government, and, with the exception of several small incidents, which have greatly alarmed the Christian communities, the whole of the Samsoun district is calm and awaiting events.

2. I beg to express the opinion that the whole movement originates with Enver Pasha, whose presence in the Caucasus there can be very little doubt of, and his appearance at the head of the present organisation is openly talked of.

3. I beg to point out that in all Mustapha Kemal's proclamations no real guarantee is given for the safety of the Christian; he states all have equal rights, irrespective of race or religion, provided they do not do anything against the interests of the movement. Already several extensive searches have been made for arms in Christian houses. A great danger will immediately arise should any incident occur, and, as no Allied military force is available, there would be no means of checking or stopping massacring should any incident occur. Even the visit of a single Greek officer could be sufficient to cause a general outbreak, the Moslem being extremely bitter against the Greek; this is greatly owing to the late Archbishop's attitude and, of course, the occupation of Smyrna; also a spirit of revenge for the Greek welcome to Allied representatives.

4. The military forces at Mustapha's disposal consist of all regular and irregular troops without exception; they are well fed, better clothed, and are paid regularly. Officers are available and are busy training their units, inspecting arms in villages, arranging ammunition supplies, and proceeding very cautiously with mobilisation of all males of the ages 20 to 37. Orders have already been issued that no passes are to be granted to leave the Samsoun area by sea to any male, Christian or otherwise, of military age. In view of this order I have arranged to send away in small parties as many Christians of military age as possible, I also propose to continue sending back to Novorossisk the remaining Greek refugees from that district, there being no prospect of their being able to proceed to their villages nor can they earn a living. Their presence at Samsoun, in view of the continuous stream of refugees from the interior, will be a great danger.

5. Restitution of property, &c., is now completely out of the question, and any attempt to restore properties would only further excite the Turk; I therefore beg to propose that I be authorised to leave this work in abeyance.

6. The presence of any small or detached military force would be a further source of danger, and unless backed up by reinforcements very quickly (which is almost an impossibility) would be almost certain of being attacked, especially since the withdrawal of the British troops at Samsoun.

I have, &c.

J. S. PERRING, Lieutenant, R.O.,
1st Suffolk Regiment.

Enclosure 2 in No. 139.

Mustapha Kemal to General Solly Flood.

To be forwarded to the British High (Extraordinary) Commissioner at Constantinople.

Sivas, September 25, 1919 (1335).

THE proclamations of the congresses convoked in Erzeroum in the name of Eastern Anatolia, and in Sivas in the name of the whole Ottoman fatherland, dated

respectively the 7th September, 1919 (1335), and the 11th September, 1919 (1335), the nation wishes publicly to make known to the world their lawful purpose which led to the present unity and organisation; also their fellow-feeling of patriotism which they maintain towards the non-Moslem elements.

2. Although complete peace prevails in the whole Ottoman fatherland, inasmuch as without any distinction of religion or nationality the protection of personal freedom is being maintained, we are informed that some ill-wishers are trying to attribute the movement which has sprung up from the national conscience to a movement against the non-Moslem elements.

3. On the 18th September, 1919 (1335), circular notes informed all the vilayets and dependent sub-provinces that every subject of His Majesty possesses the same rights; also strangers in our country must be objects of Ottoman hospitality, provided that they are not discovered in any action against our country and our nation.

4. The present demand of the nation is that, instead of the Ferid Pasha Cabinet, whose acts of treachery to the country have been asserted, a lawful and trustworthy Cabinet which complies with the national wishes should come to power.

5. Therefore I beg to state and confirm the maintenance of peace existing in our country, and the safety of our non-Moslem comrades who are protected against any kind of attack.

I remain, &c.

(On behalf of the Representative Committee for protecting
the rights of European and Asiatic Turkey),
MUSTAPHA KEMAL.

[146649]

No. 140.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 1939. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 18, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an account of a conversation which took place here recently between Mr. Hobler and Brigadier-General McCoy, who is Chief of the Staff to General Harbord. (The mission of the latter has now come to an end, and General Harbord is returning to Paris and Washington to make his report.)

2. The interview was fortunate, as General McCoy is an eminently sound and sensible man, and able to take a somewhat larger view than the majority of his compatriots who visit the Near East. It is to be hoped that it will have the effect of removing several misconceptions, and especially with regard to Major Noel's activities, concerning which such an unfortunate and entirely erroneous idea has sprung up in the minds of Turks, Americans, and, I am afraid, Allies alike.

3. As giving some idea of the views held at the United States High Commission here, I enclose also an account of a conversation which recently took place between a British officer and Lieutenant R. Dunn, U.S.N., Intelligence Officer to Admiral Bristol.

4. It seems hopeless to try and refute the arguments, or rather the definite and fixed opinions, of so many Americans concerning our political activities and our propaganda out here. As your Lordship is aware, England is practically the only nation which has kept aloof from all the intrigues which are going on in this country, and which has refused all overtures of friendliness on the part of the Turks, no matter what may be their political complexion.

5. As a result, we are credited with some deep and mysterious policy which it seems to be the endeavour of everyone to ascertain. Consequently, when some slight occurrence takes place, such as the Noel incident at Malatia, everyone at once reads into it just the explanation of our conduct which they want to prove. The result is sometimes diverting, but always wholly erroneous, for the simple reason that the policy, other than our avowed one of complete non-interference, is of course non-existent.

6. The fraternisation with the Turks, which is now so much on the increase, is naturally having a very bad effect. A recent alleged interview with Mrs. Bristol, wife of Admiral Bristol, of which I enclose a copy, is a case in point. I understand that Mrs. Bristol denies the interview, but no denial has been published, and of course the Turks firmly believe the protestations of friendship therein expressed, to the no small alarm of the native Christian committees.

7. Again, the Americans, as your Lordship is aware, publish an uncensored copy of all wireless press news received by them; though, in view of Foreign Office despatch

No. 601 of the 8th October, it is difficult to say whence these messages emanate. I attach a page of this news, including a very unfriendly and, of course, wholly erroneous statement concerning British activities in stirring up strife in the interior. The news presumably comes from some irresponsible wireless station, but an unfortunate effect is produced by the fact that the publication has an official heading, i.e., United States Navy Radio Press.

8. I do not think the Americans are following any definitive line out here at present, but, as individuals, they take colour from their surroundings. Very few of them have any previous knowledge of the Near East, of the Committee of Union and Progress, or of the political history of the past ten years. In fact, they are "green," easy for the Nationalists to spoon-feed, and ready to rise to such catchwords as independence and self-determination.

9. A certain number, chiefly trade representatives, some missionaries and young officers, desire to see an American mandate over the whole of Turkey, for the respective purposes of money, security and progress, and Imperialism.

10. The American journalist is, of course, a law unto himself, out for sensation, and with a very superficial judgment of, or regard for, facts. Their utterances are taken very seriously by the Nationalists, and one individual of this breed recently persuaded the Sivas Conference that the Nationalist movement was wholly patriotic, and had the complete endorsement of everyone except England.

11. The anti-British colour shown is really more a reflection of Nationalist ideas than anything else, though there is, of course, a certain amount of hereditary jealousy. I am inclined to think that, in a good many cases, though the voice may have a strong Yankee twang, yet the sentiments are those of Mustapha Kemal and his party. The opportunity of giving another twist to the British lion's tail is, in fact, too good to be missed.

I have, &c.
(For the High Commissioner),
RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure 1 in No. 140.

An Account of a Conversation between Mr. Hohler and Brigadier-General McCoy.

GENERAL MCCOY, second to General Harbord, came to see me this morning. He is of the regular United States army and is an old friend of mine from Mexico and Washington.

His journey is accurately described in the annexed extract from the "Stamboul."

He said that he had been very agreeably surprised by the tranquillity—apparent at all events—prevailing in the interior, but he attributed this tranquillity to that which had struck him above all during his journey, namely, the exhaustion of the Turkish people. There were really, he said, no men left. He had been prepared to find that the Christians had suffered greatly, but not to discover that the Turks had suffered quite as much or more. He had been favourably impressed with Mustapha Kemal, who had treated the expedition extremely well. The movement would never have taken place had it not been for the occupation of Smyrna, but, as it is, the people are all solid for Mustapha Kemal, though they do not want to be bothered, they want to be left alone and to rest, and it will be a long time before they are again in a position to raise their heads; at present they are "down and out." Mustapha Kemal had made every sort of eulogy of the Americans, just, said General McCoy, as a Mexican would whilst talking face to face with an American. But for the rest, he showed himself strongly anti-British, and complained bitterly of our encroachments. I asked what these were, and General McCoy said they were acts done after, and, the Pasha claimed, contrary, to the armistice; he mentioned specifically the Urfa region, the district north of Mossoul, and the efforts made to create an independent Kurdistan by certain British officers, who had been almost arrested at Malatia, Major Noel and Colonel Bell.

I was very glad of the opportunity thus presented to explain to the American general what had been up to the present the lines upon which this High Commissioner has been acting. I told him therefore that we were the last to have any objection to patriotism—a quality which he had been highly praising in Mustapha Kemal—but that experience showed that Turkish patriotism was different from any other, and was very apt—very unfortunately—to take the direction of wiping out Christians. In the course

of his remarks, he had said that there were very few Armenians left in the vilayets which were to form—according to the press—the new Armenia; only Kurds were left. We eagerly desired to see the remnant of the Armenians protected. But Mustapha Kemal had set himself up against the Central Government, having inherited the adherents, the organisation, and, I feared, also the spirit of the Committee, and it looked as if he hoped to establish himself somewhere in the interior where he was intangible, and whence he could direct all the proceedings of the regularly constituted Government, who would dance to his tune. The inconvenience of such methods were obvious, and we had represented it to His Majesty's Government, who had, nevertheless, issued instructions that we were in no way to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, even if such inaction were to result in the establishment of a direct Committee Government. This decision was undoubtedly wise, though there were many reasons also which counted in favour of assisting a Government such as that of Ferid Pasha, and hoped by peaceful methods to mitigate the decisions of the Peace Conference rather than to avert them by force, as appeared to be the idea of the, to me, almost mythical Mustapha Kemal. Mustapha need be under no fear as to our encroachments. Urfa and other towns had been occupied by us in strict conformity with the terms of the armistice, which allowed us to occupy places where danger to the Christians was apprehended. I had been here during the tragedies of 1895 and 1896, and again in 1909, and after such experiences I could not bring myself to trust Turks with Christians any more than a fox with geese, and it appeared to me that the Christians still alive in Anatolia existed by the sufferance and goodwill of Mustapha Kemal, and were in the position of new hostages in his hands for the benevolent behaviour of the Peace Conference towards Turkey.

The same observation applied in great part to the Mossoul district where the massacres of Nestorians and other Christian sects had been terrible, and there were some 30,000 to 40,000 Christian refugees whom we were still feeding and clothing until we could get such security as would permit of their being returned to their own districts in the Hekkari, &c. But I imagined that there was another perfectly legitimate factor at work. Whatever Power received the mandate of Mesopotamia, it was indispensable that that province should have a sound defensible frontier, and that could only be found in the mountains and not in the plain. This had already been proved by various raids from which we had suffered. I had no knowledge that His Majesty's Government contemplated the establishment of an independent Kurdistan, and if Major Noel and his Kurdish companions had been spreading propaganda (as the general had said) among the Kurdish tribes in that sense, it was entirely unauthorised so far as this High Commission was concerned. The Kurdish chiefs had only been allowed to go south in order that they might use their influence for the preservation of order, and they had given their word before starting that they would not engage in any form of intrigue or hostility, either against the Turkish Government or against Mustapha Kemal, whom they appeared to regard as their great enemy. It would appear that Major Noel had been carried away by his infatuation for the Kurds, whose apostle he had become. He seemed to think they were the incarnation of all the manly virtues and could do no wrong. He had been recalled and would shortly be arriving here. I regretted that the general was leaving so soon as to make a meeting impossible. But the sole efforts of His Majesty's Government at the present time were directed to the maintenance of order and the protection of the Christians; not that I would admit that we had any greater responsibility in this matter than any other Power, but it was one to which very great attention and importance was lent in England.

As to the Urfa district, I understood we were already handing over all that region to French control.

I repeated that we were entirely prepared to treat with Mustapha Kemal or any other person who might be called to power; it was, as he had said, exactly like Mexico; no matter how many changes there might be in the individuals who were in authority, that was an internal matter, and did not concern us, we were ready to enter into good relations with any of them, only we expected them to safeguard British interests, but we also expected them to observe the armistice, which included the preservation of order, the most important part of which was the protection of the Christian populations.

October 14, 1919.

T. B. HOHLER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 140.

Extract from the "Stamboul" of October 13, 1919.

LA MISSION HARBORD. LE COLONEL HASKELL.

UNE personne de la suite du Général Harbord, rentré samedi de la Caucase, a fait les déclarations suivantes au Sabah.

La mission, partie de Constantinople le 7 septembre, visita Konia, Adana, Alep, Mardine, Diarbékir, Kharpout, Malatia et Sivas. Dans cette dernière ville, le Général Harbord reçut Mustapha Kémal Pacha. Il passa ensuite à Erzendjian, à Erzeroum et à Hassam Kalé.

Le 30 septembre, la mission parvenait à la frontière de l'Arménie, tandis que le chef de l'Etat-Major du Général Harbord partait d'Erzeroum à Bayezid, qu'un autre groupe allait à Oulou Kichla et un troisième à Amassia et, de là, à Trébizonde. Quant au général lui-même, franchissant la frontière arménienne, il allait visiter Sari-Kamiche, Kars, Echmiadsin. Le général fut reçu par le patriarche suprême de tous les Arméniens.

Le général passa ensuite à Erivan, capitale de l'Arménie, où il resta deux jours.

La mission se retrouva à Batoum, d'où elle est rentrée ici. Le général et sa suite resteront ici jusqu'à jeudi, date à laquelle aura lieu le départ pour Paris.

Une copie du rapport sera remise à la Conférence et une autre au Président Wilson.

Le Colonel Haskell, commissaire supérieur en Arménie, qui est également arrivé avant-hier, partira le même jour pour Paris afin de présenter son rapport à la Conférence. Après quoi il rentrera en Arménie.

Enclosure 3 in No. 140.

An After-dinner Conversation with an American Officer at Constantinople.

LIEUTENANT R. DUNN, United States Navy, dined with me on the evening of the 4th October. He is Intelligence Officer to the American High Commissioner at Constantinople. He had lately returned from Smyrna, having been with Admiral Bristol on the Commission of Enquiry and was keen and communicative on Turkish affairs generally. To my knowledge, since he has held his present position at Constantinople, he has, other than his five weeks' stay at Smyrna on duties with the Commission, visited Tiflis, Trebizonde, and Samsoun, via Batoum, to which port he made the voyage in H.M.S. "Gardenia." He arrived in Turkey about February of this year, and it is his first visit, and his only knowledge of Turkey and the East, as far as I am aware.

According to him, the American opinion of the Smyrna affair is that the Greeks' position and claims are untenable, as also is the position of the Italians, who, though on the same basis as the Greeks, have not sufficient forces to hold the Turks in check and are therefore, in these times of keener interest, allowed to remain unmolested by the Turks.

The conversation naturally drifted to a wider basis and the Nationalist movement came to the forefront. The American authorities could see nothing but the "old intriguing policy in the present dealings with Turkey by Allied European Powers." Britain was not excluded from this general charge. The United States of America's policy was "to find the present Turkish opinion and adopt that as the policy of the future Government of Turkey." This they found in the Nationalist Party, which the British had done all in their power to suppress. That the British were opposed to the Nationalists was shown in their support of the previous Governments, some of whose members had even been nominated by the British authorities. The lack of success, or rather the feebleness of that Cabinet, had shown without doubt that the British were incapable of dealing with the present Turkish problem in the light of the new ideas. They were carrying on the intrigues of past years and, not only were they not attempting to solve a difficult problem, but were only engaged in furthering their own interests.

One of his duties is to read all the papers published in Constantinople. He remarked that the day after the fall of the Turco-British Cabinet, the only newspaper

that did not report it was the "Orient News." This led him to believe that the British were, as far as possible, trying to keep this "defeat" from their own people. When told that the "Orient News" was not published for local purposes but for the quicker publication of home news and the general entertainment of the British forces in Turkey, he remarked that it was stated, in large type, that the paper was "printed and published for the army of the Black Sea," and must therefore be considered published for propaganda purposes.

Reiterating the fact of British intrigue so often, I asked him to give me a case within his knowledge. He then told me of a visit to Malatia of a Major Noel, who was accompanied by some well-known Kurds. Major Noel, he asserted, was sent to stir up the Kurds against the Turks in order to push our Mesopotamian boundary further north. About this incident, the Americans had at least three, if not four, absolutely different sources of information which confirmed each other. He gave me three. The first, "certainly only one of our missionaries, but he was a nice old chap, who could be relied on." This missionary had asked what could be the idea of the British in deliberately stirring up trouble between the Kurds and the Turks. The second was the evidence of a "major" of the United States Relief Committee, and the third was an intercepted telegram from Major Noel to the High Commissioner handed to the Americans by the Nationalists, in which Major Noel complains that he did not know that the Kurds accompanying him were liable to arrest. They had been arrested and requested instructions. Lieutenant Dunn did not know if this telegram was in code or not. At all events, it was concluded that the telegram confirmed the other two points of information and he had reported to America this case of British intrigue, while stating that the telegram might be a forgery. He appealed to me for the true reason of Major Noel's visit to Malatia. I suggested that, as they had so thoroughly made up their minds as to the reason that they would probably not believe anything to the contrary whatever was told them. I also suggested that Admiral Bristol might take the intercepted telegram to the British High Commissioner. He, however, was certain that Admiral Bristol would not do this and begged me to find out personally.

The Americans, he states, receive information from all sources and listen to everybody, but anything in the nature of complaints from the Turks about the Allies they dismiss immediately.

He persisted in America's disinterestedness in Turkish affairs and was sure that she would not accept a mandate for Armenia alone. Even if the territory round Constantinople were also offered, she would refuse. To accept a mandate for Turkey minus the Smyrna vilayet in control of the Greeks and the Adalia district in control of the Italians would be madness. Even the attempt to conciliate British and French interests in Syria was considered a wrong policy. The British claims to Mesopotamia and Palestine were reluctantly recognised, but anything beyond this was considered an unnecessary partition of Turkey, and would not satisfactorily settle the Turkish question. America would accept, although even this would be difficult to persuade their people in America, a mandate for the whole of Turkey ex Mesopotamia (not including the British attempted "bulge") and Palestine.

American authorities in Constantinople did not think that Turkey should be allowed to govern herself as in pre-war days, but the French had already declared for this policy, seeing they could not get anything better from the alteration. I could not discover whether he had obtained this information from the local French official sources, or whether only from reading the French newspapers.

Whatever task America undertook in Turkey would be for the good of Turkey and the Turks, without thinking of their self-interests, but they must be given at least a chance of success. The Nationalists represented the Turkish opinion and included the best brains of the country. The basis of the Nationalist party may or may not be the organisation of the old Committee of Union and Progress, but, as the only possible British objection to the Committee of Union and Progress was its support of the Germans, all further opposition was unnecessary owing to the present impotence of Germany for harm. I asked whether even the American Relief Committee were as disinterested as, he asserted, was the American Government. He admitted that a few of that body may be commercially interested, but in the large majority of cases this was not so.

The British, he said, had made themselves thoroughly unpopular all over the East including Trans-Caucasus. Wherever the Americans went, they were asked to accept the mandate. British policy in the East was a failure proved by the discontent shown

by the recent risings in Egypt, which had been under her guardianship for so long a time.

In the course of our conversation, Lieutenant Dunn remarked that the new British High Commissioner was anti-Turk.

I met Lieutenant Dunn at the club the next day. He "rushed" at me and asked me if he had been rude to the British in his conversation the previous evening, as he could not remember all that had occurred. I answered him in the negative.

Enclosure 4 in No. 140.

Extract from the "Entente" of October 15, 1919.

LES TURCS ET MME. BRISTOL.

DU correspondant à Smyrne du "Yéni-Güne":

Mme. Bristol avait accompagné à Smyrne, à bord du yacht "Scorpion," son mari l'amiral, l'un des commissaires de l'Entente pour les méfaits commis durant l'occupation hellénique.

Elle a visité les lieux les plus remarquables, exprimant en outre le désir de se rencontrer avec quelques dames musulmanes appartenant à la meilleure société de Smyrne.

Tandis que, au moment où le départ de la commission était décidé, nous nous entretenions avec Mme. Bristol dans un terrain de tennis proche de la Pounta, une personne présente voulut connaître ses impressions sur son séjour dans notre pays. Elle répondit:

"Je ne puis nier que, tandis que je me trouvais en Amérique, je m'étais laissée prendre à différentes opinions fausses et désavantageuses qui avaient cours à l'endroit de votre pays. En effet, comme conséquence de nombre de suggestions produites au cours de la guerre, des convictions très graves pour la Turquie, et surtout pour les Turcs, s'étaient accréditées.

"C'est seulement en parcourant la Turquie avec mon mari et en m'initiant aux opinions recueillies par lui du fait de ses fonctions que je suis restée persuadée que notre opinion publique avait été influencée par les propagandes se donnant libre cours dans notre pays. Une différence profonde existe entre les témoignages recueillis personnellement par mon mari et les rumeurs répandues là-bas sur votre compte. Et même l'une des choses qui ont contribué le plus à me faire accompagner mon mari, ce sont ces déclarations au sujet de l'Orient et des Turcs. Je suis venue à Constantinople avec lui à l'effet de me trouver personnellement en contact avec les Turcs, au sujet desquels on pensait tant de choses inexactes; c'est pour cela que je l'ai accompagné jusqu'en Arménie. Complètement d'accord avec mon mari sur ses impressions, je puis dire que les Turcs sont le joyau de l'Orient. Ils ont un tel fonds de noblesse qu'il n'est pas possible de ne pas les aimer.

"J'ai connu à Constantinople nombre de dames turques. Ici même, je me suis trouvée en rapport avec quelques jeunes demoiselles turques. J'ai vu chez toutes une grande affabilité, une préoccupation du moment, une participation étroite et sincère aux besoins. Il y en a parmi elles qui parlent anglais. Initiée à leurs vœux simples et sincères, j'ai confirmé mon mari dans ses convictions. Par mes rapports avec les familles étrangères d'ici, j'ai constaté qu'elles étaient du même avis que moi et cela m'a consolidée dans mon opinion.

"Je suis très heureuse d'avoir ainsi connu dument les Turcs. Mon opinion n'est pas d'accord avec les attitudes contraires et persistantes de votre Gouvernement.

"Et vous trouverez cela très naturel."

Enclosure 5 in No. 140.

Extract from United States Radio Press, Constantinople, Turkey, October 15, 1919.

THE NATIONALIST PARTY IN TURKEY.

MUSTAPHA KEMAL said:—

"The Nationalist party recognised the necessity of the aid of an impartial foreign country. It is our aim to secure the development of Turkey as she stood at the armistice. We have no expansionist plans, but it is our conviction that Turkey can be made a rich and prosperous country if she can get a good Government. Our Government has become weakened through foreign interference and intrigues. After all our experience, we are sure that America is the only country able to help us. We guarantee no new Turkish violences against the Armenians will take place.

"It is untrue that we are working with Edver Pasha. We believe his policies injured Turkey. We do not know his whereabouts. It is rumoured that he is with the Russian Bolsheviks. I saw a letter wherein he stated that he was going to form an independent Turkish Government, possibly at Azerbaidjan. It is untrue that the Nationalists are supported by Anglo-French capitalists, seeking to preserve their interests in Turkey.

"British money is spent here to destroy Turkey. We are aware that the British gave 150,000L to Adeel Bey, ex-President of the Association of Turkish Friends in England, 200,000L to the Governor of Konia, perhaps a larger sum to the Governor of Angora."

Reouf Bey, ex-Minister of Marine, and known in the United States, speaking of the English, said, "America is our only hope, otherwise we fight it out." The Nationalists claim the control of 40,000 troops, but others say it is improbable.

Harbord's progress was facilitated by the posts of the American Commission for the Relief of the New East, whose agents, frequently women, are courageously occupying dangerous isolated positions, doing what Harbord termed civilising work under nearly hopeless conditions. They are conducting schools, hospitals, workrooms, caring for thousands of orphans and widows. The crops of the interior reported in fair condition for the winter, but the country is suffering from the lack of a stable Government. The people need soap, medicine, and clothing. It is estimated that at Kharput 70 per cent. of the young men are missing.

[147559]

No. 141.

Earl Curzon to Viscount Grey.

(No. 681.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 30, 1919.

THE United States Ambassador called upon me this afternoon, in order to make representations with regard to a case in which his Government took a keen interest, and concerning which they had received a reply from the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office that did not altogether satisfy them.

The case arose out of the claim of certain American geologists (as they were called by the Ambassador) representing the Standard Oil Company, who, being in possession of a concession from the Turkish Government for the exploitation of certain oil-producing areas in Palestine, had gone to Jerusalem with a view of inspecting their properties, but who had been denied by the British authorities any opportunity of carrying out their task. The defence had been made by the Foreign Office that, pending the grant of a mandate, all such proceedings had been impartially vetoed by His Majesty's Government, who felt that they had no right to anticipate a decision which might compromise the ultimate mandatory, whoever that might be; and which, further, might be a source of trouble in the country itself while it remained under a military administration.

The Ambassador read to me a long and rather argumentative statement from his Government, which did not seem to carry much conviction to his own mind, but which, he apparently felt, compelled him to reopen the case. He argued as though it would

[1356]

2 Q 2

be safe to proceed upon the hypothesis that the mandate, if not already given, would presently be given to Great Britain.

To this I replied that, so far as my recollection extended, though there had been a certain classification of different forms of mandate drawn up by Lord Milner's Commission in Paris, the French had hitherto refused to agree to the grant of any particular form of mandate with regard to any part of the Turkish dominions.

Mr. Davis then sought to establish a distinction between investigation and operation. He contended that it might be possible to allow a concessionaire at least to investigate upon the spot the nature of the concession which he had obtained, without taking any practical steps to carry it into effect.

I said that, though this was a logical, I did not think that, in practice, it would be a very helpful distinction. A permission given in one case would have to be given in others; there were doubtless scores of concessionaires who held, in differing degrees, concessions from the Turkish Government—with whom, I reminded him, Great Britain was still at war—and I could not imagine anything more unfortunate than to have Palestine overrun by groups of persons of different nationalities, endeavouring to ascertain what their concessions—the legal status of which had not yet been determined—were likely to be worth. I promised, however, to look into the matter myself, and to let him have a reply.

I then took advantage of the presence of Mr. Davis to tell him, not in the form of an official protest, but as a fact of which I thought that in fairness I ought to make him aware, that I had good reason to believe that the United States High Commissioner in Constantinople, Admiral Bristol, was inspired by no very friendly feelings towards Great Britain, and was continually suspecting, and sometimes openly accusing, us of dark and sinister intrigues for which there was not a vestige of foundation. Not only had we evidence that Admiral Bristol had openly spoken to this effect in recent discussions in Smyrna, but I had an abundance of testimony from independent quarters that his whole action was characterised by a similar suspicion. This, I said, seemed to me to be a very unjustifiable attitude for the Admiral to adopt. Amongst the various parties who were figuring upon the international stage in Constantinople and Asia Minor, there was, I said, none less anxious to get any individual advantage out of the situation or more sincerely desirous to be quit of responsibility than the British. Our evacuation of the Caucasus; our retirement from Trebizond and Samsun; our reluctance to let our forces play any compromising part in Asia Minor; our well-known intention not to take a mandate for any of those regions; and the sincerity and consistency with which we had advocated, and were still prepared to support, an American mandate should alone have been sufficient to protect us from the kind of insinuation in which Admiral Bristol appeared constantly to indulge. I should have thought that a satisfactory solution, already very problematical, could only be retarded, and might indeed be eventually prevented, by disagreement between the Americans and ourselves. It was not for me to make any suggestion, still less did I desire to make an official complaint, to the Ambassador, but if he felt disposed to take any informal steps to moderate the attitude of Admiral Bristol, I thought that some good might be done.

While I was speaking to the Ambassador there was handed to me the telegram which your Excellency had sent, recording your conversation with Mr. Lansing about the possibility of hurrying on the negotiations as to the Turkish Peace Treaty. I said to the Ambassador that, as Mr. Lansing had suggested that, in the interests of the debate in the Senate and of the ratification by the United States of the Peace Treaty with Germany, it might be desirable to postpone the Turkish negotiations for another ten days, we should of course do nothing that would at all complicate the situation in America.

Mr. Davis said that he saw no reason why, if we so desired, we should not at once enquire among our Allies whether they would be willing to consider the early resumption of negotiations on that aspect of the general peace, of the desirability, and indeed the necessity, of which he was as much convinced as we were; and, although he knew that Mr. Polk was anxious to return to the United States to spend Christmas with his family, he did not think that, if he were pressed to stay, there would be any insuperable obstacle to his taking part in the negotiations, whether they were conducted here or at Paris.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[147731]

No. 142.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 508.)

My Lord,

Ramleh, October 16, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1340 of the 8th September, 1919, I have the honour to inform you that recent reports from the British agent at Jeddah, as well as the tone of telegrams from King Hussein himself, make it appear possible that the latter may announce his resignation at any time, and perhaps without giving Colonel Vickery notice of his intentions. However this may be it would obviously be advantageous to establish the King's successor with as little delay as possible, in order to avoid an interregnum which might lead to anarchy, or even civil war. Colonel Vickery would therefore be glad of any general instructions which could be issued for his guidance.

Emir Abdullah would be the most suitable successor. He is not fanatical, will listen to advice, is progressive and pro-British in his ideas. He has considerable diplomatic ability, learnt from long intercourse with the Turks, and this, added to his personal popularity both in British and native circles, should enable him to establish himself without difficulty. He would also probably be able to persuade his father to nominate him to the exclusion of his elder brother the Emir Ali, who is childish, incompetent, fanatical, and weak, and therefore not a serious rival.

In the event of King Hussein nominating Emir Abdullah, it may be anticipated that the latter will before accepting responsibility ask the British agent the extent of the support, moral and material, which His Majesty's Government will be prepared to give him.

As regards moral support, he will probably demand the maintenance at Jeddah of a senior British official who will act as his intermediary with His Majesty's Government, and whose views will carry the necessary weight. I understand that the King and the Emir Abdullah would view with apprehension the re-establishment of a simple consulate at Jeddah in place of the present agency. If the agency as such ceases to exist, I suggest that the consulate might be placed in charge of a senior official with experience of Arabian political affairs, who would be appointed temporarily as British consul, and be assisted in his consular duties by a junior official of the Consular Service, but would perform the duties of a British agent.

Emir Abdullah would rely largely on His Majesty's Government for material support to secure his position in the Hedjaz, and is certain to ask for a statement from His Majesty's Government as to the maintenance of the subsidy after December 1919, and he may submit proposals for a loan to the Hedjaz to supplement his reduced subsidy. I do not suppose it is possible to make any definite statement on this subject at the present stage, but should His Majesty's Government's future policy with Arabian rulers favour the continuance of the principle of subsidies and stipends which is the feature of the truce treaties, and of the arrangements concluded with the chiefs such as the Abdali Sultan and the Sultan of Lahaj, we should presumably have to give marked preferential treatment to the ruler of Mecca. Any indication which could be given of our policy in this respect would undoubtedly do much to enable the King's successor to make good.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY.

[148099]

No. 143.

Mr. Davis to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 3.)

My dear Lord Curzon,

American Embassy, London, October 31, 1919.

IN the matter of our conversation of yesterday, I have just received a despatch from the State Department saying that it is informed by the Standard Oil Company of New York that a representative sent to Bagdad to investigate petroleum conditions in Mesopotamia is forbidden to operate by British authorities while a geologist, probably employed by the Shell group, has been working in Mesopotamia for four months past. Naturally there is complaint, based upon the assertion that representatives of private American concerns are not being allowed equal privileges with those of British or other nationalities in Palestine, Mesopotamia, and the adjacent regions.

I am most anxious to forestall any misunderstanding to which these repeated charges of discrimination may give rise. May I therefore renew, entirely upon my own responsibility, the suggestion which I made during our conversation as to the propriety of drawing a line between operation and investigation, treating the former as including both the physical operation for oil—road-making, drilling, pipe-laying, &c.—and the procurement of concessions, which might well be prohibited pending the settlement of the political status of the occupied territories, and the latter as relating to geological inspection and survey which can in no way alter the *status quo*?

I quite appreciate the reasons which have actuated you in this matter, but offer for your consideration the possibility that the inconvenience which might arise upon the admission of these persons, if they should come in any appreciable number, is perhaps counterbalanced by the irritation which is being caused by their exclusion.

Believe me, &c.

JOHN W. DAVIS.

[146217]

No. 144.

Earl Curzon to Sir E. Croke.

(No. 7338.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 3, 1919.

I TRANSMIT herewith copy of a note on the subject of the International Commission of Enquiry into the events attending the Greek landing at Smyrna, left with Mr. Kidston on the 29th ultimo by the Greek Prime Minister.

M. Venizelos, who complained bitterly of the way in which the Greek army had been treated in this matter, stated that it was an insult to a friendly army which had fought alongside the Allied forces, and a denial of the most elementary principles of justice. He continued that it was entirely contrary to the whole conception of British fair play that any accused person should be condemned without having access to the evidence against him, and that he would be at a loss to explain to the Greek Parliament this monstrous travesty of justice. He was insisting to the Conference that a fresh enquiry must be made at which the Greek representative should have access to all the evidence.

On Mr. Kidston pointing out that this was a matter which solely concerned the Peace Conference in Paris, and that the Foreign Office had had nothing to do with their decision, he objected that the inception of the enquiry had been due in the first place to agitation in the press in this country, notably in the "Manchester Guardian," and to questions asked in Parliament. M. Venizelos anticipated that the matter might again be brought up in Parliament, and declared that he would resent any statement being made in Parliament based on the findings of the Commission, whose operation, he considered had been conducted in defiance of all principles of common justice and legality.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 144.

M. Venizelos to Earl Curzon.

M. VENIZELOS presents his compliments to Earl Curzon of Kedleston and following his letter of 16th October, has the honour to request his Lordship to take into consideration the following point:—

The President of the Peace Conference, in replying to the protest of M. Venizelos regarding the non-communication of the depositions of witnesses made to the Commission of Enquiry, has meanwhile kindly explained that, if the Commission of Enquiry was obliged to communicate to Colonel Mazarakis all the depositions collected after the instructions issued by the Supreme Council on the 30th September, the Commission remained bound by the engagements previously given to the witnesses that their depositions would not be communicated (to the Greek representative).

M. Venizelos is convinced that his Lordship will agree that such an interpretation of the instructions given by the Supreme Council cannot be admitted, as on the 30th September the work of the Commission was already accomplished and the

Commission was in the course of drawing up its report. Thus the instructions issued by the Supreme Council on the 30th September could not in any way affect the depositions of certain witnesses and would be void of all sense if they were not applied to all the depositions collected.

M. Venizelos has considered it necessary to draw the kind attention of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the preceding considerations in order to prove that the point of view taken by the Greek Government regarding the annulment of the conclusions arrived at by the Smyrna Commission of Enquiry is in no way affected by the new communication that the President of the Peace Conference has kindly made to him.

London, October 27, 1919.

[149750]

No. 145.

Sir M. Cheetham to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 526.)

My Lord,

Cairo, October 27, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 457 of the 22nd September, 1919, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a further report by Major H. Garland, M.B.E., M.C., dealing with the detention at Bajil of Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob's Mission to the Imam Yahya.

I have, &c.

M. CHEETHAM.

Enclosure in No. 145.

Note 2 on the Seizure of Colonel Jacob's Mission at Bajil.

(Compiled from reports from Hodeidah and other documents by Arab Bureau.)

THE following note has been compiled with a view to assisting the various Army Departments which will be concerned should it ultimately be necessary to take military action to secure the release of Colonel Jacob's Mission. It should be read in conjunction with the first note (dated the 18th September, 1919) on the subject.

Colonel Jacob and his companions have been incarcerated in the miserable little town of Bajil since the 20th August. Several letters and telegrams have been received from them, but, although the news of their health and safety is satisfactory, their liberation does not appear to be any more imminent than it did seven weeks ago.

In a somewhat pessimistic letter written on the 10th September Captain Nasr-uddin (the Indian political officer with Colonel Jacob) stated that the tribesmen were much disappointed at not finding, as they had expected, a large sum in gold amongst the property of the mission.

At the time Captain Nasr-uddin wrote the sheikhs were quite unable to settle any terms amongst themselves, though in the hints they occasionally let fall the evacuation of Hodeidah, the grant of stipends, arms and ammunition by His Majesty's Government, protection against the Imam, and confiscation of the mission's property, appeared to be some of the conditions which they were considering.

The execution of seven Arab prisoners taken in the attack on Hodeidah as a reprisal for mutilation of our wounded is said to have incensed the sheikhs, and to have rendered the safety of the mission precarious for a time. That the mission was not murdered as an act of retaliation was probably due solely to the influences of Chief Sheikh Abdul Hadi of the Qubrah and Seyyid Abdul Qadir of Marawa.

The negotiations have been rendered more difficult owing to a claim now made by the Abs tribe to joint ownership, with the Qubrah, of Hodeidah.

By the 13th September the Idrisi of Asir had heard of the fate of the mission. The Idrisi has looked with covetous eyes towards Hodeidah for a long time, and is very averse to it becoming the property of Imam Yahya. It has been suggested in some quarters that the Idrisi may have had some hand in the capture of the mission, but although he must naturally have felt suspicious and jealous when he heard that a British mission was visiting the Imam, any idea that he instigated its capture may be

dismissed, as such an act would be quite contrary to the scrupulously correct behaviour he has hitherto displayed towards His Majesty's Government and its representatives.

Writing on the 13th September, 1919, to an Indian political officer at Aden, Seyyid Mustafa, the Idrisi's cousin, stated that the Idrisi had received a disquieting report that a British mission had left Hodeidah for Sanaa with the object of making the Imam the ruler of all the Yemen, and had further heard of the arrest of the mission. The Idrisi hesitated to believe the story, and asked for information as to the purpose of the mission. Later he received a letter from Mohammed Zeid, one of the Qubrah sheikhs, who took a leading part in the seizure of the mission. He was entirely opposed to the ill-advised action of the Qubrah, and replied in that sense to Mohammed Zeid.

With regard to efforts made at Hodeidah towards obtaining the release of the mission, the political officer there reported on the 20th September that various attempts made by him to get into touch with the Qubrah and other local sheikhs had not been successful. Two prominent merchants in Bajil had been written to, and they had promised to use all their influence to secure the return of the mission to Hodeidah. Supplies had also been sent out to Bajil.

The efforts of the political officer, Hodeidah, had been supplementary to those of Colonel Jacob, who preferred to retain charge of the negotiations, and considered he should be consulted before any serious step was taken.

On the 20th September a letter was sent by the Political Resident, Aden, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, to Imam Yahya emphasising his responsibility for the safe return of Colonel Jacob and his party.

Mahmud Nadim was reported to have arrived at Bajil on the 19th September to open negotiations on behalf of the Imam.

On the 21st September Colonel Jacob got a letter through to Hodeidah. The following is an extract:—

"Received this day a letter from the Zaraniq tribe. It is over the seal of Sheikh Maaruf Munassar Saghair, but is clearly handiwork of Seyyid Ali Bari, who was here and saw all our letters to Qubrah sheikhs. In this letter they demand evacuation of Hodeidah, removal of Richardson, and opening up of the land routes to trade. They accuse me of deceit and prevarication. They assert that our object in sitting in Hodeidah and the aim of this mission to settle the affairs of the Arabs is not only an interference in matters which concern themselves alone, but further point to our desire to pinch the country. They will have no other ruler than the Turk. It is well known that the Zaraniqs were the most active enemies of the Turks during this war. It may be that all this bombast is the result of manifestos of the Imam and Mahmud Nadim. They think that we mean to hand the country over to the Imam, and have taken up the pose of pro-Turk. Mahmud Nadim is now here and is trying to patch up something. He is very bitter in his denunciations of Richardson, though probably without reason. The Qubrah sheikhs came to see me to-day, and said that their demands were the evacuation of Hodeidah and free trade by sea and land. They alleged that the trade route from Hodeidah to Murawa was closed, and of what use then to them was the raising of the blockade. They are writing again to the Zaraniq, &c., to cease raids on Hodeidah (for the Zaraniq in their letter threatened to start raiding as a religious duty), and in return for this action of theirs, they ask me to write to you to allow passage of food supplies by land. I think this is very essential at once, provided of course that no raiding takes place."

This is the first irruption of the Zaraniq tribesmen into the affair. Their entry can only have enhanced the difficulties in negotiation, increased the risk, and lengthened the term of the mission's imprisonment. They occupy Tihamah territory south of the Abs tribe. Their objection to Dr. Richardson is not explained, but he has since been relieved, and Major Meek of the Aden Political Staff is going to Hodeidah to replace him.

Major Meek will make fresh attempts to get into touch with the recalcitrant Qubrah and other chiefs. The negotiations have possibly hitherto failed because they were conducted by the chief prisoner, whose promises the sheikhs would hesitate to believe. Major Meek is also to furnish a report as to the practicability of utilising the services of the Idrisi. There is no doubt whatever that the Idrisi would joyfully accept the task of releasing the mission, and it is very likely that he would succeed in doing so without resort to force. He would, however, probably regard a request from us for such assistance as tantamount to a recognition of his suzerainty over the

Tihamah as far south as Hodeidah, and this would complicate matters. Nevertheless, our first concern is not the future welfare of the Yemen, but the liberation of the mission, and it is thought that any means which offer a possibility of securing it without military operations should be used. Colonel Jacob apparently still takes a zealous interest in the future welfare of the Yemen, regardless of his own, for in the last telegram received from him (4th October, 1919) he says:—

"I still think arrival of Turkish troops a *sine qua non*, as giving us time to work out a reasonable programme for future welfare of Yemen. Interesting telegrams have passed between Imam, Mahmud Nadim, and myself, and in the light of these he may favour the formation of a Shafei defensive combination, and so best secure that power which was maintained by Turks. I shall send full report by te'egraph as soon as possible, meanwhile I hasten to apprise His Majesty's Government of possibility of this solution, which would obviate necessity of using force from Hodeidah."

In a previous communication Colonel Jacob had mooted the sending back to Hodeidah of some Turkish troops, to whom we should hand over the town after release of the mission. This was suggested in order to support the Qubrah against the Imam, but the proposal has received no approval from either Aden or Egypt. To the Arab mind—and the whole of Arabia would quickly hear of the Turks' return—such an act would be an admission of defeat, whilst to the Turkish Nationalists it would be invaluable for propaganda purposes.

A proposal has also been made for aeroplanes to be sent to fly over Bajil. The utility of such an operation is not evident, and there is a possibility that the fear which the first sight of an aeroplane arouses in the Arab breast might result in untoward consequences for the mission. In any case, it could but be an expensive demonstration.

The situation at present may be summed up as follows:—

It has as yet been impossible to obtain from the Arabs any definite statement of the conditions under which they will set free the mission. Major Meek is to make a report on the possibility of securing its release through the good offices of the Idrisi or by other peaceful means. In the meantime the party is being treated satisfactorily, and supplies are getting to them from Hodeidah. The Imam is using his efforts through Mahmud Nadim, but there is probably little chance of success in that quarter.

If as a last resort military action has to be taken, it must be by British troops, and not by the Imam nor the Idrisi. Bajil being by road less than 40 miles from Hodeidah, it might be feasible to effect the release by a dashing raid of armoured cars, but there may be too much loose sand on the road for this. At present all higher opinion is against the employment of military force, and it is thought that the situation of the mission has not yet become sufficiently threatening to demand it.

Personalities.

Imam Yahya.—The Imam Yahya lays claim to the ownership of all those parts of the Yemen outside the Aden protectorate and Asir; indeed, he probably also includes these two districts in his aspirations. During the war he maintained a more than benevolent neutrality towards the Turks, and his true feelings towards us are not known even yet. Certain parts of the Yemen—notably, the Tihamah—were occupied by the Turks, and since their departure the Imam has endeavoured to extend and strengthen his influence over them. He sent friendly letters of welcome when he received intimation that His Majesty's Government wished to send a mission to his capital to discuss a future policy.

Events have proved, however, that in the future, as in the past, the Imam's influence is likely to be confined to the Zeidi districts—i.e., the highlands from the borders of Asir to those of the Aden hinterland, together with a part of the inner Central Tihamah.

The Idrisi of Asir.—The Idrisi is overlord of Asir, a portion of the Tihamah and the hinterland situated south of the Hejaz and north of the Yemen proper. Under the Turkish régime it was a sanjak (county) of the province of El Yemen, but during the war, under the Idrisi, it seceded from Ottoman rule. The boundaries of the Idrisi's territory are not yet fixed; his control at present stretches from south of Qunfudah to slightly north of Salif. His Majesty's Government has commitments with him, and he is very friendly disposed towards us, having taken the chance of revolting against the Turks at an early stage of the war.

The Yemen.

The Tihamah, which has to be crossed to reach Bajil, is a level plain with a slight rise inland. Bajil, nearly 40 miles by road from the coast, is only 600 feet above sea-level. The Tihamah is chiefly soft, sandy, sterile desert. Then follows the maritime range, which throws out low foot hills towards the coast and occasionally culminates in massifs rising to 5,000 feet above sea-level. Sanaa is on the Central Yemen plateau, with an altitude of about 7,600 feet.

The climate of the Yemen naturally varies greatly according to the altitude and the district. The coast is exceedingly damp, and this makes the excessive heat very trying. Heavy winds are prevalent from the sea, from north-west in summer and south-west in winter. Rain seldom reaches the coast. The maritime ranges have a feverish climate, with close, muggy nights, but as the higher elevations are approached further inland the climate becomes healthy and bracing. Winter fogs are very prevalent on the maritime range. This zone has two rainfalls—one in early spring, the other in late summer.

At Sanaa the weather is said to be cool and pleasant all the year round.

Route to Bajil from Hodeidah.—The road is said to be passable for artillery and light-wheeled transport. For the first mile the route traverses (north-north-east) a sandy plain, which gradually develops into sand dunes covered with bushes. There is grazing for camels and donkeys. The going is difficult in wet weather. At mile 5 and at mile 10 there is a small well with slightly saline water. At mile 12 the road winds through a belt of tall bush, following a watercourse, then through short scrub up a gentle rise to Tannan at mile 15.

Tannan is merely a collection of mud-huts forming a caravanserai for travellers. The water is unpalatable, but not injurious.

At mile 15½ north-east of Tannan is an ex-Turkish post to guard the telegraph line. From here the road makes a wide divergence to the north, and swings back to the east at mile 17. There is a gradual descent over sandy ground, and at mile 18 the route passes through a timber belt of mimosa over firm ground. At mile 20 there are wells, and no further sand is encountered. The road here debouches on to broad, open steppes, gently rising towards the east and covered with coarse grass, gradually yielding to cultivation at mile 26.

At mile 28 the crest is reached, and the route, still running east, descends and enters the Bajil plain at mile 30. Here the road follows a stony, wady bed (Wadi Karamiyah) in loamy, arable land, and enters Bajil at mile 32.

Bajil is a town of 3,000 inhabitants; it is dominated by low foot hills on the south. Water is obtained from a good well in the middle of the town. In ordinary times live-stock, poultry, grain, &c., are obtainable, the district being an agricultural one.

Tribes.

Zaraniq (or Dharaniq).—A powerful, unruly Tihamah tribe, whose administrative centre is Beit-el-Faqih. Reported to be able to muster 10,000 men. They are notorious caravan-raiders, are opposed to the Turks, follow the Shafei sect, and have leanings towards the Idrisi and against the Imam. Sheikh: Maaruf Munassar Saghair.

Abs (or Absiyah).—This tribe extends from the coast south of Hodeidah about 30 miles from west to east and about 15 miles north to south. Their numbers are estimated at 5,000 to 6,000 men. Shafei with pro-Idrisi tendencies. Sheikh: Ali Bari (leader of the first attack on Hodeidah on the 30th August).

Seyyid Adul Qadir of Marawa, friendly towards mission.

Qubrah.—Occupy territory extending from the sea for about 50 miles north-east of Hodeidah. They can put 3,000 to 4,000 men in the field. Shafei with pro-Idrisi tendencies.

Sheikhs.

Abul Hadi. Consistently friendly towards mission.

Mohammed Zeid.

Yahya Ali Muzairyah.

Ismail Baghawi.

Khuzam.

} Chief conspirators in the capture.

Sheikhs Mohammed Zeid and Khuzam wrote to the Idrisi, and the latter is thought to have replied advising them to release the mission.

Ramleh, October 11, 1919.

APPENDIX.

Since the foregoing note was written two interesting documents have come to hand. The first is a letter from the Imam Yahya, dated the 19th September, to the Political Resident, Aden. The Imam explains that, agreeably to our request, he put off the military action he had planned against the Qubrah for the release of Colonel Jacob's Mission, but it is clear from the tone of his letter that he is not prepared to make any compromise with the Qubrah, and that he would, if he could, inveigle us into lending him military aid to secure his overlordship of the Tihamah tribes.

"Some of the Qubrah," he says, "have made mean and foolish demands. It is necessary that we should close every door to their requests, to show indifference, and to shut the doors against the cupidity of the impudent Qubrah. If the matter remains as it is, then there is no alternative but to take action and make a common display against the Qubrah, to punish them and to extricate the mission."

The second document is a letter written by an Aden merchant, Abul Kadir Mackawi. It is an illuminate commentary on our Yemen policy, and deserves more than a cursory perusal.

"The question of the future government of the Yemen," he writes, "has not yet been settled, and the province is in a state of anarchy and chaos. The Imam is conquering the Sunni (Shafei) countries, and it seems that he intends to rule over the whole of Yemen. In my last letter I described the attitude of the Sunnis towards the Imam, and I need not repeat here what I wrote in that letter. The Imam's rule over the whole of Yemen will in a short time be an accomplished fact. The Sunnis are unable to resist his troops, and their attempt at resistance is followed by the massacre of the population. The Sunnis were willing to acknowledge his suzerainty and pay him all tithes, taxes, &c., if the civil administration, in accordance with their Sunni doctrines, is left to them. The Imam, however, insisted on their unconditional surrender, and the places conquered by him are now governed in accordance with the Zeidi codes and regulations. The Arabs of Yemen cannot understand why Great Britain insisted on the withdrawal of the Turks and would not accept a mandate for Yemen as it has done in the case of other countries. Such a mandate, at least for the Sunni places, with the approval of the Allied Powers, including America, if communicated to the Imam by a delegation consisting of the representatives of the Associated Powers, would most probably not have been opposed by the Imam, especially if he saw that they were determined to carry out their decision by all means. The Imam would think twice before resisting the demands of the combined Powers."

On the subject of the capture of the mission, Abdul Kadir Mackawi asserts that the change of attitude of the Qubrah sheikhs, after promising a safe-conduct to Colonel Jacob, was due to propaganda of Mahmud Nadim and his fellow intriguers, who misrepresented the aims and motives of the British Government, and attributed to it all the evils that have fallen upon the Arabs. The blockade of their ports and the removal of the Turks (their protectors against the Imam), which nearly reduced them to starvation and their country to anarchy, and the arrival of Colonel Jacob on a mission to the Imam to hand over to him, as they were told, the Shafei country and its people, gave support to the Turkish propaganda.

"Now," continues Abdul Kadir, "the silence of the British Government on the subject and their omission to counteract the effect of these reports left a bad impression on the minds of the people and strengthened the case of the Turks' friends. These people were under the impression that after all the sufferings and troubles caused by the blockade and the war, a new era would dawn upon their country on the departure of the Turks, as the British Government would become their future ruler and protector, or at least adequate measures would be taken to ensure their protection against the Imam and against each other. They were bitterly disappointed when they were left, after the Turks' withdrawal, in the lurch. If anything has done more to alienate the sympathy and good feelings of the Arabs of Yemen it is that blockading business."

"The sympathy and good feelings of the Arabs of Yemen is an asset not to be despised. If anything can be done by Great Britain to save their country from anarchy it will earn the everlasting gratitude of the Arab nation. At least something should be done to restore British prestige and credit, and to remove from the minds of the Arabs the impression that Great Britain is working with the Imam against them."

Although it is highly desirable that the Imam Yahya should have a good harbour, and though Hodeidah is the natural port of his capital, Sanaa, it is becoming increasingly clear that it would be a mistake to give him even only our moral support in his efforts

to enforce his supremacy over the Shafei tribes of the coastal lowlands. We are, indeed, faced with an Arab variation of the "Fiume" incident, with the Tihamah tribes in the rôle of Italy. Sheikh Ali Bari of the Aba failed, however, to make good as the poet in the affair.

A Shafei Confederation along the Southern Tihamah would inevitably lead to the Idrisi's domination of those parts, the result of which would be continual disputes between that ruler and the Imam. The latter would no doubt be able to overpower the Quhrah and neighbouring tribes if he were free to take military action, but his success would certainly be followed by similar excesses to those his Zeidi troops have committed elsewhere in the Yemen.

Recent events rather indicate that we shall be compelled to support a Shafei Confederation against the Imam, and the most practical way of doing this will probably be through the Idrisi, who, in contradistinction to the Imam, has genuine claims to our good offices.

H. GARLAND, Major,
Acting Director, Arab Bureau.

Ramleh, October 12, 1919.

[149679]

No. 146.

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 243. Commercial. Confidential.)

My Lord,

WITH reference to your telegram No. 837 of the 1st November, I have the honour to report that the commercial counsellor has had a long conversation to-day with Signor Bissolati on the general subject of the Georgian Mission, the principal member of which, M. Sabachtarachvili, ex-Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was yesterday presented by him to the Prime Minister.

Signor Bissolati began by saying that he had long found himself in sympathy with the Georgian people, with whom he had originally come in contact when mountain climbing. That sympathy had been increased on account of their political conduct during the debacle in Russia, which had run parallel to his own theories as a reformist Socialist, namely, that modern socialism should be elastic, and should now represent the evolution of a people towards a higher ideal and the formation of a barrier against the extreme tendencies of anarchy and disorder.

The Georgian Mission had come to Europe in the first place to ask for recognition by the Allies of their newly-formed Government; and the conversation yesterday with Signor Nitti, at which Signor Bissolati had been present, had turned mostly on this subject.

The arguments laid down by M. Sabachtarachvili had, he repeated, his personal sympathy, but he was the first to admit that the matter was one of the utmost delicacy, and demanded common accord among the Allies. He believed that Mr. Lloyd George's opinion was, so to speak, suspended for the moment, and that a non-committal answer had been given. The same answer, he said, was returned yesterday by the Italian Prime Minister, who, after platonic expressions of courtesy and goodwill, had said that the matter must be referred to his colleague the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and must also be debated and settled with the allies of Italy.

The mission was also here for the development of closer economic and commercial relations with this country, which could supply manufactured articles against raw material, and especially coal, iron, and petroleum. With regard to this, Signor Bissolati said that negotiations were necessarily in a very embryonic state, owing especially to the lack of transport and the unsatisfactory condition of the petroleum industry. The former was, as far as he knew, represented by the sailing of one Italian ship about every twenty days; the latter was disorganised, owing to the breakage of the petroleum conduit, and the fact that it would take a very considerable time to repair the damage.

The commercial counsellor, being naturally unable to give any hint which might betray the confidential information contained in your telegram No. 837, told Signor Bissolati that the Embassy had been approached by a company in London (who, no doubt, in their turn, had been instigated by the Georgian Mission) with a view to join British and Italian enterprise in the Caucasus, and asked Signor Bissolati whether he thought that such an idea would, if eventually put forward, be acceptable to the Italian

Government. The only thing, he added, which seemed to him to militate against the project was that it appeared that some sort of offer of a like description had been made to German financial houses. If, therefore, the Georgians were intriguing with the Germans, their chances of success with the English would be considerably reduced and probably rendered null and void.

The information (though true) was put out as a feeler, and Signor Bissolati answered that, though he perfectly understood why the Ukraines should intrigue with the Germans and the Vatican, as he believed they had been doing, he yet was at a loss to understand why the Georgians should also do so, since they had not the excuse of the geographical position, and, as far as commerce was concerned, he did not believe that German houses were in a position to afford assistance.

Given the known probity of Signor Bissolati and the fact that he cannot be accused of reticence in the past towards the British Embassy, I cannot help thinking that it is probable that he, at any rate, has no cognisance of the intriguing between Italian subjects and German financial houses in the Caucasus. I will, however, endeavour to find out more on the subject.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[150511]

No. 147.

Emir Feisal to the Prime Minister of Great Britain.—(Received at Foreign Office, November 10.)

Paris, November 6, 1919.

Your Excellency,

I CAME to Paris, as you advised, and have been here about fifteen days. I have done my best to keep on good terms with the French Government, endeavouring to eliminate misunderstandings and to meet our mutual interests. In fact, I even told M. Berthelot and M. Gout that I am ready to write a letter to the French Government in which I will guarantee to uphold French interests in Syria, thereby giving them full confidence in my good-will and proving that I shall take no stand against them in the future. I also invited them to discuss with me, through a committee which shall be held for that purpose, the withdrawal of British troops and the type of administration thereafter suitable for maintaining the unity of the country. I fully explained to them all my reasons for this, but you will see by the enclosed letter that M. Clemenceau does not approve of such a procedure.

To-day I lunched with M. Berthelot and thought that he intended to discuss the present situation with me. However, it was evident later that he intended to have me talk with General Gouraud, who was also present. As soon as we left the table

he withdrew and left me alone with the General. We had a long talk, similar to my previous conversations with other officials. In this case there was a slight difference, for the General admitted that the Arabs were right and that they cannot accept the division of their country. He expressed his sympathy, but told me he would be obliged to carry out all orders he might receive. He further said that although he disapproved of bloodshed he could not hesitate to meet it if his orders required it.

This is a brief summary of what has happened in Paris, and will prove to your Excellency that I have made every effort to reach an agreement with the French Government, and that I have done my best to continue with them my ever peaceful policy. I have been obliged to refer the entire matter to the Supreme Council, trusting they will take it in hand and save me from bearing the responsibility of any unfortunate outcome. I abhor bloodshed, but I see that the French Government may bring it about by insisting on the withdrawal of the British troops and the upheaval of the present régime in Syria, before any step is taken to reassure the people as to the future of their country and unity of the administration.

The Arab Syrian nation will do everything in their power to defend their independence and this unity, and they intend to make every effort in this connection. Are the British Government and your country willing to stifle national feeling in Syria and to expose the innocent to annihilation. I wish greatly to know your ideas on this subject, because I earnestly desire to follow your advice in all these matters.

I beg, therefore, for your assistance before the Supreme Council, as you have kindly given it before in your approval of assembling a special mixed commission. Without that we can never put an end to the present disagreement.

I have, &c.
FEISAL.

M. Clemenceau to His Highness Emir Feisal.

Altesse,

Paris, le 2 novembre 1919.

VOUS avez bien voulu me signaler, par votre lettre du 25 octobre dernier, l'inquiétude que vous a fait éprouver la décision prise par la Conférence de la Paix le 15 septembre dernier relativement à la relève des troupes anglaises par les troupes françaises dans une zone définie en Syrie et en Cilicie.

Vous craignez que l'exécution de cette décision ne soit interprétée par les Arabes et les Syriens comme un partage de la Syrie et ne risque par là de donner naissance à des troubles dont vous voudriez dégager votre responsabilité.

En vue d'éviter ces éventualités, votre Altesse propose de constituer une Commission chargée d'étudier les modalités de l'évacuation des troupes anglaises, de créer une administration provisoire de nature à sauvegarder l'unité du pays, à conserver l'harmonie entre les différentes zones occupées et d'assurer les droits des habitants.

J'ai pris connaissance de vos vues avec beaucoup de sympathie et je tiens à vous déclarer, d'une manière générale, que le Gouvernement français n'a jamais cessé d'être sincèrement désireux d'assurer à la Syrie, comme à la Mésopotamie et aux autres pays d'Orient délivrés par la victoire des Alliés, le régime de liberté, d'ordre et de progrès, conforme aux principes libéraux de sa politique, qui sont en même temps ceux de la Conférence de la Paix.

Je reste persuadé que la confiance établie entre les Arabes et leurs Alliés, pendant la guerre poursuivie en commun, permettra de régler leurs relations conformément à leurs traditions, aux vœux des populations et à la liaison de leurs intérêts. Les Gouvernements français et anglais resteront à cet égard aussi étroitement associés dans la paix qu'ils l'ont été dans la guerre.

La question que vous voulez bien poser aujourd'hui est moins étendue et me paraît d'une grande simplicité: il ne s'agit, en effet, que de faits, sans que le droit puisse être modifié. Ni la condition politique de la Syrie, ni ses frontières éventuelles ne sont en question. Vos inquiétudes et celles que la population pourrait éprouver doivent donc être faciles à dissiper. Dans les régions où les soldats français prendront la place des soldats anglais, j'ai la certitude que nos chefs militaires sauront rassurer les populations et maintenir l'ordre. Il vous appartient, avec votre haute autorité, d'agir de même à Damas et à Alep: je suis tout prêt à venir à votre premier appel pour vous aider à maintenir l'ordre, s'il venait à être troublé par des agitateurs qui ne pourraient que compromettre les intérêts des Arabes et diminuer la confiance que la Conférence est prête à leur accorder.

Un simple exposé des faits vous montrera que la nomination d'une Commission ne ferait actuellement que compliquer la situation et serait même en contradiction avec la décision du Conseil suprême.

Le 15 septembre dernier Mr. Lloyd George a fait connaître à la Conférence que les nécessités de la démobilisation l'amenaient à retirer les troupes britanniques de la Cilicie et de la Syrie, et à proposer que les soldats anglais soient remplacés par des soldats français. Le Conseil suprême a sanctionné cette décision, en prenant acte des réserves faites par le Président du Conseil français sur tout autre point du mémoire de Mr. Lloyd George, et en déclarant que cet arrangement militaire n'avait qu'un caractère temporaire et ne préjugait pas la solution des questions de mandats et de frontières qui seront réglées en même temps que le problème oriental dans son ensemble.

Dans ces conditions, toute garantie est donnée au point de vue de l'avenir, la question politique est intégralement réservée, l'administration locale n'est pas modifiée, aucune décision n'est prise quant aux frontières. L'ensemble des intérêts dont vous vous préoccupez si légitimement reste confié aux décisions de la Conférence de la Paix. La nomination d'une commission pour étudier les modalités de l'évacuation et modifier l'administration actuelle du pays serait non seulement inutile, mais contraire aux décisions du Conseil suprême.

Je suis, d'ailleurs, tout disposé à envisager avec vous, au point de vue de l'avenir, les questions qui vous préoccupent, en tenant compte de nos grands intérêts communs.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

G. CLEMENCEAU.

His Highness Emir Feisal to M. Clemenceau.

Conférence de la Paix, Secrétariat de la Délégation
du Hedjaz, Paris, le 5 novembre 1919.

M. le Président,

JE suis heureux de constater dans la réponse que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'envoyer, en date du 2 novembre 1919, une nouvelle confirmation de la sympathie que le Gouvernement français n'a cessé de témoigner à ma nation et une preuve manifeste de son désir d'assurer à la Syrie comme à la Mésopotamie et autres pays arabes libérés, un régime de liberté, d'ordre et de progrès.

Les Arabes qui ont combattu pour obtenir leur indépendance ne peuvent que se féliciter de ces nouvelles assurances, qui viennent leur confirmer les déclarations antérieures et les promesses réitérées des Puissances alliées. J'en suis d'autant plus heureux moi-même que je n'ai cessé dès la première heure de travailler à l'inauguration de cette politique d'entente et de confiance réciproque qui a contribué à la défaite de l'ennemi et assuré la libération du pays.

C'est précisément dans le but d'entretenir cette amitié et de maintenir cette confiance que je me suis permis d'insister dans ma dernière lettre datée du 25 écoulé, sur l'opportunité de former une commission chargée d'étudier les modalités de la relève des troupes et l'établissement en Syrie d'une administration provisoire propre à en sauvegarder l'unité, conformément aux vœux de la population.

Tout en remerciant votre Excellence de la bienveillance avec laquelle elle a bien voulu examiner mes propositions, je crois, cependant, de mon devoir d'attirer son attention sur les considérations suivantes:

Votre Excellence considère que la question de la relève est extrêmement simple, vu qu'elle ne modifie en rien le droit et qu'elle ne met en question ni la condition politique ni les frontières éventuelles de la Syrie. En effet, elle aurait été très simple s'il ne s'agissait que d'un simple retrait de troupes d'occupation, et si au régime de l'unité de l'administration on substituait un autre instrument qui assurerait la cohésion entre les différentes zones du même pays.

Si la condition politique et les frontières éventuelles ne sont pas en question, par contre la vie publique du peuple et l'unité de l'administration du pays sont gravement compromises. L'aide-mémoire de Mr. Lloyd George traduit la préoccupation évidente de mettre à exécution l'accord secret de 1916 qui partage le pays, tue son existence et contre lequel nous n'avons cessé de protester. D'ailleurs, la lecture de cet aide-mémoire suffit pour démontrer qu'il ne s'agit nullement d'une simple opération de retrait de troupes, mais d'une délimitation de sphères d'influence politiques et économiques et en somme du règlement du sort futur de notre pays suivant des intérêts qui lui sont étrangers. Votre Excellence, il est vrai, n'a pas accepté l'ensemble de la proposition, mais il n'en reste pas moins acquis que c'est le point de vue du Gouvernement anglais sur quoi je n'ai pas manqué d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement britannique; et c'est à la suite de mes protestations et après des conversations laborieuses que j'ai pu faire adopter mon point de vue concernant la constitution de la commission.

Ce sont ces graves conséquences de l'avenir qui entretiennent cette atmosphère d'inquiétude et d'angoisse chez le peuple arabe, inquiétude que j'ai eu l'honneur de signaler à votre Excellence et que rien ne saurait calmer tant qu'une nouvelle solution ne sera pas intervenue.

Mon expérience personnelle et ma connaissance du peuple arabe m'autorisent à affirmer à votre Excellence que le peuple syrien ne peut être entraîné par des agitateurs. C'est un peuple conscient de ses droits et de ses devoirs, dont la conduite est inspirée uniquement par le souci d'assurer sa liberté et son indépendance. C'est ce sentiment, c'est cette conscience de lui-même qui l'ont décidé à participer à la guerre contre ses frères de religion au moment même où la victoire était encore incertaine. Ce peuple n'hésitera pas aujourd'hui à défendre cette liberté et cette indépendance pour laquelle il a combattu, comme hier il n'a pas hésité à se sacrifier pour la conquérir. Tous ceux qui ont été en contact avec lui ont constaté cette suprême résolution, témoin la Commission américaine d'Enquête qui s'est rendue en Orient. Votre Excellence, sûre que tout mouvement qui pourrait se produire dans les régions occupées par les troupes françaises sera étouffé, se montre encore toute prête à venir à mon premier appel pour m'aider à maintenir l'ordre s'il venait à être troublé par des agitateurs dans la région qui m'est confiée.

Que votre Excellence me permette de lui soumettre que les événements qui pourraient se produire, et auxquels j'ai fait allusion, ne seraient nullement le fait d'agitateurs inconscients. Le mouvement qui se produira inévitablement dans le pays est un mouvement essentiellement national où il serait un peu délicat de faire appel à des troupes étrangères, dont l'intervention ne serait pas comprise par le peuple syrien. D'ailleurs, le sentiment développé chez le peuple de Syrie est directement inspiré par les déclarations officielles des hommes d'État alliés et pour le triomphe duquel les grandes nations, la France à leur tête, ont soutenu la plus terrible et la plus effroyable des guerres.

Les grands chefs de l'armée française, qui ont forcé l'admiration du monde par leur héroïsme en défendant en même temps leur patrie, les principes immortels du Droit et de la Liberté, seraient eux-mêmes dans l'embarras pour tirer l'épée contre un peuple qui, en réclamant son indépendance, ne demande que le droit et la liberté pour lesquels ces mêmes chefs héroïques ont si valeureusement combattu.

Le Conseil suprême, en prenant acte du changement prévu dans la situation actuelle en Syrie, sans m'avoir entendu, m'a imposé une responsabilité grosse de conséquences.

Les Arabes se sont toujours attachés à mériter la confiance des Alliés; et c'est en invoquant les principes que ceux-ci ont proclamés qu'ils fondent leurs espérances pour obtenir la réalisation de leurs légitimes aspirations. Il dépend beaucoup de votre Excellence que cette espérance ne soit point déçue et que leurs convictions ne soient point ébranlées.

Quant aux inquiétudes qui m'assiègent et à l'insistance que je témoigne, elles ne proviennent nullement de préoccupations personnelles. Guidé par le constant souci de servir ma nation et d'être loyal vis-à-vis de nos Alliés, j'estime de mon devoir de mettre sous les yeux de votre Excellence la situation telle qu'elle se présente dans la réalité et non telle que d'aucuns voudraient la présenter. J'ai dans mon âme et conscience une vision nette de l'effervescence qui va agiter tout le pays. Encore une fois, le souci de maintenir les meilleures relations entre les Arabes et leurs Alliés et d'écarter tout danger de nature à menacer l'existence de notre jeune nation, me porte à insister auprès de votre Excellence en la priant de soumettre la question à un nouvel examen.

Votre Excellence estime que cette procédure est en contradiction avec l'acte par lequel le Conseil suprême a pris connaissance de la décision de deux Gouvernements alliés. Ma responsabilité étant de ce fait directement engagée, je crois de mon devoir de m'adresser au Conseil suprême lui-même et j'ose croire que votre Excellence voudra bien employer sa puissante influence et son bienveillant concours pour me faciliter ma tâche et m'aider à me dégager des grandes responsabilités qui pèsent sur moi.

En terminant, je remercie votre Excellence des dispositions favorables qu'elle a témoignées en se montrant prête à envisager avec moi, au point de vue de l'avenir, les questions qui nous préoccupent. Je me permets de lui réitérer les déclarations que j'ai déjà faites à M. Berthelot concernant mon vif désir d'arriver promptement à un accord définitif pouvant assurer, avec la liberté et l'indépendance, le progrès et le développement du peuple arabe.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
FEISAL.

Enclosure 3 in No. 147.

Note to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference.

I WAS called in September from Damascus by his Excellency the Prime Minister of Great Britain to discuss the Syrian Question with the Great Powers. In London, his Excellency handed me an *aide-mémoire* involving certain changes in the present administration in Syria. He said that similar copies were handed to the representatives of France, America, and Italy. I understood from the correspondence and interviews which ensued that the said *aide-mémoire* was not based on an agreement between Great Britain and any other Power, but it is simply a statement showing the decision of Great Britain taken for reasons of economy as to the withdrawal of her troops from certain Arab provinces. The whole question is supposed to be a provisional military arrangement, neither administrative nor political, taken for the maintenance of order until the final decision of the Peace Conference as to the future government of the country.

Having carefully read this document and having closely observed the general situation in the Arab provinces since the Treaty of Truce was signed with Turkey

(and as you know I am in a good position to judge of the affairs of my country), I came to the conclusion that the execution of this project would not only entail disagreement with the rights of nations, but would also be detrimental to the interests of the country and my people, and destructive to public peace throughout the East. I am persuaded that the Great Powers with interests in the East will suffer harm in proportion to their respective interests. The two Powers cannot have been aware of the troubles which may arise from any alteration in the *status quo* established since the occupation; for this agreement will alter the provisional administration established since the occupation without making any suitable arrangement in lieu of it.

When the British Government informed me of this plan, which they called a "suggested project," based on the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916, I protested, and put on record my reasons for so doing. The British Government, having realised the gravity of the situation, accepted the proposal to appoint a Committee of American, British, French, and Arab delegates to consider the questions involved in the impending evacuation and to establish a unified provisional administration to take the place of the present régime. When, however, the proposal was referred to the French Government, I was informed by Lord Curzon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, that M. Clemenceau did not approve the suggestion, and expressed the desire to see me in Paris. Furthermore, the French Government also refused to agree, as they informed me themselves, to the British proposal, except in regard to the evacuation of British troops on November 1st. The two Governments, considering exclusively their own interests in the question, have not given full consideration to the effect it will have on the Syrian people. As I am responsible for the safety and welfare of my country, I have similarly informed the French Government of the reasons for my inability to agree to the arrangement, and again proposed a mixed commission. The French Premier in his reply declines to accept any of my proposals, because he says that he cannot go against a decision taken by the Supreme Council, adding that French troops are ready to maintain order in their zone and to assist me to do the same in my own district on my first call. I believe that M. Clemenceau is under the impression that the movement of which we are afraid will be due to "agitators," and not a spontaneous outburst of national feeling. I doubt if the Supreme Council and public opinion throughout the civilised world would approve of suppressive measures against perfectly legitimate national movements that could only result in bloodshed. The Supreme Council, I understand, has taken no decision in the matter, having merely "noted" the fact of the agreement, on September 15th, 1919, and communicated to me by the French Government. The Council presumably believed that the suggested project was simply to relieve troops and did not entail any political or administrative change in the occupied enemy territory now administered in the name of the Allies. It is clear, therefore, that the "suggested project" was not approved by the authorities concerned, and should therefore be given fresh consideration and discussion by the Supreme Council. I beg herewith to briefly expose some of the principal reasons for my objections to the proposal which will plunge the people into despair as to their future.

1. I find it difficult to understand that the project is a purely military one. It seems to me that it contains many economic and political points that should only be decided by the Peace Conference. The fact of taking away the supreme power of administration from a single head and the division of the country into three different zones, each reporting to a separate Government and acting through a different system, is surely a very important change in the present administration, and cannot be called a military measure. Such matters as the railway arrangements and zones of influence, &c., &c., do not come within the measures to be taken for the preservation of order, until a final settlement of the Syrian Question by the Peace Conference.

2. According to the proposed arrangements the Arab provinces are to be divided into three districts, one under British administration, another under French, and the third under the Arab Government. This is to say that the Syrian nation, which has always been looking forward to a unity of administration, is now to be split up and each part put under a separate Government. The harm resulting therefrom is a deadly blow to the country. Dissension between the inhabitants of different districts, possibly fostered and encouraged by ignorant officials, or even competition between different administrators, will increase, and thereby neutralise any benefits which might have come through one distinct administration. Troubles will begin on the frontiers and will spread into the heart of the country.

Furthermore, that portion left to the Arab Government is said to be an independent Arab province, but is again divided into different zones of influence, one under the British and the other under the French. Any assistance required for one of these two sub-divisions should be asked for from the Power which exercises influence over it. Has ever a nation in the history of the world been able to make any progress under such obstructive circumstances? This arrangement will undoubtedly dishearten the people and create disaffection among them. They will feel distrust of the Allies and will do everything in their power to defend the unity of their country. They are a weak nation and they will be unable to resist for long, but they will nevertheless meet death for their just cause. Who will then be responsible before the civilised world for such a sacrifice? No one can persuade the people of the country that they are wrong in their fixed ideas. Every one who has had experience of the prevailing feeling amongst the people can say that public order can never be maintained without bloodshed.

3. The withdrawal of British troops is proposed to be made on a ruling which is not recognised by the Arabs nor by the United States Government, who declared on entering the war that they would not recognise any secret agreement. I refer to the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, which dealt with the country as if it were a private estate or a mere parcel of goods, at a time when her young men were pouring from Syria to the desert and offering their lives for her independence. Any action based on a ruling not recognised by the Peace Conference cannot be executed without a special discussion from that Conference.

4. The Commander-in-Chief, when the Allied troops occupied Syria, ordered me to withdraw my agents from the coast, and made a declaration to the Syrian people that he proposed to occupy the country and establish a unified Government in the name of the Allies. His administration thus formed would remain active until such time as the Peace Conference gave its last decision. The Syrians considered this declaration as a pledge given by the Allies, and their country as being placed as a trust in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, acting on behalf of the Allies, and establishing one single administration which he promised to maintain as above stated. I take it that no change in the fundamental basis of this arrangement can be made before the proper time comes or before another administration based on the same principles is established. Great Britain recognises this pledge, but says it was not anticipated that such a long delay would pass before such a decision should be taken by the Conference. Is this delay the fault of the Arab Syrian nation, or have we committed any disloyalty which deserved such a punishment? We have always shown complete loyalty to the Allies, ever since we rose against the Turks, and the least we expect is the fulfilment of a promise given by the Commander-in-Chief.

5. The over-excited feeling now prevailing in the Arab provinces, as well as all other Moslem provinces of the Ottoman Empire in Asia, caused mainly by unwise foreign interference, is no longer a secret. Any person having the slightest knowledge of what has been going on in the Syrian province is undoubtedly convinced that there will be trouble, and in many places, if the *status quo* of the present administration is changed.

I therefore beg you in the name of humanity and the interests of peace, in the name of the Arab nation and in the name of the multitudinous interests of France, Italy, Great Britain, and America in the eastern world, that no new doors be opened for further troubles, of which we all may see the beginning, but of which the end cannot be foretold. The incidents of Smyrna and other places are still fresh in our memory.

I very much fear that the mischief will spread throughout the Moslem world. The people will think that there is a definite intention to persecute Islam. You may still remember that the rising of the Arabs, headed by my father the King, has given the first blow against the hated principle of fanaticism. The Arabs attacked the Moslem Turks because they were oppressors, and joined the Allies believing that they were fighting for right and justice irrespective of religion. I personally throughout the war have been fighting fanaticism at every time and place. Arabs gathered around me from every direction and every religion. Our unity was national and not religious. A great number of men who are working with me now in this national cause do not belong to my religion. This must prove to you how distressed I shall be if this high ideal is debased to religious conflict through misunderstanding, mismanagement, and imprudence.

You must agree with me that it is in the interests of all to preserve the utmost

tranquillity during the short period of time previous to the final decision of the Peace Conference, rather than cause trouble to occur for no logical reason. I am therefore of the opinion that the Great Powers should be informed of the serious situation as we know it, so that immediate steps be taken for the interested Allied Powers and brethren in arms to consider the interests of each Government according to the ideal of justice for which we have fought together.

I conclude by emphasising my request to be allowed to lay in person a full statement of my case, which touches my country more closely than it does any other, for it will be on me and my people that the results of any action, whether for good or evil, will fall.

FEISAL.

November 6, 1919.

[151212]

No. 148.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 2001.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, October 28, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information some notes which have been prepared in this High Commission on the Nationalist movement in the Samsoun area.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 148.

Notes on the Nationalist Movement in the Samsoun Area.

THE armistice saw Turkey crushed and defeated, prepared to give up anything but the last hope of existence. This has remained the sentiment of the vast mass of the people, the desire for peace and security, oblivious of the cost.

As was natural, Constantinople began to consider how best to retrieve as much as possible from the ruins. One by one parties appeared representing a few politicians, each working for power. At this time the imposition of any peace terms would have been easy.

This phase lasted till the 15th May, when the Greeks landed at Smyrna. The result of this was like breaking open an ants' nest—temporary stupefaction, much running about, and a few hardy souls spitting acid at the invaders.

A period of resistance followed. The Central Government pinned its hope to the ultimate good-will of the Allies and the influence of the mass of the Moslem world. In opposition appeared the Military Party, which hoped to save Turkey by its own activities. They realised that Constantinople and the Central Government were under the thumb of the Allies, and that any resistance must be organised from outside. Among this party was Mustafa Kemal Pasha.

It would appear that the Central Government was not without sympathy with the Military Party. A system of army inspectorates with large powers was devised, and early in May Mustafa Kemal was sent as inspector to Samsoun.

The Turks were excited. They had been caught napping at Smyrna. There was good reason for believing that an Armenian State was to be formed, and many talked of a Greek Pontus State. The military were determined to be prepared to prevent another coup.

Mustafa Kemal at once set to work to rouse his area. He made Amassia—well away from Allied control—his headquarters. From here he sent emissaries as far afield as Kharput and Diarbekir. Backed by Refat and Hamid Bey, he proceeded to put down brigandage and enlist the brigands in his new national army.

The movement appeared to be revolutionary and dangerous. The Greek and Armenian authorities wailed in chorus, ably backed by the American missionaries, foreseeing massacre. Apparently Mustafa Kemal saw the same and took steps to prevent such an eventuality.

On the 19th June Mustafa Kemal moved his headquarters to Kavsa, where he

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was joined by Raouf Bey, and both announced their determination to act independently of the Central Government.

Up till then the leaders had acted much like naughty schoolboys, fearing the birch at any moment. Meeting with no opposition from the Allies, and realising the futility, and perhaps the complicity, of the Central Government, they came out more into the limelight. On the 3rd July it was reported that the Nationalist army was concentrating on Erzeroum, and Mustafa Kemal moved his headquarters to this town.

Once more the Greeks, Armenians, and Americans wailed of massacre, but after events have shown that the Nationalists realised that it was to their own interests to protect Christians.

On moving to Erzeroum, Mustafa Kemal left the General Officer Commanding the 3rd Caucasus Division orders to resist the landing of foreign troops. This the latter proceeded to do, and practically issued an ultimatum that if the newly arrived Gurkha battalion landed at Samsoun he would not be responsible. As usual, the Turks feared that the arrival of a British battalion meant that a Greek division was coming along behind. The General Officer Commanding, however, had gone further than his orders, and he was replaced by strong action from Constantinople, and the Gurkhas landed without any incident.

On the departure of Mustafa Kemal the kazas of Kavsa and Amassia calmed down, but the organisation remained. The position was by no means assisted by the fire-eating attitude of the Greek Bishop of Samsoun.

Mustafa Kemal's intrigues were now spreading far and wide. He was in close contact with the Kurds, and information received from Armenian and other interested sources endeavoured to indicate that he had some understanding with the Emir Feisal. A certain tinge of anti-British feeling appeared in the propaganda.

Colonel Rawlinson, who visited the area, reported on the 21st July that the Turks did not realise their defeat, and a recourse to arms would probably be necessary.

Erzeroum has now become the centre, with Konia as a minor centre. Between Amassia and Erzeroum were some 8,000 men and 2,000 men, and a military zone was declared. The Congress of Erzeroum was announced, and what was to all intents and purposes a temporary Government independent of Constantinople was formed. Plans were discussed by the Central Government to destroy the movement by force. Then plans were made to come to terms with the Nationalists. These, however, fell through, meeting with considerable opposition from members of the Government and the Allies.

On the 7th August the Erzeroum Congress published its decisions. This congress only represented the eastern vilayets. It proclaimed itself loyal to the throne and the Turkish Empire, but attacked Damad Ferid's Government as unable to protect Turkish interests. It decided to protect Christians, but to resist by force all entrance of foreign troops. It proclaimed itself the representative of the Turkish people, and demanded that the Turkish nation should decide its own destiny. While loyal to the Sultan, it severed all connection with the Central Government.

On the 12th August the Vali of Angora announced his adherence to the National movement, and it was found that Mustafa Kemal was in close touch with the Tartars of the Nachivan district. An alarmist report stated that Mustafa Kemal had some 15,000 men, with a plentiful supply of officers and non-commissioned officers, and that in case of fighting 30,000 Kurds might be expected to join him. It was, however, becoming apparent that, provided neither the Allies nor the Central Government employed force, the Nationalists had no intention of fighting.

Early in September a new Congress was called at Sivas, which became the centre of gravity. This Congress professed to represent all Turkey. It issued daily declarations against the Central Government. It maintained that it stood for the interests of the Turks, while Damad Ferid stood for those of the Allies.

On the 11th September a Gurkha escort between Samsoun and Amassia was politely refused permission to proceed into the interior. It was decided, in view of the situation, to stop for the time being the repatriation of refugees.

The movement now extended outside the Samsoun area westwards down the railway. On the 12th September Angora was in the hands of the Nationalists, and Afon-Kara-Hissar more or less under their control.

The Sivas Congress ordered all communications with Constantinople to be cut. It was very evident that the movement was the work of a clique, and had failed to touch the mass of the people, who sat docile, praying for peace and security. On the 15th September the control officer, Samsoun, reported that the local population were hoping for Allied intervention against the Nationalists. The movement showed

signs of developing anti-British sentiments. By now it had spread upwards from Konia and downwards from Samsoun. Sivrihissar was Nationalist, and finally Eski-Chehir. Except for the Greek area, the Nationalists controlled the larger half of Anatolia, independently of Constantinople.

On the 20th September, in accordance with orders from the British War Office to avoid armed conflict, the British troops were withdrawn from Merzifun and then from Samsoun. The allied policy appeared to dictate no interference with internal politics, but enough interference to prevent the Turkish Government settling its own affairs. On the 20th September the control officer, Samsoun, expressed his opinion that the Christians were unduly alarmed, as Mustafa Kemal had guaranteed their safety. It was felt by the Allied authorities that the Nationalists were, at any rate for the time being, as much interested in the protection of the Christians as the Allies themselves, and that the carrying out of the terms of the armistice was the Nationalists' one hope of salvation. They argued: the effete and corrupt Government of Constantinople had never represented the Turks. It has ruined Turkey. We represent the Turks and we will show you that we can rule.

At one time the Nationalists intended to mobilise Christians. On the 12th September the Mutessarif of Allatcham reported that all males were to be mobilised between the ages of 20 and 37 within the Samsoun, Baffra, Amassia, and Allatcham areas. On the 25th September the Sivas Congress found this unwise and decided to call up only Turks for the present.

On the 26th September the Armenian quarter of Samsoun was surrounded and searched for arms. A number of Armenians were beaten. This led to a panic, and all who could prepared to leave for Constantinople.

On the 1st October Damad Ferid Pasha's Government, bound hand and foot by the Allies, and kicked and beaten by the Nationalists, resigned. Foreign Office instructions had already been received that no force was to be used against the Nationalists. The new Cabinet and Mustafa Kemal came to some agreement, by which the Nationalists continued to rule.

A report from the Commander-in-chief of the 9th October stated that all was quiet and satisfactory at Samsoun, and that trade was reviving. The Nationalists were in complete control. Brigandage round Samsoun had stopped, but still continued round Trebizond. The Christians were frightened, and the Nationalists looked on the withdrawal of British troops as a sign of weakness.

The Mutessarif of Eski-Chehir having been murdered on the 10th October, another was appointed. His declaration is interesting. He declares that he has been appointed by the Sivas Government as representing the nation. He will uphold justice, equal rights for Moslems and Christians, and will treat the Allies as "honoured guests." This is roughly the Nationalists' policy.

Briefly, the position may be summarised as follows: born in Constantinople, bred in Erzeroum, the Nationalist movement had spread across until it controls the whole of Anatolia except the Greek area, and has a considerable hold in Thrace. It has enlisted the sympathies of some of the Kurds, Arabs, and Tartars. The Central Government has become no more than the borough council of Constantinople and the liaison between the Nationalists and the Allies.

Since the armistice, in the Samsoun area, and, in fact, throughout Asia Minor and Thrace, the state of the security of the country had tended to become worse. The landing of the Greeks at Smyrna, the length of the armistice, the Allied policy of non-interference in internal affairs while keeping a stranglehold on the Central Government, combined to produce this result. There were dangers of Christian massacres. Brigandage was on the increase. For the moment the Nationalists have checked this. In some areas conditions have improved. The Allies have either shown considerable sympathy or disinterested benevolence in the movement, which amounts to recognising it as a force to be counted with.

So far so good; but when the problematic peace is offered to Turkey the other side of the picture will appear. The Nationalists are organising, gaining morals, drilling, recruiting, collecting funds, and endeavouring to rouse a torpid people to resist the disintegration of Turkey or the imposition of foreign control. They have been successful up to date; they look on this as due to the weakness of the Allies. They understand one argument alone—the dragoon. Each day makes the imposition of unwelcome peace harder.

Reports show certain outstanding features both in the Samsoun and the whole area affected. The repatriation of refugees has become impossible. The Nationalists are protecting the Christians and resent outside assistance and interference.

There is a strong and rapidly growing stronger feeling of resentment against the British, and in a lesser degree against all the Allies. This has unfortunately been accentuated by the efforts of a mission sent to this area by the French authorities under Lieutenant Boigne. Combined with this is a feeling that the Allies are really too weak to enforce their will. The local population are hardly touched by the movement. They wish to be left alone. The constant proclamations of protection for the Christians would appear to be a matter purely of policy. The sentiment of the Turk and his instinct in this matter is massacre. Should the Nationalists have to fight, it is probable that the Christians will be massacred.

[152068]

No. 149.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 2013.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 30, 1919.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 601 of the 8th October, concerning Bolshevik radio messages published at Constantinople, and to paragraph 7 of my letter to your Lordship No. 1939 of the 18th October, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a letter, dated the 20th October, which I have addressed to his Excellency the United States High Commissioner, calling his attention to the harmful passages which still occur in the "United States Naval Radio Press."

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 149.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to United States High Commissioner.

Sir,

Constantinople, October 28, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that my attention has been called to a number of items which have appeared from time to time, though fairly continuously, in the United States Naval Radio Press.

2. I understand that my predecessor has already discussed this question with your Excellency on the 5th June, and that your Excellency then informed Admiral Calthorpe that you would endeavour in future to see that any remarks as regards either the movements or morale of Allied troops were omitted.

3. The items which recently attracted my notice have dealt with stories of dissensions among the Allied Powers which are still at war with Turkey, as well as among the Allied and Associated Governments whose representatives are assembled in Paris. Other items have also appeared aimed directly at one or other of the Allied Powers mentioned above.

4. In this latter connection may I not instance in particular the issue of the 15th October, commencing "Mustapha Kemal said," &c.? The value of this depends entirely on the individuality of the person to whom these words were addressed, and the agency through which it was received, and I feel convinced that your Excellency will agree with me that a good deal is involved by what follows, notably the statement that "British money is spent here to destroy Turkey. We are aware that the British gave 150,000*l.* to Adil Bey," &c.

5. It is, of course, unnecessary for me to point out that there is not a word of truth in the statement I have quoted, and I find considerable difficulty in trying to estimate whence such a fabrication emanated. It is clear that it would not have come from an Allied or friendly source, and I cannot help thinking that your Excellency's operator may be repeating some message from a source which deliberately desires to do harm to the Allied cause.

6. In these circumstances, and taking into account the present situation in Turkey as between that country and the Allied Powers, who are still in a state of war against her, I feel convinced that your Excellency will agree that the repetition of these or similar mendacious or harmful statements can serve no useful purpose, and can, in fact, only be most undesirable at such a time as the present.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

[151221]

No. 150.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 2014.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, October 30, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a letter dated the 18th October, with enclosures and sketch map,* which I have received from the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, showing the present military situation and resources of the Turkish Empire.

2. Copies have been given to the French and Italian High Commissioners.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 150.

General Sir G. Milne to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

Your Excellency,

Constantinople, October 18, 1919.

WITH reference to your letter dated the 14th October, 1919, on the subject of the Ottoman army, I have the honour to attach an estimate (A) of the present strength and a map (B)* showing approximate distribution of the Ottoman regular forces.

2. As regards irregular forces, I attach a schedule (C) showing estimates of the forces which have been called up to prevent advances by the Greeks in Aidin vilayet. Besides these forces there is the possibility of similar forces being brought into existence all over Turkey should Greeks or Armenians be brought in, as in the case of Smyrna. An energetic agitation is being carried on in order to recruit and enrol those who will undertake, or can be forced, to come out if required. Reports vary greatly as to the success attained and the reality of these preparations, and as long as their character is largely that of a paper transaction it is impossible to make a serious estimate of the numbers involved.

3. With regard to armament, I attach an estimate of the position as regards artillery (D). The column "At Armistice" is based on Turkish figures, and may not be correct. It is believed, however, to be at least approximately so, for the reason that it was obtained in the early days when all information was freely given, and wherever inspections could be made it has stood this test.

4. I further attach (E), a schedule showing the position as regards machine guns.

5. There have also been taken over by me about 345,000 rifle bolts. I am unable to state accurately the number of modern rifles in possession of the Turkish army prior to the armistice, but it has been estimated at 600,000.

6. The columns "handed over" in all these schedules do not include any armament taken over after the armistice by General Allenby, nor a considerable quantity seized by the Greeks in Smyrna, where much delay in packing and consignment had occurred. This information will, it is hoped, be shortly obtained.

7. As regards artillery ammunition, it has been impossible to deal with the vast quantities in various districts, and attention has been therefore concentrated upon dismantling the guns.

8. As regards small arms ammunition, over 100 million rounds have been brought by me from the depots on the Anatolian Railway to Ismidt to be guarded. There are also very large quantities of small arms ammunition at Gulhane, Constantinople, but I do not regard any of the foregoing as available to evil-disposed persons.

9. There remain in Anatolia in inaccessible places, more especially at Erzeroum, quantities large enough to supply a guerilla war, but not large enough for a serious offensive or defensive on the modern scale.

10. To sum up, the position in Turkey in Europe appears to me satisfactory. In Asia, west of a line drawn north and south through Sivas, the Ottoman army is weak and lacks armament. No unidentified guns, for instance, have appeared opposite the Greeks at Smyrna, as would certainly have been the case had such existed. The missing armament in the schedules is undoubtedly mainly at Erzeroum, whence all

* Not reproduced.

efforts to retrieve it have failed. I trust that in a few weeks it will once again be immobile until May 1920 by reason of snow. I attach an estimate, (F), of the armament now available at Erzeroum and other places in Anatolia, which may be regarded as available for the Nationalists.

11. It is further pointed out for your information, that during all the years of the war rifles have continuously leaked from the Ottoman army by reason of desertion and dishonesty. It must be accepted as a principle that in Asia Minor if one can raise a soldier one can find a rifle for him. That being so, I am agreeably surprised to learn definitely that there is a difficulty in providing rifles for the bands, which are armed with many different patterns, involving great difficulties in the supply of ammunition.

I trust these observations and estimates will be of value to yourself and your colleagues.

I have, &c.

G. F. MILNE, General,
Commanding-in-chief, Army
of the Black Sea.

SCHEDULE (A).—Strength of the Ottoman Army.

Army Corps.	Situation.	Strength, Including Division.	Division.	Situation.	Approximate Strength.
I	Adrianople	2,700	49th	Kirkilisse	800
			60th	Quechan	700
III	Sivas	4,700	5th Caucasian	Amassia	1,800
			15th	Samsoun	1,500
XII	Konia	3,000	11th	Nigde	600
			41st	Karaman	500
XIII	Diarbekr	4,900	2nd	Silvan	800
			5th	Mardine	1,100
XIV	Panderma	2,800	55th	Tekfourdas	490
			61st	Panderma	900
XV	Erzeroum	13,800	3rd Caucasian	Tortoum	2,000
			9th	Erzeroum	2,500
			11th	Van	3,000
XVII	Smyrna	5,700	56th	Smyrna	1,500
			57th	Aidin	1,500
XX	Angora	1,600	24th	Eregli	700
			23rd	Afium Kara	600
				Hissar
XXV	Constantinople	3,800	1st	Ismid	1,400
			10th Caucasian	Constantinople	1,200
Total Strength	43,000

SCHEDULE (C).—Turkish National Bands

(In the neighbourhood of Smyrna.)

Area.	Comprising.	Strength.	
		Sources of Information.	
		British Intelligence Officers.	Greek Headquarters.
Aivali	Edremid Aivali	2,000	..
Aivali Balikessar	Balikessar Edremid Kiragach	..	3,000
Akhissar	Saz Oba Sarichan Mormero	3,700	..
Akhissar	Akhissar Adala Sarachan Mormero	..	2,100
Salihli	Salihli Sart Alashenir Birge	2,600	1,700
Aidin	Denizli Nazilli Odemish Keushk	12,000	7,000
Sokia	Sokia Ayasoluk	Nil	600
Total		20,300	14,400

Notes.—

1. The figures given by the British Intelligence Officers are probably over-estimated, as their information has in most cases been obtained from the leaders of these bands, who naturally exaggerate their numbers.
2. Estimates given by Greek Headquarters have often proved to be exaggerated also.
3. Since the Greek forces in Asia Minor have been placed under the orders of General Milne, it has been reported that the National leaders at Akhissar ordered some reinforcements to be sent back. On the Aivali front the National bands are said to be daily decreasing in numbers. This sector is being taken over by Ottoman regular troops (the 172nd Regiment), who are collecting the rifles from the bands.
4. At present there is no sign of a decrease in numbers on the Aidin front. No doubt the bands there are largely recruited from the displaced population.

SCHEDULE (D).—Ottoman Artillery.

	At Armistice.	Breech-blocks handed over.	Allowed.	Breech-blocks not handed over: still owing.
Heavy guns	1,224	1,028	24 heavy 72 medium	100
Mobile guns	636	340	160	136
Total	1,860	1,368	256	236

Note.—Not included in the "At Armistice" column are a certain number of Russian guns, mainly in the neighbourhood of Erzeroum.

SCHEDULE (E).—Ottoman Machine Guns.

At Armistice.	Handed over.	Allowed.	Not handed over.
3,080	2,164	240	676 (367 at Erzeroum)

SCHEDULE (F).—Estimate of the Arms Available to the Nationalists in Asia Minor.

Guns and Machine Guns.

1. Excluding the XIIIth Army Corps area (Diarbekr) and the XVIIth Army Corps area (Smyrna), both of which Army Corps have been only partially disarmed, there does not appear to be any appreciable number of machine guns available to the Nationalists, apart from the allowance to the regular army, except in the XVth Army Corps area (Erzeroum).

2. The XIVth Army Corps (Panderma), however, has still more than 100 machine guns to hand over, according to information received. But as none of these have turned up in front of the Greeks it is possible to hope this discrepancy is an error.

3. *Rifles*.—No estimate possible.

4. *Ammunition*.—Excluding ammunition in the depots in Turkey in Europe, that in the Smyrna area, and the quantities stored at Derinje and Ismiet (which include a very large amount sent from Kutania), there is :—

Place.	S.A.A.	Shells.
	<i>Rounds.</i>	
Angora	10,000	..
Kastamouni	345,000	..
Kaisariye	300,000	..
Konia	2,930,000	34,000
Nigde	1,000,000	5,000
Karaman	310,000	..
Eregli	5,000	..
Kolozouhan	142,000	..
Afion Kara Hissar	496,000	5,600 cases of shells. (Also some quantities of explosives and bombs.)
Eskishehir	30,000 (and much more)	80,000
Erzeroum	11,884,000	..

5. There are definitely the following at Erzeroum and Van :—

Armament available at Erzeroum—

Heavy guns	300*
Field and mountain guns	66
Total guns	366
Machine guns	367
Rifles	13,771
Heavy shells	131,453
Field "	25,383
Mountain "	112,119
Total shells	268,955
Small arms ammunition rounds	11,884,000

* This includes a number of guns claimed by the Turks to be unserviceable, and never included in their returns.

At Van—

Heavy guns	2
Mountain guns	21
Rifles	3,661
Heavy shells	2,292
Field "	6,498
Mountain "	14,024
Total shells	22,814

6. The XIIIth Army Corps ammunition has been concentrated at Diarbekr—amount unknown, but probably considerable.

7. There are various small depots of ammunition not greatly affecting the result.

[151132]

No. 151.

Sir E. Crowe to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 2123. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 10, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1537 of the 8th November, recording the proceedings at the Supreme Council on that day, I have the honour to inform your Lordship in detail of the attitude adopted by me when the discussion on the report of the Smyrna Commission was resumed on the 10th November by the Council.

2. I began by observing that doubtless the text of the instructions given to the commissioners (see Mr. Balfour's despatch No. 1474 of the 31st July) gave considerable latitude to the Commission in drafting their report and more latitude, I ventured to think, than the Council really intended. What the Council presumably had in mind, was the investigation of various accusations made against the Greek troops and commanding officers by the Turks and from other sources as to action taken contrary to the orders of the senior allied naval officer by the occupation of certain towns and districts, and as to excesses and mas-acres. The Commission, after investigating the facts, was to present a report on them to the Council. The latter did not, however, intend that the Commission should report as to whether the Council were justified in giving the Greeks a mandate to occupy a certain area round Smyrna, or as to whether the Greeks should be allowed to continue to hold this mandate, until the whole question of Turkey should come before and be settled by the Peace Conference. The drafting of a report with so wide a scope would have involved many other considerations besides those of a purely military nature, and could hardly have been entrusted by the Conference to a purely military commission.

3. I suggested, therefore, that the report of the Commission might with advantage be considered by the Council virtually as falling into two separate parts: first, the facts as to the action of the Greek troops and the allegations against them, together with the assignment of responsibility for the facts; secondly, the more general conclusions as to the future attitude to be adopted towards the Greek occupation. Taking the second part first, I pointed out that this question had really been already settled by the Council themselves, and I recalled the following facts: As explained by M. Venizelos at the Council's sitting on the 8th November, he had on the 23rd June taken responsibility before the Council for ordering the Greek troops to make advances in various directions owing to serious and urgent reports which he was receiving as to organised Turkish concentrations. Between the 18th and 23rd June M. Venizelos had written four letters to M. Clemenceau on this matter, to none of which he received an answer, and he inferred from this that the Council did not disapprove his action. On the 16th July the Council heard M. Venizelos' case and, as a result of that meeting, M. Venizelos and M. Tittoni were brought to make an agreement regarding the dividing line between the Greek and Italian zones of occupation. This agreement had been approved by the Council on the 18th July, and communicated to General Milne, who had at the same time been commissioned by the Council to delimit afresh the zone of the Greek occupation. At the same meeting it was agreed to appoint an Inter-Allied commission of enquiry into the Smyrna incidents. General Milne had since recommended a certain line which he thought the Greeks could hold, except that in the angle formed by the boundary of the Smyrna sandjak and the Venizelos-Tittoni line (the angle including Aidin and the railway as far as Keuschik), General Milne suggested either that the Greek troops should advance from Aidin as far as the Kochak Chai, an

[1356]

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advance which might lead to further fighting, or that the angle should be occupied by Allied troops.

4. The Council approved General Milne's recommendations on the 7th October, agreeing that the angle should be occupied by Greek, French, and British troops. Virtually, therefore, the question whether the Greeks could be allowed to occupy a zone round Smyrna until the treaty of peace with Turkey came under discussion, and, if so, what the limits of this zone should be, had already been settled by the Council. M. Venizelos had, moreover, emphasised in conversation with me and informed the Council on the 8th November that the Greek army was now sufficiently strong to hold the zone delimited by General Milne, and he was confident that they could continue to do so.

5. At this juncture I took the opportunity of pressing M. Clemenceau to reconsider his decision not to send a French battalion to the Aidin area, in which I was indirectly supported by Mr. Polk, who pointed out that the alternative offered by General Milne, i.e., advance of Greek troops from Aidin to Kochak Chai (reoccupation by the Turks was unthinkable) might render the Council responsible for further fighting between the Turks and the Greeks. I was also supported by General Bunoust, the president of the Smyrna Commission who was present, and who felt convinced that the Turks would not attack again in the Aidin section if French and British troops were present. M. Clemenceau finally promised to give me a final decision on this point to-morrow, the 11th November, but did not hold out much hope that French troops could be sent. He was quite ready to assent to General Milne's alternative suggestion that the Greeks should remain in occupation.

6. I then returned to what might be termed the first part of the Commission's report. While in no way wishing to call in question the spirit of impartiality and sincerity with which the commissioners appeared to have conducted their enquiry, and while appreciating fully the value of the work which they had done, I could not refrain from sympathising with the reason which M. Venizelos had advanced on the 8th November to explain his inability to accept the conclusions of the commission's report, i.e., the fact that, without the knowledge or approval of the Supreme Council, neither the names of the Turkish witnesses nor their evidence had been communicated to the Greek representative. Possibly the reasons for adopting so secret a procedure might have been excellent, though it was difficult to see why the evidence itself, after the suppression of the names, could not have been placed before the Greek representative; but I could not help feeling that, if the more normal procedure in municipal courts of law had been followed, whereby the accused party would have been able to cross-examine the witnesses, or at any rate to have an opportunity of rebutting their evidence, some of the conclusions of the report might have been mitigated in favour of the Greeks. For the rest, however, and with the above reservation, I felt that the actual facts as regards the excesses and massacres, as recorded in the Commission's report, could be substantially accepted. Moreover, M. Venizelos himself, I ventured to think, accepted them in the main. He had himself caused enquiries to be held and the guilty punished, as the report itself pointed out, and General Bunoust, who was present, confirmed this. Lastly, I observed that for a considerable period order had been re-established and reigned both in Smyrna and the neighbourhood, though not, of course, on the fringes of the Greek occupation, where their troops were in touch with the Turks. Even here it might be hoped that the result of General Milne's recent work might effect a material change for the better.

7. My views appeared to be generally accepted by the Council and it was agreed that a letter should be written by M. Clemenceau to M. Venizelos, saying that, while the Council sympathised with M. Venizelos' attitude in the matter of the procedure adopted by the Commission, they were impressed with the serious facts brought to their notice in the Commission's report—facts the accuracy of which seemed substantially to be proved, and concluding by urging prudence and restraint on the Greeks, and by repeating that their occupation of this area was provisional pending the final decisions of the Peace Conference regarding Turkey.

8. I venture to transmit for your Lordship's confidential information a copy of a memorandum written by Mr. Philip Kerr for Mr. Balfour's information in July last, after a perusal of the proceedings of the Council of Four, and a dossier of papers communicated to him by M. Venizelos. This memorandum contains evidence which I venture to think tells materially in M. Venizelos' favour as regards various occasions on which the Greek troops were said to have advanced without the authority of the Council or of the S.N.O. at Smyrna. Much of this evidence was not, of course, available to the Smyrna Commission, and as it refers to proceedings of the original

Council of Four, which are supposed to be and remain absolutely secret, I could not well bring it to the attention of the Council now. A copy of a further memorandum by Mr. Forbes Adam comparing *in extenso*, as regards two cases of alleged unauthorised advances by the Greeks, the Commission's report with the evidence of M. Venizelos, as given to Mr. Kerr, and bringing the matter up to date, is also enclosed. These papers may serve to give further reasons which led me to adopt the attitude before the Council which I have set forth above.

I have, &c.

EYRE A. CROWE.

[151671]

No. 152.

Memorandum.

WITHIN an hour of the arrival of the French Presidential party in London, M. Pichon attended, by appointment, to see me in the Foreign Office. He was accompanied by M. de Fleuriau. Our conversation, which lasted for more than an hour, covered all the more important questions connected with the Near and Middle East.

After a mutual exchange of friendly sentiments and sincere intentions, M. Pichon proceeded to describe the situation as it was in Paris.

The information which he gave about the state of negotiations with the Emir Feisal was much more sanguine than that which had been reported to us by our own informants. I could not help thinking that it was considerably coloured by hope. He said nothing about the suspension of negotiations between the Emir and M. Clemenceau; on the contrary, he described their correspondence and intercourse as being of the most amicable character. He said nothing of the appeal of the Emir to the Peace Conference, although at the moment I had that appeal in my possession. He said nothing about any difficulties arising out of the military evacuation, which had already begun; nor did he say anything about the prospect of danger in the wider field of Syria as a whole. Instead, he represented the Emir as gradually receding from the position which he had at first taken up; as having put forward extravagant pretensions, which were now being watered down; and as realising by degrees that he had taken himself much too seriously, and probably might not find the support, even in his own country, upon which he relied. M. Pichon evidently desired to give me the impression that the negotiations with Emir Feisal would ultimately eventuate in the manner which the French desired.

I did not dispute this rosy estimate of the situation, although it was far from corresponding with the information I had received from Paris. The important thing to my mind, was that the French and the Emir should not split asunder, and should continue their conversations to a point at which some sort of agreement might be arrived at.

The French Foreign Minister was emphatic in his declaration that any suspicion of our intentions and attitude had been removed, and in his satisfaction at the evidence to that effect which we had supplied, both to his own Government and to the Emir. He clearly did not think that the case was one in which we, at any rate, were likely to quarrel.

While reciprocating his hopes, I expressed the strongest possible view that the real danger was that a situation might arise in which the Emir, if he could not come to terms with the French, would so manage matters that our two nations were brought into disagreement, if not into collision, while he remained outside as *tertius gaudens*.

M. Pichon went on to say that America having disappeared from the scene as a factor in the settlement of the East, and all chance of an American mandate for any portion of the Turkish Empire having, in his opinion, vanished, there remained only two parties whose interests had seriously to be considered and reconciled, namely, Great Britain and France. From this point of view, he was authorised to say that his Government were prepared to enter into confidential discussions with us as soon as we pleased. Either M. Clemenceau would come here alone, or he would come with M. Pichon, or he would depute the latter. In any case, conversations must take place, and an understanding must be arrived at, before the Peace Conference addressed itself to the Turkish question.

I accepted with gratification both the necessity of such an interchange of views and the desirability of a meeting with M. Clemenceau. I pointed out to M. Pichon

that, quite apart from the larger question of peace with Turkey, there were matters connected with the Emir Feisal's case which could be settled only by some such discussion. There was, for instance, the question of the eastern boundary line of the coastal area in Syria which we were now evacuating, in order that we might be replaced by the French. This had been defined in Paris as the Sykes-Picot line. Had the matter been more carefully thought out, the boundary suggested would in all probability have been the military frontier line of O.E.T.A., since between that line and the Sykes-Picot line were tracts of country and villages which the British troops had not occupied, but had left to the Arabs, and where the intrusion of French forces, if they appeared prematurely upon the scene, might be fraught with serious danger. I myself thought that the military frontier ought to be the limit of provisional military occupation by the French. Then, I said, there were in addition such questions as the division of the subsidy to Emir Feisal between the French and ourselves; the control of the railways; the replacement of British by Arab troops in the areas into which the French were not to advance; the risks of risings or disorders there; and the future boundaries of the protected areas in the Syrian State: all of which questions must be considered and agreed upon by the French and ourselves. They were all of them sources of possible mischief, and the sooner they were examined and composed, the better.

But, I went on to say, there was a much larger issue than the mere settlement of these questions by negotiation or otherwise between the French and ourselves; there was a much larger question than even that of the mandates for Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine—although of course it was highly desirable that these mandates should be arranged, and that we should all settle down to work in these countries as soon as possible. I referred to the peace with Turkey itself, and here I desired to go a good deal beyond the suggestion of the French Minister, and to submit to him a definite proposal on behalf of His Majesty's Government. I understood that the proceedings of the Conference in Paris dealing with the Peace Treaties, so far as they had at present gone, and the matters arising out of them, were likely to be brought to a close about the end of the present month. There seemed to be a general desire that the Conference in its present form should then dissolve. Why, I asked, should it not meet again, perhaps in another form and in another place, to deal with the Turkish question? The idea which had hitherto seemed to find favour was this: that the Conference, having completed its present labours, would take a holiday; that, when the French elections were completed, it would meet again, probably in Paris; and that, some time in the early part, possibly not till the spring, of next year some sort of agreement about Turkey might, it was hoped, be reached. I earnestly deplored any such postponement. By next spring, I said, there might very likely be no Turkish Government to deal with at all. It was more than possible that there would be no one to accept the sort of treaty which the Allies would desire to impose. It was even conceivable that the defeated Turk, who would then be one of the few parties on the scene with a serious force available, would declare war upon the Allies, and dare them to enforce their terms. If this were the case, I did not see how we were to conquer Asia Minor, or who was to do it; and the ignominious result might be that the weakest and most abject of our foes would end by achieving the greatest triumph. Why then, I asked, should not the Conference meet at an early date next month? It might very well meet after the conversations with the French statesmen in London. For the best part of ten months the British and other foreign statesmen had been willing to reside almost continuously in Paris. The conditions of political life here rendered this no longer possible. The Prime Minister could not go to Paris again for any length of time. It was very difficult for me to go there at all. In this country were to be found most of the experts who were familiar with the Eastern question. The French and Italian Ambassadors were themselves both experts, having served as Ambassadors in Constantinople. M. Tittoni, I knew, was willing to come here. The American Government would, I believed, agree to send a representative here. In these circumstances, would it not be desirable to arrange at once that the Eastern question should be reserved for London, and taken up and determined here? My own impression was that, if this idea were favourably regarded, a settlement might be arrived at in a month, or not much more. The Conference, if it met in December, might, if necessary, adjourn for Christmas, meet again early in January, and complete its work by the middle of that month.

I enumerated to the French Foreign Minister the main headings of the subjects which would have to be decided. They were, it seemed to me, the following: the future of Turkey-in-Europe and the setting up of some form of administration or control in Constantinople, whether or not the Sultan was left in Stamboul; the question

whether Greece was or was not to be allowed to remain in Smyrna; the question whether Italy was to have any foothold in Asia Minor or not; the question whether a mandate was to be given to any Power or Powers, either for the whole of the Turkish Empire or for any portion of it; the degree of sovereignty, if any, to be left to the Turk; the question whether, if no mandate were given or accepted, some form of international supervision would, or would not, be required; the supervision of the Caucasus; the restitution of Armenia; and the future of Kurdistan. These were matters that required to be handled, quite apart from those questions the solution of which had to some extent been prejudged, such as the fate of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. Upon these latter questions, the kind of understanding between France and ourselves which M. Pichon had predicated was most desirable. If we could attain it at the conversations which he had suggested, we might then approach the larger problems with some hopes of success.

M. Pichon explained to me in reply that this was an entirely new proposal, which he would, upon his return to France, submit without delay to the Président du Conseil. He did not himself regard it with disfavour, but he feared that there might be obstacles in the way. For instance, he described to me the system of elections going on simultaneously or in rapid sequence in almost every electoral area and for almost every conceivable elected body in France. He personally was standing, or was affected, in four or five different places and capacities. France would not be quit of these preoccupations till the middle of January, and it might therefore till then be very difficult for French statesmen to go abroad for a discussion. Nevertheless, he promised to put forward the suggestion, with which I told him that M. Cambon had for long been in warm sympathy, and he would let me have an early reply.

In the evening of the same day I mentioned the matter to the President of the French Republic. His attitude, although most friendly and polite, seemed to me on the whole to be antagonistic to the project.

I was left with the impression that the French will fight hard, for many reasons which can be conjectured, to retain in Paris the entire proceedings of the Peace Conference, and to represent France as the only possible or effective pacificator of the world.

I did not conceal from M. Pichon that we should find the greatest difficulty in acceding to any such plan, and I impressed upon him that the proposal I had put forward was one deserving the most serious consideration.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Foreign Office, November 12, 1919.

[152008]

No. 153.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 2045.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 2, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship a report on the political situation in the Samsoun area by the control officer at that place, which has been communicated to me by the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea.

2. I would invite your Lordship's attention specially to the sixth paragraph of this report, as it bears on a consideration to which I have already had the honour to refer in a previous despatch (my No. 1836 of the 10th October, paragraphs 20 and 21)—the fact that the security of the Christians in the interior of Turkey is dependent upon the goodwill of the Turks, and that, if it is proposed to impose drastic and "humiliating" peace terms on this country, it is essential that the Powers should, in the first place, take adequate measures to protect the Christian inhabitants from the effects of Turkish resentment.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 153.

Report on the Political Situation in the Samsoun Area.

THE situation in the Samsoun sanjak is good. When the news of the change of Cabinet arrived it created very little interest among the population.

The Mutessarif, Hamid Bey, has gone off on a supposed brigand-hunting expedition to Uniya and Fatsa, and Lieutenant Popplewell is paying a visit to the same places in order to discover the real object, if not that given, of the Mutessarif's visit.

Military officers, of whom several have arrived recently from the interior and from Constantinople, of the latter, notably a certain Riza Pasha, who appears to be an agitator, still talk of very little but politics and the future of Turkey, and consider themselves the saviours of the country, comparing the present movement with that of the Constitution.

The very few really intelligent Turkish inhabitants look upon these men with distrust, and ask for nothing better than a British protection for the country. The common people do not think, but will follow any lead that is given to them, provided that military service is not required of them.

The military party has well organised a gendarmerie of surrendered Turkish and Lazz brigands; but beyond these and the few troops that it already possesses could not mobilise many of the inhabitants against a European force, although the inhabitants are well armed and would join in a massacre of Christians with great pleasure.

There is a very strong anti-Christian feeling, that is held within bounds by the military party and by important civil officials, who do not consider the present moment a very suitable one for such a feeling to express itself in action. But, if this control were taken away, and the slightest encouragement given to the people, massacres in the interior would take place without fail. Four Greeks were killed recently by Turks at Ladik.

The departure of the British troops from Samsoun encouraged to a considerable extent the supporters of the Sivas movement, who published the statement that they had forced this evacuation. Local C.U.P. Turks were also inclined to become more obnoxious than usual; but the visit of the "Iron Duke" and a few words of advice decided them to behave better.

The Sivas Congress is not so violently anti-British as it was some time ago; and I believe that the anti-British feeling was chiefly due to fear that the British authorities would take offensive action against them. The anti-British element is chiefly composed of old C.U.P. men and escaped prisoners. Halil Pasha and Kotchuk Djemal Pasha are among them.

Generally speaking, the most satisfactory solution of the Turkish question that can possibly be obtained by the Turks is considered to them to be the evacuation of Smyrna and Adalia, and a British or American mandate for the whole of Anatolia with no cession of territory to Armenia. Retention of Smyrna by the Greeks is considered to be a possible danger, and cession of territory to Armenia a certain danger of an uprising.

Control Officer, Samsoun.

October 16, 1919

[152025]

No. 154.

Vice Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 14).

(No. 2066.)
My Lord.

Constantinople, November 4, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to report that a few days ago I visited the Sublime Porte in order to return the visit of Mustapha Reshid Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. There was nothing of particular interest in the conversation, except that I took the opportunity to question him as to the accuracy of a report I had seen in that morning's paper, to the effect that Mustapha Kemal had telegraphed to the Government demanding that the new Parliament should be summoned to meet at Broussa, and not at Constantinople, so that in conducting their deliberations they might be free from certain undesirable foreign influences. His Excellency hastened to assure me that he knew nothing of any such message. I suggested that if the idea were adopted it would imply the practical transference of the capital to Broussa, but Reshid Pasha

explained that the constitution provided for the event of the Parliament being held in any part of the country, and on my further enquiring whether the Sultan would proceed to Broussa to inaugurate the new Chamber, he hastened to reply that the basic law provided for this eventuality also. His Excellency was evidently much perturbed at the insinuation I had made to him, and which I have no doubt whatever is correct—in fact it has received confirmation by the present moment—that Mustapha Kemal has made such a proposal, and in very strong terms.

2. I have the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum which has been written by Mr. Hohler on the question of the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople. I am entirely in concurrence with his views.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 154.

Memorandum by Mr. T. B. Hohler.

THE idea of convening the Turkish Parliament at Broussa is perhaps one which may be contemplated with favour. We here are in entire ignorance of the real intentions, which at the time of writing may already have become decisions of the Peace Conference, but it must be permitted to believe that the Turkish Empire will be whittled down to Asia Minor, and not even very probably to the entirety of that; that the vast regions of Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Thrace, and the islands will pass under another rule; whilst compliance with an interpretation of the Wilsonian principles may result in the formation of Greek and Kurdish independent States in the West and in the East; and that the Grand Seigneur, whose pompous titles used to fill the first two pages of any treaty he thought fit to conclude, will be reduced to the status of a petty provincial ruler, with a certain dubious title to a religious leadership.

2. The city of Constantinople is Imperial, both by its geographical position and its historical traditions, and not in all its annals, except in the times of the palaeology, has it been reduced to such a state of impotence and wretchedness as now. Only in the last few months the writ of its rulers practically could not run beyond its walls, and of the very buildings in Stamboul it may be safely stated that nearly two-thirds lie in ruins, the result of the devastating fires that have occurred during the last few years. Pera and Galata have remained comparatively unscathed, but these districts are the homes of a cosmopolitan crowd, which gives its character to the town far more than does the Turkish population—comprised largely of refugees huddled together in the mosques and medresses and glad to find shelter in any of the old vaults of Byzantium which have become exposed by the flames. It seems unsuitable that the ruler of a third-rate kingdom in Asia should still possess so great a capital, the very upkeep of which is beyond his means as is being proved at this very time; it is as if a petty landowner, whose farm and buildings were in complete dilapidation, should endeavour to occupy and to maintain from family pride some noble old historic castle. Again, if there is any certain lesson to be derived from history, it is that the Turk is incapable of governing even himself, to say nothing of other races, and it is necessary to go no further than Constantinople to obtain at once abundant proof of his maladministration.

3. I cannot find that there is, in actual fact, any real basis for the argument which has of late been frequently advanced that Constantinople is in any way whatever a Holy City of Islam. The edifice of Santa Sophia is merely the symbol of the Turkish conquest of the Greek Empire, and it is no more the symbol of this than is the tenure of Constantinople itself as a whole, and the fane is venerated by the Turks as such, but it is no object of pilgrimage and has no peculiar sanctity for other Turkish Moslems. The only two spots in the city which are held genuinely sacred are the two shrines: the one is the old seraglio in which the relics of the Prophet are preserved, and which the Sultan only is allowed to visit, but which owes its sanctity merely to the presence of the relics; and the other, the alleged tomb—spurious, however, and nothing more than a pious fraud—on the upper waters of the Golden Horn, of Eyoub, who was a companion of the Prophet, and who fell in the Arab attack on Byzantium in 675. Apart from these, the mosques and other religious buildings, splendid as many of them are, have no sanctity beyond that which attaches to all time-honoured places of worship in all countries; the sentiments of pride and of affection of

[1356]

2 U

the Turks would be hurt by seeing these places fall from their control, but not those of piety or religious fervour.

4. It is frequently stated, though there is considerable difficulty in determining with how much truth, that the Turks do not know or will not admit that they have been conquered. It is highly desirable that they should not be left with the slightest illusion in this respect, and nothing will bring it home to them with such force as to deprive them of their capital. The Sultanate is now become a very tawdry hollow show, and the present sovereign, a man apparently of high principles and aspirations, though of weak character and little courage, and who is entirely averse to the working of the Nationalist party who have brought him into his present position, sits trembling in Yildiz, bereft of all such brilliancy as still existed in the time of Abdul Hamid, and fearful lest some other accident similar to that which occurred in the early summer when the kiosk in which he was sleeping burst into flames, the doors were locked, and His Imperial Majesty escaped in his night clothes through the window, may deprive him of his throne and his life. The house of Osman seems to be exhausted, and there would seem to be no prince who possesses the talents or the energy for ruling his people. But from its very foundation, Constantinople has been the home of conspiracy and intrigue, and it is natural to believe that the scheming which will inevitably grow up among the various minor Moslem States which are about to come into being in the Levant as a result of the disruption of the Turkish Empire is likely to find a more propitious soil in Constantinople than if the seat of the Sultanate, and perhaps also of the Caliphate, were to be transferred to the clearer atmosphere and more peaceful traditions of Broussa, the early capital of the Turks. It appears to me there is danger of over-estimating the shock to Mussulman feeling at large by the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople, and I believe there is greater risk, in reality, in leaving them there to brood over their fallen greatness; they understand no treatment but that of force, and they are fairly prepared now to receive a violent shock, and it can hardly be detrimental that the Mussulmans at large should be given clearly to perceive that it is entirely disadvantageous to stand against the British Government.

5. The difficulties that beset the question of the Government of the town, should it be taken from the Turks, are obvious, and whilst there seems to be no solution save that of placing it under an international régime, the example of Tangier stands as a warning of the deplorable results of a divided control. Still it should not be beyond human ingenuity—if indeed it prove impossible to place it under a single mandatory—to devise some scheme by which an equable and practical administration may be created that will give liberty and justice to the motley population and the varied interests centred here.

6. Even should it not seem advisable to His Majesty's Government to take the present opportunity to eliminate the Turk from Europe straightaway, even then Constantinople might be held as a hostage, subject to the will of the captor, should there be any recalcitrance in accepting the terms of the Treaty of peace, however harsh or distasteful these may be.

T. B. HOHLER.

[152026]

No. 155.

Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 2067.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 4, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a report on the situation in Transcaucasia which has been prepared by Lieutenant-Commander H. C. Luke, R.N.V.R., of the Staff of the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

2. As the messenger is leaving for England within an hour, there has not been time to copy the report, and one copy only is therefore enclosed.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 155.

Report on the Situation in Transcaucasia.

"Iron Duke" at Constantinople,

November 2, 1919.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on the present political and general situation in Transcaucasia, made as the result of my recent visit to that country.

2. Transcaucasia, that is to say the region bounded on the north by the main Caucasus chain and on the south by the old Russo-Turkish and Russo-Persian frontiers, is at present divided into four separate territories, namely, the three republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Russian Armenia (sometimes called the Ararat Republic), and the province of Batum, which is under British military administration. There are also various small neutral zones, composed of districts in dispute between Georgia and Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijan and Armenia, which do not require separate enumeration. The mountainous region known as Daghestan does not form a part of Transcaucasia, but will be referred to in this report in so far as it is concerned with Transcaucasian affairs.

3. The separation of Transcaucasia from Russia dates from the assumption of power in Russia by the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks having surrendered Batum and Ardahan to the Turks, the Georgians, considering those districts to be Georgian, decided to break away from Russia, and with the Tartars and Armenians formed the joint Transcaucasian Republic. This Republic shortly afterwards split up into the three republics of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, with capitals respectively at Tiflis, Baku, and Erivan.

The British military province of Batum owes its origin to clause 15 of the Armistice with Turkey, Batum having been at the time of the conclusion of the Armistice in Turkish military occupation.

4. The crucial question in Transcaucasia, a question on which all other problems in the country are dependent, is that of the recognition or otherwise of the independence of the three republics by the Peace Conference. The question has multitudinous aspects, conditions in the three States differing widely, but there are two facts common to the situation, namely:

- (1.) Recognition, if granted, will run counter to the aims of Denikin and Kolchak for an "Undivided Russia."
- (2.) Recognition must necessarily be accompanied by a mandate in order to protect the three States both from re-conquest by Russia, and from internecine warfare.

5. Before submitting any observations as to British policy with regard to recognition, I propose to outline briefly political conditions in the three republics severally.

GEORGIA.

Of the three States, Georgia has had the longest continuous independent existence, and perhaps the most pronounced national consciousness. She has a distinct language, script, and an ancient literature, and an independent national Church co-extensive with the kingdom. Kingdom and Church were forcibly absorbed by Russia in 1801, but they never abandoned the hope of recovering independence. When Georgia declared her independence of Russia in 1918, the Church of Georgia similarly renounced its dependence on the Church of Russia, and, while remaining in full communion with the Russian and other Orthodox Churches, has resumed its status of an "autocephalous" and independent Church.

The present Georgian Government is Social Democrat, but anti-Bolshevik. The Georgian people are probably much more conservative than their Government, and it is thought that at the forthcoming elections the parties of the Right will be far more strongly represented than they are in the present Constituent Assembly.

The instinct of the Georgian people is naturally sympathetic to any Power that is opposed to the Bolsheviks, with whom they have nothing in common. Any manifestation of Bolshevism in Georgia is rigidly suppressed, and the bulk of the Bolshevik agents in the country are Russians and Jews, not Georgians. On the other hand, Georgians are in a quandary as regards Denikin. They sympathise with him in his war against Bolshevism, but they cannot but regard him as the principal

[1356]

2 U 2

opponent of their independence. Denikin has made it abundantly clear that an independent Georgia is incompatible with what he is fighting for, namely, an undivided Russia; so to the Georgians, the ultimate success of Denikin means the end of their independence, unless some mandatory intervenes to preserve it.

With Azerbaijan, Georgian relations are on the whole cordial, despite several points of difference, mainly commercial. Georgia has, for example, lent the Azerbaijan army a number of her officers; and both countries are united by a common dread of reincorporation by Russia, and to a lesser degree, by a common dislike of their mutual neighbour, Armenia.

As regards the latter, Georgian antipathy is directed against Armenians individually rather than against the Armenian Republic. Georgia is quite capable of making common cause with Armenia and Azerbaijan for the purpose of preserving Transcaucasian independence as against Russia. She probably dislikes the Armenians within her own borders more than those beyond them, the reason being that the bulk of the wealth of the country has found its way into Armenian pockets.

All the best houses in Tiflis are owned by Armenians; and although the Armenian Republic is as a neighbour somewhat of a *mauvais coucheur*, Georgia is inclined to see in its existence a means of ridding herself of a number of unwelcome guests.

To the Turks the Christian Georgians, who form the overwhelming majority of the race, are unhesitatingly hostile. Moslem Georgians living in Batum province have bonds of sympathy with the Turks, but carry no political weight. At the same time, there is said to be a Georgian representative at the headquarters of Mustafa Kemal, the reason doubtless being that Georgia, in her desperate eagerness for independence, is prepared to accept recognition wherever she can get it. This reason also explains Georgia's friendly relations with Germany prior to the German collapse. Germany, aware of the importance of Georgia's geographical position on the direct route to Persia, Afghanistan, and India, bargained with her ally Turkey to secure Georgian independence, which she was the first officially to recognise; and even now Germany is making efforts to capture Georgian sympathy and Georgian trade. Her argument to Georgia is as follows: "Russia and Germany are bound to come together once Russia has been reconstituted. Russia will need German help, and Germany will make the independence of Georgia one of the conditions on which she will afford that help. In return, Germany asks for the monopoly of the concessions granted by Georgia." Quite recently, again, Germany has invited Georgia to send 300 Georgian children to Germany, to be educated free of charge in German schools.

AZERBAIJAN.

The national or separatist movement in Azerbaijan is of much more recent growth than in Georgia or Armenia. It was, in fact, unheard of until 1917, when Georgia took the lead in the idea of separation from Russia; and from the purely ethnological point of view there seems to be no more reason for the separate existence of the Tatars of Baku than of any similar group of Tatars elsewhere. But the idea of independence has by now taken deep root; and the Azerbaijanis, while very friendly to the Russian people, and while anxious for economic reasons to be on good terms with Russia, who is their natural customer, would be prepared to fight rather than go back to the old régime of incorporation with a centralising Russia.

The members of the two principal political parties in Azerbaijan, the Musavat and the Itahad, belong to the property and land-owning classes, and are anti-Bolshevist. Their attitude to Denikin is thus similar to that of Georgia, namely, sympathetic so far as his fight against Bolshevism is concerned, suspicious as regards his Pan-Russian aims.

Relations between Azerbaijan and Denikin have not been improved by the latter's policy in Daghestan. Azerbaijan alleges that all Daghestan south of Petrovsk was originally allotted to her by the British military authorities; and the fact that Denikin has now occupied that region, and has proceeded to conscript the Moslem population (which under the Tsarist régime was exempt from conscription) has caused risings in the country which Azerbaijan (and Georgia) are unofficially abetting. Towards the end of October, Denikin notified Azerbaijan that he would not tolerate the Azerbaijanli flag on the Caspian, and this, together with the events in Daghestan, has caused much alarm at Baku, where it is feared that an attack by Denikin may be impending.

The natural dislike of the Azerbaijanis to the Armenians is made use of by the Turks and the Kurds, who do their best to incite them to attack Armenian

villages and massacre their inhabitants. This they do in the belief that, the smaller the number of Armenians in the world, the smaller will be the territory to be transferred from Turkey to Armenia.

There is a certain amount of sympathy for Turkey in Azerbaijan, but the feeling, due largely to pan-Islamic propaganda, is sentimental rather than practical. It is discounted to a considerable extent by the fact that three-quarters of the Moslems of Azerbaijan are Shiah, and only one-quarter Sunni; and the Azerbaijanis, who are a practical people, are well aware that Turkey is not in a position to do anything for them. This does not prevent them from making use of Turkish officers to stiffen their army.

It should be added that the republic of Azerbaijan has no connection with the Persian province of the same name. The inhabitants of the Persian province of Azerbaijan are Tatars also, but there is no question of their withdrawing from Persian rule and joining the republic.

ARMENIA.

The Republic of Armenia, as it exists at present, lies entirely within what was formerly Russian territory, but it is understood that three schemes for its ultimate boundaries have been propounded. These schemes are:—

- (1.) Nubar Pasha's project of a vast Armenia running from the Black Sea and Persian frontier to the Mediterranean at Alexandretta. In this area the Armenians form only about 3 per cent. of the total population.
- (2.) The "Six Vilayets" scheme, namely the existing Armenia with the vilayets of Sivas, Erzerum, Kharput (Mamuret-el-Aziz), Diarbekr, Bitlis and Van.
- (3.) The so-called "Erivan project," namely existing Armenia with the vilayet of Erzerum, that part of the vilayet of Trebizond east of Kerasund, and roughly the portions of the vilayets of Van and Bitlis north of the 30th parallel of latitude.

The latter more modest project, which corresponds more closely to the realities of the situation, is said to be that advocated by the leaders of the present Armenian Republic.

The President of Armenia, M. Hatissian, is a wealthy Georgian Armenian, who has been a successful Mayor of Tiflis, and has with commendable patriotism left Georgia and his business in order to devote himself to the new Armenia. In politics he is a moderate man, but unfortunately his colleagues are mostly members of the Dashnak party, which controls and even terrorises the Government. The Dashnakists showed much heroism in the field, in leading the Volunteer Bands against the Turks, and thereby securing such independence as Armenia has already won, but in politics their influence is pernicious. They are intensely socialistic, they aim at the nationalisation of land, and by threats and blackmail they are intimidating the prosperous *bourgeois* Armenians of Tiflis, Baku, Rostov, Batum, &c., from entering the country, fearing that with the influx of a wealthy class of superior education they would lose their political supremacy and their monopoly of Government posts. It is evident that the Dashnakists prefer a small and chaotic Armenia controlled by themselves to a settled Armenia which would attract the better and more constructive elements of the Armenian race.

6. The one point upon which all persons with whom I spoke in Transcaucasia were unanimous—such persons including British officers, British civilians with long experience of Russia, and natives—was that, whatever its future, Russia would inevitably come under German commercial and political influence. There is no question of doubting the *bona fides* of General Denikin and Admiral Kolchak, or the sincerity of their anti-German feeling. It is the conviction of all those with whom I came in contact that whether Bolshevism prevails or is extinguished, the permeation of Russia by Germany is equally certain. Russia, it is said, will need support of a kind which only a neighbour such as Germany can give her, and not even the gratitude which a reconstituted anti-Bolshevik Russia should owe to Great Britain would be able to prevent a close Russo-German association, if not a positive alliance. Again, it is evident that reconstituted Russia will make every effort not only to recover Transcaucasia, but also to resume her pre-war activities in Persia. At this very moment M. Sazonof is said to be seeking to obtain for Russian interests certain extensive timber concessions in north-west Persia; moreover a strong Russia

of the future will find it difficult to forgive the Anglo-Persian agreement. If this is admitted, the wisdom from the British point of view of detaching Transcaucasia from Russia, and from German influence, can scarcely be doubted, not so much on account of the wealth of the country, as on account of creating a buffer between a more or less Germanised Russia on the one hand, and Persia, Mesopotamia, and India on the other. In other words, the strong desire of the Transcaucasian peoples for independence of Russia coincides with what seem to be the true interests of British policy.

The existence in some form or other of an independent Armenia is presumably a foregone conclusion; Georgia has already been assured of the sympathy of His Majesty's Government; the completion of the Transcaucasian buffer by the inclusion of Azerbaijan would not seem, therefore, to involve any departure from accepted principle.

7. If the three States are to be recognised it will be necessary, as stated above, that they should be placed under one mandatory Power, both to preserve them from reconquest by Russia and to prevent them from becoming a second Balkans. It would not seem desirable that the mandatory should be Great Britain, for whoever takes the mandate will incur the hostility of Russia. Moreover, we have no need to control Caucasian produce, the bulk of which, namely, the oil, can have no other market than Russia. The United States, with her well-known sentimental interest in the Armenians and her less widely advertised but equally keen interest in Caucasian trade, would seem from the British point of view the most desirable mandatory, as being best able to bear the brunt of Russian hostility. But if she can be induced to accept the mandate it should not be a nominal American mandate in which the bulk of the work as performed by British officers lent to the United States for the purpose. In such a case the blame for any mistakes would tend to fall on the British officers, the kudos for success to be monopolised by the mandatory Power.

8. It cannot be said that the Americans at present officially employed in the Caucasus have given those with whom they have worked or come in contact a very favourable impression of American methods. Colonel Haskell, the Allied High Commissioner, who is said to have been the nominee of Mr. Hoover, has antagonised not only Transcaucasians, but his own subordinates, by his tactlessness, his overbearing methods, and his disinclination to remedy his ignorance of local conditions by consulting persons acquainted with the country. It is believed in Tiflis that his departure is due to General Harbord's recommendation for his recall. Colonel Rhea, U.S.A., is at present replacing him as Acting High Commissioner.

The unofficial relief organisation known as the A.C.R.N.E. (American Committee for Relief in the Near East) has lately been taken over by an official military body known as the N.E.R. (Near East Relief), which is controlled by the United States army. The army officers who have been sent out in charge of this organisation seem to have made themselves very disliked by the natives, and there is also a good deal of friction between them and the remaining volunteer workers belonging to the A.C.R.N.E. They have the reputation of being extremely dictatorial and brusque in their methods of dealing with the people, and they appear to disdain to learn anything of native habits or ways of thought. The officers I met in Armenia bear out this reputation. Their organisation of relief work, judging from what I saw of it at Erivan, and from what I have heard there and elsewhere in Armenia, leaves much to be desired. They appear to combine relief work with business; their flour is sold to the Armenian Government at a profit which I have heard estimated as high as 400 per cent., and their staff includes experts in oil and cotton. An English mining engineer long resident in the Caucasus told me that he had recently been invited by a N.E.R. officer to undertake on his behalf the Georgia agency for the purchase of women's hair.

It is only fair to say that several of the Americans realise their lack of qualifications to deal with Eastern races, and openly express the hope that if the United States accepts the Transcaucasian mandate she will be able to rely on the loan of British officers with Eastern experience.

There is an impression in Tiflis that General Harbord's recommendation is in favour of an American mandate for Transcaucasia, provided that it is accompanied by the mandate for Turkey.

9. The Italian missions in the country are nothing more or less than commercial agents for Germany, a fact of which everyone in Transcaucasia is fully aware. Their purpose is to obtain timber, mining, and railway concessions from the three republics.

I learned from a reliable source in Baku that at the time when the question of

an Italian mandate for the Caucasus was under consideration the Italian terms as regards Azerbaijan included the following:—

- (1.) The forced substitution of Italian paper lire for the local currency at the rate of 40 roubles to the paper lira.
- (2.) The collection by Italy of all royalties on oil exported from Baku.
- (3.) The appropriation by Italy of 50 per cent. of the shares of each of the oil companies working at Baku.

10. Another instrument of German propaganda is to be found in the wireless stations at Tiflis and Baku, which take in daily via Moscow a large quantity of German press news. The news, which appears to be just as offensive to the *Entente* as it was in war time, is published in full in the local newspapers. The stations are worked by the Georgian and Azerbaijan Governments respectively. When I enquired why no British press news was apparently taken in from Basra, it was stated, with what truth I cannot say, that it was because Basra messages were made too quickly to be understood by the local operators. The Moscow news is sent out so slowly that it can be taken in without difficulty.

In addition to the Georgian Government W/T Station at Tiflis the Italian mission has at Tiflis a receiving station.

The Armenian Government has a station at Erivan which is not yet in working order.

11. From the material point of view, as also in the interests of British trade, it is desirable that the fate of the Transcaucasian States should be settled as soon as possible. There are good openings for British capital in the country in the shape of mining, timber, and engineering enterprises, but until the republics are recognised, the exchange cannot be stabilised, and importation and exportation must remain suspended. The great need of the country is exchange on Europe, which in its present indeterminate position it cannot obtain.

The absence of a controlling authority able to deal with the conflicting interests of the three republics is also responsible for much overlapping in railway administration, and for mutually invidious treatment as regards the importation of goods. At present each of the three States insists on separately managing its own section of the Transcaucasian railways. There are unwise and vexatious Customs barriers, the train personnel changes at each frontier, and there is no pooling of the scanty rolling-stock. This inability to combine in a direction where combination would be so obviously beneficial to all concerned would no doubt be at once corrected by the mandatory Power. Similarly the mandatory Power would prevent Georgia from putting, as she is doing at present, every obstacle in the way of supplies entering Armenia, such supplies having to pass in transit through Georgia. She would also no doubt put a stop to the present practice whereby the politicians in control of Azerbaijan are enriching themselves at the expense of the poor by forcing up the prices of the necessities of life, thus unconsciously encouraging Bolshevism.

12. The present position of the oil industry at Baku is briefly as follows:—

Some 160 firms are working in the district, but 85 per cent. of the total output is controlled by four groups, namely: Nobel Brothers, the Shell group, the Lianosoff group, and the Russian Société Neft, who in turn have certain working agreements between themselves in connexion with output, the use of the Transcaucasian pipeline, employment and payment of labour, &c.

The most powerful group is Nobel Brothers, who are not only producers, but also refiners and distributors on a large scale, and who, besides dealing with their own products, purchase from other producers, and have controlling interests in companies working in other parts of Russia. Nobel Brothers have their own fleet of sea-going tankers and river barges, the latter including motor-driven craft carrying up to 5,000 tons of oil in bulk.

The Nobels are a Swedish family established in Russia, but the bulk of the capital is, or was until quite recently, German. I heard, however, at Baku that a French group has just taken over a controlling interest (? from the Germans), but no definite details as to the deal were obtainable locally.

The Shell group, besides its own produce from the former Rothschild Companies at Baku, controls that of other companies at Grozni and in Transcaspia. It has numerous refineries, and through its subsidiary, the Société Mazut, which has large storage in all the principal Russian towns, as well as steamers and tank barges, in normal times does a large distributing business throughout Russia.

The Lianosoff group is financed by Russian banks with the assistance of the Russian and General Oil Trust, an Anglo-French concern. Quite recently Nobel Brothers have bought up a large number of the shares of this trust, which they now control to a certain extent.

The Russian Société Neft, originally a small distributor of naphtha products in Russia, and then a producer in the Baku district, has within the last six years expanded into a powerful group, with the aid of French capital provided through Messrs. Louis Dreyfus and Co., of Paris.

The Standard Oil Company has lately made an unsuccessful attempt to acquire a footing in the Baku district.

The overwhelming bulk of the Baku oil products is consumed in Russia. It cannot, except as regards lubricants, and to a certain extent, kerosene, compete further west with Roumania, Galician, and American products. The mazut is sent to Russia *via* the Volga, where it is used for fuel on the railways, &c. The bulk of the kerosene goes to Russia for home consumption, although a certain quantity is sent abroad *via* Batum, whither it is conveyed by the pipe-line. Baku oils are exceptionally rich in lubricants, of which large quantities are shipped abroad. On the other hand they give but small percentages of benzine and paraffin.

As no Baku oil now passes into Bolshevist Russia, storage accommodation at Baku is taxed to its utmost, and unless the Russian market is opened up before long, the producers will be faced with the alternatives of letting the oil run to waste or of closing down production. There are now stored at Baku 3,500,000 tons of oil, and the impossibility of procuring the necessary materials prevents the storage accommodation from being enlarged.

The difficulty in closing down production lies in the industrial crisis which would inevitably ensue. The labour employed at the Baku oil-fields amounts to 80,000 men, representing almost the entire industrial labour of Azerbaijan; and if these men were to be discharged, or were put on reduced wages owing to unemployment, the resulting industrial upheaval would have the most serious effects both on the oil-fields and on the country generally. The labour is composed almost equally of Tatars, Persians, and Armenians.

The normal output from the Baku area up to March 1918 was between 500,000 and 600,000 tons monthly. Since then it has dropped to somewhere between 300,000 and 350,000 tons. This decrease is partly intentional, but is also due in part to the exhaustion of the shallow depth oil through the flooding of the upper sources with water. Consequently deeper drilling is now necessary in order to tap the lower sources. These sources are apparently very rich, but deep drilling on a large scale must await the time when it is again possible to import the necessary machinery.

The Baku-Batum pipe-line is an 8-inch pipe running alongside the railway, with pumping-stations at intervals of 35 miles. The question of increasing the line has not been seriously considered, as the existing pipe can cope with the demand. It now conveys 2,000 tons daily, and can at full pressure convey 3,500 tons. The oil now stored at Batum amounts to 200,000 tons.

Much of the oil stored at Baku has been pledged to the Azerbaijan Government by the several companies in return for cash advances required by them for the payment of labour. Nobels are the only company that has hitherto been able to redeem its oil.

13. Shipping at Baku is at present nearly at a standstill. Astrachan is, of course, entirely cut off, Transcaspia practically so, and the only regular steamship communication is that provided by the Mercury Company with Petrovsk, Derbent, Lenkoran, and the Persian port of Enzeli. Dockyard activities are consequently negligible.

14. A word should be added as to the future of Batum province. Denikin is, of course, most anxious to take it over, but he could only do so (assuming that we were to evacuate it) at the cost of war with Georgia, and probably with Azerbaijan and Armenia as well. The fate of Batum is linked with that of Transcaucasia generally, and if it is decided to recognise the Transcaucasian republics, Batum must be united with the State of which ethnologically and geographically it is a part, namely Georgia. The only other possible claimant is Armenia, who might wish to control one end of the Transcaucasian railway, but ethnologically such a claim could not be substantiated.

As regards the armies of the Transcaucasian States, Georgia has an army of about 60,000, with over 5,000 officers. She has, in fact, more officers than she can at present employ.

The Azerbaijan army is thought to consist of about 20,000 regulars, with perhaps twice that number of irregulars.

The Armenian army consists of 20,000 regular troops, but only has uniforms for 1,000.

Each of these armies possesses several competent native generals who have seen service as generals in the old Russian army.

A certain number of Russian officers of Russian nationality is also employed in the Armenian army.

I have, &c.

H. C. LUKE, *Lieutenant-Commander, R.N.V.R.,*
Political Officer.

[152298]

No. 156.

India Office to Foreign Office. — (Received November 15.)

Sir,

India Office, November 14, 1919.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward for submission to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a translation of a note read by Ahmad-ibn-Thunaiyan on the occasion of the interview between the Nejd Mission and representatives of the Foreign Office and India Office on the 1st November.

Mr. Montagu would suggest that, with Lord Curzon's concurrence, the questions raised in this note might be considered at an early meeting of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Middle Eastern Affairs.

The hope was expressed at the interview that it might be possible to convey an answer to Ahmad-ibn-Thunaiyan as from His Majesty's Government at a further interview to be held before the departure of the mission from this country.

I am, &c.

L. D. WAKELY.

Enclosure in No. 156.

Note read to India Office and Foreign Office Joint Conference on behalf of Ibn Saud by Ahmad-bin-Thunaiyan, November 1, 1919.

(Translation.)

AS your Excellencies are aware, after the occurrence of the regrettable clash between the subjects of Ibn Saud and Shereef Abdullah, His Majesty's Government sent an official representation through their consul at Jedda to the effect that Ibn Saud and the Ikhwan had in defiance of the counsels of His Majesty's Government committed an act of aggression against the boundaries of the Hedjaz, that, if he did not retire and withdraw his troops from the Hedjaz, His Majesty's Government would treat him as an enemy and sever relations with him and discontinue his subsidy. Ibn Saud was distressed by the tenour of this representation and said: "What has caused His Majesty's Government to write thus?" seeing that he had frequently informed His Majesty's Government of the attitude of the Shereef and his acts of aggression against the territories of Nejd, and had gone so far as to request the despatch of a mission to solve the difficulties existing between him and the Shereef, declining responsibility therefore, and His Majesty's Government made no answer until the affair occurred, owing to the aggression of the Shereef against the territories of Nejd. He was disturbed at heart because he was hoping for suitable assistance from His Majesty's Government in accordance with the tenour of the agreement made between them and him, against all acts of aggression which may occur against his territories by land or sea.

And when the subjects of Ibn Saud drove the Shereef from the frontiers of his territories, he did not commit aggression against the Hedjaz, his only object being to please His Majesty's Government, and on our arrival in London we learned that His Majesty's Government had sent Mr. Philby by air to meet Ibn Saud, and had sent him a written communication to that effect, which did not reach him, while Mr. Philby returned.

Now the requests of Ibn Saud are as follows:—

1. The question of the protection of his independence and the avoidance of any interference in his internal affairs, and the realisation of all the provisions mentioned in

[1356]

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the preliminary agreement and its ratification anew on both sides with a view to giving effect to it.

2. If you honour us by asking us regarding the boundaries of Nejd, they are patent: to north-west Hanakiyya, to the south thereof Ashaira and the Hadhm range, and that which is beyond it (looking) from the Hedjaz, according to the dictum of the prophet: "Whose beholdeth the Hadhm is in Nejd"; and to the east of it Khurma and Turaba, and Ranya, and Bisha, and Tathlith. And we request His Majesty's Government again, as we have done before and frequently, to send a commission to delimit the boundary; if it is not sent the above are our boundaries, as we have explained in accordance with the instructions of Ibn Saud, and whoso transgresses them Ibn Saud will be bound to defend himself against him.

3. The question of the removal of the embargo on pilgrims from the people of Nejd. This year we abandoned the Haj at the request of His Majesty's Government, but if it is forbidden for the future we shall be obliged to perform the Haj as of obligation, and therefore we beg His Majesty's Government to make suitable arrangements, and we guarantee that there will be no disturbance by the subjects of Ibn Saud during the Haj in the territory of the Hedjaz, and we beg His Majesty's Government to take a guarantee from the Hedjaz Government that it will obstruct our subjects during the Haj.

4. The question of the enhancement of the original temporary subsidy and its continuance in perpetuity for the rehabilitation of his territories from the ruin caused by internal wars and during their occupation by the Turks, and on their behalf by Ibn Rashid for a period of nearly fifty years.

5. The question of the demarcation of the boundary and of the despatch of Mr. Philby to Ibn Saud as desired by the latter as political agent empowered for the solution of this problem and other kindred problems, and for the purpose of personal discussion with Ibn Saud, as he has some knowledge of our conditions and those of our neighbours, whether States or cities, seeing that he has been long in Arabia.

[152998]

No. 157.

Colonel C. E. Wilson to Major Young.—(Received at Foreign Office, November 18.)

My dear Young,

"The Rest," Taplow, Bucks, November 9, 1919.

I SEND you the following remarks with reference to Cheetham's despatch dealing with King Hussein's probable abdication—which you showed me on Friday last.

The considered opinion of Emir Abdulla, the Grand Kadi at Mecca, and every man of influence in the Hedjaz I have met, is that, should Hussein abdicate, there would be something very like general anarchy in the Hedjaz, and I think it probable that this unanimous opinion is correct. Such a state of affairs would not be good for British Imperial interests. It is unlikely that the Akhwan would remain quiet, and they would probably attempt a serious invasion of the Hedjaz.

In my humble opinion, the Akhwan movement is the most troublesome feature of the Arabian situation; the longer the Indian Government supports Ibn Saud, as they have up to date, the longer will be the series of difficult situations which will confront His Majesty's Government, whether Hussein abdicates, dies, or remains in his present position.

Hussein and the Arab chiefs believe that the Indian Government is subordinate to His Majesty's Government, and it is difficult for them to understand why the greatest Moslem Power in the world should support a sectarian movement which aims at the overthrow of orthodox Islam.

Denys Bray (Political, Simla) in a private letter to me, dated last July, wrote: "The lifting of the Akhwan menace was indeed a relief. Had it materialised, the effect in India would, of course, have been appalling."

I am prepared to believe that Ibn Saud personally is loyal to us, and is possibly not a "whole hogger" in wishing to convert Islam generally to Wahabism. His formation of the Akhwan was probably carried out with a view to political, rather than religious, aggrandisement, but we must take facts as they are, and Ibn Saud is the head of the really fanatical Akhwan: thus, support given to the former is really support given to the Akhwan movement.

Hussein holds that there is no difference between "orthodox" Wahabism and the Akhwan movement; I do. The latter is essentially a fanatical movement of a military and aggressive nature.

I submit it is important for us to do all we can to keep Hussein from abdicating for the present, and a definite declaration on His Majesty's Government's part that they recognise Khurma, Turaba and Bisha as being within the legitimate boundaries of the Hedjaz would probably keep him going, and I suggest that I be given some such message to deliver to him from His Majesty's Government. At the same time, Hussein should be asked to depute a responsible representative to go to Cairo (I would try and get Abdulla sent) to meet a representative of Ibn Saud there to fix on a boundary. I entirely disagree with Philby that a boundary commission should delimitate this frontier on the spot; such action would ask for trouble and be barren of any permanent result.

Should something on these lines be approved, I would suggest that a message be sent to Hussein, saying that I will be leaving for Jeddah shortly and will discuss the whole situation with him, including His Majesty's Government's proposal for dealing with the Hedjaz-Nejd boundary question.

Hussein has frequently expressed his intention of visiting England when peace with Turkey is concluded if he has not previously resigned. I suggest that I be given authority to tell him that His Majesty's Government would welcome a visit next year. I am inclined to think that if Hussein came here the result would be beneficial, he could get a lot "off his chest," and it would prove a real education for him. The thought of visiting England would also tend to keep him from abdicating, which, in view of the general situation in the East, would, I think, be harmful for us at the present time.

With reference to Cheetham's suggestion that we should get Hussein to nominate Abdulla as his successor, I have given a lot of thought to the situation which might possibly be created in the event of Hussein's abdication, and think I told you that the only way that appears at all possible is for us to enter into a secret agreement with Abdulla to support him privately with funds in such a contingency, and to recognise him as King, &c., if he makes good his position. I cannot recommend this course, but if any action regarding Hussein's successor is to be taken now, it appears to be the best, but it has many obvious drawbacks, though less serious than approaching Hussein direct, who has already appointed Ali "Crown Prince."

As matters stand at present, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to separate the Kingship of the Hedjaz from the Emirate of Mecca, and the latter appointment being at present a prerogative of the Caliph, any move on our part in appointing, or trying to appoint, an Emir and Grand Sherif of Mecca is likely to be resented by Moslems generally.

Our best policy is to do everything in reason to keep Hussein in his present position, in any case until the Turkish treaty is signed, and the effects of its provisions can be more clearly seen.

He has always implicitly trusted His Majesty's Government, but his belief in our good intentions has been severely strained owing to the way in which we have hitherto dealt with the Khurma question. If we take a sympathetic line with him now, do him as well as we can, and give him confidence, we retain his trust, and need have no fear that he will not carry on relations with foreign countries exclusively through us.

If you can spare the time I should much like to have a talk with you regarding the above any day this week, as you will doubtless be able to give me His Majesty's Government's views.

Owing to my intimate and extremely cordial personal relations with Hussein I should like to—and, indeed, think it advisable that I should—be in a position to give him some crumbs of comfort and encouragement on my return, and thus get the idea out of his head that His Majesty's Government proposes to discard him like a soiled glove after getting invaluable assistance from him during the war, at a critical period of which he revolted and risked his all with us.

I must apologise for inflicting this long screed on you; my excuse is that Hussein, in my opinion, has an influence as leader of the revolt, father of Feisal, Emir of Mecca, &c., which appears underrated, and that he can be made as useful to us in peace as he was the last three years of the war.

Sincerely yours,
C. E. WILSON.

[1356]

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No. 158.

Correspondence between the Sherif of Mecca and His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo.—(Received at the Foreign Office, November 19.)

(1.)

Communication from Sherif of Mecca to Mr. Storrs, Oriental Secretary to British Representative, Cairo.

To the dear honourable, may God protect him.

I PRESENT to your dear honour my affectionate regards and respects, and hope that you will do your best to make the enclosed note, containing the proposed conditions, effective, as you are capable of doing.

And in this connection I declare to you and your Government that you need not be anxious about the ideas of the people here, because they are closely bound to your Government by community of interests.

Do not be at pains to send aeroplanes or men-of-war to throw reports and rumours, as was done before, because the matter is now decided.

What we desire to beg you is to open the way for the Egyptian Government to send the charitable offerings of corn for the Holy lands, i.e., Mecca and Medina, which were stopped since last year.

For verily, the sending of this grain for this year and last would be an important factor in laying the foundations of our mutual advantage.

This should suffice for a person of your grasp.

In conclusion I offer you my best salaams and respects.

July 14, 1915 [2nd Ramadan 1333].

Kindly do not trouble to send any correspondence until you see the result of our operations; except the reply to the note and its enclosure, which should be through the bearer only; and, if you should think fit, give him a written token to make it easy for him to reach you when we find it necessary.

He is all right.

[Unsigned.]

Enclosed with foregoing.

To his Honour.

WHEREAS the whole of the Arab nation without any exception have decided in these last years to live, and to accomplish their freedom and grasp the reins of their Administration both in theory and practice; and whereas they have found and felt that it is to the interest of the Government of Great Britain to support them and aid them to the attainment of their firm and lawful intentions (which are based upon the maintenance of the honour and dignity of their life) without any ulterior motives whatsoever unconnected with this object;

And whereas it is to their (Arabs') interest also to prefer the assistance of the Government of Great Britain in consideration of their geographical position and economic interests, and also of the attitude of the above-mentioned Government, which is known to both nations and therefore need not be emphasized;

For these reasons the Arab nation sees fit to limit themselves, as time is short, to asking the Government of Great Britain, if it should think fit, for the approval, through her deputy or representative, of the following fundamental propositions, leaving out all things considered secondary in comparison with these, so that it may prepare all means necessary for attaining this noble purpose, until such time as it finds occasion for making the actual negotiations:—

Firstly.—England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina-Adana up to the 37° of latitude, on which degree falls Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Amadia Island, up to the border of Persia; on the east by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by

the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina. England to approve of the proclamation of an Arab Khalifate of Islam.

Secondly.—The Arab Government of the Sherif to acknowledge that England shall have the preference in all economic enterprises in the Arab countries whenever conditions of enterprises are otherwise equal.

Thirdly.—For the security of this Arab independence and the certainty of such preference of economic enterprises, both high contracting parties to offer mutual assistance to the best ability of their military and naval forces, to face any foreign power which may attack either party. Peace not to be decided without agreement of both parties.

Fourthly.—If one of the parties enters upon an aggressive conflict, the other party to assume a neutral attitude, and in case of such party wishing the other to join forces, both to meet and discuss the conditions.

Fifthly.—England to acknowledge the abolition of foreign privileges in the Arab countries, and to assist the Government of the Sherif in an international Convention for confirming such abolition.

Sixthly.—Articles 3 and 4 of this Treaty to remain in vigour for 15 years, and, if either wishes it to be renewed, one year's notice before lapse of treaty to be given.

Consequently, and as the whole of the Arab nation have (praise be to God) agreed and united for the attainment, at all costs and finally of this noble object, they beg the Government of Great Britain to answer them positively or negatively in a period of 30 days after receiving this intimation; and if this period should lapse before they receive an answer, they reserve to themselves complete freedom of action. Moreover we (Sherif's family) will consider ourselves free in word and deed from the bonds of our previous declaration which we made through Ali Eff.

[Undated and unsigned.]

(2.)

Sir H. McMahon to His Highness the Sherif Hosayn (titles), dated August 30, 1915.

After compliments and salutations.

WE have the honour to thank you for your frank expressions of the sincerity of your feeling towards England. We rejoice moreover that your Highness and your people are of one opinion, that Arab interests are English interests and English Arab. To this intent we confirm to you the terms of Lord Kitchener's message, which reached you by the hand of Ali Effendi, and in which was stated clearly our desire for the independence of Arabia and its inhabitants, together with our approval of the Arab Kaliphate when it should be proclaimed. We declare once more that His Majesty's Government would welcome the resumption of the Kaliphate by an Arab of true race. With regard to the questions of limits, frontiers and boundaries, it would appear to be premature to consume our time in discussing such details in the heat of war, and while, in many portions of them, the Turk is up to now in effective occupation; especially as we have learnt, with surprise and regret, that some of the Arabs in those very parts, far from assisting us, are neglecting this their supreme opportunity, and are lending their arms to the German and the Turk, to the new despoiler and the old oppressor.

Nevertheless we are ready to send to your Highness for the Holy Cities and the noble Arabs the charitable offerings of Egypt, so soon as your Highness shall inform us how and where they should be delivered. We are moreover arranging for this your messenger to be admitted and helped on any journey he may make to ourselves.

Friendly reassurances. Salutations.

(Signed)

A. H. McMAHON.

(3.)

English Translation of Letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, dated September 9, 1915 [29th Shawal, 1333].

To His Excellency the Most Exalted, the Most Eminent—The British High Commissioner in Egypt; may God grant him Success.

WITH great cheerfulness and delight I received your letter, dated 19th Shawal, 1333 (30th August, 1915), and have given it great consideration and regard, in spite of the impression I received from it of ambiguity and its tone of coldness and hesitation with regard to our essential point.

It is necessary to make clear to your Excellency our sincerity towards the illustrious British Empire, and our confession of preference for it in all cases and matters and under all forms and circumstances. The real interests of the followers of our religion necessitate this.

Nevertheless, your Excellency will pardon me and permit me to say clearly that the coldness and hesitation which you have displayed in the question of the limits and boundaries by saying that the discussion of these at present is of no use and is a loss of time, and that they are still in the hands of the Government which is ruling them, &c., might be taken to infer an estrangement or something of the sort.

As these limits and boundaries demanded are not those of one person whom we should satisfy, and with whom we should discuss them after the war is over, but our peoples have seen that the life of their new proposal is bound at least by these limits, and their word is united on this.

Therefore they have found it necessary to first discuss this point with the Power in whom they now have their confidence and trust as a final appeal, viz., the illustrious British Empire.

(Literal translation of the above passage.)

"And therefore they saw the discussion in it first the place of their confidence and trust the axis of final appeal now, and that is the illustrious British Empire."

Their reason for this union and confidence is mutual interest, the necessity of regulating territorial divisions

and

the feelings of their inhabitants, so that they may know how to base their future and life, so not to meet her (England?) or any of her allies in opposition to their resolution which would produce a contrary issue, which God forbid.

(Literal translation of above passage as follows)

"the feelings of its inhabitants to know how to base their future and life for not to meet her or one of its allies in front of their resolution when the thing comes to a contrary result, which God forbid."

For the object is, honourable Minister, the truth which is established on a basis which guarantees the essential sources of life in future.

Yet within these limits they have not included places inhabited by a foreign race. It is a vain show of words and titles.

May God have mercy on the Caliphate and comfort Moslems in it.

I am confident that your Excellency will not doubt that it is not I personally who am demanding of these limits which include only our race, but that they are all proposals of the people who, in short, believe that they are necessary for economic life.

Is this not right, your Excellency the Minister?

In a word, your High Excellency, we are firm in our sincerity and declaring our preference for loyalty towards you, whether you are satisfied with us as has been said or angry.

With reference to your remark in your letter above mentioned, that some of our people are still doing their utmost in promoting the interests of Turkey, your Goodness (*lit.*, "Perfectness") would not permit you to make this an excuse for the tone of coldness and hesitation with regard to our demands, demands which I cannot admit that you, as a man of sound opinion, will deny to be necessary for our existence; nay, they are the essential essence of our life, material and moral.

Up to the present moment I am myself, with all my might, carrying out in my country all things in conformity with the Islamic law all things which tend to benefit the rest of the kingdom, and I shall continue to do so until it pleases God to order otherwise.

In order to reassure your Excellency, I can declare that the whole country, together with those who you say are submitting themselves to Turco-German orders, are all waiting the result of these negotiations, which are dependent only on your refusal or acceptance the question of the limits, and in your declaration of safeguarding their religion first and then the rest of rights from any harm or danger.

Whatever the illustrious Government of Great Britain finds conformable to its policy in this subject communicate it to us and specify to us the course we should follow.

In all cases it is only God's will which shall be executed, and it is God who is the real factor in everything.

With regard to our demand for grain for the natives and the monies (*surras*) known to the Wakfs Ministry, and all other articles sent here with pilgrims' caravan, O High Excellency, my intention in this matter is to confirm your proclamations to the whole world, and especially to the Moslem world, that your antagonism is confined only to the party which has usurped the rights of the Caliphate, in which are included the rights of all Moslems.

Moreover, the said grain is from the special Wakfs, and has nothing to do with politics.

If you think it should be, let the grain of the two years be transported in a special steamer to Jeddah in an official manner, in the name of all the natives as usual, and the captain of the steamer or the special "Mamur" detailed as usual every year to hand it over on his arrival at the port, will send to the Governor of Jeddah asking for the Mamur of the grain at Jeddah, or a responsible official to take over the grain, and give the necessary receipt signed by the said Mamur, that is, the Mamur of the grain himself. He should make it a condition that he would accept any receipt but that signed by this Mamur.

Let the captain of the steamer or the "Mamur" (detailed with the grain) should be instructed that if he finds anything contrary to this arrangement, he should warn them that he will return home with the cargo. Thereupon the Mamur and the special committee detailed with him, which is known as the committee of the grain for the natives, will take over the grain in the proper form.

Please accept my best regards and salutations.

If you choose to send a reply to this, please send it with bearer.

29th Shawal, 1333 [September 9, 1915].

(4.)

Letter from Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, to the Sherif of Mecca, dated October 25, 1915.

To the Sherif of Mecca (with titles).

October 25, 1915.

I HAVE received your letter of 29th Shawal with much pleasure, and your expressions of friendliness and sincerity have given me the greatest satisfaction.

I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of the limits and boundaries with coldness and hesitation; such was not the case, but it appeared to me that the moment had not yet arrived when they could be most profitably discussed.

I have realised, however, from your last letter that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have therefore lost no time in informing the Government of Great Britain of the contents of your letter, and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement, which I am confident you will receive with satisfaction.

The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries.

With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept those limits and boundaries and, in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:—

Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.

Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognise their inviolability.

When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice, and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.

On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

With regard to the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control, in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local populations, and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubt of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her traditional friends the Arabs, and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke, which for so many years has pressed heavily upon them.

I have confined myself in this letter to the more vital and important questions, and if there are any other matters dealt with in your letters which I have omitted to mention we may discuss them at some convenient date in the future.

It was with very great relief and satisfaction that I heard of the safe arrival of the Holy Carpet and the accompanying offerings, which, thanks to the clearness of your directions and the excellence of your arrangements, were landed without trouble or mishap, in spite of the dangers and difficulties occasioned by the present sad war. May God soon bring a lasting peace and freedom to all peoples!

I am sending this letter by the hand of your trusted and excellent messenger, Sheikh Mohammed Ibn Arif Arayfan, and he will inform you of various matters of interest, but of less vital importance, which I have not mentioned in this letter.

(Here follow the usual compliments.)

A. HENRY McMAHON.

(5.)

Translation of a Letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, dated 27 el Hijj, 1333 [November 5, 1915].

[LITERAL TRANSLATION.]

(In the name of God the Merciful the Compassionate.)

To his Excellency the most exalted and eminent Minister who is endowed with the highest authority and soundness of opinion. May God guide him to do His Will!

I RECEIVED with great pleasure your honoured letter, dated 15th Zul Hijj (24th October, 1915), to which I beg to answer as follows:—

1. In order to facilitate an agreement and to render a service to Islam, and at the same time to avoid all that may cause Islam troubles and hardships—seeing moreover that we have great consideration for the distinguished qualities and dispositions of the Government of Great Britain—we renounce our insistence on the incursion of the vilayets of Messina and Adana in the Arab Kingdom. But the provinces of Aleppo

and Beyrut and their sea-coasts are purely Arab provinces, and there is no difference between a Moslem and a Christian Arab; they are both descendants of one forefather.

We Moslems will follow the footsteps of the Commander of the Faithful, Omar Ibn Khattab, and other Khalifs succeeding him, who ordained in the laws of the Moslem faith that Moslems should treat the Christians as they treat themselves. He, Omar, declared with reference to Christians "they will have the same privileges and submit to the same duties as ourselves." They will thus enjoy their civic rights in as much as it accords with the general interest of the whole nation.

2. As the provinces of Irak are parts of the pure Arab Kingdom and were in fact the seat of its Governments in the time of Ali Ibn Abu Talib, and in the time of all Khalifs who succeeded him; and as in them began the civilisation of the Arabs, and as their towns in those provinces were the first towns built in Islam where the Arab power became so great; therefore these provinces are greatly valued by all Arabs far and near, and their traditions cannot be forgotten by them. Consequently we cannot satisfy the Arab nations or make them submit to give up such a title to nobility. But in order to render an accord easy, and taking into consideration the assurances mentioned in the fifth article of your letter, to keep and guard our mutual interests in that country as they are one and the same, for all these reasons we might agree to leave under the British administration for a short time those districts now occupied by the British troops without the rights of either party being prejudiced thereby (especially those of the Arab nation, which interests are to it economic and vital) and against a suitable sum paid as compensation to the Arab Kingdom for the period of occupation, in order to meet the expenses which every new kingdom is bound to support, at the same time respecting your agreements with the Sheikhs of those districts, and especially those which are essential.

3. In your desire to hasten the movement we see not only advantages, but grounds of apprehension. The first of these grounds is the fear of the blame of the Moslems of the opposite party, as has already happened in the past, who would declare that we have revolted against Islam and ruined its forces. The second is that, standing in the face of Turkey, which is supported by all the forces of Germany, we do not know what Great Britain and her Allies would do if one of the *Entente* Powers were weakened and obliged to make peace. We fear that the Arab nation will then be left alone in the face of Turkey together with her Allies, but we would not at all mind if we were to face the Turks alone. Therefore it is necessary to take these points into consideration in order to avoid a peace being concluded in which the parties concerned may decide the fate of our people as if we had taken part in the war without making good our claims to official consideration.

4. The Arab nation has a strong belief that, after this war is over, the Turks, under German influence, will direct their efforts to provoke the Arabs and violate their rights, both material and moral, to wipe out their nobility and honour and reduce them to utter submission, as they are determined to ruin them entirely. The reasons for the slowness shown in our action have already been stated.

5. When the Arabs know that the Government of Great Britain is their Ally, who will not leave them to themselves at the conclusion of peace in the face of Turkey and Germany, and that she will support and will effectively defend them, then to enter the war at once will, no doubt, be in conformity with the general interest of the Arabs.

6. Our letter dated the 29th Shau'al 1333 (9th September, 1915) saves us the trouble of repeating our opinions as to Articles 3 and 4 of your honoured last letter regarding administration, Government advisers and officials, especially as you have declared, O exalted Minister! that you will not interfere with internal affairs.

7. The arrival of a clear and definite answer as soon as possible to the above proposals is expected. We have done our utmost in making concessions in order to come to an agreement satisfying both parties. We know that our lot in this war will be either a success which will guarantee to the Arabs a life becoming their past history or destruction in the attempt to attain their objects. Had it not been for the determination which I see in the Arabs for the attainment of their objects, I would have preferred to seclude myself on one of the heights of a mountain, but they, the Arabs, have insisted that I should guide the movement to this end.

May God keep you safe and victorious, as we devoutly hope and desire.

(Unsigned.)

Dated 27 el Hijj 1333 [November 5, 1915].

[1356]

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(6.)

Letter from Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, to the Sherif of Mecca, dated December 14, 1915.

To Sherif Hussein :

(After customary greetings and acknowledgment of previous letter.)

I AM gratified to observe that you agree to the exclusion of the vilayets of Mersina and Adana from the boundaries of the Arab territories.

I also note with great pleasure and satisfaction your assurances that the Arabs are determined to act in conformity with the precepts laid down by Omar Ibn Khattab and the early Khalifs, which secure the rights and privileges of all religions alike.

In stating that the Arabs are ready to recognise and respect all our treaties with Arab chiefs, it is of course understood that this will apply to all territories included in the Arab kingdom, as the Government of Great Britain cannot repudiate engagements which already exist.

With regard to the vilayets of Aleppo and Beyrout, the Government of Great Britain have taken careful note of your observations, but, as the interests of our ally France are involved, the question will require careful consideration, and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course.

The Government of Great Britain, as I have already informed you, are ready to give all guarantees of assistance and support within their power to the Arab kingdom, but their interests demand, as you yourself have recognised, a friendly and stable administration in the vilayet of Bagdad, and the adequate safeguarding of these interests calls for a much fuller and more detailed consideration than the present situation and the urgency of these negotiations permits.

We fully appreciate your desire for caution, and we have no wish to urge you to hasty action, which might jeopardise the eventual success of your projects, but in the meantime it is most essential that you should spare no effort to attach all the Arab peoples to our united cause and urge them to afford no assistance to our enemies.

It is on the success of these efforts and on the more active measures which the Arabs may hereafter take in support of our cause, when the time for action comes, that the permanence and strength of our agreement must depend.

Under these circumstances I am further directed by the Government of Great Britain to inform you that you may rest assured that Great Britain has no intention of concluding any peace in terms of which the freedom of the Arab peoples from German and Turkish domination does not form an essential condition.

As an earnest of our intentions, and in order to aid you in your efforts in our joint cause, I am sending by your trustworthy messenger a sum of 20,000*l.*

(Customary ending.)

(Signed) H. McMAHON.

(7.)

English Translation of Letter from the Sherif of Mecca to Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, dated January 1, 1916 [25th Safar, 1334].

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate!

To his Excellency the eminent, energetic, and magnanimous Minister.

WE received from the bearer your two letters, dated 9th Safar (17th December, 1915), with great respect and honour, and I have understood their contents, which caused me the greatest pleasure and satisfaction, as they removed that which had made me uneasy.

Your honour will have realised, after the arrival of Mohammed [Faroki] Sherif and his interview with you, that all our procedure up to the present was of no personal inclination or the like, which would have been wholly unintelligible, but that everything was the result of the decisions and desires of our peoples, and that we are but transmitters and executants of such decisions and desires in the position they (our people) have pressed upon us.

These truths are, in my opinion, very important, and deserve your honour's special attention and consideration.

With regard to what had been stated in your honoured communication concerning El Irak, as to the matter of compensation for the period of occupation, we, in order to strengthen the confidence of Great Britain in our attitude and in our words and actions, really and veritably, and in order to give her evidence of our certainty and assurance in trusting her glorious Government, leave the determination of the amount to the perception of her wisdom and justice.

As regards the northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our previous letter what were the utmost possible modifications, and all this was only done so to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment is desired by the will of the Blessed and Supreme God. It is this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what may possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France and the agreement made between them during the present war and calamities; yet we find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beyrut and its coasts.

I do not find it necessary to draw your attention to the fact that our plan is of greater security to the interests and presumption of the rights of Great Britain than it is to us; and will necessarily be so, whatever may happen, so that Great Britain may finally see all her own peoples in that contentment and advancement which she is endeavouring to establish for them now, especially as her allies being neighbours to us will be the germ of difficulties and discussion with which there will be no peace of mind. In addition to which the people of Beyrut will decidedly never accept such isolations, and they may oblige us to undertake new measures which may exercise Great Britain, certainly not less than her present troubles, because of our belief and certainty in the reciprocity of our interests, which is the only cause that caused us never to care to negotiate with any other Power but you. Consequently, it is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France, or any other Power, a span of land in those regions.

I declare this, and I have a strong belief, which the living will inherit from the dead, in the declarations which you gave in the conclusion of your honoured letter. Therefore, the honourable and eminent Minister should believe and be sure, together with Great Britain, that we still remain firm to our resolution which Storrs learnt from us two years ago, for which we await the opportunity suitable to our situation, especially in view of that action the time of which has now come near and which destiny drives towards us with great haste and clearness, so that we and those who are of our opinion may have reasons for such action against any criticisms or responsibilities imposed upon us in future.

Your expression—"we do not want to push you to any hasty action which might jeopardise the success of your aim"—does not need any more explanation, except what we may ask for when necessary, such as arms, ammunition, &c.

I deem this sufficient, as I have occupied much of your honour's time. I beg to offer you my great veneration and respect.

(Unsigned.)

Dated 25th Safar, 1334 [1st January, 1916].

(8.)

Letter from Sir H. McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, to the Sherif of Mecca, dated January 25, 1916.

(After customary greetings.)

Cairo, January 25, 1916.

WE have received with great pleasure and satisfaction your letter of the 25th Safar (1st January) at the hands of your trusty messenger, who has also transmitted to us your verbal messages.

We fully realise and entirely appreciate the motives which guide you in this important question, and we know well that you are acting entirely in the interests of the Arab peoples, and with no thought beyond their welfare.

We take note of your remarks concerning the vilayet of Bagdad, and will take the question into careful consideration when the enemy has been defeated and the time for peaceful settlements arrives.

[1356]

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As regards the northern parts, we note with satisfaction your desire to avoid anything which might possibly injure the alliance of Great Britain and France. It is, as you know, our fixed determination that nothing shall be permitted to interfere in the slightest degree with our united prosecution of this war to a victorious conclusion. Moreover, when the victory has been won, the friendship of Great Britain and France will become yet more firm and enduring, cemented by the blood of Englishmen and Frenchmen who have died side by side fighting for the Cause of Right and Liberty.

In this great Cause Arabia is now associated, and God grant that the result of our mutual efforts and co-operation will bind us in a lasting friendship, to the mutual welfare and happiness of us all!

We are greatly pleased to hear of the action you are taking to win all the Arabs over to our joint Cause, and to dissuade them from giving any assistance to our enemies, and we leave it to your discretion to seize the most favourable moment for further and more decided measures.

You will doubtless inform us by the bearer of this letter of any manner in which we can assist you, and your requests will always receive our immediate consideration.

You will have heard how El Sayed Ahmed el Sherif el Senussi has been beguiled by evil advice into hostile action, and it will be a great grief to you to know that he has been so far forgetful of the interests of the Arabs as to throw in his lot with our enemies. Misfortune has now overtaken him, and we trust that this will show him his error, and lead him to peace for the sake of his poor misguided followers.

We are sending this letter by the hand of your good messenger, who will also bring to you all our news.

With salaams.

[153212]

No. 159.

Sir E. Crowe to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 2155.)

SIR E. CROWE presents his compliments to Lord Curzon, and transmits herewith copies of notes from the Hedjaz and French Delegations respecting Syria.

British Delegation, Paris,

November 17, 1919.

Enclosure 1 in No. 159.

Secretary-General of the Hedjaz Delegation to Secretary-General of the Peace Conference.

LE Secrétaire général de la Délégation hedjazienne a l'honneur de communiquer au Secrétariat général de la Conférence de la Paix la note ci-jointe de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Faysal, à l'adresse du Conseil suprême.

Le 6 novembre 1919.

Note au Conseil suprême de la Conférence de la Paix, Versailles.

Au mois de septembre dernier, son Excellence le Premier Ministre de la Grande-Bretagne m'a fait venir de Damas afin de discuter la question de Syrie avec les grandes Puissances. A Londres, son Excellence m'a remis un aide-mémoire, où il était question de certains changements dans l'administration actuelle de la Syrie. Des copies de ce document, me dit-il, ont été remises aux représentants de la France, des États-Unis et de l'Italie. Au cours de la correspondance et des entrevues qui suivirent, j'ai compris que ledit aide-mémoire ne repose pas sur un accord établi entre la Grande-Bretagne et une autre Puissance quelconque, mais qu'il s'agit uniquement d'une déclaration indiquant la décision prise par la Grande-Bretagne, pour raisons d'économie, au sujet du retrait de ses troupes de certaines provinces arabes. Toute la question est censée n'être qu'un arrangement militaire à titre provisoire, qui n'est pas d'ordre administratif ni politique, et qui a pour but le maintien de l'ordre, en attendant que la Conférence de la Paix prenne une décision définitive sur la forme du Gouvernement à donner au pays.

Après avoir lu ce document avec grande attention et étudié de très près la situation générale des provinces arabes depuis la signature de l'armistice avec la Turquie (et, comme vous ne l'ignorez pas, je suis bien placé pour juger les affaires de mon pays), je suis arrivé à la conclusion que l'exécution de ce projet non seulement serait en désaccord avec le droit des nations, mais aussi porterait préjudice aux intérêts du pays et à ceux de mon peuple; la paix générale s'en trouverait en même temps profondément troublée dans tout l'Orient. Je suis convaincu que les grandes Puissances qui ont des intérêts en Orient auront à souffrir de cette situation dans la mesure de leurs intérêts respectifs. Les deux Puissances n'ont pas dû se rendre compte des troubles qui pourraient résulter de toute modification apportée au *statu quo* établi depuis l'occupation; car cet accord changera l'administration provisoire établie depuis l'occupation sans prendre aucune disposition convenable pour la remplacer.

Lorsque le Gouvernement britannique a porté ces plans à ma connaissance, en les appelant "un projet suggéré" se basant sur l'accord Sykes-Picot de 1916, j'ai protesté en donnant formellement les raisons de mon attitude. Le Gouvernement britannique, ayant alors pris conscience de la gravité de la situation, a accepté la proposition de nommer une commission composée de délégués américains, britanniques, français et arabes, à l'effet d'examiner les questions soulevées par l'évacuation imminente et d'instituer une administration unique qui remplacerait à titre provisoire le régime actuel. Cependant, quand cette proposition fut soumise au Gouvernement français, j'apprenais par Lord Curzon, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, que M. Clemenceau n'était pas en faveur de l'arrangement suggéré, et avait exprimé le désir de me voir à Paris. En outre, le Gouvernement français refusait d'accepter, ainsi qu'il nous en a informés lui-même, la proposition britannique, sauf en ce qui regardait l'évacuation des troupes britanniques pour le 1^{er} novembre. Les deux Gouvernements, ne consultant que leurs propres intérêts dans la question, n'ont pas accordé toute l'attention voulue à l'effet produit sur les populations de la Syrie. Comme je suis responsable de la sécurité et du bien-être de mon pays, j'ai également porté à la connaissance du Gouvernement français les raisons qui m'empêchent de souscrire à cet arrangement, et j'ai à nouveau proposé la création d'une commission mixte. Le Président du Conseil des Ministres français, dans sa réponse, décline toutes mes propositions, parce que, dit-il, il ne peut aller à l'encontre des décisions du Conseil suprême; il ajoute que les troupes françaises sont prêtes à maintenir l'ordre dans leur zone d'occupation, et à m'aider à en faire autant dans ma propre région, au premier appel de ma part. Je crois que M. Clemenceau a l'impression que le mouvement que nous redoutons sera le fait d'"agitateurs," et non l'explosion spontanée du sentiment national. Et je doute que le Conseil suprême et l'opinion publique du monde civilisé approuvent des mesures qui, tendant à réprimer des mouvements nationaux absolument légitimes, ne peuvent avoir d'autre résultat qu'une effusion de sang. A ce que je crois savoir, le Conseil suprême n'a pris aucune décision à ce sujet, ayant simplement "pris note" de l'accord du 15 septembre 1919, tel qu'il m'a été communiqué par le Gouvernement français.

Le Conseil, selon toute apparence, croyait que le projet qu'on lui soumettait impliquait simplement la relève des troupes et n'entraînait aucun changement d'ordre politique ou administratif dans les territoires ennemis occupés et qui sont maintenant administrés par les Alliés.

Il est évident que le projet proposé n'a pas été approuvé par les autorités intéressées. Il faudrait donc qu'il fût examiné de nouveau et discuté par le Conseil suprême. Je demande la permission d'exposer rapidement moi-même quelques-unes des raisons des objections que je formule contre la proposition faite et qui fera désespérer mon peuple de son avenir:

1. J'ai peine à comprendre que le projet soit purement militaire. Il me semble qu'il renferme plusieurs questions économiques et politiques qui ne devraient être décidées que par la Conférence de la Paix. Le fait même d'enlever le pouvoir suprême à une seule direction et diviser le pays en trois zones différentes, dans lesquelles chacune aurait à rendre des comptes à un Gouvernement séparé et à agir par l'entremise d'un système différent, est assurément un changement très important porté à l'administration actuelle et ne saurait être appelé une mesure militaire. Des affaires telles que le règlement des chemins de fer et les zones d'influence, &c., ne peuvent être comprises dans les mesures à prendre pour le maintien de l'ordre, en attendant un règlement définitif de la question syrienne par la Conférence de la Paix.

2. D'après les arrangements, proposés les provinces arabes devront être divisées en trois districts: Un sous l'administration britannique, un autre sous l'administration française et le troisième sous le Gouvernement arabe. Cela revient à dire que la nation

syrienne, qui avait toujours compté sur une administration unique, devra être maintenant morcelée et chaque partie soumise à un Gouvernement séparé. Le mal qui en résulterait sera un coup mortel porté au pays. Des discussions entre les habitants de régions différentes, suscitées et encouragées, selon toute probabilité, par des fonctionnaires ignorants, ou même par les rivalités entre des administrateurs différents, se multiplieront et neutraliseront tout le bien qui aurait pu résulter d'une administration distincte.

Des perturbations commenceront sur les frontières et s'étendront jusqu'au cœur même du pays.

De plus, la portion laissée au Gouvernement arabe est appelée province arabe indépendante, mais elle se trouve divisée en différentes zones d'influence, dont l'une est soumise aux Britanniques et l'autre aux Français.

Si l'une quelconque de ces deux subdivisions venait à avoir besoin de secours, il lui faudrait le demander à la Puissance qui exerce son influence chez elle. Y a-t-il jamais eu une nation dans tout le cours des siècles qui ait jamais pu faire des progrès au milieu d'entraves pareilles? Cet arrangement découragera sans aucun doute le peuple et créera du mécontentement chez lui. Il éprouvera de la méfiance à l'égard des Alliés et fera tout ce qui est en son pouvoir pour défendre l'unité de son pays. La nation est faible et ne pourra résister longtemps, mais, néanmoins, elle affrontera la mort pour défendre sa juste cause. Qui alors sera responsable devant le monde civilisé d'un tel sacrifice? Personne ne saurait convaincre le peuple de ce pays que ses idées arrêtées sont erronées. Tous ceux qui ont pris connaissance du sentiment général qui règne parmi ces populations diront que l'ordre public ne pourra jamais être maintenu sans effusion de sang.

3. Le retrait des troupes britanniques s'effectuera, dit-on, d'après une décision qui pourtant n'est reconnue ni par les Arabes, ni par le Gouvernement des États-Unis, qui a déclaré à son entrée en guerre qu'il ne reconnaîtrait aucun accord secret, je veux parler de l'accord Sykes-Picot de 1916, qui disposait du pays comme s'il eût été un domaine privé, ou comme un simple ballot de marchandise au moment où la jeunesse du pays se répandait de Syrie jusqu'au désert et donnait sa vie pour sauver son indépendance. Toute mesure basée sur une décision qui n'a pas été reconnue par la Conférence de la Paix ne saurait être mise à exécution sans une discussion spéciale de la part de cette Conférence.

4. Le général en chef, au moment de l'occupation de la Syrie par les troupes alliées, m'a donné l'ordre d'avoir à retirer mes fonctionnaires de la côte et a déclaré au peuple syrien qu'il se proposait d'occuper le pays et d'y établir un Gouvernement unique au nom des Alliés. Son administration, ainsi formée, resterait en activité jusqu'au moment où la Conférence de la Paix prendrait une décision définitive.

Les Syriens ont considéré cette déclaration comme une garantie donnée par les Alliés, et ont estimé que leur pays était placé sous la garde du commandant en chef, agissant au nom des Alliés, et organisant une administration unique qu'il avait promis de maintenir comme il est dit ci-dessus. Elle comprend qu'aucun changement dans les bases fondamentales de cet arrangement ne pourra être apporté avant le moment opportun ou avant qu'une autre administration, basée sur les mêmes principes, ne soit établie. La Grande-Bretagne reconnaît cette garantie, mais dit ne pas avoir prévu un délai aussi long avant que la Conférence prenne une décision de ce genre. Ce délai est-il imputable à la nation arabe syrienne, ou bien avons-nous commis un acte déloyal qui mérite une telle punition? Nous avons toujours montré une loyauté complète envers les Alliés depuis que nous nous sommes soulevés contre les Turcs, et le moins que nous puissions attendre est l'exécution d'une promesse faite par le commandant en chef.

5. La surexcitation, causée principalement par l'intervention imprudente des étrangers, qui règne dans les provinces arabes ainsi que dans les autres provinces musulmanes de l'Empire ottoman en Asie n'est plus un secret. Toute personne tant soit peu au courant de ce qui s'est passé dans la province de Syrie est, sans aucun doute, convaincue qu'il y aura des désordres dans beaucoup de localités, si on apporte des modifications au *statu quo*.

En conséquence, je vous supplie, au nom de l'humanité et dans l'intérêt de la paix, au nom de la nation arabe et au nom des innombrables intérêts de la France, de l'Italie, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Amérique dans le monde oriental, de ne pas ouvrir la porte à de nouveaux désordres dont nous pourrions tous voir le commencement, mais dont il est impossible de prévoir la fin. Les incidents de Smyrne et autres lieux sont encore présents à notre mémoire. Je crains beaucoup que le mal ne se répande d'un bout à l'autre du monde musulman. Le peuple pensera qu'il existe un plan bien arrêté

de persécuter l'Islam. Vous pourriez-vous rappeler encore que la révolte des Arabes dirigée par le Roi mon père a porté le premier coup au principe exécuté du fanatisme. Les Arabes ont attaqué les Turcs musulmans parce qu'ils étaient des oppresseurs, et se sont joints aux Alliés, pensant que ceux-ci se battaient pour le droit et la justice, sans faire de distinction entre les religions. En ce qui me concerne, j'ai pendant la guerre combattu le fanatisme partout et toujours. Les Arabes de toutes les religions se sont groupés autour de moi, venant de toutes les directions. Notre unité était nationale et non pas religieuse. Un grand nombre des hommes qui travaillent avec moi maintenant pour cette cause nationale n'appartiennent pas à ma religion. Ceci vous prouve à quel point je serai découragé si cet idéal si élevé est abaissé jusqu'à une guerre de religion par suite de malentendus, de mauvaise administration et d'imprudence.

Vous estimerez avec moi qu'il est de l'intérêt de tous de maintenir le plus grand calme pendant le court délai précédant la décision définitive de la Conférence de la Paix, plutôt que de laisser des troubles prendre naissance sans raison logique. En conséquence, je suis d'avis que les grandes Puissances soient informées du sérieux de la situation telle que nous la connaissons, de façon que des mesures immédiates soient prises afin que les Puissances alliées intéressées et leurs frères d'armes examinent les intérêts de chaque Gouvernement d'accord avec l'idéal de justice pour lequel nous nous sommes battus ensemble.

Je conclus en demandant avec insistance à être autorisé à présenter moi-même un rapport complet sur ma situation qui touche à mon pays d'une façon plus intime que n'importe quel autre, car c'est sur moi et sur mon peuple que les conséquences de toutes les mesures prises, soit pour le bien, soit pour le mal, retomberont.

FAYSAL

Enclosure 2 in No. 159.

Note by the French Delegation.

LA note que la Délégation du Hedjaz a adressée au Secrétariat général de la Conférence ne paraît pas répondre à la situation présente et ne semble pas susceptible de suite immédiate. Son double but essentiel est en effet :

1. De revenir sur la décision prise par la Conférence le 15 septembre relativement à la relève des troupes anglaises par les troupes françaises en Syrie ;
2. De demander à être entendue sur le fond de la question concernant l'administration des populations de la Syrie.

Touchant la relève, aucune modification ne paraît ni utile, ni possible. En fait, d'ailleurs, l'exécution de la mesure est commencée depuis le début du mois et se poursuit dans des conditions qui indiquent que les inquiétudes de l'Émir Faysal ne sont pas justifiées.

La décision de la Conférence a nettement marqué que la relève n'avait que le caractère d'un arrangement purement temporaire et provisoire réglant la continuation de l'occupation militaire indispensable.

Au point de vue de l'avenir, la décision de la Conférence a marqué que la solution définitive des questions de mandats et de frontières n'était pas préjugée par les mesures pratiques et limitées prises en ce moment et ne pourrait être examinée isolément, mais serait étudiée comme partie du problème général de paix avec la Turquie, au moment où la Conférence examinera le règlement d'ensemble de la question d'Orient.

Le Gouvernement français a déclaré verbalement et par écrit à l'Émir Faysal que tel était bien le sens de la résolution de la Conférence du 15 septembre et l'interprétation qu'il y donnait. Il a ajouté que, dans ces conditions, un mouvement indigène ne serait nullement justifié.

Il a eu soin, pour ôter tout prétexte aux agitateurs, de porter à la connaissance des populations syriennes le sens exact des décisions du Conseil suprême et de l'exécution de la relève, en affirmant la volonté commune des Alliés d'assurer aux pays d'Orient libérés par leur victoire le régime de liberté, d'ordre et de progrès promis aux populations et inspiré de leurs désirs, de leurs vœux et de leur intérêt.

Dans ces conditions, il ne semble pas qu'aucune modification puisse être apportée à la décision concernant la relève, qui ne prête à aucune équivoque, n'engage pas le fond de la question et est en cours d'exécution.

Il ne semble pas, davantage, opportun que le Conseil suprême entende la Délégation hedjazienne sur le fond du problème syrien, qui ne peut être détaché de l'étude d'ensemble de la question d'Orient.

Paris, le 13 novembre 1919.

[153849]

No. 160.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received November 21.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, November 20, 1919.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, certain notes which were made by the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, and forwarded by him with a letter of the 19th October, in connection with his cruise in the Black Sea in October.

2. Copies of the enclosures forwarded with this letter (with the exception of Enclosures 1 and 6) have also been forwarded to the War Office, and the latter part of Enclosure 3 to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I am, &c.
(For Secretary),
ALEX. FLINT.

Enclosure in No. 160.

Notes made by Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, in connection with his Cruise in the Black Sea, October 1919.

Itinerary.

Left Constantinople 1700, 5th October.
Arrived Samsoun 0900, 7th October, left 1800.
Arrived Trebizond 0900, 8th October, left 2200.
Arrived Batum 0800, 9th October, left 1700, 11th October.
Arrived Novorossisk 1200, 12th October, left 1700, 13th October.
Arrived Sevastopol 1000, 14th October, left 0700, 16th October.
Arrived Yalta 1130, 16th October, left 0700, 17th October.
Arrived Constantinople 0900, 18th October.

ON the 7th October, 1919, I arrived at Samsoun in "Iron Duke."

The Mutessarif of the independent sanjak of Samsoun was absent from headquarters, but the "Commandant de Place," who acted for him in his absence, came off to call on me accompanied by Captain Perring, High Commissioner's representative.

The Commandant de Place, a major, is a member of the C. U. P., and a supporter of the Nationalist movement. I impressed upon him that the Allies, while abstaining from interfering with the internal politics of Turkey, expected the Turkish authorities to maintain order within their respective districts.

In the afternoon, after returning the commandant's call at the Konak (Government offices), I received deputations from the local Greeks and Armenians, headed respectively by the Bishop of Bafra (acting for the Metropolitan of Samsoun, now in Constantinople), and by the Armenian Archbishop. While the Greek Bishop gave an obviously exaggerated account of the vexations to which his flock was being subjected by the Turks, both he and his Armenian colleague were genuinely apprehensive, probably with good reason, of the fate awaiting their several communities at the hands of Mustafa Kemal's followers should the terms of peace be found to alienate any part of the Anatolian territory from Ottoman rule.

On the 8th October, 1919, I proceeded in "Iron Duke" to Trebizond. The Vali, Ghalib Bey, had been absent for the last seventeen days at Erzerum (which lies

outside his vilayet), having been summoned thither by Mustafa Kemal. His representative, the Defterdar (Treasurer) of the vilayet, who is a puppet in the hands of the military (Nationalist) officers, demurred at calling on me, intimating that he considered the first visit to be due from me to him. I thereupon summoned him to repair on board "Iron Duke," where I explained to him the difference between an armistice and a state of peace, expressed surprise at the Vali's prolonged absence from his province, and warned him that the Allies expected Turkish authorities to maintain public security.

On proceeding ashore I received deputations from the Greeks and Armenians. The latter colony in Trebizond has been reduced by massacres and deportations from a pre-war strength of 60,000 to some 400. They state that the town itself was relatively quiet (though Christians had even lately been murdered within its limits), but that the safety of the Christians in the villages was precarious. The withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus and the Black Sea had been interpreted by the Turkish Nationalists as a sign of weakness, and had rendered them more truculent in their attitude towards the Christians. I think that the Christians are largely to blame—through an untimely attitude of provocation—for incurring the resentment of the Turks; at the same time I consider their apprehensions far from groundless.

I also saw the commandant of the local troops, Major Ali Riza, who, as the representative of the Military and Nationalist authorities at Erzerum, controls the policy of the civil officials. I represented to him the warning previously given to the Vali's representative, and furthermore cautioned him against obstructing the British Military Control Officer, Captain Crawford, in his task of recovering the Russian military material still in the hands of the Turks at Trebizond.

Visit to Tiflis.

In order to pay an unofficial visit to Mr. Wardrop, our representative in Trans-Caucasia, I left Batum at 8.30 p.m. on Thursday, the 9th October. Brigadier-General Cooke-Collis arranged my journey, and he came to see me off at the station, where he introduced me to Mr. Gambas-chidze who is one of the leading men in Georgia. This gentleman had come to Batum the previous day from Tiflis in company with General Harbord and the American Mission. He gave me the pleasure of his company in my carriage for over two hours. He expounded his views on the situation in Georgia in a very clear and concise manner.

The journey to Tiflis is interesting but slow, and owing to my making the journey at night, it was only in the early morning that we had an opportunity of seeing the country. Our train arrived at Tiflis at about 10 a.m., where I was received by a Georgian guard and band and a number of officials, in spite of the fact that Wardrop had explained to the Government that my visit was purely unofficial, and was of a personal nature.

I drove with Wardrop to his house: a fine building, the property of a Georgian who made his fortune in Persia. The house is situated at the south side of the town and next to the War Office.

Before lunch, I was able to have a long talk with Wardrop, who gave me much information on the present situation.

He telegraphed to me before leaving Batum, asking me if I would meet the Georgian Cabinet at lunch. I replied that, as my visit was purely unofficial, it seemed undesirable, but I would always be pleased to meet any of his personal friends.

Wardrop holds a unique position, as he and his sister appear to have endeared themselves to the Georgian people in a way that no other Englishman has approached.

At lunch there were a number of his friends to meet me and my staff. The latter consisted of Commander Birkett, and Lieutenant-Commanders Luke and Bowlby.

After lunch we first went to the Military College, which I had been asked to visit; as it had only been started one month, a description of it is not necessary.

On returning to Tiflis, it was almost time for dinner, and among the people Wardrop had asked were the Foreign Minister, the Minister of the Interior and War, the Under-Secretary for War, and some half-dozen other representative people.

I had a conversation with the Foreign Minister before dinner, a Prince Melikof being the interpreter. The Foreign Minister did not appear to be a particularly capable person, and I understand that he is rather inclined to the advanced ideas

bordering on Bolshevism. At dinner I sat next to the Minister of Interior and War, and Mr. Gambas-chidze interpreted for us. The Minister is understood to be the strong man of the Government, and he has recently shown it when the Bolsheviks attempted to assassinate General Baratof. He shot two, and arrested and put in gaol some 270 of the fraternity.

(General Baratof has lost his left leg below the knee, but is considered to be progressing favourably.)

The impressions that I carried away with me after this short visit are the extraordinary possibilities if the country was properly prospected and developed.

The west or Black Sea side is sub-tropical and very fertile.

Around Tiflis the land is not so good, but produces good crops even with the primitive methods of farming at present employed. Serious mining has hardly been attempted. Oil is known to exist in several places, and only requires capital to exploit it. Roads are few and bad, the railway is worn out, and the rolling-stock requires renewing.

The greatest difficulty in the way of trade is the exchange.

The present value of the rouble is so low that little or nothing can be done. It was impressed on me continually that this was due to the uncertainty of the future of the country, and if Georgia was recognised by the Allies as an independent State, the value of the rouble would at once rise.

The country might easily become a tourist resort for others than Russians. The climate on the whole is good, and the country beautiful, and with improved roads and modern conveniences it would be hard to find a more delightful holiday resort.

It is plain that the average intelligence of the Georgian is high.

Few speak English, but they are desirous of finding a means to send several hundred boys to England to be educated there. Wardrop told me that a few days previously the Germans had made an offer to the Georgian Government to educate 300 Georgian boys free of cost if they were sent to Germany.

Mr. Gambas-chidze impressed on me how anxious they all were that some of the boys should receive their education in England. The feeling at the moment in the country is very favourable to the British.

They appear to be genuinely sorry that the British troops were withdrawn from Tiflis, where they had become great favourites. (About ninety officers and men found Georgian wives and took them away.)

France is not liked. The French military mission has made a distinctly unfavourable impression.

The Italians are looked on as intriguers and German agents, and are working by every possible means to promote German interests both in regard to trade and politically. No doubt there is a liking for the Germans, it being considered that General von Kress saved them from the Turks after the Russian collapse, and for which the country is grateful.

The Russian is not liked. However, failing a better arrangement with America or England, or independence, she would be prepared to come to an arrangement with Russia for some form of federation.

The Turk is not disliked. The Armenian is loathed, being credited with having already formed an alliance with Denikin against Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Georgians point out that the difference of their nation to Armenia is that the Armenians send all their best men to foreign countries in order to carry out propaganda, leaving none who are capable of directing their home affairs, and this is the reason for the present deplorable condition of many Armenian districts.

The friendly relations with the Azerbaijan Government is largely due to the personal influence of Wardrop.

Regarding the American mission, Georgians doubt their intention of taking any form of mandate for Armenia, but they would gladly get a footing in Georgia, realising its possibility.

Haskell, the representative of the Allied Relief Commission in the Caucasus, appears to have been a failure and quarrelled with many people. General Harbord and his mission were appreciated, but it was realised that they have really little time in which to study the conditions and possibilities of Georgia and its people.

Rumour at Tiflis says that Harbord will replace Haskell. Generally the Georgian feels that if the final terms of peace which deal with this part of the world are

favourable, his country has a bright future. They point out the growing importance of Persia and Central Asia with the trade which must develop therefrom; Georgia being on the high road between Persia and Europe, it must benefit by such development.

Not the least interesting were the views I heard on the Bolsheviks. There are many hundreds in Georgia, where they are extremely active. Wardrop receives letters threatening his life, also many of the leading people of Tiflis. The Bolshevik is trying to stir up trouble on the northern boundary. It is said that if they can make Denikin send his troops to attack Georgia and Azerbaijan, this will divert him from his true objective, which is Moscow. Bolshevik letters indicate that if Denikin drives them from Moscow they will retire to Central Asia to the neighbourhood of Tashkend, where they consider that they will be able to continue their struggle against Britain, who is looked on as the chief enemy of Bolshevism.

The Georgians say that Bolshevism is purely a Jewish movement, controlled in Europe from Germany by the "international Jew," but the real directors of the movement are in the eastern part of the United States.

I was questioned about a Georgian navy, what they want is a few small ships for policing their coasts, where there is a certain amount of piracy carried on by the Laz-born sailors—but pirates by profession.

I advised them against having a navy, but rather to put their money into merchant ships, which would, by showing their flag, be doing more to make their country known, than would the patrolling of their coasts by a gunboat.

I left Batum in "Iron Duke" on the evening of the 11th October and arrived at Novorossisk at noon Sunday, 12th October.

General Denikin had also at that moment arrived from Odessa in the Russian cruiser "Kornilof" on his way back to Taganrog. This was unexpected by me, nor was I anxious to meet General Denikin so soon, but, as things turned out, I am glad that the chance occurred.

2. Major-General H. G. Holman, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., head of the British Military Mission, and Captain Charles A. Fremantle, D.S.O., R.N., naval member, came on board shortly after anchoring, having arrived from Taganrog a few hours previously.

I learnt from General Holman that Denikin expected to leave by train almost immediately; accordingly I went with the former to visit him. I was well received by Denikin and his staff on board the cruiser, which was alongside the railway jetty, and after about half-an-hour's conversation the whole party came back with me to "Iron Duke" for lunch.

3. General Denikin left about 4 p.m., satisfied, I think, with his visit. General Holman and Captain Fremantle remained for further conferences, and the result of the various conversations with these officers and Denikin is summarised herewith:

- (a.) Denikin has at this moment a "fighting" strength of about 220,000 men and a "feeding" strength of about 800,000. His principal, if not his only, anxiety is the supply of food and clothing to his men and the inhabitants of the districts freed from the Bolsheviks.

He well knows that unless he can ensure a measure of both of these the Volunteer Army will not be looked upon as an Army of Liberation.

- (b.) The Bolsheviks have recently taken to a policy of destruction when they retreat. Railways are torn up, rolling-stock removed or wrecked, telegraphs dismantled, houses razed, and crops destroyed, and thus, with every successful advance of Denikin, the economic burden imposed upon him becomes the greater.

Assuming his ability to reach Moscow this winter, it is very questionable whether he ought to; Moscow is starving (so it is reported), and the Bolshevik legacy will be one of famine, pestilence, and general misery. There is little fuel, no heating arrangements for buildings of any size, and the people will have to herd together in confined spaces, where one fire can warm as many as possible. Unless help is forthcoming, Central Russia will, for the most part, perish, and this should not be laid to Denikin's account.

- (c.) It is generally agreed that the peasants want peace—How, indeed, could they want anything else? To be loyal and law-abiding they must be fed. They will espouse the cause of any side that can give them food and quiet.

- (d.) Hardened as we have become during this war to widespread calamities, I cannot help feeling that if the facts were known assistance from Great Britain would be generally approved to save a people who are neither Royalist nor Reactionary, neither governing class nor bourgeois, but men, women, and children who have lived through a period of untold horror to die of starvation only at the end of it.

It is not necessary to import food. There is abundance in certain parts of the South. A million tons of grain could even be exported, but what is required is means of transport and a better administrative service. The latter is slowly improving under General Holman's direction, trains are now conveyed by British officers, and "the stuff gets to the army," and, as regards the former, General Holman asks for 1,000 locomotives and a real reinforcement of railway and "Q" staff.

- (e.) I asked whether the character and functions of the naval part of the mission might not be changed with advantage; i.e., instead of a Naval Mission in the field make it a mission at Sevastopol to work with the fleet, on the lines of our Naval Mission to Greece. General Holman undertook to sound Denikin on this point, without in any way committing the Admiralty.
- (f.) The nucleus of the Russian Black Sea fleet is to-day at sea. Although its growth will be slow, it will nevertheless soon become a force exercising influence on the Roumanian, Bulgarian, Georgian, and Anatolian coasts. If, through a naval mission, some form of British control can be exercised over policy and operations, we may be saved many delicate situations in the future.

A detail in this connection is that the Russians are much impressed by rank, and a commodore means far more to them than a captain.

- (g.) As regards the Caspian, I heard good reports of Captain Sergaief, who commands there. He is energetic and understands the essentials of the situation. He has also been recently reinforced with officers and men.
- (h.) Admiral Gerasimof, whom I met, is General Denikin's naval adviser. Unsuited for many reasons, chiefly age, health, and inertia.

At the outbreak of the revolution he was at Reval (?), and, besides being shot in the head, was nearly beaten to death by the Bolsheviks. He is not entirely sympathetic to the British, and I think General Holman, who is on intimate terms with Denikin, will seek a way of getting him replaced by a more energetic and knowledgeable officer.

I endeavoured to impress on the Russians that, after the ice had imposed a truce on naval operations by sea and river, their efforts should be directed to training officers and men at Sevastopol for the spring. The old naval personnel scarcely exists. They will have to start from bed-rock with young men, and are not likely to succeed without recasting their ideas as to the relations between officers and men. It is in this sphere, almost more than in the technical sphere, that a British mission would be most helpful.

Concerning Denikin's western front, General Holman gave me to understand that the volunteer army would not try to cross the Dniester. Denikin was content to leave the question of Bessarabia to the future. The Ukraine, he said, wants self-government under Russia, not independence. Petlura was looked upon as an impostor, a brigand, a mere "killer of Jews." His force was estimated at 15,000 men.

Bratiano, it was stated, had expressed to General Keyes his goodwill towards Denikin and his intention to back Petlura no longer, so that generally speaking the situation with Roumania appeared very much easier.

4. Having only forty-eight hours previously been with Mr. Wardrop at Tiflis, I was interested to hear the views of Denikin and General Holman concerning Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Daghestan.

General Holman furnished me with circumstantial evidence of many hostile acts against Denikin's southern front, the most serious being those which threaten his line to Petrovsk and his oil supply at Grosni.

Denikin acquits the Georgian people of any hostile desire, but the Georgian Government, he is convinced, is not innocent. Germans and Turks are engineering all the mischief, aided by Bolshevik elements scattered throughout the Caucasus.

It will be difficult, but I think not impossible, to bring about some solution here.

These "countries" cannot exist side by side in a state of independence. They must fall as prey to the Turks or the Russians eventually. Their Governments are self-elected, an assembly merely of self-assertive men.

If the Allies could make it clear to these people that the Turks are beaten, the Germans beaten, and the Bolsheviks in process of being beaten, that they will be allowed independence if steps are now taken to evict or restrain such elements, and that such independence shall endure until a solid, just government has been founded in Russia, then I believe Denikin could devote himself wholeheartedly to his northern front, instead of dissipating strength to keep his rear secure.

The first step is, to my mind, a better liaison between Tiflis and Taganrog; the second, good propaganda; the third, a conference at some central spot at which representatives of the Great Powers could state an agreed policy and show what advantages would accrue to these so-called republics by conforming to it.

5. General Denikin mentioned that he had many Kubans fighting for him, and fighting well; that the people as a whole were for him, but the Kuban Government was hostile and treacherous.

6. General Holman has already reported that in a number of cases very unsatisfactory officers have been sent out to join his mission. At such a time and in such a place it appears to me inexcusable to send officers who are unable to maintain British prestige. The damage such officers do is out of all proportion to the actual offence committed and (this much can be said on their behalf) they are probably quite unaware of it.

I am sure the Admiralty will bear this in mind when naval officers are required for similar service.

7. As there has been a general impression that Denikin has in his entourage a number of officers of German sympathies, I enquired of General Holman as to this.

He said that amongst some Russian officers, especially the younger ones, such a feeling undoubtedly existed, and it is because these officers feel that they have gone through, and are still going through, many of the trials that the Germans endured—rejected by their men, persecuted by the "common people." Amongst the older officers there was no leaning towards Germany. They knew well enough that once in Germany's commercial or military grip there would be no escape for their country.

8. General Holman considered that the Italian, French, and United States missions with Denikin were purely commercial. A Polish mission has recently been added in order to extract concessions from Denikin.

The disinterested character of our military mission is understood and appreciated, and they have won for Great Britain an influence in Russia that should not be allowed to diminish.

9. Finally, General Holman paid tribute to General Denikin himself. He spoke of his absolute straightforwardness and unswerving policy. Expediency is unknown to him. He will make no promises that he cannot fulfil, and he is ready to fight down all who are against his cause.

My short acquaintance with him leads me to believe that this estimate is correct. He is imperturbable, unpretentious, and when he speaks all listen attentively. He is quite unimpressive in appearance, but has a sense of humour.

10. These observations are not, in the main, such as will immediately concern the Admiralty, and indeed are somewhat beyond the province of an admiral to make. But since arriving at Constantinople I have been impressed with the fact that sometimes the point of view of an outsider, however uninstructed beforehand, may be of value. One hears, for instance, such a remark as "Holman is more Russian than the Russians," "Wardrop more Georgian than the Georgians," and so I have thought it worth while to report my impressions, having in the last three days had the opportunity of conversing at great length with both of these officers, also with General Sir G. F. Milne.

I arrived in "Iron Duke" at Sevastopol at 0800 on the 14th October, "Iron Duke" proceeding up harbour, making fast to buoy which gave her ample room to swing. The weather was fine throughout my stay. The following Admirals were present in the port:—

Vice-Admiral Nenukof, Commander-in-Chief of the Black Sea Fleet.

Vice-Admiral Sablin, Admiral of the Port.

Rear-Admiral Boubnof, Chief of Staff to Admiral Nenukof.

The usual official calls were exchanged that day. On the 15th October, accompanied by my staff, I was shown over the fortifications and all the points of interest including Malakof, Redan, Panorama, &c., and also we motored out to have a

look at Balaklava. Vice-Admiral Nenukof entertained us and all the principal officers at Sevastopol to lunch, and in the evening I returned their hospitality by dinner on board "Iron Duke."

As has been already reported, Admiral Sablin has given way to Admiral Nenukof, and from the short acquaintance I have had of those two officers it could not have been otherwise than a change for the better. Admiral Sablin strikes me as taciturn, unenterprising, and without powers of leading or organising. Admiral Nenukof and his Chief of Staff, Admiral Boubnof, are men of understanding, and have been placed in their present positions by Admiral Koltchak. Admiral Nenukof is rather old, has no look of the sea about him, is untidy in appearance but quite alert mentally, speaks English very fairly, and on all naval questions he seemed to me to have sound ideas. The combination of Nenukof and Boubnof should be good. Nenukof, a thoughtful and experienced head; Boubnof, a young officer (only 40), full of ideas, a great student of history, especially the history of our service, which he knows intimately, a man of humane and high principles. I formed a great opinion of Admiral Boubnof. He explained that the Russian navy was not short of officers, as more ships had been sunk than officers required for them lost, but that a great deal of weeding out would be necessary as many of the officers of the old régime were unsatisfactory.

The new Russian navy that Admirals Nenukof and Boubnof are keen to create will be modelled on British lines. The men are all to be volunteers, and a sufficient supply seems to be assured, and a careful selection will be made. Their pay is going to be good. Each ship will carry a complement of marines, about 20 per cent. of the whole. No man will be selected whose antecedents and present political opinion are not above suspicion. Selection will be confined to a good class, i.e., a class above the peasant class, by which I understand the artisan and shop-keeper classes.

As regards the officers of the new navy, on the day of "Iron Duke's" arrival the first day of the examination of cadets at the Naval College was taking place. It is hoped shortly that 400 cadets will be in residence at the College, and the course outlined will take three years. Admiral Boubnof is mainly directing these affairs, and is well qualified to do so, having been a gunnery officer in the past and head of the War College. He is keenly interested in naval tactics; he was severely wounded at the battle of Tsushima while serving in the "Orel." He married a daughter of Admiral Rodjestvensky. The Russian officers are keen and enthusiastic about this new navy, and appear to realise that in order to become efficient and avoid future outbreaks they must establish quite a new relationship between their officers and their men. This was a point which I took the liberty of impressing on them more than once, for if they are unable to create a feeling of loyalty they will be building on the sand.

Admiral of cruiser "Kornilof" stated that he carried 88 officers, his complement being 22, the extra 66 were dressed as seamen as far as the stock of uniform allowed, and carried out the more important and responsible duties of seamen, such as gunlayers, anything to do with charge of explosives, &c., but they lived in the ward-room and gun-room with the officers. For a considerable period he could only steam 3 knots, but can now do 23.

Their two principal needs at the present moment appear to be cloth and paint. They remarked that without uniform it is impossible for the men to be self-respecting, and without paint it is impossible to respect their ships. The greater part of their crews wear British khaki military uniforms. I promised that I would do what I could to supply them with some anchor badges and good-conduct stripes which they might sew on to whatever clothes they were wearing until they had proper supplies of uniform. It is little things like these that show to what a state the country is reduced. There is no cloth, no cotton, no linen for hospital use, and if there were, there is no money to buy them. Admiral Boubnof told me that he could not keep a servant, and that his wife did all the cooking and housework herself; their ships, despite the lack of paint, are far more presentable than the French ships, and when we passed them I noticed how steadily their crews stood to attention on all occasions.

In Captain Erazart they have an energetic head of the Submarine Service, who commands great respect for his attack on the "Goeben" in the Black Sea, for which he was awarded our D.S.O.

Great pleasure was expressed at the prospective return of the "Volga" and "Derski"; also, they are glad to be given a greater measure of freedom with their submarines.

I feel sure that the conversations with these officers have done good, and that the sight of a ship like the "Iron Duke" in their inner harbour, as well as the behaviour and appearance of our ship's company in the town, had a wholesome effect.

[148099]

No. 161.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Davis

Foreign Office, November 21, 1919.

My dear Ambassador,

THE question of permitting investigations or operations for oil in the occupied enemy territories of Palestine and Mesopotamia to which your Excellency alluded in your recent conversation with me of the 31st ultimo has had careful consideration, and I now send you my promised reply.

As regards operation, that is the active development of oilfields, building of roads, &c., the view which has been held about economic questions in general affecting occupied enemy territories is this:—

That the provisional character of the military occupation does not warrant the taking of decisions by the occupying Power in matters concerning the future economic development of the country.

Accordingly, our policy has been to prohibit the initiation of any new undertakings, or the exercise by concessionnaires of rights, which they may have acquired, but not taken advantage of, before the war.

This view has equally governed our attitude in regard to investigations and surveys which private individuals or firms may wish to undertake in occupied enemy territories, and our action in prohibiting this class of operations has been further ruled by the principle that nothing should be done which might in any way compromise the future authorities of the country, to whom, we consider, should be left the decision as to the methods and measures necessary to be adopted for ensuring the development of the mineral resources of the territory which they will be called upon to administer.

We have also felt that to open the occupied territories to prospectors during temporary military tenure would be most undesirable, as it would inevitably lead to a rush of speculators and others who, under the guise of simple investigation, would aim at securing definite and exclusive rights or options from native landowners. Further, while a certain amount of freedom of communication with towns and ports in Mesopotamia and Palestine has been allowed in the interests of trade, it would be quite incompatible with the conditions of war which still prevail in those countries, that this freedom should be extended to individuals who desire to travel and carry out investigations in the interior.

With regard to the Standard Oil Company, I realise that their complaint arises out of the fact that a representative of the Shell group visited Mesopotamia in the early part of this year. I think, however, you already know that the visit of this representative was undertaken without the knowledge or consent either of this Department or of the India Office, and that steps were immediately taken for his recall as soon as the object of his mission had been ascertained. The two members of his party who remained behind were not permitted to work any oil lands except for military purposes, and have only been allowed to stay because their services have been required by the military authorities for the repair and working of certain refineries at Quaiyara in order to obtain supplies of oil needed for military and transport purposes. They will be recalled as soon as there is no further use for their services in this direction.

I greatly regret that the mistake to which I have referred was committed. But the worst way of rectifying it would be to consent to its repetition. So innocent, indeed, have His Majesty's Government been of any conscious discrimination that we have refused at least eleven applications from British firms and syndicates to carry out investigations and studies in various parts of occupied enemy territory, and to this policy I propose, so long as the existing conditions prevail, unflinchingly to adhere.

Believe me, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[154611]

No. 162.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 59.)
My Lord,

Tiflis, October 23, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows on my recent journey in Armenia:—

1. On the 14th October, at 3 P.M., I left Tiflis by special train accompanied by Mr. Grundy, Commander Birkett, R.N., Lieutenant-Commander Luke (these two

officers were left here by Admiral de Robeck when he visited me on the 10th October), Captain Prince Mamuca Orbeliani (attached to my mission by the Georgian War Office), Captain Anief (of the Armenian army). On leaving the neutral zone of Borchalo, I was welcomed in a prepared speech by the Commissary of Karaklis on behalf of the Armenian Government.

2. On the morning of the 15th we arrived at Erivan, and found at the railway station the President (M. Khatissian), the Ministers, the civil and military authorities; a guard of honour was provided. Speeches were made by the President and the Minister for War, and my reception was of a very cordial nature. The President drove with me to the commodious house provided by the Armenian Government for Captain Gracey, and I took up my quarters there and received on my arrival the visits of those who had met me at the station.

3. The aspect of the city is pitiful. The streets are ill-kept, and the wind carries clouds of infected dust. Everywhere there are wretched refugees in rags—hungry, diseased, demoralised; M. Khatissian told me there were 200,000 in the district of the Ararat Republic. There are epidemics of typhus, cholera, dengue, malaria, and other fevers, and the general state of the public health is bad. The Americans are doing all that is possible to relieve this great mass of suffering, and are themselves paying their toll of illness and mortality. Of the troops on the southern frontier 70 per cent. are sick with malaria, and as there was no quinine I immediately telegraphed to the Military Governor of Batoum province asking if he could provide some. During my short visit I saw in different places two men lying on the ground dying of hunger and exhaustion, and the appearance of some of the children was very painful to see; they were picking up refuse in the streets and eating it. The shops were bare of goods, and almost the only food for sale in fair quantities was fruit and melons. Among a population in this plight the common instincts of pity, cleanliness, and family affection are dimmed; people are selling their children for prostitution, robbery with violence has become frequent, and on both the nights when I was in Erivan I heard a lively and frequent interchange of rifle and revolver fire between the militia and bandits. Erivan at present is more depressing than any place I have ever seen.

4. During the afternoon I called and saw the Ministers, the foreign representatives, and other authorities, and I have already conveyed to your Lordship by telegram the chief points of interest discussed with M. Khatissian. Among my visits was one to His Holiness George 5th, Catholicos of Armenia, who is at present staying at the Bishop's palace at Erivan to undergo medical and surgical treatment. He is a strong personality of striking appearance, and I was glad to have the opportunity of conversing with him.

I venture here to suggest that a regular interchange of friendly letters between the hierarchy of the Church of England and the heads of the smaller Christian Churches would be greatly appreciated by the latter.

In the evening I was entertained at a dinner where M. Khatissian made a speech of welcome very carefully worded, to avoid hurting the susceptibilities of the other foreigners present, including representatives of America, France, Italy, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Denikin's army, &c.

Following my invariable rule I made no public speech. I will confess that the thought of the hungry people outside spoiled my appetite, and I was sorry that M. Khatissian had disregarded my request to dispense with a banquet.

Among the guests was Colonel Daly, who has since been appointed American Governor-General of Nakhichevan.

5. On the 16th October I walked in the bazaars and streets for some hours and then drove to Edehmiadzin, where I was hospitably received by the monks, including my acquaintance, Bishop Tirair, who has spent some time at Oxford, and speaks English fluently and correctly.

I was grieved to see how the monastery had suffered since I last visited it nine years ago. There are now only twenty-two monks in residence. All the most valuable church property, including the splendid library, was transferred to Moscow for safety early in the war, and is thus exposed to great risk of destruction or pillage. The buildings are sadly in need of repair, the fine trees have all been cut down, and what was formerly the peaceful, well-kept abode of cultured scholars is now, to a great extent, given up to miserable refugees. Yet, both here and in Erivan, I was told the situation was far better than it had been; at one time, when the Turks were within 5 miles of Erivan, there were on the plain between Edehmiadzin and Ararat 200,000 refugees, and as many as 900 died in one day.

6. In the afternoon Mme. Khatissian (a Russian by birth) held a reception, at

which I had the opportunity of meeting the chief political leaders, including the two delegates recently arrived from Paris, sent by Boghos Nubar Pasha, and two representatives of the American Armenians. These gentlemen had come to Erivan to discuss questions of policy with the Ararat Government, and I have been given to understand that one of their chief aims is to prevent too close a rapprochement between that Government and the Russian Volunteer Army. One of the things that struck me most in my conversation with the American and Turkish Armenians was their evident disinclination to make any long stay in the Republic as at present organised.

7. I may mention that the President lives in a very modest way in a small apartment over an apothecary's shop, though he has a handsome house in Erivan (now given up to refugee work), and the Ministers generally are very poorly housed. The heroic old General, Thomas Nazarbekof, Commander-in-chief, seemed to have only one poor room for himself.

8. At the invitation of the Parliament I was present at their sitting in the evening. On my entrance the President made a speech of welcome which was much applauded by the House and the public who crowded the galleries. The deputies seemed to be serious, well-educated, and business-like; there were three women among them. M. Khatissian sent me in the evening a letter, of which I annex a translation.

9. Early in the morning of the 17th October I left in my motor-car with Captain Gracey, Mr. Grundy, and Lieutenant-Commander Luke. We were followed by another car containing Commander Birkett, Prince M. Orbeliani, and Captain Yablokof (an Armenian officer from Nakhichevan on Don), attached to Captain Gracey's office; this car, we afterwards learned, had a series of accidents, and we did not meet it till our return to Elenovka from Novo-Bayazid.

10. The state of the roads was very good, and at various places we found men working at their maintenance and repair. In the forenoon we approached Elenovka, on Lake Goktcha, and some miles before arriving there were met by a cavalry escort. The Russian Molokans of the place offered me bread and salt, and made a speech of greeting. We were then entertained at breakfast by the commissar of the district, after which we set out along the lake by a good road.

I may here mention that about a week ago Armenia laid the foundation of her naval power by launching at Elenovka, with much ceremony, a motor-boat armed with one 24-inch gun and manned by a lieutenant, who has under his command forty men.

For a distance of over 20 miles every house was in ruins, as the result of the internecine strife between Armenians and Tartars. Some miles before arriving at Novo-Bayazid detachments of cavalry and boy scouts (refugee orphans from Turkish Armenia) were drawn up on the road as guards of honour and followed us into the town.

11. The district of Novo-Bayazid, in the bleak highlands above Lake Goktcha, at a height of over 6,000 feet, was not able, even before the war, to produce half the food necessary for the inhabitants. There is now a large refugee population, and the prospects for the winter are, in spite of the good work of the American relief authorities (here represented by Armenians), disquieting. The officials and notables, and apparently the whole population, turned out to greet us, and there were parades of cavalry and cadets, and the streets were guarded with troops.

At a luncheon given in our honour, numerous speeches were made by the mayor, the well-known guerilla leader Hamazasp, and others. Then, escorted by troops singing patriotic songs, I visited the church and received the blessings of the local clergy. After seeing a refuge for 850 orphans, I returned to Elenovka and found the missing members of my party there.

12. In the dusk we drove along the lake in sight of the island with the monastery of Sevan and, mounting to a height of about 8,000 feet, crossed the pass near Semenovka and by a splendid zig-zag road descended over 2,500 feet to Delijan, where we arrived about 7.30 p.m., and were hospitably entertained by the family of the Armenian general who built and now looks after the road.

13. On the morning of the 18th I was able to see the natural beauties of Delijan, a favourite health resort surrounded by high mountains thickly clad in deciduous trees, now taking the tints of autumn, and well supplied with water. There are numerous attractive wooden villas with gardens, and the whole aspect of the place formed a striking contrast to the ruins and squalor of Erivan and the desolate shores of Lake Goktcha. I inspected, with the local authorities, the homes for the relief of refugees from Turkey, and found the elder people busily engaged in the carpet-making

industry established and organised by Captain Gracey some time ago (before he entered the service of the Foreign Office), while the orphan children (of whom I saw as many as 320 in one house with large gardens and meadows on the river bank outside the town, on the property first requisitioned from the Georgian Prince Chavchavadze and then nationalised) looked healthy and clean, though many of them still had an expression of terror on their faces very sad to see, and others were scarred and disfigured by disease. I also saw the prison, the occupants of which, though somewhat crowded, seemed well-nourished and as comfortable looking as could be expected; I was told they were chiefly robbers and murderers.

At the grain stores samples were in my presence drawn from flour sacks received from America, and I was able to verify the assertion that heavy adulteration with sand had taken place; subsequent enquiries tend to show that possibly this may be done on the road between Karaklis and Delijan by the carters. The behaviour of the local officials and population was very hospitable, and when I left at 2.0 P.M. I was warmly bidden farewell by a large guard of honour and a crowd of people; women and children threw flowers into my car and cheered.

14. By a fine smooth road, through a well-timbered, fertile country, past numerous villages and tilled lands, I arrived at Karaklis before dark. The place seemed little changed since I spent some days there in 1910. It is not very tidy or prosperous looking, but is a trading centre of some importance, and has a considerable production of the meadow-honey for which it is famous.

Dr. Pratt, the head of the American Relief Mission at the place, was good enough to spend some time with me in my railway carriage, which was waiting for me at Karaklis, and gave me an account of his work and of local conditions generally; he is aided by three American ladies, including his wife, and the work among the refugees is of a very strenuous and depressing kind; among other things he told me that he had only a few days ago distributed 1,800 complete sets of clothing in the town, and he did not believe 100 could now be found there, the remainder having been sold. Round the railway station, encamped in the open air (like hundreds I had seen in Erivan), were crowds of sick, hungry, dirty, exhausted people of all ages.

15. After the comparative comfort of Tiflis and the positive luxury of Baku it was painful to see the misery of Armenia. Not only have the people reached the limit of physical privation and suffering, but their moral character has been put under a strain which has in many cases passed the breaking point, and in all has produced lamentable results which must last for a long time. I cannot wonder that our American friends hesitate to take the mandate for such a country where for many years no return seems likely for the financial and other aid indispensable to make human life tolerable. Yet the Armenian people have a stubborn power of resistance, an indomitable tendency to steady work (qualities in which they remind me of the Bulgarians), so that they will certainly "make good" if they have any kind of chance.

They are not, perhaps, an easy people to get on with, especially at present; they are (according to some of themselves) generally devoid of anything like "charm," rather one-sided in their views, indisposed to admit that they have any faults of character or conduct, excessively individualist (not to say "egoistic"), but they are very clever, hardworking, thrifty, frugal people who cannot fail to achieve physical well-being and prosperity when an opportunity is given them. In any case, they have been faithful allies, and have fought with a bravery and endurance which must for ever close the mouths of those who formerly slandered them, and said that it was their *métier* to be massacred unresisting, and which justifies their claim to a free political life for which they have a decided aptitude.

I have, &c.

O. WARDROP.

Enclosure in No. 162.

M. Khatissian to Mr. Wardrop.

(Translation.)

Sir,

THE Armenian nation and the Government of Armenia are devoting all their efforts to the complete organisation of the peaceful life of the State of Armenia; they have organised the public institutions the army, Parliament, the Government, and all these are working regularly.

Erivan, October 16, 1919.

But the non-recognition hitherto of the independence of the Republic of Armenia by the Allied Powers constitutes an enormous hindrance to the regular working of the State in the spheres of finance, politics, and the army.

In view of this, I, in the name of the Government, ask your Excellency to intercede with the British Government for the immediate recognition of the Republic of Armenia.

The extremely sympathetic attitude of the British Government and people towards Armenia and the Armenians is well known, and we therefore boldly count on England's protection of the desires of the Armenian people.

Your personal attitude towards the interests of Armenia gives me full assurance that my request will find in your Excellency a powerful supporter.

I beg, &c.

AL. KHATISSIAN,

Minister-President of the Republic of Armenia.

[154439]

No. 163.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 2085.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 6, 1919.

WITH reference to my letter No. 1935 of the 20th October, relative to the activity of the Italians in Smyrna and its environs, I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a further letter, dated the 22nd October, which I have received on this subject from my representative at Smyrna.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 163.

Mr. Morgan to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

October 22, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 14th instant, it is reported to me on good authority that an Italian, who has recently arrived from Italy, named Gresser, has installed himself in the house which I referred to in my despatch as "Propaganda Bureau." A number of Turks frequent this house, and Dr. Brunetti, a local Italian doctor and a fervent Italian propagandist, is a frequent visitor.

JAMES MORGAN, Representative of British
High Commissioner, Smyrna.

[154340]

No. 164.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 2052.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Constantinople, November 10, 1919.

THE information contained in your telegram No. 1727 gives rise to serious misgivings. The already extraordinary prolongation of the armistice has brought about a state of real chaos which we have managed to palliate so far by a series of make-shifts, but if I am correct in interpreting your phrase "for some time to come" as a period of at all events six months, I feel it my duty to point out some of the principal difficulties we must be prepared to meet.

1. *Finance.*—See my telegram No. 1854 and my despatch No. 1775. It has been presumable that the new Government would have sufficient control over Mustapha Kemal to obtain now from the provinces the customary revenues, but whilst the situation is very obscure, it is, I think, now certain that this is not the case. On the contrary, the Nationalists are reported to be levying forced contributions in the interior only for the support of their movement. Thus to assist the Government in its great emergency is, in a way, to subsidise the Nationalists, whilst not to do so is to upset what is left of the administrative machinery. Moreover, it appears to me impossible to

[1356]

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grant any loan without controlling it; presumably this control would have to take an international form, which is most cumbersome and I think undesirable. It could hardly fail also to prejudice the position of the eventual mandatory. Much depends upon internal politics. There is plenty of money in the country if it could be got at as Mustapha Kemal appears to be doing. He shows unwillingness either to take over the Government himself, which he wishes carried on by others who shall do as he directs, or to come to Constantinople, he has, as you are aware, suggested that the Parliament shall meet at Broussa. The elections which are proceeding are of course the most utter farce and will result in the nomination of practically a pure Committee body. It is just possible that they may be able to raise funds.

2. *Judicial*.—The situation is quite unparalleled. Ottoman Courts judge Ottoman subjects, and Allied troops are subject to Allied courts martial. Beyond this no courts of law exist at the moment of writing. The Turkish Government are reluctant to adopt proposed temporary international tribunal, and even this would be a quite inadequate palliative. Criminal charges are dealt with in a rough and ready way by the inter-Allied police, but with no real legal sanction; offenders are often arrested and then released after a few days, as there is no prison accommodation and no tribunal which can deal with, say, a case of fraud. There are measures which it is most desirable to enforce in the public interest, such as the prevention of profiteering, or the speculation in roubles and shipping, passport or customs regulations. Whilst we can, more or less, impose our decisions on the Porte, we have no legal authority over foreigners. This absence of law courts, tolerable as it was for a time, presents every day greater disadvantages.

3. *Police and Sanitary*.—In accordance with War Office instructions (see your telegram No. 88 of 14th January) the British military authorities assumed control of the Turkish police and sanitary administrations, admitting French and Italians, so that the controls might take on a proper inter-Allied complexion. But to offset our action as regards the police, the French assumed control of the gendarmerie, in which we declined to participate. They have, I gather, made very little progress with their organisation, which they appear to have used, under the guidance of an indiscreet general named Poulon, who was employed in the gendarmerie before the war, mainly as a means of propaganda and of obtaining information. The police control under British supervision has given fully as satisfactory results as could possibly be hoped for in the circumstances, directing the action of the Turks, who find the money to meet the expenses; only the cost of the foreigners employed is borne by the respective Allied Governments. Crime is kept within fairly reasonable limits, but the heads of the inter-Allied police have found themselves forced into the position of being a kind of court of summary jurisdiction, and to give decisions which only by the most elastic interpretation can be brought under the denomination of military necessity.

The sanitary control of the city and environs was similarly taken over by the British military authorities, who adjoined to themselves representatives of the other Allies, as well as Greek and Russian representatives. This body is called the Commission sanitaire interalliée, and gives directions to the existing Turkish municipal organisation. Its control, however, has never been entirely effective, as we have furnished no money, and, as the municipality possess no funds (see my telegram No. 2004), they are always able to plead lack of means as an excuse for not carrying out recommended measures. Plague and typhus both exist here, and I am advised that, while the former probably presents no great danger, we must be prepared to face a considerable epidemic of the latter during the winter and the health of the Allied troops has to be safeguarded. The above-mentioned Commission is responsible for all the work that has been done, but it is immensely hampered by lack of means and competent personnel as well as by the action of General Franchet d'Esperey. When the headquarters of the Allies were moved here he, as Commandant en chef, introduced from Salonica a Commission internationale d'Hygiène, composed of the directors of medical services of the three Allies, to which he added on arriving here representatives of the navies and of the two Turkish sanitary administrations (municipal and quarantine), as well as of other nationalities. The Allied High Commissioners are also represented. This body possesses properly no executive but only advisory functions, though the French members are continually trying to extend its sphere, and I understand that it issues instructions in quarantine and lazaret matters, though the executive remains in the hands of the Turkish Commission de la Défense sanitaire des Frontières. Here, again, effective action is greatly hampered by lack of funds (see my telegram No. 1946). You will see that no more unsatisfactory

state of affairs could well be imagined, but it must continue as long as does the armistice.

4. *Foreign Relations*.—I am glad to say that my relations with both my colleagues are entirely satisfactory and cordial, even if the attitude of the Italian Government is ambiguous and lends itself to certain suspicions. When the divergence of our views and interests, as well as the natural and instinctive efforts of the Turks to accentuate it, are taken into account, this result may almost be considered as surprising. This happy situation is, however, constantly and seriously menaced by the attitude of General Franchet d'Esperey, who is consumed with vanity and a sense of his own importance, and who never loses an opportunity to presume upon his position of Commandant en chef for interfering in every kind of matter, from municipal latrines to the relations of this High Commission with the Turkish Government, none of which depend in the most remote manner upon his responsibilities as Generalissimo. He has treated me personally with studied discourtesy. It would be of real advantage were it possible to replace him by some person of a less overbearing and more conciliatory character. It is of course a standing enigma to the world at large here, but especially to Turks, why the Supreme Command in Turkey is not in the hands of that country which alone overthrew the Turkish Empire.

5. *Internal Situation*.—As indicated above, this is very obscure. It seems clear that the present Government has not been able to come to an agreement with Mustapha Kemal and the Nationalist movement, which appears to be meeting with quite serious opposition from the *Entente libérale* party and others who are resolutely opposed to the Committee. Accounts have come to my ears of serious engagements between them in the interior, but especially in the neighbourhood of Caesarea, where regular massacres of Turks are stated to have taken place, the anti-Nationalists being ill-provided with arms. The Christians have not been touched so far. My French colleague learns that the *Entente libérale* were making vigorous attempts to overthrow the present Government, and he seemed to think that I was interested in the movement, but I have most rigidly adhered to your instructions, namely, to insist on the maintenance of law and order and of legally constituted authority, but to take no action which could be interpreted as assistance to any one party, and I have taken special pains to emphasise to the Turkish Government and to my colleagues that this and no other is the policy of His Majesty's Government. It is one which it is not entirely easy to follow; for instance, recently several arrests have been effected, and I am at a loss to know whether they are political arrests, and so contrary to the instructions in your telegram No. 1691, or whether the arrested were implicated in plots against the present Government, i.e., against constituted authority.

At all events, the discord existing among the Turks themselves is undoubtedly on the increase and can only tend to their future weakening. Nevertheless, you must be under no illusion as to the necessity of a considerable military force if it is desired either to impose upon the Turks any really onerous conditions of peace or to ensure stable safety to the Christians.

6. It is my duty to submit to you recommendations for meeting these difficulties, but before doing so I desire to point out to you one factor which underlies the whole situation and which must not be lost sight of. In the course of the negotiations of the armistice the Turkish delegates absolutely refused to accept the occupation of Constantinople, a point upon which, I think, you might advantageously consult Admiral Calthorpe, with the result that to-day we are not technically in occupation of it. It is a fact which relieves us perhaps of certain responsibilities, but which certainly imposes many limitations. In any case, we have under the armistice no real justification now for declaring an occupation. Arguments based upon an occupation are invalid.

7. My recommendations, then, are as follows:—

(1.) The presumption I have made is convenient, and is sufficient to justify procrastination in making an advance till the Nationalists are forced to come out into the open.

(2.) The situation really can only be met by a declaration of occupation, from which I submit we are precluded by considerations of good faith. But apart from this I can see no sound remedy, and we must get along as best we can, relying upon His Majesty's Government and the Peace Conference to support such action as we may be obliged by circumstances to take should the occasion arise.

(3 and 4.) The remedy is clear. It is very necessary to remove General Franchet d'Esperey, whose existence appears no longer justified by circumstances, or, if it is,

to replace him by a man of wider views and who understands more perfectly the duties and the obligations of an ally.

8. I venture to hope that the considerations in my despatch No. 1836 will meet with your Lordship's attentive consideration.

9. I am reporting separately on the situation with regard to the native Christian population of Turkey (see my despatch No. 2110/M./2348 of 11th November, 1919).

[154459]

No. 165.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 2110.)

My Lord.

Constantinople, November 11, 1919.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 1727 of the 4th November, I trust that it is fully realised what the delay in the conclusion of peace with Turkey, which is foreshadowed therein, means to the country at large and particularly to the native Christian population.

2. Owing to the Nationalist movement in Asia Minor, arising out of the occupation of Smyrna by Greek troops, there is a strong and growing tendency on the part of all Christians in the interior to make for the sea-coast, where they arrive destitute and homeless, to swell the crowds of refugees, for whom it is already impossible to provide adequate food and accommodation in the coast towns and villages.

3. Even at Constantinople, under the eyes of the various committees organised for the relief of Armenian and Greek refugees, a recent visit which the Assistant High Commissioner paid to an Armenian refugee camp at Haidar Pasha revealed an almost indescribable state of affairs. Men, women, and children were huddled into tents until there was hardly room to move, the decencies could not be preserved, and in wet weather the whole place was deep in mud. Moreover, there were not enough tents for all and several families were camping in the open, sitting on their bundles in the daytime and sleeping on the bare ground at night.

4. Some explanation of the difficulty in housing refugees in Constantinople is to be found in the destruction caused by recent huge fires and the requisitioning of buildings required for military needs, but it is always the Christian element that has to bear the chief burden of suffering. If this state of things exists in the capital, it is easy to imagine what the conditions of refugee camps in the provinces must be.

5. No stronger proof could be given of the anxiety which the present situation inspires in the heads of the Christian communities than the fact that the Greek and Armenian Patriarchs recently called jointly upon me, arriving together at the British Embassy, for the purpose of drawing attention to the dangers and sufferings of their peoples—an unparalleled instance of fraternity in the history of their churches (see my despatch No. 1923 of the 18th October).

6. The various relief organisations which are endeavouring to cope with this great mass of human suffering never contemplated the possibility of having to continue their operations over another winter, with the fate of Turkey still hanging in the balance, and without the material assistance and support of a controlling Christian Power or Powers, or any decision being arrived at with regard to the fundamental questions of policy raised a year ago.

7. The Armenian Committee, which is dependent on voluntary contributions, has almost exhausted its funds; the Greek Committee was never able to extend its operations beyond Thrace and the Asiatic shore of the Sea of Marmora, and it now sees its grant from the Greek Government curtailed by a sum of 200,000*l.*; the American Committee for Relief in the Near East is also being obliged to reduce its expenditure and staff in a very large measure, and it is seen with dismay that the great hopes of American political and material assistance which had been aroused by President Wilson's declarations and by the activities of the various American Commissions of Enquiry now seem doomed to disappointment.

8. Meanwhile, the needs are increasing daily and mortality, which from various causes is already high, will be enormously increased by the advent of winter, which must bring about the death of many thousands by starvation exposure, and disease, unless effective measures for relief on a very large scale are quickly set on foot. Typhus has already made its appearance and there is every reason to fear a rapid spread of the disease, due to malnutrition, overcrowding, and insanitary conditions.

9. The work of the relief officers of this High Commission in obtaining the restitution of their property to returned refugees, which was proceeding satisfactorily, received a check on receipt of the news of the Greek landing at Smyrna. But the full effect of that event did not make itself felt for some months, when Turkish resentment for our share in it had been fanned into a flame by the anti-British propaganda of the Nationalists. Now, when the services of the relief officers would be more valuable than ever, they find themselves met with obstructions and hostility instead of readiness to help. The most flagrant cases of injustice to Christians have to be left unredressed, and the well earned prestige and personal influence which they had acquired with all classes of the population have been seriously impaired.

10. With regard to the question of the personal security of Christians in Turkey, it is true that Mustapha Kemal Pasha proposes to guarantee their safety, provided they refrain from any agitation threatening the integrity of the Empire, but after the experience of the last five years no reliance can be placed in the word of an irresponsible Nationalist leader who regards the surviving Armenians and Greeks as so many hostages for the exaction from the Allies of more favourable terms of peace for his own country.

11. The whole of the Near East might be compared to a jelly. Touch it in one part and the whole trembles. The events at Smyrna have had their repercussion throughout the length and breadth of the land. The Christians are now bewildered and terrified—bewildered by the seeming change of front, when, after proclaiming through the world our solicitude for their welfare, they see us apparently abandoning them to their fate, and terrified—and justly so—as to what their fate may be. Great Britain occupies the unique position in the eyes of both Moslems and Eastern Christians, due, on the one hand, to the existence within the British Empire of vast numbers of Moslem fellow subjects and on the other to our consistently sympathetic attitude towards all downtrodden races, while all alike recognise in her the Power which overthrew the Turkish Empire. The moral effect of what they regard as a betrayal is far greater as coming from us than if it came from our French or Italian Allies, or even from the Americans, who are very much of an enigma to them. Despair must seize upon the Christian, while the Moslem is encouraged in a fresh course of oppression.

12. Another result of the indefinite prolongation of the armistice is to increase and emphasize the chaos already existing in Turkey, militarily, politically, and financially. Signs are not wanting that the present Government is as helpless as its predecessor in establishing its authority over the country, nor can it be otherwise while an Allied occupation interferes with almost every branch of administration. To add to its embarrassments, serious distress is inevitable during the coming winter among the many thousand Moslem refugees from the Smyrna area, who are now homeless and destitute. It is true that a certain number of these refugees have been accommodated in the villages vacated by deported Christians, but in their blind hatred of the Christians, the Turks had destroyed much which might now have served for the maintenance of their own distressed co-religionists, cutting down olive and mulberry trees and wrecking houses and buildings in the most wanton fashion.

13. Meanwhile it is not to be supposed that German and Bolshevik agents have been idle. On this fertile soil they could sow the seed of revolution and anarchy, coupled with insane hatred of the Allies, which would be bound to bring forth a plentiful crop of violence and crime. Every district has its band of brigands now posing as patriots, and even in the vicinity of Constantinople robbery under arms is of daily occurrence, the principal victims being naturally the unprotected Christian villagers. Behind all these elements of disorder stands Mustapha Kemal and his German trained officers, hating and fearing the British, who they know would stand for a state of things in which their occupation would be gone, and ready to proceed to any length to keep Turkey for the Turks and free from foreign interference—above all, that of Great Britain. A prolongation of the armistice served their purpose well. Every week sees their influence grow as the disorder and distress becomes more acute, and the resulting situation will render the task of imposing terms of peace on Turkey infinitely more difficult when it comes at last to be undertaken.

14. If it must be that the armistice is still to continue for some time to come, it becomes necessary to consider what immediate steps should be taken to ameliorate, as far as possible, the unhappy plight of the Christians. It is hopeless to look to the Turkish Government for this. Representations to the Grand Vizier, notes to the Porte and orders from the Central Government to civil and military authorities in the interior are alike treated with indifference or remain without effect. The Government cannot and

will not move a finger to help the Christians and possesses no funds to carry out the necessary relief work, even if it desired to do so, but the reverse is now the case. Turks are again taking possession of property restored to their Christian owners through the instrumentality of our relief officers, and a recent report shows that there is a general tendency on the part of the Moslem population, supported by the local authorities, to render it impossible for the Christians to earn their living, and by boycotting and terrorism to drive them again from their homes, never to return.

15. The only possible remedy, or rather palliative, pending a final settlement of the Turkish question, is to be found in extended relief operations. The resources of the existing relief organisations are already practically exhausted, and voluntary efforts will be quite inadequate to cope with the misery threatening the Christians of Turkey during the coming winter, and provide money, food, medical assistance and clothing for hundreds of thousands of sufferers. Under these circumstances, I venture to urge that Great Britain, who has shattered the fabric of Turkish misrule and raised the hopes of better times in the surviving Christian population, should not abandon them to their fate, but assume the responsibility of their relief until their future is better assured, and that she should do this either alone or in concert with her Allies.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

[155741]

No. 166.

Earl Curzon to M. Cambon.

My dear Ambassador,

Foreign Office, November 22, 1919.

COMMUNICATIONS are passing between our respective military authorities with regard to the evacuation by the British troops of the coastal areas in Syria as defined in the provisional agreement recently concluded between Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau in Paris. It has been agreed that this is a purely military operation, and is not intended to prejudice or compromise the future political and administrative settlement of those areas by the Peace Conference. It may be well, however, for me to place on record that it is being carried out by His Majesty's Government without prejudice to the future determination of the northern and eastern boundaries of Palestine, which will require to be examined and readjusted in the final settlement.

I am, yours sincerely,

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[154967]

No. 167.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 24.)

(No. 2114.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 12, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith the translation of a memorandum addressed by Sadik Bey, the Chief of the "Hurriet ve Itlaf" (Liberal Entente) political Party, to the Grand Vizier, in which he expounds the reasons why this party has decided to abstain from taking any part in the election of deputies to the new Chamber. It should be noted that the Greek and Armenian communities had also decided before to have nothing to do with the elections.

2. The elections are now in full swing throughout the country, and the columns of the Constantinople press are filled daily with articles on the subject. There is no doubt that in the provinces the usual methods of intimidation and fraud are being employed without any pretence of disguise in order to ensure the return of deputies who are the nominees of the Committee of Union and Progress and the Nationalists. Even in Constantinople gross abuses are being practised, as will be seen from the enclosed cutting from a Constantinople newspaper, by which it is shown that out of 1,200 votes cast at the Fatih election 1,050 were manufactured for the occasion.

3. The new Chamber, when elected, will therefore simply constitute a packed assembly of Committee of Union and Progress and Nationalist partisans and delegates.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure 1 in No. 167.

Memorandum.

(Translation.)

THE *Entente libérale* Party has already submitted to you by its *exposés* of the 26th September and 13th October its point of view concerning the election of deputies, as well as concerning the real character of the national forces in Anatolia, which, profiting of crimes and attacks made in Smyrna by the Union and Progress Committee, have thrown into calamity a big nation of 600 years.

This Committee has ever since filled its safes by plundering and stealing, by speculating and bribing, by killing and deporting, and by using all sorts of oppressive and illegal means. This Committee succeeded to open again its doors by importing great sums from Anatolia, and by collecting in the capital after the Armistice many reservist officers connected with it, as well as by appointing many high officials to important posts, and this through the organisations made in Constantinople. All our efforts and our repeated applications to the Government to point out abyss in which the nation is led remained fruitless.

This ominous Committee consists of persons famous for having secured their way through all sorts of conditions and ways by causing revolutionary movements which had most disastrous results, and availing of this they drew innumerable advantages. It consists of persons who have hidden the crime they perpetrated, and by rejecting all responsibility they did not refrain of provoking the execution continuously of the most horrible crimes without feeling the least remorse of conscience. It forms a band which is happy for not meeting any impediment of whatever description, and profiting of the uncertainty of the Ottoman Government, tried to adhere predominating to all positions and times, and in this it succeeded. It has already been submitted to the Government by our party, both verbally and in writing, that all the officers, officials, and gendarmes connected with the Committee of Union and Progress and sent to Anatolia, all these rebels will influence the elections, and as they had already done before, by using threats and force, they will violate the electoral rights of the nation, and they will thus bring in the middle a body under the name of Parliament which will execute all their aspirations by obtaining in their hands all the destinies of the nation.

We had then pointed the way in which the elections could be safely carried out, and we had requested that measures might be taken to this effect accordingly. But unfortunately up to this day no trace was seen of the verbal assurances which the Grand Vizier had given to our party, nor of the promises which the Government undertook in the proclamation published; on the contrary, the brigandage which was reported in detail in the proclamation of our party still continues, a fact which is proved by the continuous immigrations from Anatolia to Constantinople as well as by the risings and oppositions which are made in several places against this revolution. The Unionist chiefs, who took the name of the representatives of the national forces, are interfering in the elections in every corner of Anatolia, are violating all national rights, and have even accomplished in many places the election of second-class electors. They even use all their energy in the capital, under the mask of national congress, by influencing the people through various means—we are everyday eye-witnesses of this.

The fact that the Government will be unable to secure the free elections is proved by what follows:—

Salih Pasha, who returned from Amassia with Kara Vassif Bey, representative of the national forces in Constantinople, had published in the papers that the agreement arrived at between them forms in a way a fourth force.

The Government had denied the fact that it has been allowed to have telegraphical correspondence of the national movements sent without paying any postal tax.

The Government is still employing these commandants who were on the fronts and who compelled the country to conclude an armistice under very sad conditions, and who consequently were accountable for all this.

The Government is coming into contact for the sake of an understanding with such a commander whose rank was taken away by Imperial Iradé for disobedience.

The Government is appointing as Governors, Valis, Mutessarifs and other official persons who were formerly exiled and imprisoned by the national forces, without examining whether they are legally entitled to such rights.

Under the circumstances, we beg to bring to your Highness's knowledge with regret, that the *Entente libérale* Party which formed the conviction that the political life in the country had become impossible, and which is more interested in the elections

[1356]

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in view of its possessing branch offices everywhere in Anatolia and in Roumeli, cannot possibly take part in the elections of to-day, pending the return, to its normal state of the actual conditions.

Consequently, our party considers its sacred duty to demand the protection of the rights of all the people found under the sovereignty of the Turkish Government, which is bound to punish officially all criminals. We believe that the Government should not satisfy themselves with the convictions brought forth by Salih Pasha in consequence of his having been sent to Amassia, but to send a commission chosen by our party and have the criminal acts mentioned in the attached list examined on the spot so that the legal penalties might be imposed according to the results which would be attained.

Appendice.

After the writing out and sealing of the above Takrir, your Highness ordered that our President should come to an understanding with Kara Vassif Bey, who arrived in Constantinople as a representative of the known organisations, in order to fix the names and number of our deputies desired by both parties. Our party, whose sole aim is the execution of legal national elections, as stipulated in the above Takrir, being a political party, considers the discussing of this matter with such a military committee entirely unknown to it as not only damaging to its own prestige, but also as violating the electoral rights of the nation, and we consequently beg to state that we are unable to accept the proposal you made, and to request that you allow the execution of the inquiries which we desire, as soon as possible.

List of Criminal Acts.

(Translation.)

1. The arrest of Tefvik Bey, Kaimakam of Cushak, and his imprisonment in Sparta.
2. The arrest of Vassif Bey, Mutessarif of Bordor, during the execution of his duties; the confiscation of all his documents, his exile and imprisonment, first to Sparta and then to Sivas.
3. The arrest of Muheddin Pasha, Vali of Angora, and his exile to Sivas.
4. Compelling Djemal Bey, Governor of Konia, to resign his duties, and then to have him killed by bombs.
5. The assassination of Hilmi Bey, Mutessarif of Eski Shehir; letting free the assassins after having arrested.
6. The sending of Fazli Effendi, Second Commissaire of Eski Shehir, to Sivas, and compelling him under threat to resign his post.
7. They have sent Izzet Effendi, Control Officer at Eski Shehir, to Sidigazi, by land; imprisoned him there for five days, and tortured him.
8. They prevented Halis Effendi, Police Director of Konia, to do his duty, and they obliged him to run away.
9. They transferred by force Djavid Bey, Mutessarif of Nigde; Moustafa Selim Bey, accountant; and Lufti Effendi, police official, to Sivas, and they imprisoned them; the Mutessarif for two days, the accountant for fifteen days, and the police official from the 15th September, 1919, till the 22nd October, 1919.
10. They imprisoned the Kaimakam of Kadenkhane, through gendarmerie sent from Konia, for five days in his own house; they prevented him thus to do his duties, and they exiled him there.
11. They have sent under escort to Sivas the Kaimakam of Eyridere, Karagatch, and Yalvakh.
12. They killed the candidate deputy of the *Entente libérale* Party at Aintab, and they obliged another candidate to withdraw his name by threatening him.
13. They have sent under escort to Constantinople Moustafa Pasha, Vali of Brousa.
14. They have sent to Sidigazi Esmref Effendi, Mehmed Effendi, and Riza Effendi, members of the *Entente libérale* Party in Eski Shehir, obliging them to walk all the way long, and they have tortured them in that place.
15. They have gathered and collected from all parts very big sums of money.
16. They have burnt the house and beasts found in it of a person from the Nahie of Sidigazi in Eski Shehir, because he objected to them; in the house a man was sleeping, who was also burnt.
17. They threatened by death Mahmoud Effendi, ex-Mudir of the Nahie of

Ak Hissar, in the Kaza of Gueyve, and obliged him to run away to Constantinople in order to save his life.

18. They condemned to death Hadji Mehmed Ali, President of the *Entente libérale* Party in Eski Shehir; his secretary, Burhannedin; and one of the members, Seliniye Effendi; after killing Subhi Bey, the Mutessarif, the terms came to these three persons, but in the meantime they ran away to Constantinople, seeking refuge to the English.

19. They exiled the Mudir of the village of Fertek as well as Ismail Bey, Kaimakam of Bor, to Nemshehir, the Mudir of Public Instruction at Nigde Araboun and the judge of Oulou Kishla to Nigde; they thrashed the judge and they threatened the Kaimakam.

20. They proposed to Niazi Bey, Attorney-General of Navouza, to evacuate the prison, and as he refused to do this they thrashed him. They broke his arm and obliged him to run away to Constantinople.

21. They have found a committee in the Congress of Erzeroum by proclaiming a mobilisation and a provisional government, considering it a general centre; Moustak Kemal Pascha and Reouf Bey, being natives, entered in the Congress and the military commanders interfered in political matters; to this Omer Fevzi Bey, owner of the newspaper "Selamet," published in Trebizond, strongly objected; they therefore blockaded his house one night and tried to send him to the court martial of Erzeroum; however, by an unexpected assistance, he saved his life; thereupon they summoned him to the Court altogether illegally with a view to condemn him to death; however, he succeeded to escape and wandered for twenty-six days on the mountains, and finally he arrived now at Constantinople.

22. They have taken by force thousands and thousands pounds Turkish from Panderma, Kunan, and its surroundings, and specially 70,000 from Esk Shehir, 30,000 from Sivrihissar, 40,000 from Edremid, and 30,000 from Burhanis.

23. The fact that Nail Bey, one of the chiefs of the revolutionary movements, who was condemned to death for massacres and deportations, has again joined them to-day and is acting in the name of the national forces.

24. They have compelled, using force, Haji Mustafe Effendi, Mufti (religious chief) of Akshehir, to pull down the placard of the *Entente libérale* Party's premises there, and this with the assistance of the soldiers with bayonets on the rifles; they imprisoned the Mufti for some time, afterwards they threatened him to such an extent that he was obliged to escape to Constantinople.

25. They have despatched military forces, and they are still doing so against the population of Bozkir, practically fighting against them, because they objected and categorically denied to participate in actions of brigandage.

26. They have levied an arbitrary tax of 120,000 Turkish liras on Kutahia; they took the first instalment of this money; and on this occasion they have killed Dilsiz Oglu Osman.

27. They have attacked, with a force of 3,500 men, the Greek forces in Smyrna, and on this occasion the rebels of Anatolia attacked Mustafa Bey, of Alashehir, one of the notables of the place; they blew up his house by bombs, and he scarcely succeeded to escape to Constantinople with only one of his daughters.

28. The newspaper "Atchik Seuz," published at Castamouni, wrote on the 19th October, under the title of "Candidate Deputies," the following:—

"The Central Committee for the Protection of the National Rights at Castamouni has elected and approved the following four persons, and the election in question was confirmed by the representatives of the Congress of Sivas: (a.) Reshid Bey, ex-Mutessarif of Malatia; (b.) Youssouf Kemal Bey, ex-Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Justice; (c.) Dr. Souad Bey, ex-Inspector of Hospitals; (d.) Fazlzade Bessim Bey. All these openly prove that all these four persons are Unionists, and have interfered in the elections."

29. It was understood by a telegram signed by Mustafa Kemal, dated the 25th September, and published in "Kerassun," that Ali Riza Bey, Vali of Castamouni, was a partisan of Ferid Pasha Cabinet, and so they arrested him and sent him to Constantinople by the steamer "Sahm." It was proved that Mouniddin Pasha, Vali of Ancora, was opposed to the Nationalist movement, and he was therefore arrested by the National forces and sent under escort to Sivas. In a telegram dated the 29th September, the National forces in Ereğli, Bolou, Ada Bazar, Izmit, and the surroundings requested His Majesty that the Central Government should at once be dismissed in view of its treacherous dealings, and that in case of the resignation of Ferid Pasha Cabinet, they

are ready to march on Constantinople perfectly convinced that in such a case the *Entente* Powers will remain entirely neutral. All this shows quite clearly the character of the movement.

30. The fact that Saadeddin Effendi, Kaimakam of Seari, informs by telegram dated the 27th October, 1919, that he invited all honourable personages who did not want to participate in the elections, to appear before him, and then openly threatened them.

Enclosure 2 in No. 167.

Extract from a Constantinople Newspaper.

UN VOTE-TYPE.

LA question du vote contesté de Fatih se précise. Il apparaît que c'est une question de parti. Fatih est le centre où vont voter les électeurs de la seconde moitié de Stamboul—la partie occidentale.

Ces électeurs sont au nombre de 3,000 seulement. La moitié d'entre eux n'ont pas participé à l'opération. En effet, les votes exprimés sont au nombre de 1,200. Sur ceux-ci, les 1,050 étaient des bulletins imprimés uniformes, avec une signature au-dessous.

Les votes imprimés ne sont-ils pas valables? La loi ne dit rien à cet égard. Mais le préfet Djémil Pacha, chargé, de par ses fonctions, de ces élections, considère que le fait que, sur 1,200 votes les 1,050 sont imprimés, constitue comme la manifestation d'une organisation (il a dit "une force") destinée à faire prévaloir ses candidatures.

De ceci et de ce qui s'écrit dans les journaux, il est permis de déduire que l'on fait allusion à une action des Unionistes.

Le Conseil d'État, consulté, a déclaré qu'il ne trouve aucune prescription légale à appliquer en l'espèce et recommande une enquête destinée à faire la lumière sur le point de savoir s'il y a eu manœuvre.

A rapprocher de ce qui précède le cas de ce Véli agha de Pacha-Bagtché, auquel un membre du conseil des anciens de l'endroit avait demandé son cachet pour l'apposer, dit-il, sur une pièce relative à la distribution du pain, et qui s'en servit pour signer un bulletin de vote du Milli-Congrès.

[155758]

No. 168.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 1391.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 25, 1919.

M. CAMBON opened his conversation with me this afternoon by raising again the question of the proposed Anglo-French guarantee for the integrity of Belgium.

He seemed to be under the false impression that the British Government had finally and definitely declined to have anything to do with the matter. I pointed out to him that this was not the case, and that the decision taken by the Cabinet was merely this: that they did not wish at the moment to take independent action about Belgium before the question of the Anglo-American guarantee of the French frontier was itself in a less precarious position.

We presently found ourselves simultaneously pointing out to each other a feature of the case which neither of us had fully realised at our last interview, namely, that if a new guarantee is not given to the Belgians by Great Britain and France, the Guarantee Treaty of 1839 still survives, and is equally obligatory upon both our countries; in other words, if Belgium does not get the new guarantee, she will continue to subsist upon the old one.

I said that, in these circumstances, inasmuch as, even if we gave the new guarantee to the Belgian Government, while it might satisfy their desires, it did not seem clear to me that it would at all tempt the Dutch Government to accept the draft treaty that had been proposed in Paris, I did not quite understand why the Belgian Government were so eagerly pressing the matter.

The Ambassador also was unable to answer this question.

When I asked him whether his Government would prefer to offer the new guarantee or to remain content with the old one he said that he had no official

instructions on the subject, but that personally he inclined towards maintaining the Treaty of 1839.

I promised to examine the question of the two alternatives and to communicate with him again about them.

His Excellency then spoke to me in terms of great apprehension about reports that had reached the French Government from their Minister in Copenhagen concerning probable pourparlers between Mr. O'Grady, whom we had sent there, and M. Litvinoff, the representative of the Soviet Government, on the occasion of their discussion of the proposed exchange of prisoners. The French Government had heard, it was alleged on the authority of Mr. O'Grady himself, that he was authorised to listen to anything that M. Litvinoff might say upon the larger question of peace with Soviet Russia, and to send home a memorandum which, it was understood, M. Litvinoff was anxious to submit. This memorandum was said to contain proposals with regard, among other things, to the blockade and the financial and economic terms upon which the Bolshevik Government would be disposed to make peace.

In reply to this I told the Ambassador that Mr. O'Grady's instructions had been explicit to the contrary; that he had been deputed to deal with the question of prisoners alone; and that he was not to encourage or embark upon any wider discussion. I believed that he had been told that, if M. Litvinoff desired to secure the removal or mitigation of the blockade as a condition of the release of our prisoners, the discussion was to be suspended and a telegraphic report sent home. This might be the basis of the rumours which had reached the French Government. There would be nothing improper in such action on Mr. O'Grady's part; but on the larger question I had been very careful throughout to prevent there being any misunderstanding and to confine him within the limits of his instructions. I thought, therefore, that the French Government had been somewhat unduly alarmed, but I would watch the matter very carefully myself.

M. Cambon said that there were also a number of French prisoners confined in Moscow and he asked whether it would be possible for Mr. O'Grady to include in his negotiations an effort to secure their release.

I said that I thought the best thing I could do was to ask Mr. O'Grady by telegram to communicate with the French Minister in Copenhagen, and to ascertain from him the facts of the case, with a view to giving help if it were possible to do so.

For this the Ambassador expressed his hearty thanks.

We then had a brief discussion of the French attitude towards the proposal which I had submitted to M. Pichon more than a fortnight ago, concerning the transference to London of the meetings of the Peace Conference in order to deal with the Turkish Peace.

I said that no official reply to this proposal had been received, though I understood that it was not favourably regarded by M. Clemenceau.

M. Cambon said that, during his recent visit to Paris, he had not been able to see M. Clemenceau, who was away in the country, and he had had only one short talk with M. Pichon. The latter had, however, mentioned the objections of the Président du Conseil, who apparently declined to consider the possibility of the Peace Conference sitting elsewhere than in Paris, or of interrupting the work which had been begun there; a labour which, I observed, had been spun out for the best part of a year.

While M. Clemenceau had offered to come with M. Pichon to England in order to reach an understanding with us, and while we should warmly welcome such an interchange of views, I could not share the French view that, even if we did come to an agreement in that way, the proceedings of the Peace Conference in Paris could afterwards be got through in a few days. On the contrary, the questions which remained for settlement, and which I enumerated to the Ambassador, would probably occupy at the very least a month or six weeks of time. Whom we could spare, or how we could spare anyone, to go there to conduct our share of such negotiations I was at a loss to imagine. Considering that members of the British Government, and members of the British Foreign Office in particular, had dislocated their entire lives for nearly a twelvemonth in order to meet the wishes of the French Government, it did seem to me unreasonable that the latter should now insist on retaining the venue in Paris, and be quite unwilling to submit to the slight inconvenience of transferring their activities for a short time to our capital. I contemplated going to Paris myself before long, and, if so, I should perhaps have an opportunity of discussing the matter with M. Clemenceau then.

As regards the situation in America, the Ambassador expressed the opinion—which, however, he was careful to point out was only an *obiter dictum* of his own—

that the best course of action would be to accept the whole of the reservations which had been passed by the Senate. He did not think that, even if the covenant of the League of Nations as embodied in the treaty had been accepted without modification by the American Government, the Senate would have been in the least deterred from acting as it might choose on each occasion as it arose under the covenant. The Senate, he was convinced, would insist on retaining precisely the kind and degree of control which it claimed in the reservations.

I did not argue the matter at length, but I pointed out that our view of the reservations was a different and much more serious one; that, so far as I knew, President Wilson himself was not at all likely to take them lying down; and that our latest news as to the attitude of America, derived from our Ambassador there and also from what Mr. Davis and Mr. Polk had said to me here, was that there still remained a possibility of a compromise which might save the covenant of the League and secure American participation. So long as there was still this possibility, it seemed to me very much better to work for that end than to throw up the sponge and admit at this early stage what amounted to practical defeat.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[155729]

No. 169.

M. Clemenceau to Mr. Lloyd George.—(Received at Foreign Office, November 26.)

*Offices of the President of the Council,
Paris, November 9, 1919.*

The Prime Minister,

I HAVE to thank you for the perfect clearness with which you have expressed your point of view concerning our Syrian negotiations, just as I have myself, counting on the friendly intentions of British policy with regard to France.

You gave us the proof of your intentions when you declared to the Emir Feisal that you took responsibility for the relief of the British troops by French troops, and that you advised him to come here to reach an understanding with the French Government.

In point of fact, if this procedure had been followed at once at the beginning, that is to say, at the time of the occupation of Damascus a year ago, the recent misunderstandings would without doubt have been avoided. I am pleased to think that henceforth there is no chance of their recurring between us, and that the Peace Conference will have nothing to do but to sanction our agreement for the French mandate in Syria and the British mandate in Mesopotamia. Each of us will arrange with the Arab Governments and administrations of our respective mandates the liberal conditions under which we will respectively give our effective support and assistance in accordance with our agreements.

I have never called in doubt the sincerity of the sentiments of the British Government, nor have I ever suspected the uprightness of Sir E. Grey, whose character is just as deeply respected in France as in Great Britain; but in my view, the secondary agents on the spot, who do not realise the complexities of the situation, have let themselves be influenced by the fact of the British occupation of the Syrian territories.

I do not intend to take up point by point the detailed historical discussion contained in your note of the 18th October, although I continue to regret that we were not called upon to defend our interests ourselves at the time of the agreements of 1915, not even the text of which had been communicated to us, just as our agreements of 1916 had not been communicated to the Arabs—a dangerous omission, whence spring the principal difficulties with Feisal, who considers the agreements of 1916 as a secret understanding between us for the partition of the Arab countries, contrary to the agreements, in too absolute a form, of 1915 with King Hussein.

I interpret in a manner less restrictive than you the rights which result for the French and British Governments with regard to the Arab Governments from the text of the agreements of 1916 and the declaration of November 1918. These rights will, moreover, be finally defined by the terms of the mandate which the Conference alone is qualified to determine.

I must, however, make two points clear:—

The replacement (which I had failed to notice) of the term "protéger" by that of "soutenir," effected several months after the signature of the agreements and accepted by M. Paul Cambon on his own initiative, had as its only object to avoid an ambiguity, our intention being not to exercise a protectorate over the Arab federations, but merely to lend them our exclusive assistance in every form.

As regards our conversation of December 1918, I cannot admit that I consented without an equivalent to the extension of the British mandate to Mosul and to Palestine. It would have been unprecedented that such concessions should have been made without any precise definition on paper, all the advantage being on the one side. You may remember that, when the question was on the point of being taken up again, I proposed to you, as well as to President Wilson, a new distribution of the mandates in Asia Minor. Perhaps you have kept the map which I thought it necessary to communicate to you to this effect.

The case of Mosul has, moreover, this special aspect, that the town is included in the Arab zone of the French mandate under the same category as Damascus and Aleppo, and is claimed by our Arab Allies under the same conditions.

I welcome with the greatest satisfaction the assurance that the Arabs have not received a single rifle, machine-gun, or gun, contrary to the reports furnished by our agents on the spot, just as I have read with the greatest pleasure the declarations made to the Emir Feisal.

I share your opinion as to the very serious importance of an agreement with the Emir Feisal. The negotiations pursued on our side with him at Paris have been very courteous, although they have not yet resulted in an agreement. The essential difficulty lies not in the excessive ambitions of France, but in the absolute designs of the Emir, who does not seem yet really to understand the necessity for the Arabs to accept a French mandate and a British mandate with a view to organising and developing the Arab States. His general attitude makes as difficult for you as for us the unequivocal understanding which we all desire, but which demands from each of us equivalent concessions. However this may be, the intermediate phase of the mandate, the utility of which has notwithstanding been confirmed by the Conference, is not yet frankly admitted by him. I would not despair of convincing him.

The French Government have not failed to confirm to him that they were resolved to remain in full agreement with the British Government in peace just as in war, and that every attempt to separate the two policies would be in vain. The alliance of the two peoples, and the depth of the sentiments which bound them after five years of war carried on in common, are the most certain and the most precious guarantee for the peace of the world.

Please accept, &c.

CLEMENCEAU.

[155730]

No. 170.

Emir Feisal to the Earl of Derby.—(Received at Foreign Office, November 26.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 21, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to hand your Lordship the enclosed letter for forwarding to the Prime Minister; also a copy of my last letter to M. Clemenceau for the perusal of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

FEISAL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 170.

Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George.

Sir,

Paris, November 21, 1919.

I HAVE come to realise that the French Government, in spite of continued suggestions for an amicable settlement, intend as a result of your *aide-mémoire* of the 15th September, 1919, to occupy some of the districts evacuated by the British troops around Damascus, such as Bekaa, Baalbeck, Zebdani and also other places around Homs, Hama and Aleppo.

These districts, as you know, are part of the territory where the British Government undertook to establish an independent Arab State, and in accordance with this they handed over the administration to the Arab Government at the time of occupation. Any violation of the boundary by any Government or in any way contrary to the wishes of my father the King and the expressed desires of the people will be considered as an aggression which the Arab army cannot be blamed for actively resisting. This violation is expressly a breach of international law and the sacred rights of the people.

In the name of my father the King and his Government I call upon the British Government to immediately help in the difficulties arising from this arrangement which is alleged to be temporary, until such time as the Peace Conference will have determined the future of the whole country, the littoral as well as the interior.

I again beg to remind the British Government that they cannot exonerate themselves from the responsibility of their agreements with us which we still expect them to carry out.

I reserve to myself the right to bring once more before the Peace Conference our country's cause.

I have, &c.
FEISAL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 170.

Emir Feisal to M. Clemenceau.

M. le Président,

Paris, le 20 novembre 1919.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre du 13 novembre, en réponse à celle que j'ai adressée à votre Excellence en date du 5 de ce même mois.

J'ai eu le profond regret de voir que ma lettre ne vous a pas paru correspondre à la situation présente, et que mon interprétation de l'acceptation par le Gouvernement britannique de ma demande, concernant la nomination d'une commission, ne vous a pas semblé tout à fait exacte.

Si ce n'était le souci de vous éviter de longs détails, j'aurais bien voulu donner à votre Excellence de plus amples explications pour justifier mon point de vue et ma façon d'envisager la situation. Néanmoins, je me permets de vous soumettre le passage de la lettre de Mr. Lloyd George, datée du 10 octobre, en réponse à la proposition que je lui ai faite pour la nomination de la commission. Il y est dit textuellement :

"Ils seraient très heureux d'arranger une réunion immédiate entre vous et des représentants français, anglais et américain, pour régler de la façon la plus amicale, et à la satisfaction de tous les intéressés, les problèmes que comprend le retrait prochain des troupes britanniques de la Syrie le 1^{er} novembre 1919."

Il me semble que le sens de cette lettre ne prête à aucune interprétation équivoque, et démontre clairement que le Gouvernement britannique a agréé en principe ma proposition. Aussi dans l'espoir d'obtenir votre assentiment, je me suis empressé de répondre à votre aimable invitation, transmise par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères britannique, et je suis venu à Paris, pour m'entretenir et régler en premier lieu avec votre Excellence les problèmes découlant nécessairement de l'opération de la relève.

A cette occasion, je tiens à vous réitérer les assurances que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous répéter. Ce n'est nullement la relève des troupes britanniques, en elle-même, qui provoque le trouble et l'inquiétude, mais bien l'exécution de cette relève sur les bases et d'après les limites du Traité Picot-Sykes.

En effet, l'opération, telle qu'elle est prévue, entraînera de fait un changement dans les limites et dans l'administration actuelles des zones, et cela ne peut que provoquer une grande effervescence parmi la population, malgré toutes les déclarations antérieures et toutes les assurances qu'on pourrait lui donner. Le peuple qui m'a accordé sa confiance et m'a chargé de la responsabilité de sa direction politique, comme je m'étais chargé de la responsabilité de sa direction pendant la guerre, a le droit d'attendre de moi des garanties effectives et des assurances formelles pour dissiper ses inquiétudes. De mon côté, je crois avoir le droit d'attendre des Alliés leur concours bienveillant pour m'aider à maintenir la confiance réciproque entre eux et les Arabes, œuvre à laquelle je me suis sincèrement consacré, et que j'ai

jusqu'à ce jour menée avec succès. Je suis, cependant, obligé d'avouer que, malgré tous les efforts que j'ai déployés depuis mon arrivée ici, je n'ai pu encore obtenir aucune garantie efficace qui puisse m'autoriser à rassurer la population.

La seule entrevue relativement courte que j'ai eu l'avantage d'avoir avec le Général Gouraud n'a fait que confirmer l'opinion que j'avais déjà des grandes qualités de ce brillant chef de l'armée de la victoire, elle justifie amplement sa grande réputation et l'opinion exprimée dans la lettre de votre Excellence. Je n'ai à aucun moment douté de la sincérité et de la noblesse de vos sentiments, ni des bonnes dispositions de la grande nation française envers mon pays. Je suis aussi convaincu que le Gouvernement de la République est très désireux de prendre en considération les vœux de ce peuple qui s'est rangé aux côtés des Alliés au moment le plus critique de la guerre, et qui a apporté sa modeste contribution à l'œuvre de la victoire en Orient. Aussi je ne fais qu'interpréter les vœux de ce peuple et sa foi dans l'esprit de justice et d'équité de votre Excellence, en me permettant d'insister pour arriver à une solution qui puisse lui donner la conviction que son existence n'est nullement menacée.

Votre Excellence m'ayant fait comprendre que la question était du ressort de la Conférence de la Paix, qui en avait déjà pris acte, j'ai cru de mon devoir de m'adresser au Conseil suprême, non pas pour amener une décision définitive, mais plutôt pour trouver une solution propre à concilier tous les intérêts, en attendant que la Conférence règle définitivement le sort de l'Orient.

Je suis toujours d'avis que c'est au Conseil suprême qu'il appartient de rechercher une solution satisfaisante, si toutefois votre Excellence ne juge pas opportun de prendre en considération la suggestion suivante que je me permets de lui soumettre. C'est, d'ailleurs, la proposition que je comptais exposer à la Commission dont j'avais demandé la formation, et que j'estime indispensable pour dissiper les inquiétudes et me permettre de pouvoir rassurer la population, et éviter les malentendus. Cette solution consiste :

1. Au maintien des troupes arabes dans les limites de la zone qu'ils occupent depuis l'armistice, des troupes britanniques dans la Palestine et des troupes françaises dans la zone ouest occupée par elles. D'autant plus que rien ne justifie un changement, dans les limites actuelles des zones, avant la décision de la Conférence.
2. La nomination d'une commission composée de trois membres : un français, un anglais et un arabe, désigné chacun par le commandant de la zone respective. Cette commission siégera dans une ville qui sera choisie en Syrie; elle aura pour mission de régler d'un commun accord les différends qui pourraient surgir entre les trois zones et sera chargée de maintenir la cohésion et la liaison entre les différentes administrations.

Je considère que cette solution aura le grand avantage de sauvegarder l'unité du pays et de faciliter la tâche des trois Gouvernements. C'est encore le seul moyen de convaincre la population que la mesure adoptée est de caractère purement militaire et provisoire, qu'elle ne vise pas le partage du pays, ne contredit ni les déclarations des Alliés, ni les doctrines qu'ils ont proclamées, et ne préjuge pas non plus la solution définitive de la question qui reste réservée à la décision de la Conférence.

Le désir que votre Excellence a manifesté de rechercher les bases d'une entente tenant compte des vœux des populations et de nos intérêts respectifs, m'encourage à insister auprès d'elle pour la prier de donner une suite favorable à ma présente demande, afin de m'aider à préparer les voies à une entente effective.

Mon absence s'étant trop longtemps prolongée, je me vois obligé de rentrer bientôt en Syrie; je serai donc très heureux de recevoir un moment plus tôt une réponse favorable de votre Excellence.

Veillez agréer, &c.
FEISAL.

[156079]

No. 171.

Notes of a conversation between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Arab Mission representing the Emir Ibn Saud, 26th November, 1919.

THE Secretary of State received Feisal-ibn-Saud and Ahmad-ibn-Thunaiyan at the Foreign Office on the 26th November, 1919.

After customary greetings had been exchanged, the Secretary of State said that he proposed to review the general situation between King Hussein and Ibn Saud before

[1356]

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replying in detail to the requests presented on the 1st November in a note read to the India Office and Foreign Office Joint Conference.

His Majesty's Government were well aware that Ibn Saud was one of the great independent rulers of Arabia; he was their friend, and they had entered into treaty engagements with him. They were earnestly desirous that the friendly relations established in this treaty should be maintained.

During the past year Ibn Saud had come into conflict with another of the friends of His Majesty's Government, His Highness Sherif Hussein, the King of the Hejaz. Without going into the merits of the controversy, he wished to make it clear that this was a state of affairs which His Majesty's Government could not view with equanimity. They were desirous of seeing the principles of cohesion and unity replace separation and discord in Arabian politics, and the first essential to the attainment of this object was that the two greatest independent rulers of Arabia should live at peace with one another.

His Majesty's Government were delighted to welcome Ibn Saud's son and the mission which had accompanied him to England, but so long as the main issues between Ibn Saud and King Hussein remained undecided, they were not prepared to give specific answers to such questions as those presented by the Arab Mission on the 1st November. The outbreak of hostilities between these two rulers had caused considerable disquiet to His Majesty's Government, who had given careful thought to the means by which they could be instrumental in bringing it to an end.

In the month of June the position had been that Ibn Saud was in possession of Khurma and Turaba, and had successfully resisted two attempts by King Hussein to reassert his authority in those places. His Majesty's Government had despatched Mr. Philby by air with the intention that he should make his way to Ibn Saud, and propose to him that hostilities should cease pending a settlement of the dispute by a British Commission. One of the conditions which was to have been made by Mr. Philby was that Ibn Saud should withdraw his forces at least from Turaba, and that a strip of country should be left unoccupied between the contending armies. Ibn Saud had, however, in the meantime received a previous message from His Majesty's Government which had induced him to suspend hostilities and return to Riyadh. Mr. Philby was accordingly unable to deliver the message of His Majesty's Government, and Ibn Saud had remained in possession of Khurma and Turaba ever since.

He wished the mission to understand clearly that, on the evidence before them, His Majesty's Government were inclined to accept King Hussein's contention that he was the rightful owner not only of Turaba, to which his claim appeared indisputable, but also of Khurma; but it was impossible for them to make a definite decision on points of detail from this distance. They had been quite ready to appoint a boundary commission if this had been the desire of both parties. Ibn Saud had always agreed to this solution, but King Hussein had objected. His Majesty's Government were now of opinion that the best way of settling the dispute between the two rulers was that they should meet personally and talk matters over, either at Jeddah or possibly at some other place. They had accordingly suggested to King Hussein that this should be done, and he would be glad to know how Ibn Saud would be likely to view a similar proposal.

Ahmed-ibn-Thunaiyan replied that he had no doubt that Ibn Saud would welcome a meeting with King Hussein himself, but he was not authorised to give an undertaking to this effect, nor could he say anything as to the place of meeting. Ibn Saud would not agree to meet any representative of King Hussein, though he might depute a representative in the event of a personal interview between the two rulers being impracticable.

The Secretary of State remarked that, so far as he knew, King Hussein had never refused to meet Ibn Saud. He had, however, definitely refused to accept arbitration by a British Commission on the question of Khurma. The intention of His Majesty's Government was that a meeting should now be brought about between the two rulers for a frank discussion of all points at issue between them. This was what he might call the first step of the negotiations. It was hoped that such a meeting would result in general agreement; if, however, it turned out that the two parties were unable to agree, His Majesty's Government suggested that the second step should be the intervention of an impartial British official who would endeavour to decide such points as remained in dispute. He asked whether Ibn Saud would agree to this second step.

Ahmad-ibn-Thunaiyan again pointed out that he had no authority to give a definite answer, but his personal opinion was that Ibn Saud would accept arbitration by

an impartial British official, provided that King Hussein agreed equally to be bound by that official's decision.

The Secretary of State said that His Majesty's Government would of course make it a condition that both parties should accept without question the decision of the arbitrator, and that unless both parties agreed to this the proposal would fall to the ground.

Ahmad-ibn-Thunaiyan enquired whether His Majesty's Government would guarantee both parties against an infringement by the other party of the agreement arrived at.

The Secretary of State replied that His Majesty's Government could not undertake this until they saw the agreement, but that they would be glad to accept any reasonable agreement arrived at by the two parties, and would use their influence to restrain either party from infringing it in future.

He went on to say that the appointment of a Boundary Commission, which he might call the third step in the negotiations, would present no difficulty if the first two stages had been successfully negotiated, nor would it be necessary at all if, as he himself hoped, it was found that the first stage would be sufficient. He thought that what he had said provided an answer to most of the points raised in the mission's note of the 1st November. At Ahmad-ibn-Thunaiyan's request, however, he dealt with them *seriatim* :—

In answer to No. 1, he expressed some surprise that Ibn Saud should demand the ratification of the treaty entered into by His Majesty's Government. There was, so far as he knew, no term set to the treaty, and in these circumstances there did not appear to be any necessity for its renewal.

With regard to No. 2, His Majesty's Government did not propose to discuss the disputed boundary with either party. They sincerely hoped that a meeting would result in an agreement being arrived at.

As to No. 3, the question of an embargo on pilgrims from Nejd appeared to him to depend entirely on the relations between the two rulers. If, as he hoped, before the next pilgrimage season commenced they had found a solution to their differences the question would not arise.

In answer to No. 4, he must disclaim any liability on the part of His Majesty's Government to rehabilitate the territories of Ibn Saud from damages which extended over the past fifty years. He did not consider that it was a suitable moment to discuss the enhancement of his subsidy at a time when he was not on friendly terms with a friend and ally of His Majesty's Government.

He did not quite understand the last suggestion, that Mr. Philby should be despatched to Ibn Saud as political agent empowered for the solving of the boundary question and other kindred problems, inasmuch as the proposals now put forward by His Majesty's Government would, he hoped, result in all these problems being solved without British intervention.

With regard to the attachment of a British official to the missions for its return journey, this was a matter which would, he understood, be arranged by the India Office, to whom he would not fail to represent the mission's wishes.

In conclusion, he impressed upon Feisal-ibn-Saud and upon Ahmad-ibn-Thunaiyan the paramount necessity of Ibn Saud's establishing friendly relations with the King of the Hejaz. This was the most important point, and all questions of detail should be made subordinate to it.

Foreign Office, November 26, 1919.

[156260]

No. 172.

Sir E. Crowe to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 28.)

(No. 2199. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Paris, November 26, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit the accompanying copies of notes exchanged by the Supreme Council and M. Veniselos regarding the Greek occupation of Smyrna, together with a copy of a private letter to me from M. Veniselos on the same subject.

2. I would venture to call attention to M. Veniselos's correction of the statement in M. Clemenceau's note of the 18th November, and I would explain that that statement was added by the French Secretariat without the Supreme Council having been previously informed or consulted. If the Supreme Council had seen the draft

[1356]

3 C 2

of the note before despatch, I should myself have drawn attention to the inaccuracy of the statement contained in the added words.

3. I have thought it unnecessary to raise the point myself in the Supreme Council now, as I do not desire to revive discussion on a subject which generally engenders some heat in the Conference, and also because M. Veniselos himself has, for the same reason, asked me to let the matter drop. He merely desired by this note to me to place on record the true state of things, and I would add that, so far as I can gather from the records available, M. Veniselos's version is entirely correct, the warning as to the provisional nature of the Greek occupation having been given, not at the time when M. Veniselos was invited to occupy Smyrna, but after he had effected the occupation.

I have, &c.

EYRE A. CROWE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 172.

M. Veniselos to Sir Eyre Crowe.

Dear Sir Eyre Crowe,

Paris, November 20, 1919.

I HAVE duly received the letter which the President of the Conference addressed to me under date of the 18th November. As I am desirous of avoiding further dispute with him, I shall not forward an official reply to the above letter. I am taking the liberty, however, of assuring you that the statement which appears in the aforementioned letter, to the effect that I was "formellement averti au moment où la décision a été prise par le Conseil des Quatre" of the temporary nature of the occupation of Smyrna, is not exact.

When Mr. Lloyd George spoke to me first of the decision regarding the occupation, he made no mention whatever of its temporary character. And when I appeared before Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and Mr. Wilson, in order to discuss matters relating to the carrying out of the occupation, again no mention was made of its being temporary. Only after the occupation had taken place and I appeared before the Supreme Council—M. Sonnino being present at this meeting as well—for the purpose of discussing the extent of the Greek occupation area, mention was made for the first time in that meeting of "temporariness," concerning the extent rather than the nature of the occupation.

I do not, of course, infer that the occupation entrusted to Greece is equal to a definite recognition of her sovereignty over the occupied area. But I desire to state that when Greece was asked to proceed to this occupation, not only was there no mention made to me of its being temporary, but on the contrary, the very decision implied—though tacitly—that this occupation was the first step towards giving Greece part of Western Asia Minor. Mr. Lloyd George can testify as to the correctness of my impression.

Believe me, &c.

E. K. VENISELOS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 172.

M. Clemenceau to M. Veniselos.

Conférence de la Paix,

Paris, le 18 novembre 1919.

M. le Président,

LE Conseil suprême a pris connaissance de votre lettre du 15 novembre dernier, répondant à la communication qu'il vous avait faite, après avoir entendu la lecture du rapport de la Commission d'Enquête de Smyrne et les indications que vous aviez bien voulu donner à cet égard.

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que le Conseil a estimé que les impressions que vous exprimez au sujet de l'occupation de Smyrne ne modifient en rien la déclaration faite par le Conseil suprême sur le caractère provisoire de l'occupation militaire grecque. Vous en avez été formellement averti au moment où la décision a été prise par le Conseil des Quatre.

Il appartient à la Conférence de la Paix seule de décider, au moment où l'ensemble de la question d'Orient sera étudié par elle, quel sera le sort des différentes régions de l'ancien Empire ottoman.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

CLEMENCEAU.

Enclosure 3 in No. 172.

M. Veniselos to M. Clemenceau.

Délégation hellénique au Congrès de la Paix,

Paris, le 15 novembre 1919.

M. le Président,

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de la lettre que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 12 novembre, au sujet de la Commission d'Enquête de Smyrne.

L'esprit d'amicale confiance dont s'inspire la réponse du Conseil suprême aux réclamations écrites et aux réserves verbales que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui exposer me fait un devoir de ne pas insister sur les vices dont est entachée l'enquête par suite des incontestables irrégularités commises au cours de la procédure adoptée par la Commission.

Mais je manquerais à la déférente sincérité de sentiments que j'ai toujours témoignés au Conseil suprême si je ne signalais pas à sa bienveillante attention les réflexions que, sur deux points, me suggère la réponse qu'il a bien voulu me donner.

En premier lieu, le Conseil suprême exprime l'espoir que la tension dangereuse, qui ne paraît pas avoir cessé actuellement de se faire sentir sur les limites de la zone d'occupation grecque, sera peu à peu réduite par la sagesse et la justice de l'administration grecque et grâce à l'œuvre de délimitation récemment terminée par le Général Milne, commandant des forces alliées en Anatolie.

Le Conseil suprême peut absolument compter sur le maintien de l'ordre le plus parfait dans la zone d'occupation des armées helléniques. Mais ce serait se méprendre sur la réalité des faits auxquels est due la tension dangereuse persistant sur les limites de ladite zone que d'en attendre la réduction des effets de l'administration grecque. Sa vigilance ne s'exerce, en effet, qu'en dedans de ces limites, alors que la tension signalée provient des attaques entreprises du dehors. Leurs auteurs ne sont pas seulement libres de les organiser. Ils s'y sont cru encouragés par la procédure de l'enquête où ils ont voulu discerner une défaveur pour le régime grec. Dès lors, ils ont répété leurs impuissantes agressions avec une fréquence d'autant plus grande que les risques en sont forcément réduits, puisque les troupes grecques doivent se borner à les repousser sans pouvoir les poursuivre.

L'examen objectif des faits conduit à la conclusion que le bon ordre régnant dans la zone d'occupation grecque sera également assuré au delà de ses limites aussitôt que les Turcs, privés de l'espoir de trouver des appuis pour fomenter des troubles, auront repris réellement conscience de leur défaite. Ce résultat sera certainement obtenu par les décisions définitives de la Conférence de la Paix.

En second lieu, le Conseil suprême remarque que l'occupation de Smyrne n'a été décidée que pour des raisons de fait et ne constitue aucun droit nouveau pour l'avenir. Il me sera permis de faire observer que, quelles qu'aient été les raisons de sa décision d'envoyer à Smyrne des troupes grecques, le Conseil suprême ne pouvait se méprendre sur la signification qui devait y être, à bon droit, attribuée par le Gouvernement et le peuple grecs. Les revendications de la Grèce sur Smyrne et la région avoisinante n'étaient pas seulement de notoriété publique : elles avaient été officiellement formulées devant la Conférence, longuement défendues devant le Conseil suprême et nettement approuvées par la Commission spéciale des Affaires grecques. En allant à Smyrne, la Grèce savait que si elle n'y avait pas encore de titre légal, elle y avait déjà un titre moral. Elle n'y envoyait pas ses troupes comme simples instruments d'exécution sur une terre étrangère, comme elle l'avait précédemment fait en Russie, mais bien comme les organes les plus intéressés au succès d'un mandat international ayant pour but le maintien de l'ordre dans un pays essentiellement grec. Dès lors, si l'occupation de Smyrne n'a pas constitué, au point de vue strictement juridique, un droit nouveau au profit de la Grèce, elle n'en a pas moins créé une situation de fait nouvelle, qui ne saurait être négligée. Si elle n'augmente pas les droits que la Grèce avait auparavant sur Smyrne, et que la Commission des Affaires grecques a déjà reconnus, du moins elle les corrobore et redouble la confiance légitime avec laquelle la nation hellène attend la décision finale de la Conférence de la Paix.

Je partage entièrement ce sentiment, car je suis convaincu que les droits de mon pays sur Smyrne sont en parfait accord avec la situation générale du monde comme avec les vœux et les intérêts des populations.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

E. K. VENISELOS.

Enclosure 4 in No. 172.

M. Clemenceau to M. Venizelos.

Conférence de la Paix,
Paris, le 12 novembre 1919.

M. le Président,

LE Conseil suprême a reçu la lettre que vous avez bien voulu lui adresser au sujet de la Commission d'Enquête de Smyrne. Il a également pris connaissance du rapport de la Commission et examiné ses conclusions.

Au cours de votre audition par le Conseil suprême, le 8 novembre, vous avez fait certaines réserves quant aux conditions imposées par la Commission au représentant grec, le Colonel Mazarakis. Ces conditions l'auraient empêché d'interroger les témoins turcs—voire de lire et d'examiner leurs dépositions. Comme vous le savez déjà, le Conseil suprême n'avait pas été averti au préalable de la procédure envisagée par la Commission, et, au moment où il a décidé de donner satisfaction à votre demande au sujet de la communication des témoignages au commissaire grec, les travaux de la Commission se trouvaient déjà tellement avancés qu'il n'était plus possible de donner suite à ses instructions.

Tout en admettant ainsi ce qu'il y avait de bien fondé dans les réserves que vous avez cru devoir formuler, le Conseil suprême ne pense pas que les résultats de l'enquête peuvent être regardés comme entièrement viciés en ce qui concerne les faits relatifs à certains excès et actes de violence commis par les troupes grecques. Il a rendu hommage à l'impartialité des membres de la Commission et à la conscience scrupuleuse qui a présidé à leurs travaux.

Le Conseil est d'accord que les incidents survenus à la suite du débarquement des troupes grecques à Smyrne ont semblé indiquer l'absence presque complète des mesures de précaution que les circonstances exigeaient de la part des autorités civiles et militaires grecques—omission qui fut la cause principale des incidents fâcheux rapportés par la Commission.

Le Conseil estime que, dans l'ensemble, la responsabilité des excès commis et des mesures dont la sévérité n'était pas justifiée par les circonstances actuelles incombe aux autorités militaires grecques. Vous-même avez, d'ailleurs, avec l'élévation et la sincérité de votre caractère, reconnu ces fautes et ces abus et ordonné des sanctions contre les coupables.

Le Conseil suprême appelle votre attention la plus sérieuse sur ces graves erreurs, tout en espérant que l'expérience faite par l'administration grecque lui permettra d'en éviter la répétition à l'avenir. Il prend acte de vos déclarations quant à l'ordre qui règne aujourd'hui dans la ville et dans ses environs. Il espère que la tension dangereuse, qui ne paraît pas avoir cessé actuellement de se faire sentir sur les limites de la zone de l'occupation grecque, sera peu à peu réduite par la sagesse et la justice de l'administration grecque, et grâce à l'œuvre de délimitation récemment terminée par le Général Milne, commandant des forces alliées en Anatolie.

Quant à la région d'Aidin, les Puissances ont décidé qu'en présence des difficultés pratiques et des inconvénients politiques que peut présenter l'organisation d'une occupation interalliée, elles préfèrent maintenir la situation de fait existante et l'occupation grecque.

A un autre point de vue, le Conseil désire obtenir de vous des renseignements sur les conditions dans lesquelles, en violation des décisions du Général Milne, les troupes grecques auraient franchi à Soma, sur l'ordre du Gouvernement grec, la ligne de démarcation fixée par le Haut-Commandement interallié.

Le Conseil suprême rappelle enfin que l'occupation de fait de Smyrne et de la région avoisinante par les troupes grecques n'a été décidée que pour des raisons de fait, et ne constitue aucun droit nouveau pour l'avenir. Il ne s'agit que d'une mesure provisoire qui laisse entièrement intacte la liberté de la Conférence de la Paix de régler les différents problèmes posés sur la question d'Orient en tenant compte de la situation générale du monde, ainsi que des vœux et des intérêts des populations.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

CLEMENCEAU.

No. 173.

[156779]

Colonel Meinertzhagen to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 311. C.P.O.)

General Headquarters,

My Lord,

Egyptian Expeditionary Force, Cairo, November 10, 1919.

IN amplification of my cable No. 49305 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to submit the following report on the present situation in Syria and Palestine:—

Situation in Syria.

The temperament of the inhabitants, already strained by uncertainty and delay, is rendered doubly suspicious and alarmed by the commencement of the evacuation and the increasingly violent tone of Turkish propaganda. Turkish influence is gradually creeping back, and signs are not wanting of a rejuvenated popularity of Turkish rule with all its forgotten disadvantages. The main theme of all propaganda is the religious argument, which is producing an anti-European and pan-Islamic feeling. This is not confined to Syria alone, but has been recently traced in Jerusalem and other Palestinian centres.

1. There are, however, two distinct schools of political opinion. The one is anxious to accept any Government which gives security and permits healthy development; the other is above all anti-French, but also would prefer the exclusion of all foreign elements and the reinstatement of pre-war conditions. This latter party is in the majority in the towns and along the Arab-French borders. To the more moderate party, who are willing to accept a French mandate, belong the more educated business men, the majority of the Bedouin, and the Druzes of Jebel Druze. Great efforts have been made by the Arab authorities to win over these two latter peoples, but it is my opinion that the Rualla tribe under Nuri Shalan are not concerned with the choice of a mandatory Power or the unity of Syria. They are willing to accept any Government which does not attempt to control them, but which is willing to buy their friendliness with subsidies. The Druzes have alone shown a willingness to accept a *fait accompli*, and have given signs of ingratiating themselves with the French, this being due to our persistent attitude of neutrality and not to any liking for the French. Their threat to give active assistance to their brethren in the Lebanon is, I consider, as empty as any Bedouin threat to leave the desert and assist Feisal in military operations in the Lebanon and on the Syrian coast. I may add that I recently visited the Rualla tribe encamped some 50 miles east of Damascus, where I found them most friendly, though they pointed out that French officers would not be allowed to wander about the desert in motor-cars. They were, however, willing to accept a subsidy from the French so long as it was paid to them in Damascus and not in the desert. I do, however, intend to get into closer touch with the Druzes of Jebel Druze when the evacuation is complete, at the express invitation of their head, Selim Pasha-el-Atrash.

Yasin Pasha, the leading spirit in Syria, is now known to be in correspondence with Mustapha Kemal, though actual proof could only be obtained by using violence on the disguised Turkish officers who act as carriers. Yasin is aiming at reinstating Turkish rule in Syria, not so much on national or pan-Arab grounds, as on those of personal power: in this he is an open disciple of Jemal. There is little doubt that at the present moment Yasin's influence has replaced for the bad the more moderate and reasonable influence of Feisal. He now carries with him the army and the majority of the people. It is even doubtful now whether Feisal can assume control over an administration which must move with public opinion or disappear.

A situation which contains a large percentage of genuine national feeling and a conviction of having been unfairly treated cannot fail to be dangerous when religious feelings are used as a stimulant and when the leading spirit is governed by personal ambition and imbued with a brain which is as quick as it is unscrupulous.

2. Damascus is the natural centre of political feeling; other towns will be largely guided by events in that city. I therefore do not anticipate any serious trouble till we commence to evacuate Damascus. Arab feeling has been changed from anti-French to anti-European. This is now noticeable in propaganda where hostile allusions are made to the English and friendly overtures made to Turks and even Germans. Unarmed demonstrations, previously of rare occurrence and with good-natured intent, have now given place to armed demonstrations of almost daily occur-

rence. It is noteworthy that in Damascus the Arabs are trying to win over the Christians and even the Jews to assist them against the French. An offer of arms has been made to both these communities. On the frontier between O.E.T.A. East and West incidents have occurred between French and Arab gendarmerie, which, though trivial in themselves, might at any moment necessitate military intervention. In the Lebanon there are frequent but isolated acts of violence in which French troops have no more than one occasion been used.

Though bad in themselves, the above factors constitute nothing more than was to have been expected; when taken collectively they build up an anxious situation, whose future improvement or otherwise is at present difficult to foresee.

Our military policy is to conduct the evacuation without incident. Our political policy has been to remove the bitter anti-French feeling among the Arabs, to explain to them the purely temporary nature of the Anglo-French *aide-mémoire* of the 13th September, 1919, and to induce them to accept it, using much the same arguments as were used in your letter to Feisal dated the 9th October, 1919. I regret to say that such arguments have not produced much effect in Syria. Similarly with the French local authorities, I have endeavoured to explain to them our one desire to work wholeheartedly in assisting them, our innocence of the various anti-French intrigues and propaganda of which they continue to accuse us, and the necessity of their showing a more conciliatory attitude to the Arabs. Their policy in this respect can only be described as irritating, and is not free from a suspicion that they are trying to embroil us with the Arabs before evacuation.

Under these circumstances political officers find it most difficult to maintain a strictly neutral attitude, and their refusal to take sides, when two distinct sides exist, has been the cause of a considerable loss to our prestige among the Arabs and increased mistrust by the French.

The French, moreover, take a totally different view of the situation. Their contempt for the Arab is undisguised, and it is typical of their attitude that M. Picot informed me only a week ago that ten French soldiers could do anything and go anywhere in Syria either during or after the evacuation.

3. Trans-Jordan has remained remarkably apathetic to events in Syria. Beyond the normal inter-tribal and inter-village quarrels, which often involve the loss of life, there has been no untoward incident during the last two months. The country is very loosely administered, and the local responsible natives depend considerably on the advice of political officers.

The evacuation of Syria by our troops and the splitting up of O.E.T.A. East into a northern and southern zone, under French and British mandates respectively, brings up the question of the administration of the southern zone. Presumably the present system will be continued; that is to say, it will be administered by the British Commander-in-chief, through an Arab Administration whose headquarters are necessarily at Damascus. Doubtless your Lordship has considered this anomaly and the advisability of having a British official at Arab Administrative Headquarters at Damascus who can deal with the Arab Administration on all questions affecting the southern zone.

There are other questions which require an early ruling, such as the administration of the Deraa-Haifa Railway, now that its workshops at Damascus cease to be under British influence, the control of the Arab Army in the two zones, and whether Feisal can be permitted to move troops freely from one zone to another, and the eastern boundary of the southern zone. These points have been referred by the Commander-in-chief to the War Office.

Situation in Palestine.

In Palestine there has been a marked improvement in the political situation.

The assembly of the newly constituted Zionist Commission under the chairmanship of Dr. Weizmann has already done a great deal to relieve the burden of trivial detail from our Administration and to weld together the Jewish elements in Palestine. M. Ussishkin's attitude at the outset was one of overbearing intolerance with a contempt for compromise. His relations with British officials were of an unhappy nature, which was accentuated by the fact that he cannot speak English. This has now been remedied by confining M. Ussishkin's activities to pure routine matter within the Zionist Commission. Dr. Weizmann has been well received wherever he has gone, his personality going a long way to allaying feeling among the more responsible Moslem heads. The Arab national and irreconcilable elements have so

far failed in producing any political effect, and their threats have not materialised, though their activities, directed against the British and Zionists, still continue.

My conviction that anti-Zionist feeling in Palestine is largely artificial and has been exaggerated both locally and at home is more than ever confirmed on further investigation. I do not anticipate any serious trouble in the initial stages of Zionism with the present moderation displayed by Zionist leaders.

There are, however, certain factors which still continue to foment a feeling antagonistic to Zionism and a British mandate over Palestine.

Events in Egypt and Syria are reflected in Palestine in an exaggerated form, and a serious situation or disorders in either of the two former countries would produce a wave of feeling in Palestine which would find its butt in Zionism.

The Arabs in Palestine are well armed and have plenty of ammunition. I do not pay much attention to this quite normal state of affairs, though it produces a feeling of insecurity among the community who regard Zionism as the spark which may light a general Palestinian conflagration, an opinion which I do not share.

I have confronted the local French authorities with their anti-Zionist propaganda in Palestine, and they agreed to stop it. I was gratified to hear that French officials have already received instructions from Paris that their attitude towards Zionism is to be of a more friendly nature.

Italian propaganda is of a more serious and complex nature, and has been conducted in a much more subtle manner. Up to the present it has been difficult to gauge either its scope or intention. The Banco di Roma has fallen under suspicion as a political agency, Italian Roman Catholic organisations in Palestine have been active in furthering Italian popularity, and Cardinal Giustini's recent visit to Jerusalem assumed an ill-concealed political rôle. It is also known that the Vatican is violently opposed to Zionism, as has already been reported to your Lordship.

I do not, however, anticipate much effect from any of these disturbing factors, though they will have to be carefully watched and countered.

There are in Palestine at the present moment two points calling for attention, neither of which is due to outside or hostile influence.

The first is lack of co-ordination and patience among the Jews themselves. This is being satisfactorily dealt with by the Zionist Commission and will be largely dissipated by the publication of the declaration embodied in your telegram No. 1216 of 7th November.

The second feature is the lack of some visible sign of the birth of Zionism in Palestine. This opens up several important questions which must be faced in the near future. I wish now to draw your Lordship's attention to the very great hardships now being experienced in Palestine from the delay in signing the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. Industrial and agricultural progress is impossible under the laws and usages of war, the influx of capital is checked owing to uncertainty in the future, and general stagnation is writ large on the face of Palestine. We cannot stand by indefinitely and see Palestine and the Zionist cause rotting, more especially when the obstruction is the Allies' delay in settling peace with Turkey. Such conditions cannot and should not be allowed to continue and, in fairness to all sections in Palestine, I consider, they are and have been patient under very trying circumstances, and that they have every right to demand a modification on certain lines. The Zionist Commission have drawn up a constructive scheme of work which they wish to undertake at once, and of which the following is a summary.

The Zionists are the only organisation now in Palestine with the necessary brains, energy, and resources to institute a commencement to progress, and in accordance with the policy of His Majesty's Government, the Zionists are the right and proper body to undertake preparatory measures for building up their national home and for easing the general economic situation.

The following suggestions are, in my opinion, admissible and can materialise under the strict letter of the laws and usages of war:—

1. The taking over of the Wieland Factory at Jaffa by the Zionists on a lease for a term of years, with a view to the manufacture of building material. The factory is German owned.
2. The purchase of land by the Zionists to enable them to construct one or more cement factories in suitable but as yet undecided localities. I am informed that 300,000*l.* is available on this account.
3. The acquisition of the Sarona and Wilhelmina colonies, where some 70 houses give the Zionists a suitable housing basis for immigrants of the skilled classes.

4. The building of good hotels in certain centres. This is a want which is largely felt by all classes in Palestine.
5. The opening of a large store which would benefit all classes in Jerusalem, with branches elsewhere.
6. The opening of the Land Registries on a limited and strictly controlled scale.
7. Permission to introduce some 500-700 skilled workmen into Palestine to develop the above schemes.

I submit this comprehensive programme with hesitation, but only after fully going into each point. I am satisfied that the schemes are not only practicable but desirable from a general utility point of view. They establish first-class industries, give a large employment to Arabs, bring about a considerable circulation of new money, they constitute work of a preliminary nature and vital to the success of Zionism, they generally benefit the whole community and fall within the scope of the laws and usages of war.

I have outlined the above programme only in an anticipatory sense. Each and every scheme where policy is involved will be submitted to you for sanction before its inauguration.

I have, &c.

MEINERTZHAGEN, Colonel, C.P.O.

[156715]

No. 174.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—Received November 29.)

(No. 2143. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 16, 1919.

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the general political situation in this country, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of what purport to be telegrams exchanged between Salih Pasha, Minister of Marine, and the Central Government here during Salih Pasha's mission to the "National forces." These documents have reached me from a very secret source. I am unable to verify their authenticity, but they bear on the face of them an impress of genuineness.

2. When Salih Pasha went to Amassia it was announced that though a complete agreement had been arrived at between the new Cabinet and the head of the national movement on all questions of broad policy, various matters of detail remained to be settled, and that the Pasha was being sent to treat about these matters direct with Mustapha Kemal and his companions. Salih Pasha returned precipitately, in circumstances which are still obscure, but which left no doubt that his mission had not been a success. The official version was that it had been a success, but that certain matters of detail remained still to be settled, a formula exactly similar to that used before he started.

3. Tewfik Pasha admitted not very long ago that there was a question between the Nationalists and the Government, as to whether the Parliament should meet in Broussa or Constantinople, and in a private conversation on the 6th November the Grand Vizier definitely admitted to Mr. Ryan that Salih Pasha's mission had been a failure. His Highness observed emphatically in the same conversation that the policy of his Government was one of conciliation with the national movement, but not one of complete subservience. They were now sending, he said, two further missions to study the situation in the interior.

4. In a further conversation of the same kind on the 13th November His Highness again admitted that complete accord did not reign between his Government and the organiser of the national movement. He conveyed, indeed, the impression that matters were rather at a deadlock. Though evidently a little anxious over this, he did not appear as disconsolate as might have been expected, or seem to have any immediate fear for his position. The two new missions had, he said, reached the starting points of their labours, Samsoun and Konia, and the Government hoped almost at once to begin to receive reports from them.

5. The real position appears to be that the leaders of the national movement are prepared for the moment to waive minor causes of differences with the Government, either because they feel that they have lost ground, or because they think they can afford to hold their hand in Constantinople until they have rigged the elections, and produced out of their witches' cauldron a body of deputies who can be mobilised a

month hence here or in the interior as circumstances require. The results of the elections announced so far show that they have no difficulty in inducing the free and independent electors of Thrace and Anatolia to return members of the finest nationalist and even committee flavour.

6. The Government on their side have become more and more a Cabinet of what is called in Turkish "Idare-i-maslahat," or a "business Cabinet." Every kind of rumour is afloat as to the probability of a change. As I observed in section 5 of my telegram No. 2052, the *Entente libérale* are making strong efforts to engineer the advent to power of an "anti-nationalist" Government, but they are hampered by lack of resources, energetic men of high standing, or real unity. They may succeed in spite of these disabilities, or the Sultan may conceivably try the experiment of asking the present Grand Vizier to make way for Prince Sabahuddin, about whose possible advent to power *ballons d'essai* have been flying.

7. On the whole, however, I think that if the Government goes out before the assembly of Parliament, it is more likely to be as the result of an internal break over the degree of obedience to be rendered to the national movement than for any other reason. The Minister for War, who was, as your Lordship will remember, himself identified with the national movement in its earlier stages, seems a good deal more inclined than the Grand Vizier or his colleagues of Foreign Affairs or the Interior to push matters in the capital in the interests of the movement.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 174.

Telegraphic Correspondence between the Grand Vizier and Salih Pasha.

(1.)

Salih Pasha, at Amassia, to the Grand Vizier, October 18, 1919.

(Secret.)

FOLLOWING from T. 10:—

With the blessing of God I have arrived at Amassia and got into communication with Kemal Pasha, Reouf, Rustem, and Vassif Beys, who were awaiting our mission. In the course of our interview I was requested to submit to your Highness the following conditions for the purpose of conciliation following upon those submitted by Kemal Pasha in the name of the National Defence on the 3rd October, 1335, with a request that they be considered by the Council of Ministers, and that the result of the deliberations of the council be communicated to them.

The following are the conditions and decisions in modification of those taken by the Congress on the last occasion, and brought forward by the representative of the Congress at the time of the reception of the telegram sent to Sivas, dated the 1st October, by the First Secretary, notifying the fall of the Ferid Pasha Cabinet. These conditions and decisions were submitted to your Highness by a telegram dated the 2nd October:—

1. One-third at least of the members of the delegation to be sent to Paris shall be elected by the National Organisation.
2. The acceptance by the Government of candidates and deputies designated by the National Defence during the elections; the right of candidature and election to be granted to officers and senior officers having ten years' service.
3. The acceptance by the Government, as has already been admitted by the Government and upon which the National Defence had insisted, of a general amnesty; its publication at the desired moment; to make representations to the Allied Powers for the recall of those persons now in Malta and other countries with a view to obtaining their return; later on to bring those who are guilty to trial, either in Constantinople or elsewhere.
4. To bring certain members of the Ferid Pasha Cabinet to trial before a High Court.

[1356]

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5. The National Organisation repeats its petition to His Majesty the Sultan to continue to repose his confidence in it, and for its part the National Organisation will give every kind of assurance necessary by action and by oath to dissipate any kind of suspicion or doubt entertained by His Majesty the Sultan with regard to rumours now current concerning His Highness the heir apparent.
6. As was stated in article 5 of the decisions of the Sivas Congress, the commissioners of the National Organisation will exercise control over the following: (a) conclusion of peace, (b) financial matters, (c) executive and political matters until the opening of the Chamber. In the event of the resignation of the Cabinet, no Ministers will be appointed among the opponents of the National Organisation.
7. To include in the Council of Ministers certain persons in accordance with the decision of the Congress and the demand already submitted.
8. The execution and accomplishment without delay or negligence by the Government of the points decided upon in the Sivas Congress concerning the foreign policy of the Empire; the treaties to be concluded with the Allied Powers and other countries, especially with Russia and Bulgaria, to be based upon the sovereignty of the Ottoman Caliphate and nation; negotiations with the English and French Governments to be undertaken to this end.
9. The Government to check the movement against the Nationalists at Bozki Ada Bazar; to ensure security (for the National forces) in any district where similar events may occur.

The National Organisation will not fail to take precautionary measures against any decisions of the Government contrary to the interests of the Organisation. Further, I have been definitely informed that it will not be convenient for me to proceed to Sivas before I have received a reply to these proposals.

I beg your Highness to be so kind as to reply to my telegram No. 3 and to inform me as to the answer which I am to return to the commissioners of the Organisation regarding the above-mentioned demands.—SALIH.

(2.)

The Grand Vizier to Salih Pasha, October 19, 1335.

REPLY to telegram of the 18th October, 1335 :—

The decision of the Council of Ministers which has received the assent of His Majesty the Sultan in reply to the conciliatory proposals of the honourable commission (National Organisation).

In view of the principle for which the National Organisation has been constituted, namely, for the defence of the country and of the nation, a principle maintained by the decisions of the Congress of Sivas.

In view also of Ottoman and foreign public opinion, and especially of the present delicate situation and negotiations now taking place with the Great Powers concerning matters of the highest importance.

The Government, with a view to ensuring success in these matters, accepts in principle the proposal that the commissioners of the National Defence shall act as councillors to the executive power until the opening of the Chamber, in order that it may not be supposed that a second power exists behind the Government.

It accepts the first article.

It also accepts and approves the first paragraph of the second article, the scrutiny of voting papers by commissions to be formed by the Government with the consent of the population in places where the candidates and deputies of the Organisation may be elected, provided that the elections take place in complete freedom.

As regards the second paragraph of article 2, the draft of a law has approved by the Council of Ministers and is on the point of being endorsed by the High Military Court, in conformity with which the service of senior officers is fixed at ten years only, and the right of election and of voting as a candidate [sic] is granted to these officers.

With regard to articles 3 and 4, the present Government has agreed on principle to negotiate with the Allied Powers, and after these negotiations to rely upon public opinion, and to submit them to the Chamber immediately upon its being convened.

With regard to article 5, the good intentions of His Majesty the Sultan towards the National Organisation are proved by his declarations to the nation. He will never refuse his Imperial protection within the limits of his sovereign rights and those of the Caliphate, and he has deigned to request you to bring to the knowledge of the honourable Commission his Imperial satisfaction with the assurances, by action and by oath, of the complete fidelity of the nation towards his Imperial person.

With regard to the question of the supervision which is mentioned in article 6, as has already been stated, the principles of admitting the reasonable demands of the commissioners as a Commission of Advisers until the opening of the Chamber has been accepted.

The modification to be effected in the Council of Ministers, according to article 7, would not be advisable at the present moment; His Majesty the Sultan desires that the present Cabinet should regulate all affairs until it can obtain a vote of confidence at the opening of Parliament; and with regard to article 8, since the executive power is responsible for the decisions of the administration of the political affairs of the country, the political arrangements and treaties to be concluded with the Great Powers and other Governments will be submitted in case of necessity to both Chambers.

The Government agrees to an exchange of opinion in case of necessity with the commissioners to be known as the "Commission of Councillors" until the opening of the Chamber.

The necessary measures for the earliest possible cessation of collisions caused by a certain effervescence at Ada Bazar and Bozki, resulting from the great attachment of the nation to the National Organisation, have been taken; but the Government requests that the Organisation should also do its part, and draws the attention of the honourable Commission to the fact that it is in Ottoman interests not to bring about undesirable events.

We beg you under present conditions to delay your departure to Sivas and to communicate the present decision of the Council of Ministers to the honourable Commission and to communicate to me the reply; also to return by the vessel placed at your disposal.—ALI RIZA, *Grand Vizier*.

[156735]

No. 175.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 2166.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 19, 1919.

WITH reference to the second paragraph of my despatch No. 2083 of the 6th November, I have the honour to transmit herewith a list of places from which I have received telegrams of protest against the occupation of Aintab, Ourfa, and Marash by the French.

2. The telegrams are of a more or less uniform character, and possess no individual interest. The signatories telegraph for the most part on behalf of local "national defence" committees. My object in forwarding the list is to show how widespread are the ramifications of the national movement organisation, and how untiring are the efforts of its organisers to popularise the idea of resistance to any decision at the Peace Conference tending to the dismemberment of the territory which remained under direct Turkish administration at the time of the armistice. My French colleague informs me that he also has received a very large number of similar communications.

3. Of more importance than these telegrams from all and sundry is a recent demonstration by the leaders of the national movement themselves. I enclose a full translation of a violent pronouncement issued by them on the 12th November in the form of a telegram to the Turkish Press Association, and to each of the High Commissioners here. This document is sufficiently important to receive your Lordship's special attention.

4. Mustafa Kemal Pasha's pronouncement was censored out of some of the local papers, but appeared in a sufficient number both in Turkish and in other languages to ensure wide publicity. It created some little stir in the French High Commission, which has a very direct interest in the agitation against the new form given to the occupation of Cilicia. I understand, confidentially, that M. DeFrance has been considering the advisability of enlisting the participation of myself and the Italian High Commissioner in a request that the Turkish Government should define their view of Mustafa Kemal Pasha's action in addressing himself direct to the High Commissioners

on a matter so exclusively the concern of the Turkish Government as [such, and in language so menacing.

5. M. De France has not as yet taken action in this sense, but he enquired in conversation with Rear-Admiral Webb what I proposed to do in the matter. Rear-Admiral Webb replied that he had not yet consulted me, but that he thought it probable that I should take no notice of the communication beyond reporting it to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
J. M. DE ROBECK,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 175.

List of Towns in Turkey from which telegrams have been received protesting against the occupation of Aintab, Ourfa, and Marash by the French troops, giving the date of the telegrams.

Aintab ...	October 25.	Sidi Shehir ...	November 11.
Mardin ...	{ October 25, 28.	Medrini ...	" 11.
Viran Shehir ...	November 11, 15.	Orkhan Ili ...	" 11.
Kilas ...	October 28.	Eski Shehir ...	" 11.
Nassibin ...	October 28.	Selefke ...	" 11.
Siverek ...	{ October 29.	Guevyé Akhissar ...	" 11.
Midyat ...	November 11.	Isnik ...	" 11.
Ourfa ...	October 30.	Mot ...	" 11.
Elbistan ...	November 12.	Boz Kir ...	" 11.
Maden ...	October 31.	Kangal ...	" 11.
Dersim ...	November 13, 14.	Orkhan Ghazi ...	" 11.
Tokat ...	November 1, 7, 12.	Kastamouni ...	" 11.
Elaziz ...	" 11, 17.	Karaman ...	" 11.
Cæsarea ...	" 2, 15.	Boghazlayan ...	" 11.
Rodosto ...	" 3.	Arabissou ...	" 12.
Erzindjan ...	" 3.	Selvan ...	" 12.
Adrianople ...	" 4.	Havza ...	" 12.
Yozgat ...	" 8.	Divriki ...	" 12.
Seid Ghazi ...	" 8.	Bartin ...	" 12.
Tchimishguezek ...	" 8, 11.	Mirefte ...	" 12.
Kara Hissar Sharki ...	" 9.	Konia ...	" 12.
Téké ...	" 9.	Ineboli ...	" 12.
Rize ...	" 9, 11.	Demir Keuy ...	" 13.
Baba Eski ...	" 9.	Mahmoudié ...	" 13.
Keshan ...	" 10.	Bor ...	" 13.
Ismidt ...	" 10.	Zongouldak ...	" 13.
Merzi Foun ...	" 10.	Kéréde ...	" 13.
Bolou ...	" 10.	Inoz ...	" 14.
Tchoroum ...	" 10.	Oulon Bouzlou ...	" 14.
Karadsa Bey ...	" 10.	Res-ul-Ayn ...	" 14.
Ak Dagb Maden ...	" 10.	Avanos ...	" 14.
Keupru ...	" 10.	Mabavri ...	" 14.
Alaiyé ...	" 10.	Akseray ...	" 15.
Oulou Kishla ...	" 10.	Kara Hissar ...	" 15.
Kirk Kilisse ...	" 10.	Ladik ...	" 15.
Broussa ...	" 10.	Trebizond ...	" 16.
Develou ...	" 10.	Tchopé (?) ...	" 16.
Pedjbar ...	" 11.	Biledsik ...	" 16.
Sparta ...	" 11.	Anamor ...	" 16.
		Seert ...	" 16.
		Anay Bazar [?Ada Bazar]	" 16.

Enclosure 2 in No. 175.

Translation of a telegram, dated November 12, 1919, despatched from Sivas by Moustapha Kemal (Pasha) in the name of the Representative Committee for the Defence of National Rights in Anatolia and Roumelia.

THE localities of Aintab, Marash, and Ourfa, which were occupied by the English, contrary to the provisions of the armistice and were recently evacuated, have now again been occupied by the French. The Entente Powers therefore by no means renounce their plan of depriving our nation of these, the most beautiful parts of our country, and they are carrying out their schemes on the ground apparently that this occupation is provisional and preventive, without awaiting the decisions of the conference. They are unwilling to take into consideration the glorious history of the Ottoman Empire, dating from seven centuries ago, or the circumstances and elements of its prompt and powerful development, or its rebirth. They are working to establish an equilibrium of interests among themselves by dismembering our country. The acts of these Powers are inhuman and such as to be an offence against justice and right, against the principles proclaimed with all pomp and ceremony in the Peace Conference, and against the promises made to Turkey before all the world by article 12 of the principles of Wilson.

The massacres, oppression, and atrocities and the policy of extermination carried out in the vilayet of Aidin, which was given to the Greeks to occupy with a view to opening the way to a division of Turkey, are identical with those perpetrated in the localities of Marash, Ourfa, and Aintab, dependencies of the vilayet of Adana, which the French have occupied, using the Armenians as their instrument. These acts are the last of a series of flagrant injustices of a political nature.

We protest with all our energy against the illegal proceedings of the Entente Powers up to date, and we hope that they will of their own accord return to more humane and equitable sentiments towards our country and our nation, who will continue resolutely to defend its existence and its lawful rights with all the material and moral forces at its command, rather than consent to dismemberment and slavery.

We wish to advise the Powers of the Entente that our whole nation, in the widest sense of the word, is united in this legitimate and sublime decision, a continuation of this inhuman policy which the Entente Powers, deaf to the legitimate voice of our nation, are following may entail fatal consequences, not only for a few countries, but also possibly for the two hemispheres.

The responsibility before Providence and humanity of such a disaster lies naturally with the Entente Powers. We are here acting as interpreters of the desire for unity cherished by our nation, whose only object is the defence of its rights to exist. We wish our legitimate cries to reach the nations of Europe and America, and we are convinced that they will not give their sanction to all this injustice.

[156472]

No. 176.

Foreign Office to Colonel Wilson.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 1, 1919.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state that on your return to the Hedjaz you should take the earliest opportunity of getting King Hussein to come to Jeddah for a full and frank discussion on the following lines.

You should inform him that you have just returned from London, where the whole question of his relations with Ibn Saud has been discussed by His Majesty's Government. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has himself taken a great personal interest in the question, and is very anxious that the two rulers should compose their differences.

After listening to the arguments put forward by you on the King's behalf, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that he has a strong case. So strong indeed does it appear to be that they cannot understand why His Majesty should decline to state it either in person or before some impartial arbiter to be appointed by His Majesty's Government.

If it is the case, as King Hussein contends, that his ownership of Khurma and Turaba is incontestable, there does not appear to be any valid objection to his

producing the proofs which would convince any impartial person at once of the justice of his claims.

He should realise that there is at present no question of the public demarcation of the boundary by a British Commission. It is only suggested and strongly urged by His Majesty's Government that he should agree to meet Ibn Saud personally with the object of arriving at an agreement on all points at issue between them. You should remind King Hussein that he has previously expressed his willingness to meet Ibn Saud should His Majesty's Government so desire, and add that they will readily arrange for the meeting to take place at Jeddah, Cairo, or Aden.

It is not anticipated that public opinion in the Hedjaz and elsewhere will necessarily jump to the conclusion from the fact of this meeting that the ownership of Khurma is being arbitrated upon. It may not even be necessary for an arbiter to step in at all, and only in the event of King Hussein and Ibn Saud failing to come to an agreement might it be necessary to suggest the appointment of an impartial British official to assist in arriving at a conclusion. In the event of King Hussein making difficulties about a personal interview with Ibn Saud you should point out to him that the alternative of a meeting between plenipotentiaries of the two parties would not be likely to produce so satisfactory a result, though His Majesty's Government would prefer even this alternative to direct intervention on their part.

King Hussein must realise that if, without an agreement between the two parties, Ibn Saud were now called upon to withdraw his forces, the result might be that the whole militant power of the Akhwan would be let loose upon the Hedjaz. There was nothing in the circumstances of the recent conflict to lead His Majesty's Government to believe that King Hussein's troops would be able to resist such an advance. They might even lose Mecca and thus incur the odium of the Moslem world in general and subject his own name to the greatest stain that could rest on the memory of a Moslem ruler. No one knows better than His Majesty that British troops could not come to his assistance. He would be the last to invite or expect them to do so. In these circumstances it seems the height of unwisdom to provoke a further advance which His Majesty has not the means to resist, but which equally with him His Majesty's Government would deplore. The interest of both Governments are in fact the same, viz., to avoid any such calamity and, by an agreement between the two powerful potentates principally concerned, to bring about a condition of peace and unity in the Arabian peninsula.

Ibn Saud for his part has also demanded from His Majesty's Government a definite recognition of his various claims, but has been told that His Majesty's Government must decline even to discuss them until he has made a real effort to come to an agreement without their intervention. It is believed that Ibn Saud will be quite ready to come to Jeddah and have a friendly conversation with King Hussein on the latter's territory; and he is also being told that in the event of negotiations failing His Majesty's Government will have no alternative but to propose the decision of an impartial arbiter.

His Majesty's Government do not consider it necessary at this stage to discuss the question of Khurma. They are aware of the strong feelings entertained by King Hussein on the subject, and they have not receded from the attitude which they have previously adopted. Only in the event of the King and Ibn Saud failing to come to an agreement on the matter would it be necessary for a British arbitrator to investigate the case and to arrive at a decision.

His Majesty's Government are hopeful that by these suggestions they may have once more testified their sincere regard for King Hussein and their recognition of the great services which he has rendered to the Allied cause during the war. They take this opportunity of again assuring him of their entire faith and trust in his good intentions, and in his true friendship and loyalty to Great Britain; and you are authorised to inform His Majesty that nothing would give greater pleasure to His Majesty's Government than to receive him in London in the course of next year and discuss the many interests that they have in common. But before he comes to England it is essential that the risk of hostilities between himself and Ibn Saud should be entirely removed so that trouble should not break out in his absence.

A copy of these instructions is being communicated to His Majesty's High Commissioner, Cairo, with whom you should discuss them before proceeding to Jeddah.

I am, &c.

GERALD SPICER.

[157877]

No. 177.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 3.)

Sir,

War Office, December 2, 1919.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to enclose herewith, for the information of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, a copy of a letter dated the 20th October, 1919, from the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Army of the Black Sea, forwarding a "History of the Nationalist Movement in Turkey," which, in their opinion, gives an accurate description of the movement.

The Council are confident that Lord Curzon will appreciate the point on which General Milne's letter lays emphasis in paragraphs 4, 5, and 13, viz., that the question of the peace terms to be imposed on Turkey must now be considered in relation to the means available to enforce them. And in this connection I am to say that they attach the highest importance to the request which General Milne reiterates in paragraph 14 of his letter, that those responsible for the execution of the peace terms should be given some knowledge of the nature of these terms beforehand in order that there may be time to make such arrangements as may be possible.

Lord Curzon will observe that, from paragraph 8 of the letter, modified ideas regarding the future State of Armenia are beginning to prevail.

I am, &c.

B. B. CUBITT.

Enclosure in No. 177.

General Sir G. Milne to War Office.

Sir,

Constantinople, October 20, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward a memorandum on the Nationalist movement in Turkey, which is in my opinion an accurate and balanced account of events much misrepresented in Europe, but the military importance of which, it is essential, should not be underestimated.

2. In the first place, the movement has consolidated public opinion in Turkey, and, now that its supporters hold the reins of power, will do so still more.

3. In the second place, its leaders have been coquetting with the idea of armed resistance. No one can be better aware than they themselves that, in doing so, they are playing with fire and risking a disaster to their country. It was, however, necessary for them to adopt this attitude for two reasons:—

(a.) Because it serves as a veiled threat, which they believe will influence the Peace Conference.

(b.) Because the organisation of the populace in a military way is the normal method of political agitation in Turkey. Military organisation is the only organisation which the Turks understand, and the steps taken by the Nationalist Party are admirably calculated to bring all the political power into their hands, and to make the results of the coming elections a mere instrument of their will.

4. It is therefore advisable to contemplate a situation in which the use of military force may become necessary, and to consider it in the light of possible decisions to be arrived at by the Peace Conference.

5. I do not desire in any way to influence these decisions, but it is proper to point out that the force required to enforce the peace terms will vary greatly according to the nature of these terms.

6. The three main questions, on which Mustafa Kemal and his followers in their defence of the integrity of their country declare a *non possumus*, are the question of Smyrna, the question of Armenia, and the question of Thrace.

7. The question of Smyrna is important. The events of Smyrna have affected the position so greatly that it is inevitable that its evacuation and return to Turkey will be one of the foremost demands of every Turk.

8. In Armenia the crux of the question is that there are very few Armenians, and that the more grandiose schemes for the creation of an independent Armenia would

* Not printed.

[1356]

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require large forces. Feeling on the subject is intense. Even Damid Ferid's Cabinet issued the most stringent orders that no Armenians were to be allowed to be repatriated. It is nevertheless quite possible that there is a prospect of a satisfactory settlement without the use of force, provided that settlement is within certain limits.

9. The evidence upon which this is asserted was obtained by the I. (e) branch of my staff, and can be studied in detail in a series of reports to the War Office.

10. The true value can be put on these reports only if it be clearly realised that they are conversations between leading Turks who have no idea that they are being overheard.

11. These conversations are therefore of very great value. They show the Turks clearly on the defensive on the Erzeroum frontier. They prove that the probability of an offensive against Armenia may be discounted. They also show that the Turk leaders are prepared to make concessions. For instance, Colonel Djevid Bey, the commander of the 11th Division at Van, writes to his corps commander at Erzeroum. He says fuel is a great difficulty, and wood as dear as sugar. Therefore he proposes to break up the rolling-stock on the Bayazid-Karaklis decauville. "Although," he says, "we may hope by the Nationalist movement to save most of our country, that part must go. Divisional commanders do not in practice express political views in the course of discussing administrative questions unless they know that their superiors hold these views. It, therefore, appears that the corps commander, Kiazim Karabekir, who is the backbone of the national movement on that frontier, considers some territorial concessions inevitable.

12. On the question of Thrace, I have no reason to suppose that adjustments would be considered inadmissible by the Nationalist Party.

13. If the decisions of the Peace Conference are so drastic in the treatment of Turkey that the older men, who have the spirit of compromise, are unable to keep the wilder spirits in check, then it will turn out that the national movement has very greatly prejudiced the military position of the Allies. The population is armed, and now united for the first time; it is difficult to calculate the force which might be available in the event of a national rising.

14. Between the solution without force and the action referred to as possible in the preceding paragraph, there are many other situations in which the Allied force required will vary according to the degree of division of opinion among the Turks, and the extent to which the most balanced opinion among them can be brought on to our side. In order that the situation may be considered beforehand, it is most important that a forecast of the peace terms should be presented to the Allied military authorities in time for them to consider what, if any, additional force will be required to meet the situation, which the announcement of the peace terms will create. In this way alone there will be avoided a repetition of the incidents of Smyrna.

The forces now at my disposal are only sufficient to bring pressure to bear on the Government at Constantinople, who may or may not be in a position to control the country.

I have, &c.

G. F. MILNE, General,
Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea.

[154459]

No. 178.

Foreign Office to the British Council Officer, Supreme Economic Council.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 3, 1919.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit herewith copies of three despatches which have been received from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople describing the critical state of destitution which already prevails among the Greeks and Armenians of Turkey, and which, together with the arrival of winter, threatens many thousands of them with extinction.

2. From paragraphs 7 and 8 of Admiral de Robeck's despatch No. 2110 of the 11th November, it will be observed that, while the chief organisations which have hitherto been at work in Turkey are now curtailing their activities, the need for relief is, owing not only to the rigours of the Turkish winter but also to circumstances of disease, semi-starvation, overcrowding and exposure, greater even than before.

3. Lord Curzon has little doubt that reports to the same effect have been received from the representatives of the Supreme Economic Council in Turkey, and endorses the

opinion expressed by Admiral de Robeck to the effect that if these populations are to be saved from the fate which hangs over them, the measures taken must be both immediate and extensive. Such measures, it is clear, can only be taken by the Allied and Associated Powers in common, and I am accordingly to request that you will take an early opportunity of drawing the serious attention of the Supreme Economic Council to the grave state of destitution prevailing in Turkey, with a view to the adoption by the Supreme Economic Council of measures to provide relief for the suffering population and to save them from death and disease. These measures might, in Lord Curzon's opinion, well be on the lines suggested by Admiral de Robeck and be applied alike to Moslems, many of whom, for example, are destitute in the neighbourhood of Aidin, and to Christians.

I am, &c.

J. A. C. TILLEY

[158730]

No. 179.

Sir E. Crouce to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 2248.)

My Lord,

Paris, December 3, 1919.

I HAVE had the advantage of reading your Lordship's despatch No. 1391 of the 25th ultimo to His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, recording a conversation with the French Ambassador in London, in the course of which the possibility of transferring the seat of the Peace Conference from the former to the latter capital was discussed.

2. M. Clemenceau has two or three times referred to this question in general terms in conversation with me. He has asked me not to report his remarks as he said the question was being treated direct with your Lordship through M. Cambon, and I accordingly refrained from doing so. It appears, however, to be worth mentioning that, after the meeting of the Supreme Council this morning (the 2nd December), M. Clemenceau spoke to the Japanese plenipotentiary on the subject. He said he wished to inform Mr. Matsui confidentially that in no circumstances whatever would he consent to the transfer to London of the seat of the negotiations for peace with Turkey, and that, were he to agree to it, he would find himself in a minority in the Legislature. He added that he believed that he could count on the support of the Italian Government on this question.

3. M. Clemenceau made this confidential communication to Mr. Matsui in so loud a voice that nobody present in the room could fail to overhear what passed.

I believe that M. Clemenceau's uncompromising attitude is due to a desire to preserve what remains of French prestige in the Near East, which the following facts have, in his opinion, contributed to diminish:—

- That the military operations which have led to the downfall of the Ottoman Empire have been conducted almost exclusively by British troops, to whose exertions the victory of the Allies is entirely due.
- That Syria and Palestine have been occupied by British troops to the exclusion of the French.
- That the command of the sea in the Mediterranean has, as M. Clemenceau expresses it, been taken away from France by Great Britain.
- That General Milne, by the predominant position which he occupies in Turkey in Asia, has overshadowed General Franchet d'Esperey, with the result that considerable friction exists between them.

4. M. Clemenceau evidently apprehends that, in the eyes of the population of these regions, France now plays a part subordinate to that of Great Britain, and feels that if, in addition, peace with Turkey were to be made in London instead of at Paris France would sink in their estimation to the level of a Power of the second rank. He believes this to be so well understood in France that no Government which consented to such an arrangement could retain the confidence of the country. At any rate, he has more than once told me that rather than agree to it he would resign.

5. It has occurred to me that a solution of the difficulty might possibly be found if it could be arranged that the negotiations which are to lead up to the conclusion of peace with Turkey should be conducted in London, the signature of the Treaty itself

[1356]

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taking place at Paris, like that of the peace with the other enemy Powers. I have not, however, made the suggestion to M. Clemenceau, and have no means of forming an opinion whether it would be likely to meet with a favourable reception on his part.

I have, &c.

(For Sir Eyre Crowe)

H. NORMAN.

[159178]

No. 180.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 2194.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 23, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a report, dated the 11th November, which I have received from my representative at Samsoun, relative to the Nationalist movement in that district.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 180.

Captain Perring to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

(No. 340.)

Sir,

Samsoun, November 11, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Nationalist movement is now very unpopular in this district and that Moustaffa Kemal, owing to his having stated that he was a special envoy of the Sultan, which is now discovered to be untrue, is discredited and openly attacked.

2. The only result of the movement here has been the apparent establishment of a superficial security for the Christians, but the Turk is only prevented from massacres and open persecution by the fears of Allied intervention.

3. The various bands of brigands and irregular troops are now disappearing and the recruiting efforts of the movement here had practically no success; a few promised to join up if called upon, but more with the idea of looting and massacring than of taking part in any fighting.

4. It is obvious here that any attempts at mobilisation would be a complete failure, the only remaining adherents of the movement being military officers and certain Government officials, and unless the movement receives some fresh encouragement from outside, such as penetration into the interior by Greek troops or the formation of a large independent Armenia, it is bound to sizzle out.

5. The financial support given to the movement was mostly obtained by threats, and, although considerable sums were secured, they are not likely to be increased by any further donations.

I have, &c.

J. S. PERRING.

[159187]

No. 181.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 2203.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 24, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1676 of the 11th September, transmitting copy of a report received from Lieutenant Slade, R.N.V.R., regarding a visit to certain towns on the southern coast of the Black Sea and commenting on the situation of the Christian inhabitants in general, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a communication and enclosures received from Captain Perring, my representative at Samsoun, concerning his visit last month to Unieh, Fatsa, Ordu, Kerasun, Trebizond, Rizé, and Batoum.

2. Your Lordship will observe that, as regards the all-important question of security (the settlement of which is a necessary preliminary to the successful coping

with all relief, restitution of property, and repatriation problems), the situation in the Trebizond vilayet shows a progressive deterioration. The Kerasun district, for instance, is now openly controlled by a brigand chief, who dictates orders to the local authorities and whom the Vali of Trebizond is powerless, or too inert, to suppress. The improvement in the conditions at Unieh and the scattering by the mutessarif of Samsoun of the lawless elements in the Fatsa kaza show that much can be effected by a moderately prudent administration and a display of some measure of energy.

3. The marked increase of piracy is disquieting. The pirates are almost exclusively Laz, who have come, and are often still controlled, from Rizé and the smaller, rarely visited ports of the Lazistan seaboard.

4. The methods which the Turks are employing to render life unendurable for their Christian fellow-countrymen are deserving of careful attention. The Greek or Armenian is no longer systematically massacred; he is prevented from making a livelihood in Turkey. His business is boycotted, his nutcrops made dangerous of access and farmed out to Moslems, who repudiate their engagements, and his houses and property retained. It is consequently not a matter for surprise that the Greek and Armenian refugees are again leaving Asia Minor in increasing numbers.

5. As regards the attitude of the Turkish officials and local notables towards the Allies, the undisguised hostility and open defiance encountered by Captain Perring at Kerasun and the sudden outbreak of illness which the approach of His Majesty's ship "Gardenia" caused amongst the authorities at Rizé are alike illuminating. Even the more competent officials make no secret of their sympathy with Moustafa Kemal and his aims.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 181.

Captain Perring to Sir J. de Robeck.

(No. 310.)

Sir,

October 29, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have visited the following coastal towns in H.M.S. "Gardenia": Unieh, Fatsa, Ordu, Kerasun, Trebizond, Rizé, and Batoum.

2. I have the honour to attach separate reports on each of the above towns.

3. *General.*—I found everywhere that Greek refugees who had returned to Turkey since the armistice have either left the country again or are on the point of doing so, in many cases accompanied by Greeks who had remained in Turkey throughout the war. This exodus of refugees is entirely due to complete lack of security in all villages, and to their being unable to obtain possession of their properties, or to cultivate same with the knowledge that they will be able to market the crops: also owing to the fear of further persecutions.

4. Armenians in large parties (as many as eighty families in one party) have left for Russia, and this movement threatens to become more general. Many communities (or the remains of communities) informed me that they intended to leave the country at the first opportunity.

5. I beg to point out that, with the exception of the towns themselves, there is a complete lack of security. This persecution is being carried out by means of a well-organised boycott, aiming at preventing the Christian obtaining a living.

6. Typical of this is the Turkish method of obtaining control of this year's abnormal nut crop. No Christian dares to venture from the town to visit his plantations, and he is therefore compelled to make a contract with a Turk for the harvesting of the crop; on the understanding that 50 per cent. of the crop is handed to the proprietor. In no single instance have I heard of this contract being carried out; the Turk simply harvests the crop and sells it for his own account, refusing to deliver the 50 per cent. or any proportion to the Christian.

7. In cases where the Christian has obtained possession of his land, and has cultivated his crop, the Turk prevents his marketing same, either by continuous threats, and so compelling him to abandon his property, or by attacking him on the way to or from market.

8. A further typical case of Turkish treatment of Christians occurred eight hours' journey from Kerasun. A party of returned Greek refugees returned to their village five hours from the town. They were met by the Turkish occupiers of their homes, beaten, and robbed of their money, and forced to return to Kerasun. I pointed out

this case to the kaïmakam of Kerasun and he informed me that he was unable to maintain order with the gendarmes at his disposal. This, I beg to point out, is absolutely incorrect as cases frequently occur of a Christian village retaliating on their Turkish neighbours, and in every case the Turkish authorities are able to send a large force of gendarmes immediately to investigate and in most cases pillage the Christian village.

9. I have the honour to point out the urgent necessity of suppressing piracy. Cases are becoming more and more frequent of armed parties attacking coastal villages and holding up small coastal motor boats, generally with the loss of one or two lives. A typical case of this occurred at the beginning of this month, when a party of six armed Laz held up an Armenian-owned motor boat near Kerasun and demanded to be towed to Ordou. During the journey they asked for drinking water, but as none was in the boat they could not be supplied, so they shot and killed the owner and one passenger.

10. I also beg to point out that these pirates (Laz) do not live in the larger of the coastal towns (those usually visited), but in the small coastal villages, preferably where there is a river. I therefore beg to suggest that these smaller villages be visited, if possible by one of His Majesty's sloops, or similar vessel.

I have, &c.

J. S. PERRING.

Enclosure 2 in No. 181.

Report by Captain Perring on his visit to the Coastal Towns of Unieh, Fatsa, Ordu, Kerasun, Trebizond, Rize, and Batoum.

UNIEH.

October 13, 1919.

KAÏMAKAM: Mahmoud Djelaïedine (arrived one month ago).

A very great improvement has taken place both in the town itself and in the district. All report that, with the exception of the incident reported in my No. 240, dated the 8th August, and which has now been amicably settled, no complaints are made by the Greeks or Armenians; both communities express satisfaction with the kaïmakam, and hope that the present state of affairs may continue. At the request of the kaïmakam, I wrote to the chief of the Armenian community at Keuklick, telling them that, provided they took no further aggressive measures, the incident referred to in my No. 240 was closed, and I requested them to use every means to avoid further friction. In return for this letter, the kaïmakam has sent a representative to investigate property questions in this neighbourhood, and to arrange for its return. I also informed the Armenians that unofficial means of obtaining the return of property must cease, and all claims for the future were to be made through the appointed official.

All property in the town has now been returned.

FATSA.

No new kaïmakam has been appointed, and Hamid Bey is now holding an enquiry into the actions of the late sub-Governor.

Hamid Bey is staying here to settle the many disputes and to clear the district of brigands; he informed me that he intended to remain twenty days, visiting all the villages. He has already arrested eight of the principal criminals (Turks) and destroyed their organisation, for which he is using troops sent from Samsoun.

No further trouble or complaints should be received from this district, and Hamid Bey has displayed not only great energy but great firmness in dealing with this previously very troublesome district. Several bands of robbers have been completely exterminated.

There are two small villages within 5 miles of Fatsa that are the cause of numerous incidents, and, as these are in the vilayet of Trebizond, Hamid Bey is unable to deal with them. He suggested that these villages be transferred to the sanjak of Djanik; at present they are uncontrolled. Laz land near these villages, and, he states, use them as bases for raiding along the coast.

ORDU.

October 15, 1919.

Kaïmakam: Ali Bey, appointed 27th May, 1919.

Police, 6.

Gendarmes, 133.

Population: town, 14,066; villages, 311; total population, 125,792.

Recruiting is very active here, and the recruiting office was found to be packed. The officer in charge informed me that these were lately arrested deserters, but I am informed that this is incorrect, and that many men have already been sent for training at Sivas and towns in the interior.

In the town itself security is moderate. Nobody, however, dares to venture outside his house after dusk. Outside the town no security exists for the Christian either day or night; murders are very frequent, and the local doctor informed me that every day he dressed several wounded.

The Greeks were deported, and lost heavily owing to the brutality of Kazim Bey, Havalî commandant (now at Congress at Sivas), who was responsible not only for their deportation but also for carrying it out; he is responsible for the death of several thousand, both Greek and Armenian.

No property is being returned, and the Turks control the entire nut trade owing to the Christian being unable to harvest any of the crop.

The Armenian community has almost ceased to exist, and the remainder are only waiting means of transportation to leave the country.

The Laz are very active in this area, and are continuously raiding the coast.

KERASUN.

October 16-17, 1919.

Kaïmakam: Badé Nadim Bey (appointed 8th October).

Population: town, 13,285; villages, 155; total population, 117,895.

Police, 8.

Gendarmes, 178.

Osman Agha rules the whole district and gives orders to the Governor and other officials. Apart from the security he can offer, as the chief of the whole brigands organisation of the district, none exists, especially in the villages, where Osman Agha and his followers are absolute despots. He is openly anti-Christian and is determined not to allow them to re-establish themselves in the interior. The Vali of Trebizond frankly admits his being unable to control the situation here with the forces at his disposal (even if inclined to do so).

The Greeks were deported to Sivas district, and lost a large number of their community; they were ordered to return to their homes, but were not allowed to do so, and were continuously being driven from district to district for the whole period of the war.

The Armenian community has almost disappeared, and the few remaining alive are waiting the first opportunity to leave the country.

Laz are very active, and walk about openly heavily armed.

There is no possibility of re-establishing security in this district without the use of military force. The Turks are not only anti-Christian, but openly antagonistic to any interference, and frankly state that if the *Entente* intend to interfere in their affairs, they will have to use force.

Mehmed Nouri, chief of the port and a Turkish naval officer, was not only frankly antagonistic in his attitude, but informed me that if I wished to take prisoners from the local prison I should have to use force to do so, and clearly gave me to understand that opposition would be offered.

The whole Turkish community live on the proceeds of their robberies and the proceeds of the sale of Christian goods stolen during the deportations, and, unless made by force to return property, they are determined not to allow any returns to be made.

TREBIZOND.

October 19 and 20, 1919

I called on the Vali, who had just returned from Erzeroum. He informed me he was in complete agreement with Moustafa Kemal Pasha, and that the Nationalist movement was the only means of Turkey obtaining any form of representative government, and that the movement would greatly strengthen their delegation when eventually they were called to Paris.

He openly expressed his dislike of the Greek, and stated that no hope of quiet or peace could be expected while they remained in occupation of Smyrna or any part of the Turkish Empire.

He admitted his being unable to guarantee security in his vilayet owing to lack of gendarmes or military force.

I called on Captain Crawford (British control officer) and the French and American representatives.

The Greeks informed me that no complaints could be made of lack of security in the town, but that they were unable to travel even two or three hours' journey into the interior.

The Armenian community, although very small, is very well organised; their orphanage and relief works are very successful.

No property questions have been investigated, and the Armenians informed me that as many as 800 houses are still in Turkish hands.

RIZÉ.

The mutessarif was stated to be ill, and apparently all officials were suddenly taken ill on the approach of H.M.S. "Gardenia." I was therefore only able to see a Government clerk and a police officer, neither of whom could give any reliable information. I was informed that there are only five Christians in the town itself, all of whom, they informed me, were absent for business purposes.

I was informed that no security exists, and that the whole community are largely interested in motor-boat traffic with Russian Caucasian ports and in organising piracy along the Anatolian coast.

BATOUM.

I called on the Military Governor (General Coles-Collis), who informed me that he had issued orders that no further parties of refugees were to be allowed to land, and that General Denikin had issued orders that all refugees landing at Novorissisk were to carry out their military service in the Volunteer Army. He also informed me that he was feeding over 7,000 Armenian refugees daily.

He complained that a large smuggling of arms was taking place, and that these arms were coming from Black Sea Turkish ports. I informed him that Rizé was notoriously the centre of this traffic.

I called on the British consul-general and the principal British trading firms established at Batoum.

[159836]

No. 182.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 9.)

Sir,

War Office, December 8, 1919.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to forward, for the information of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, copies of telegram dated the 29th November, which has been received from Lord Allenby, with reference to his conversations with General Gouraud at Beirut on the 27th November.

I am to draw particular attention to paragraph 3 of this telegram regarding the northern boundary of Palestine, and am to say that the Council have not the least doubt that General Gouraud will eventually claim to occupy the country down to the southern boundary of the blue area, which is, as Lord Curzon is aware, south of the northern border of the administrative area known as "O.E.T.A. south," which Lord Allenby desires to establish as a temporary line between his own troops and those of General Gouraud.

I am to say that the Council agree with Lord Allenby in thinking that a definite understanding on this question should be arrived at between His Majesty's and the French Governments. For, although it may be considered that this is a purely military arrangement which should be made between the local commanders on the spot, I am to point out that, as is shown in Lord Allenby's telegram of the 27th November, General Gouraud acts under the orders of his own Government in these matters, and will doubtless quote such orders on the subject to Lord Allenby when the time comes. Lord Curzon will remember that it was not until orders were sent by the French Government that General Gouraud would consent to any delay in penetrating into the Bekaa.

The Army Council, therefore, consider that much time, correspondence, and friction may probably be avoided if the French Government is officially approached at once on this matter, and I am to ask that Lord Curzon will take the necessary steps as early as convenient.

In the meantime the Council are despatching the attached telegram to Lord Allenby.

I am, &c.

B. B. CUBITT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 182.

Mr. Churchill to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR E.A. No. 2894, dated 29th November, paragraph 3.

Foreign Office have been asked to obtain necessary understanding with French Government.

Enclosure 2 in No. 182.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Mr. Churchill.

(Telegraphic.)

CONTINUATION of my E.A. No. 2892.

1. After General Gouraud had informed me he was determined to proceed with the occupation of the Bekaa, we agreed to send Colonel Walters Taylor and a French [?] staff officer to Damascus to announce the decision to the Arab authorities, and that General Gouraud did not intend to interfere with Arab administration, and would permit Arab troops to remain in Bekaa under certain conditions. I sent a personal message in code to Emir that General Gouraud's decision had my full approval, and that I trusted the Arabs to maintain the same relations with French troops as they had with mine.

2. I think that the Arabs may possibly allow French troops to relieve ours peacefully, but sooner or later I think a conflict will occur between the French and Arabs. Though Gouraud himself is anxious to be on good terms with Arabs, it is my impression that he will have difficulty in resisting political pressure from that party of French opinion which is frankly hostile to the Arabs, and would be glad of any pretext to occupy Damascus and the interior.

3. I discussed the northern boundary of Palestine with Gouraud, and informed him that I intended to occupy northern boundary of O.E.T.A. south as the dividing line between our area at present without prejudice to future arrangements. I understood him to agree to this, but am not sure he may not later put forward the original Sykes-Picot line as the line given to him by his Government. Under Sykes-Picot line Safed would be claimed by French. Therefore I consider it important that His Majesty's Government should come to a definite understanding with the French Government that the northern boundary of O.E.T.A. south is to be boundary during present period.

4. I returned to Cairo to-day.

[1356]

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[160263]

No. 183.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 10.)

(No. 2213. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 27, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information Intelligence Summary No. 14, issued by Advance Headquarters at Smyrna, which I have received from my representative there.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 183.

Operations and Intelligence Summary No. 14.—Northern Asia Minor.

(Period November 13-19, 1919, inclusive.)

General.

(Secret.)

APART from the unauthorised forward movement of the Archipelago Division at the end of October, no further move forward of the Greek forces has yet been reported to have taken place. This delay is probably due to the fact that on the 13th November Greek Headquarters were presented by these Headquarters with a map on which was marked the exact line which they should occupy in accordance with the decision of the Peace Conference. This definite line differed in several important details from the liberal interpretation of the line which had been prepared and issued by Greek Headquarters to their divisions for the purpose of carrying out the operation. In consequence of the receipt of these orders, Greek Headquarters modified their original orders and substituted an order, dated the 16th November, which was in conformity with these instructions.

2. The only portion of the national forces which has given any indication of its future attitude in view of the present provisional settlement of the limits of the Greek zone is the command of Demirdji Mehmet, "Commander of the National Forces of Aidin and Mughla." He has sent threatening telegrams to General Nider, and has also replied to General Milne's instructions to the Ottoman Government that they should withdraw the Ottoman regular and irregular forces to a distance of 3,000 metres from the line of demarcation by a refusal to withdraw, since that would expose yet more of the Moslem population to the "tyranny and cruelty of the Greeks." In other areas on the Greek front the national forces have taken no action except for a slight skirmish on the front of the Archipelago Division.

3. Within the Greek area conditions are apparently critical in the Odemish district, where the numerous bands in the Massifs north and south of the Odemish valley are rapidly becoming a scourge to the whole countryside. No further attempts have been made by them to interrupt railway communication, but it is reported by the British Intelligence Officer that their depredations and outrages have alienated not only the Christian but also the Turkish population, which suffers not only from them but also from the repressive measures taken by the Greek authorities against Turks who are rightly or wrongly supposed to be in league with them. The Greek 1st and 2nd Divisions are undertaking an operation, beginning on the 23rd November, in order to clear up the district between Ayasuluk and Tireh.

4. The Vali of Aidin has protested again against undue Greek interference with the rights of the Moslem civil administration, particularly in the case of the enquiry into the murder of two Turkish women on the banks of the Gediz Chai (see "Weekly Summary" No. 6, paragraph 30), where the Ottoman gendarmes and civil authorities were prevented by the Greeks from conducting the enquiry; and also concerning the wholesale imprisonment and deportation to Greece of some Turks from the Odemish area. In the latter instance, whatever may be the merits of the individual cases of arrests, it would appear to be a reasonable military precaution to endeavour to prevent assistance being rendered to the bands within the Greek area, but the judicial procedure after arrest and subsequent deportations would appear to provide justifiable reasons for the Vali's protest.

Greek Dispositions and Activities.

Dispositions and Movements of Troops.

5. Instructions have been issued from Greek Headquarters to all divisions for the occupation of the new line authorised by the Peace Conference from the sea to Bademba, inclusive, copies of a tracing sent by British Advanced Headquarters showing the new line being attached. Up to date, however, no official intimation has been received of any further occupation since the unauthorised move in the Pergama area mentioned in Summary No. 12.

6. Greek Headquarters have been informed that south of Bademba, i.e., on the Geure-Omerli front, no change in their present line is to be made.

7. The only local change occurring during the week has been the move of one battalion, 1st Regiment from Aidin to Tireh, which took place on the 11th and 12th instant.

8. The strength of the Greek army in Asia Minor, according to a statement issued on the 12th November, is as follows:—

	Officers.	O.R.'s.
Fighting services	1,240	55,493
Divisional troops	467	9,242
Corps troops	396	8,026
	2,103	72,761

of whom 5,947 are in hospital, as compared with 6,289 shown in the return of the 2nd November.

Activities.

9. There has been little activity on any front during the last week. The only incident worthy of note reported during the week was an encounter which took place on the 12th November between a body of Greek troops on the march from Aidin to Tireh and a band of some 120 irregulars. The engagement lasted an hour and a half, after which the irregulars were dispersed. Greek losses were nine killed and twenty wounded, two of the latter being officers.

10. Other small encounters have occurred, but nothing of importance. The Greeks appear to make full use of their extended powers, and in the more disturbed areas, such as Aidin and Odemish, make sure of nipping any incipient trouble in the bud by a free use of artillery against anything in the nature of a concentration opposite their front.

11. An expedition has also been planned for next week for clearing the area between Tireh and Ayasuluk.

12. A force composed of one company infantry with two machine-guns from the 2nd Division at Tireh and one company infantry from the 8th Cretan Regiment, with one mountain gun from the 1st Division at Ayasuluk, will concentrate at the latter place, the 2nd divisional contingent moving by rail from Tireh. This force has orders to start from Ayasuluk on the 23rd November.

13. The bands against whom this operation is intended are believed to number some 100 or 150, and inhabit the villages of Ebekler, Bousalan, Biyuk Mahalle, Kutchuk Mahalle, Biyuk Kadifa, Kutchuk Kadifa. The expedition is expected to reach Tireh in four days. On completion, the 1st divisional troops will return by rail to Ayasuluk.

Italian Dispositions and Activities.

14. No changes reported during this week.

Italo-Greek Relations.

15. The argument about the village of Kopler (*vide* "Weekly Summary" No. 13, paragraph 12) still continues, but it cannot have any practical value, since the line of demarcation is clear, i.e., the bed of the Mushluk Dere.

[1356]

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Delimitation of Greek Zone.

16. General Nider was informed on the 15th November that the Supreme Council had decided that the Aidin area, which was to have been occupied by Allied troops, British, French, and Greek, is to remain under Greek control as at present. Brigadier-General F. S. Montague Bates, who was ordered to return to Constantinople, left Smyrna with the 83rd Brigade Headquarters on the morning of the 20th November.

Boundary Line between Greek and Italian Zones.

17. The Italian military representative having, on the 6th November, asked the question whether the Boundary Commission (Colonels Bergera and Condos) might continue the work of fixing the remainder of the boundary, i.e., from mile 51½ on the Aidin railway to the sea, without waiting for the Supreme Council's decision as to reading of the original instructions, the question was referred to General Headquarters. The reply that no further action would be taken by the British was communicated to him and to General Nider on the 13th and 14th November respectively. General Nider expressed his intention of asking his Government for instructions as to his future action in the matter.

Turkish Regular Forces.

18. Intelligence Officer, Pergama, reports that there are 500 men and 25 officers of the 61st Division at Balikesri. According to papers captured by the Greeks in their recent advance, the total number of regulars in the Soma area is 284 men and 12 officers, also a battalion whose strength is not known. There are two 10.5 cm. mountain guns. No change is reported in the numbers in the Karagach district.

Situation in Western Anatolia.

Eastern Portion of the Italian Area.

19. The Chief British liaison officer, Rhodes, has visited Adalia and reports that the Italians do not realise the seriousness of the political situation. They fail to recognise that they enjoy only a transitory popularity and that their prestige with the Turks is almost a fiction. Moreover, it suffers seriously at the hands of their officers in the advanced posts, who are both ignorant and unsuitable. These officers and their men live with the natives under conditions which would never be tolerated by the British.

20. The Nationalist forces could at any time compel the Italians to withdraw to their bases, and Italian Headquarters recognise this possibility. Up to the present, however, they are stated to have drawn up no plans for a withdrawal, nor have they taken any definite measures.

21. They consider that the zone which comes under their interests includes the vilayet of Aidin (less the sanjak of Smyrna), the vilayet of Konia, plus the sanjak of Adalia, and possibly the sanjak of Sichan Ova (Afion Kara Hissar). If they obtain the mandate for this region they intend to develop the country economically, substituting a reformed gendarmerie for their military occupation.

22. The population in the remote districts is not enlisting in or subscribing for the national army with any great enthusiasm. Moreover, it is to be doubted whether the elections will reflect the people's wishes at all, as armed national forces supervise the polling. Meanwhile recruiting continues by force.

23. Little information was volunteered to Colonel Haskard by the Italians. A certain amount was obtainable by questioning, but it is evident that either their intelligence work is very bad or they have orders to give as little information as possible.

24. The Italians are introducing a new uniform for their troops in Anatolia, consisting of a coat with an open collar, knickerbockers, and gaiters. This uniform will be issued very gradually, and probably not until the cold weather is over.

25. Conte Senni, late Commissioner and Consul-General in Smyrna, has returned to Rhodes, after a short visit to Italy, and taken up the post of Chief Political Officer to the Eastern Mediterranean Command, with headquarters at Rhodes.

South of the Ottoman Railway.

26. The British liaison officer, Scalanova, reports on Turkish authority that in the Kocharli area the Italian cavalry are enlisting natives as militia and clothing them in Italian uniform, and states that so far 500 have been recruited. This story is accepted with the greatest reserve, and further information has been asked for.

27. On the 8th November a Greek was murdered in broad daylight outside Sokia. The murderer was captured on the 10th November and was to be hanged the next day. He is said to be a Cretan Turk.

28. The Turkish refugees in the Kocharli area (see "Summary" No. 13, paragraph 17) are under the charge of Mehmet Bey, who has done a great deal of good. A small hospital has been set up, they have doctors, and he has built huts for those that he could not house. They require clothing, blankets, and medicine, however, and will need seed-corn and farm animals if they return to their villages. Most of them are from villages that have been burnt between the Italian and Greek lines, and it is now too late in the year to build mud houses.

29. The Greeks have put out of action two ferries between the Meander bridge and above Kemer. The ferry opposite Kemer is still working.

30. On the 17th November Naval Chaplain Embling, Shefik Bey, and the "Corps Commander" (presumably General Officer Commanding XIIth Turkish Army Corps from Konia) travelled together for some distance on the Girova-Aidin road. The Turks were going to Kocharli. The Corps Commander stated that the Turks would await a Greek attack rather than attack themselves.

Ottoman Railway Area.

31. Rumours of an impending British occupation spread rapidly in Aidin and, appearing to be derived from a good source, caused many of the inhabitants, who are now, of course, largely Greeks, to apply for permission to leave on the ground that the Turks were coming back also. These inhabitants are beginning to leave, taking with them not only their own household goods but quantities of effects from the general depot of goods belonging to absent owners, and it is almost certain that this pillaging goes entirely unchecked by the competent authority.

32. Information from local sources states that in the Tourbali district recruiting is still carried on at night by unknown persons, and 250 men are said to have been collected so far. An influential Turkish farmer of this district is reported to have said that, if the irregulars persisted in their present attitude, he would be obliged to quit his farm and go to Smyrna.

33. Tireh has recently been visited by Intelligence Officer, Odemish, who states that the situation there is very similar to that at Odemish, though Colonel Condos, the Greek Commander, does not rule with quite the iron hand of Colonel Gargalides at Odemish, and fewer arrests have been made. The same complaints, however, are made of the system of passes adopted and the consequent difficulties in the way of circulating about the country. The Turks admitted that the bands, though at first anti-Greek, have now become the terror of the district, and, owing to shortage of supplies, attack the population indiscriminately. The villagers, in consequence, dare not go out into their fields to work; moreover, there is shortage of seed.

34. In the Odemish district, especially north of the town, the bands are very active indeed, and, according to the intelligence officer, constitute a serious menace to Greek troops, who have lost twenty-five men killed and four officers and thirty men wounded in less than three weeks, without apparently having been able to inflict anything like the same losses on the bands.

35. The consequence of these losses has been the severe repressive measures mentioned in recent summaries and numerous arrests. It is stated that from Odemish alone 400 Turks have been deported since the Greek occupation; 60 lie in prison there at the moment, awaiting trial on a charge of being in touch with the bands. Moreover, a system of passports has been introduced whereby it is necessary for every villager, after going to or coming from any place occupied by Greek troops, to have a passport. As these passports have to be viséd on each occasion, hours and sometimes days of detention result for people who can ill spare them. The practical outcome of this is that the peasants refuse to bring their produce into places occupied by the Greeks and to work in their fields, so that the economic life of the country is being ruined.

36. Greek Headquarters reports that the "Turkish armies under a General" are expected at Bozdagh for an attack on Odemish in the near future.

S.C.P. Railway Area.

37. In connection with restrictions on imports into the Greek zone from the Afion Kara Hissar direction (see "Summary" No. 12, paragraph 37), it is interesting to note a telegram, a copy of which has been received from Greek Headquarters from Lieutenant-Colonel Delaunay, French Director-General of Railways, Constantinople, to Captain Champigny, Director of the S.C.P. Railway, to the effect that he was not to permit more than ten or at the most fifteen wagon-loads of wheat to be sent to Smyrna per day from the whole of the area between Ahmetli and Afion Kara Hissar. According to a Greek agent, the Kaimakam of Ushak on the 7th November handed the railway inspector a letter in which he demanded the entire cessation of the transport of foodstuffs to the Greek zone.

38. On the 10th November the officer in command of the garrison at Ushak sent a letter to the stationmaster requesting the despatch of two wagons to Kapaklar in order to bring wheat to Alashehir. At Bal-Mahmoud Turkish soldiers are preventing the shipping of foodstuffs. The Mudir of Banaz has received orders from Kutaya for the stationmaster allowing him to despatch all wheat at the time on hand in the station, but forbidding any further transportation of cereals. Similar conditions prevail almost everywhere on the line between Afion Kara Hissar and Sareis.

39. The general situation at Manisa is good, and no incident of any sort has been reported since the murder of two Turkish women on the 16th September (see "Weekly Summary" No. 6, paragraph 30). All races move about the country freely to their work without any molestation whatever. That this is due to General Negropontis there can be little doubt, since previous to his arrival in July things were very unsettled indeed in this district. He has set himself steadfastly to improve the discipline of his troops and gained the confidence of the Turks by straightforward dealing, and has been loyally aided by the Mutessarif in his efforts.

40. He continues, however, to be nervous about his strategic position and seems to fear that, if his reserve troops were withdrawn from Manisa, he might be confronted with a rising in the town. This however, is very unlikely, especially as the Mutessarif would do everything in his power to prevent an outbreak which he was before successful in checking under far more difficult circumstances.

41. The position of the Mutessarif is anomalous, as is that of every Turkish official in the Greek zone, since he has no gendarmerie or police which can enforce his orders and can only deal with routine and purely Turkish matters. The taxes of the district have been sold to a Greek, who is finding difficulty in collecting them from the Greek villagers, who refuse to pay taxes to the Turkish Government or rent to the Turkish landlords, when they think there is no Government to force them to do so.

42. The Greeks complain continually that the S.C.P. lines are used to pass Turkish agents and spies through the lines to and from Panderna and Afion Kara Hissar, and even hint that the French are too intimate with the irregulars on these lines. The same complaints, however, have been made by the Turks, and the true state of the case probably is that the railway affords unhampered passage to both sides.

43. A ferry for artillery and infantry has been constructed for use on the Kum Chai, over which a bridge is also projected at Munteveli.

Soma-Aivali Area.

44. A prisoner taken by the Greeks at Aivali on the 10th November states that the Turks who took part in the attack on Kalem Keui some days previously were specially recruited for it and afterwards disbanded and returned to their villages.

45. Lieutenant-Colonel Kel Ali, in command of the forces at Karagach, left on the 5th November for Constantinople with 100 demobilised Arabs. His place has been taken by Major Reshid Bey.

46. According to a report from Intelligence Officer, Pergama, there are at Balikesri 1,000 irregulars under Naim Bey, ex-Chief of Police at Smyrna. It is rumoured that Ahmet Bey, at the head of the Circassian bands from the Geunen district, has notified the irregulars that they must disband immediately, and that he would secure obedience to his commands by force, if necessary.

47. According to papers captured by the Greeks in their recent advance, there are now nearly 2,000 irregulars in the Soma district. This is not considered an unlikely figure, as the activity of the Greeks in this sector would naturally provoke

an increase in the forces against them, since it makes an appeal to the villager, who is always the first to desert to work his land, but who on seeing his land and family in danger, returns at once to the colours.

Economic Situation in Aidin Vilayet.

48. The spell of cold weather which began a few days ago is showing how acute the economic situation is in almost all districts of the interior. Reports from several areas state that no sowing has yet been done for various reasons. At Manisa, although conditions of security behind the Greek lines are good, the comparative absence of rain so far has prevented sowing, while in Odemish the state of the country precludes any considerable effort to work the land. From Sokia shortage of seeds, added to the condition of public safety, has prevented any useful work being done.

49. The only signs of any practical interest in the economic situation being taken by the Greek Government is the fact that the Commander at Pergama has prepared a list of farmers and cultivators requiring seeds. According to information contained in a wire from the Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople, the Vali of Smyrna has reported this to his Government and impressed on them the necessity of anticipating the provision by the Greeks of seeds for Turkish farmers, owing to the loss in prestige which the Government would inevitably sustain, should it fail to do so.

In general the restriction of imports mentioned in paragraph 37 above, if persisted in, cannot fail eventually seriously to affect the whole question of food supply, especially in Smyrna itself, and a further rise in prices is inevitable.

Issued by General Staff, Advanced British Headquarters,
Smyrna, November 20, 1919

[161752]

No. 184.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 571.)

My Lord,

Cairo, November 22, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1614 of the 21st November, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of the literal translation of the Arabic letter from King Hussein to Emir Feisal which was forwarded to me for transmission.

As I reported in my above-mentioned telegram, I have returned the letter to the British agent, Jeddah, and instructed him to hand it back to the King.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY.

Enclosure in No. 184.

King Hussein to Emir Feisal.

(Literal translation.)

Sir,

Mecca, 5th Safar, 1338 (November 1, 1919).

I CABLED you on the 30th Moharram, 1338, informing you of the receipt of your letter of the 25th September, 1919. I enclose herewith a copy of the same telegram as well as copies of former telegrams for confirmation.* After this and before any discussion I only pray God to be your support and mine.

Sir, as for your enquiry about the date and the ease of conscience which were created by your accusations in the matter of what happened in connection with the conditions of our preliminary agreements with Great Britain, and especially your reminding me of my saying to you when you visited us at Jeddah that they are in my pocket, I do not know, Sir, what to say about this, except to beg you to consider my letter to his Excellency the High Commissioner of the 20th Zil Ki'da, 1336, a copy of which I sent to you and of which you acknowledged the receipt. You will find in it that which will not only acquit us of what you have referred to, but will also show

* Not printed.

something additional in our favour. Thank God I maintain those principles until this day, and will maintain them after this day and until God knows when. Had it not been for strong insistence I would not have sent the date of his Excellency's letter in which he says, "I am pleased to inform you that His Britannic Majesty's Government has approved all your demands." The same hesitation, which is caused by my feelings of aversion to protesting against [? arguing with] Great Britain, also now prevents me from naming the date of another letter of his Excellency's, in which he says, "Great Britain has accepted the Basra tribute, but she desires to postpone fixing the amount to what may be agreed upon." I spoke very frankly in my letter mentioned above (20th Zil Ki'da, 1336). Can it be said after such frankness that I understood our agreements wrongly or that something had happened which necessitated modifying them? And then to say that it is urgent for me to withdraw from the situation and give it up! On that date I receive your remarks on what concerns conscience! Reflect, Sir, on all that is in this, and then accuse me of whatever you please. Supposing, Sir, that there was nothing of that; was it right of Great Britain, after admitting that we have fought with her side by side, when neither France nor Italy could help her, to gratify France by giving her our country and our independence? Therefore, the result is, Sir, that if I encounter an incident (notwithstanding the patience and tolerance promised), and if anything interferes with my decisions, as you have already done more than once, I will withdraw that same moment. Please understand this as you understand the day from night. Moreover, if the Syrians decide to fight for their liberty and independence, I will not hesitate in going over to them to co-operate with them in my capacity as an individual Arab, so that they may know that I did not betray them. God will not guide traitors. This, Sir, is the extent of my intellect. You will excuse me if I do anything which you may think wrong. Deeds are according to intentions. God is Master of all, and He is my Guardian over you.

HUSSEIN.

[161867]

No. 185.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 2249.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, November 28, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of an interesting report received from Captain P. Hadkinson, Relief Officer attached to this High Commission, concerning conditions in the vilayet of Brusa and the sanjak of Balikessir, and to invite your Lordship's special attention to his remarks on the subject of the National Movement.

2. I have instructed Mr. Ryan, of this High Commission, to take an early opportunity of mentioning to his Highness the Grand Vizier the matters of the non-repression of the brigand bands and the disgraceful condition of Brusa prison. This latter is also being brought to the notice of the Director-General of Prisons, and will be looked into personally by Lieutenant Wilson and his French and Italian colleagues during their forthcoming visit to prisons in the interior.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 185.

Captain Hadkinson to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

Constantinople, November 12, 1919.

AFTER a sojourn of two months in the vilayet of Brusa and independent sanjak of Balikessir, during which I visited the principal towns and localities, I beg to report on the situation as follows:—

General Security.

Although the authorities have at last awakened to the fact that the security of the country leaves much to be desired, and notwithstanding that during the last fortnight active measures to suppress brigandage have been adopted, still this latter is on the increase, and every day sees new bands springing up. This state

of affairs cannot but be attributed to the complete apathy of the Brusa court-martial which, up to date, has not condemned nor even commenced the trial of one of the 105 persons arrested so far for brigandage.

I made very strong representations to the Governor-General about this, and pointed out to him that the public execution of a few of these bad characters would have a very salutary effect, and would at least put a stop to the creation of new bands. He not only fell in with my views, but also expressed the hope that our High Commission would take the matter in hand and bring pressure to bear on the military authorities with the object of getting the court-martial to sit, at the same time insisting that not only capital punishment should be meted out to all the leaders, but also to see that the sentences were carried out.

I subsequently called upon the newly-appointed military governor, who informed me that since taking up his duties he had sent a battalion of troops to Yenishehir, another to Gemlek, and a third to Karaja Bey, and as a result brigands were daily being arrested. He further informed me that the court-martial had at last been formed, and that so soon as the President, expected from Constantinople, arrived, it would sit and deal severely with these criminals.

The whole vilayet to-day is in such a state of terror that not only the villagers dare not attend to the work in the fields, but during the night are obliged to keep watch in their homes for fear of an attack. To give an idea of how panic-stricken the inhabitants are, I beg to relate the following incident which happened a few days ago on the Edinjik to Erdek road. Two boys, one holding in his hand a big mud ball, held up a carriage with four male passengers, all armed, whilst threatening to explode it, calling out that it was a bomb; the other rifled the pockets of the passengers and relieved them of all they possessed in the shape of money. Both boys got away with their booty.

The Greek brigand "Kirmani" and his band are still at large, and more fighting has lately again taken place between the Albanians and Circassians at Kirmasti.

The position is such to-day that one may safely say a reign of terror exists right through the whole country. My personal conviction is that whatever the good intentions of the Government may be, these latter are at present unable to cope with the situation.

National Movements.

The Western national movement, which originated with the occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks, Moustafa Kemal's Eastern and Ali Fuad's central movements have now amalgamated, and are spreading all over the country, but not as rapidly as expected by the ringleaders. The movement generally does not meet with much favour, especially in places where heavy sums of money are levied for the maintenance of the militia; on the other hand the people are sick of the war and are not inclined to continue under arms, however well they may be paid. Having had the opportunity of closely watching the proceedings at the late Congress held at Balikessir, and coming into touch with a good many of the leaders, I am to-day more than ever convinced that the Committee of Union and Progress is at the bottom of all this national movement, whatever may be said to the contrary. I have personally satisfied myself that about three-fourths of the leaders I have come across are old Committee of Union and Progress members. I have had this confirmed by an ex-Vali of Brusa, from whom I obtained a good deal of information on the subject, as well as on the situation in general.

There can be no doubt whatever that the stronger this national movement becomes the more difficult will it be to suppress it, and the ultimate pacification of the country will under the circumstances be a very difficult and lengthy matter, for the majority of the men composing the militia forces represent the riff-raff of the country who, it is expected, will resort to brigandage or Bolshevism, the day they will be disbanded.

General Elections.

Are simply a big farce. The urns are being tampered with. From what I have personally seen and officially been informed, the final results are sure to show a big majority of ex-Committee of Union and Progress members. In one town I was assured that, out of about 500 voters, 410 having abstained from voting, the Mayor, an ex-Committee of Union and Progress member, in charge of the urns,

[1356]

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completed the number by inserting an equal number of votes in favour of a member of his party.

Wherever I have passed through it is the same old story, pressure is brought to bear on the Christian element, as well as on the uneducated lower classes, to vote for persons favoured by the local authorities. In Bilejik, the Armenians complained they were threatened with reprisals if they did not vote for a certain Merjimek Zade Ahmed, an ex-Committee of Union and Progress member, accused of murdering about 30 Armenians and helping in the deportations.

The elections, as carried on at present, are a disgrace, and should certainly be put a stop to, or else not recognised by the Allied Powers, for they are far from representing the wishes of the people of this country.

French Propaganda.

Continues very active and openly all over the Brusa vilayet. Commencement of this month a French hospital was inaugurated at Brusa and all the Turkish civil and military authorities were officially invited and attended (I was the only official not invited). Speeches were exchanged, there was much fraternising, and all the Turkish children present were presented with cakes, books, and postcards, these latter commemorating the event. Whilst proceeding from one locality to the other, or visiting towns, I very often came across French officers, who had no official mission, but who I discovered were actively engaged on propaganda work, in some instances under my very nose.

Prisons.

Of all the premises I have so far visited those of Brusa break the record as regards sanitary conditions. The detentive prison, or building in which persons arrested are incarcerated prior to their being tried, is about the vilest it has been given me to set foot in. I found, huddled together, in six averaged-sized rooms 267 men, among which several were suffering from syphilis, in an advanced state, and other contagious diseases. I even came across, lying in a corner and in a putrid and dying state, a man suffering from the former disease.

The atmosphere in the rooms was simply stifling and nauseous, and in one instance I could not stand it, and was obliged to leave the cell before completing my investigations. The Governor-General, to whom I gave a piece of my mind, informed me that several times already he called the attention of his Government to the deplorable conditions of the prisons, but so far did not succeed in obtaining the grant of 10,000*l.* paper money necessary for the completion of the new prison buildings in course of construction, and which will comfortably contain over 2,000 prisoners. On my urgent representations, however, the Governor got the Administrative Council of the province to vote 500*l.* with which four big rooms of the new building can be completed and a good number of the prisoners transferred there.

In view of this very unsatisfactory state of affairs, I beg to suggest that strong representations be made to the competent authorities to complete the new building, for it is a sin to keep human beings, however bad they may be, under such deplorable sanitary conditions.

Work of Commissions.

Owing to the present marked hostility towards the Christians, I have in certain localities considered it advisable to put off restoring property. In Brusa, however, the Armenians took exception, because one of the decisions of the Mixed Commission was not executed, and withdrew their member. I asked the Head Priest, or "Mourahaz," to reappoint him or someone else, but he replied that, in view of the present situation, it was preferable to wait till peace was signed, or at least till such time as matters settled down somewhat. According to the Governor's endorsement in this particular case, it is evident that the Ottoman Government has given the authorities contradictory instructions to what was agreed upon between the High Commission and the Minister of the Interior, concerning the execution of decisions arrived at by the Mixed Commissions.

At Bilejik the Mixed Commission, composed of two Armenian and two Moslems, presided by the Mayor, have looked into and settled, from the 15th April to the 4th October, 1919, one hundred claims. Hundreds of other cases, referring

to the restitution of Armenian houses occupied by Turkish refugees, have been dealt with direct by the local authorities, but the buildings, as usual, have been returned in such a pitiable or dilapidated condition that the majority are uninhabitable; about one-fifth of the Armenians, viz., about 5,000, deported from this town, have returned; the remainder are to be considered as lost.

P. HADKINSON, *Relief Officer.*

[161870]

No. 186.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 15.)

(No. 2252.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 2, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that although the National movement under Mustafa Kemal has overrun the whole of Turkey, it has in certain districts met with determined opposition on the part of the inhabitants. This opposition is local, although almost certainly connected with activities of the Liberal *Entente* and Nighiaban parties in Constantinople, and has shown itself strongest in the Konia vilayet and in the districts between Broussa and the Dardanelles. It is to my mind clear that the Nationalists have at present no strong support in the general population of Anatolia; the movement is not so much "national" as a military-political organisation which, based upon the army, and making use of the elements of the population which come to the front in times of disorder, has dominated the generally docile and law-abiding population of the provinces.

2. As giving a concrete expression to the resentment felt by all Turks alike at the injustice of Smyrna, the movement was in its early days popular. Its main objective, the removal of Damad Ferid's Cabinet, was something definite to be attained. Since that time, except for making the elections, its rôle has been one of passive expectation, and enthusiasm has waned. Forced levies of money on towns and villages have caused much resentment amongst the population, already bled white by the costs of a long war.

3. The opposition movement in the Balikesir-Broussa district is now in its full vigour. It is headed by a certain Circassian, Ahmed Anzavur by name, who bears a good reputation, and was formerly a gendarmerie officer and later Governor of the district of Ismidt. He has gathered a considerable body of adherents round him, and has defeated with loss certain forces sent against him by the local military commanders.

4. The movement in the Konia district has officially been settled. Under Damad Ferid's Government, the Governor-General of the vilayet of Konia was Jemal Bey, an enlightened and capable administrator. He took a strong line against the Nationalists, and having many supporters in his province kept his district loyal after the rest of the country had been overrun by the Nationalists; he returned to Constantinople only when the situation had become hopeless, and the Cabinet was on the point of falling.

5. The procedure adopted by the Nationalists was, as a rule, to send detachments of a small number of men under a few energetic officers to the various local centres; these established their own partisans as rulers, and imprisoned or otherwise disposed of any opponents. They then proceeded to levy contributions for the Nationalist cause.

6. Such a party appears to have entered the Bozgir district (about 50 miles south-west of Konia) early in October. It first demanded a contribution; this being objected to, its members attempted to collect it by force, but met more than their match, and only a few returned to Konia. The Nationalist authorities in Konia sent a further force to subdue the "rebels," but the latter had in the meantime been joined by adherents from the neighbouring villages, and repulsed this attempt, inflicting considerable loss on their assailants and, it is stated, even capturing two machine guns. A third and more considerable force of Nationalist troops, however, then entered the district, and is reported to have burnt two or three villages, the defenders withdrawing into the mountains.

7. Attached is the translation of a petition addressed to the British High Commissioner through the Control Officer, Konia, from the notables of twenty-seven villages in this district.

8. The events at Bozgir attracted a considerable measure of attention at

[1356]

Constantinople, and a mission under General Hurshia Pasha was lately sent to the Konia district by the Government to report on the situation, and bring about some satisfactory arrangement between the opposing forces. This mission has not yet returned, and it is unknown what effect its arrival has produced.

I have, &c.

(For the High Commissioner).
RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure in No. 186.

Translation of a Petition from the Notables of Twenty-seven Villages.

To the British Political Representative, Constantinople, c/o the British Control Officer, Konia.

THE Union and Progress Committee, organised at Bozgir (south-west of Konia, near Soughla Geol) under the title of National Forces, have ordered mobilisation in the district. On this occasion they have attacked by surprise, and sacked the houses of the educated classes, the notabilities, and leading residents, by proclaiming the National Forces.

With the object of obliging the population to recognise the National Forces thus formed, they opened fire with artillery and machine guns on the people of Vaskeh village, in the Siristat district, and thus caused the death of a considerable number of both Moslems and non-Moslems. They have also destroyed by artillery fire and bombs some eight or ten houses in Kayajik, Akhirli, Odan, and Epek villages, together with the human beings, the animals and furniture therein. Owing to the interruption of postal and telegraphic communication we cannot report these atrocities to higher authorities.

Since for the space of a month the tranquillity and peace of the district have been infringed, and the re-establishment of peace appears to be an impossibility; since, also, owing to the Armistice terms, our Government is not sufficiently strong to cope with the Nationalist forces, therefore we beg the assistance of the British Government in doing what is necessary with all possible speed.

We beg you, therefore, Sir, upon receiving this report, to stretch forth your hands in help, in order to save Bozgir from the fire and tyranny of the Nationalist forces.

(Signed by notabilities of following villages):—

Soghounjak Kovanlik, Papoushdji, Hadji Yonouslar, Domlu, Karabair, Houlouslar, Seoyut, Gidret, Bekle, Chat, Yalinizja, Kiraz, Elma, Aghaj, Baybaghin, Fakiler Tebe Ersi, Ekitse, Saristad, Akche Pounar, Akhirli, Geundeckun, Ali Cherchi, Karaja Erd, Farma, Sorkon, Mervesli.

October 28, 1919.

[161872]

No. 187.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 15.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information copy of a report, dated the 15th November, by the Naval Intelligence Officer at Ismid, relative to local opposition to the Nationalist movement, which I have received from the General Staff Officer (Naval).

I have, &c.
(For the High Commissioner).
RICHARD WEBB.

Enclosure in No. 187.

Report on Local Opposition to Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

IN a recent report I stated that there was in this district a counter-movement opposed to Mustapha Kemal and his so-called "National Defence" forces. The leader in that opposition movement was a Major Bekir Bey, who recently collected a force of about 600 armed men in the neighbourhood of Adabazar. There they came into collision with part of Kemal's men. Some shots were fired without doing serious harm to either side, and as Kemal's followers were stronger, those of Bekir Bey dispersed and abandoned their leader, who went into hiding.

The Turkish authorities took immediate steps to crush the new movement and ordered the arrest of Bekir Bey. As he was not to be found, a large reward, I am told, was offered for his capture, but without result.

2. Meantime Bekir Bey succeeded in escaping to Ismid, where he hid in a friend's house. On my return here from hospital a few days ago a message was brought to me to the effect that Bekir wished to see me privately. I made an appointment, and he came to my house late one night, when he talked a great deal about the political situation. The substance of his conversation was to the following effect:—

(1.) He and his followers are supporters of the former Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha, whose aim it is to establish close friendly relations with England. Many Turks, he says, realise that in such friendship lies their only hope of salvation from ruin.

(2.) The so-called National Party under Mustapha Kemal Pasha is merely a recrudescence of the Committee of Union and Progress under a new high-sounding name, and all the leading men in that movement are former prominent Unionists, many of whom have a very black record.

(3.) As the Government had allowed Mustapha Kemal to form his party and gradually acquire such strength, he considers that he should also have been allowed equal freedom in forming his party and supporting his policy even with the aid of an armed force, as in the case of Kemal's organisation. The fact that the Government, while working in harmony with Kemal, has at once sought to crush his (Bekir's) movement is taken by him as clear proof that the Government and the Unionists are really working together and that the former is conniving in the distribution of arms and general opposition to the Allies.

(4.) As Bekir's party was formed expressly for the purpose of cultivating friendship with England, he thinks he ought to be helped in his aims by the British, or at all events protected from persecution by the Government. That help, he suggested, should partly consist in supplying his party with money and arms, as they are all poor, while the Unionists had a large amount of money in their hands. They also had secured the support of most of the newspapers by bribery.

3. Bekir Bey, I understand, has now succeeded in escaping to Constantinople on a goods train.

4. In the course of a conversation with the governor here, I casually referred to Bekir's movement, without, however, informing him of my interview with the latter. The governor said Bekir was a vain and ambitious person, who managed by lies about the pretended support he was receiving not only from the people of Anatolia but from the British Government to succeed in deluding a few stupid people and inducing them to join him, but that as soon as they realised his unreliability they promptly deserted him.

W. GORDON CAMPBELL, Captain, R.M.

November 15, 1919.

[162638]

No. 188.

Mr. Wardrop to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 195.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tiflis, December 10, 1919.

IN conversation 7th December, Azerbaijan Prime Minister told Colonel Stokes that Persian Prince Mirza Riza Kahn had suggested that Azerbaijan should confederate [sic] with Persia and gave impression that His Majesty's Government approved.

Prime Minister asks whether His Majesty's Government authorised or suggested or supported proposal.

He thinks confederation with Georgia and Armenia essential, but had never thought of Persia. He considers it is possible, however, that His Majesty's Government might prefer confederation of the two States.

I have told Colonel Stokes that I presume Prince was merely expressing his personal opinion.

(Addressed to Tehran, No. 7.)

[159836]

No. 189.

Earl Curzon to the Earl of Derby.

(No. 1479.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 17, 1919.

I TRANSMIT herewith for your Excellency's information copy of letter of the 8th December from the War Office on the subject of the boundary between the spheres of British and French military occupation in Palestine and Syria.

2. As your Excellency is aware, the existing boundaries between occupied enemy territory administrations are not identical with the boundaries of the various zones of the agreement of May 1916, which was referred to in the *aide-mémoire* presented by the Prime Minister to M. Clemenceau on the 13th September.

3. In this *aide-mémoire* the Prime Minister proposed that the garrison in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line and the garrisons in Cilicia should be replaced by a French force, and the garrisons at Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo should be replaced by an Arab force.

4. It was, however, stipulated that British troops should remain in Palestine, defined in accordance with its ancient boundaries of Dan to Beersheba, and that until the boundary of Palestine was determined, the British Commander-in-chief should have the right to occupy outposts in accordance with the boundary claimed by the British Government.

5. His Majesty's Government have recently decided to waive their right to remain in occupation of that portion of occupied enemy territory administration east which lies opposite to occupied enemy territory administration south. The reason which prompted His Majesty's Government to modify to this extent the proposals set forth in the Prime Minister's *aide-mémoire* was the imminent danger of a regrettable outburst on the part of the population of Syria, who regarded any alteration in the existing temporary administrative boundaries as an indication of permanent changes of a nature calculated to prejudice the decisions of the Peace Conference.

6. Actuated no doubt by the same motive, the French Government are understood to have also agreed to accede to the request of His Highness Emir Feisal, and to refrain for the present from occupying the districts which lie between the eastern boundary of the blue zone and the existing administrative boundary between occupied enemy territory administrations east and west.

7. The logical corollary to these two concessions to local feeling is that the existing boundary between the spheres of British and French occupation should also remain unaltered, and His Majesty's Government have accordingly decided to withdraw their troops from that portion of occupied enemy territory administration west in which they had hitherto intended to retain them, and to restrict the area of their occupation in Palestine to occupied enemy territory administration south.

8. Your Lordship should take an early opportunity of communicating this decision to the French Government, pointing out that it is a substantial concession as compared with the proposals contained in the Prime Minister's *aide-mémoire*, and expressing the hope that in the light of the considerations outlined in this despatch they will raise no objection, and will inform General Gouraud accordingly. You should make it clear at the same time that this decision has been arrived at by His Majesty's Government without prejudice to the future determination of the northern and eastern boundaries of Palestine, which will require to be examined and readjusted in the final settlement.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[163278]

No. 190.

Colonel Meinertzhagen to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 19.)

(C.P.O. 74.)

My Lord,

*General Headquarters, Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
December 5, 1919.*

WITH reference to your confidential letter of the 23rd October, I have the honour to forward the following remarks:—

There is no direct evidence to show that the Banco di Roma is acting in a manner prejudicial to British interests in occupied enemy territory. There is, however, sufficient indirect evidence to warrant the conclusion that the Banco di Roma is a political agency prompted by the Italian Government, and that it directs its efforts, both commercial and political, against those of Great Britain. There is little doubt in my own mind that these conclusions are correct.

The main points to be considered in basing an opinion are:—

1. In Egypt the bank is known to be at any rate in sympathy with the national movement, and therefore working against Great Britain. It is unlikely that it is guided by a different policy in Palestine.
2. In Palestine the bank is freely making loans on provisional contracts. Such unsound business can only be justified on political grounds.
3. They utilise an active propaganda machinery for commercial penetration in Palestine.
4. The Cairo City Police report on the 31st October of this year that three persons were sent to Syria in September last for political work against Great Britain on behalf of the Italian Government, their object being to stir up Arab feeling against the British administration. Their instructions were received from the manager of the Banco di Roma.
5. The Banco di Roma has clandestinely opened branches in various localities in Syria in spite of instructions forbidding such action.
6. There is a mass of indirect evidence of a less serious nature, which tends to confirm the suspicion that the bank's activities, both political and commercial, are directed against Great Britain, and that the methods they employ are not those customary in a respectable banking establishment.

I have, &c.

R. MEINERTZHAGEN, Colonel,
Chief Political Officer.

[163275]

No. 191.

Colonel Meinertzhagen to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 19.)

(C.P.O. 92.)

My Lord,

*General Headquarters, Egyptian
Expeditionary Force, Cairo, December 2, 1919.*

AT the request of the Chief Political Officer, Bagdad, I have the honour to forward to you a copy of a report No. 37 from the Political Officer at Damascus, dated the 15th October, 1919.

I understand that the Chief Political Officer, Bagdad, in communicating with your Lordship desires to refer in particular to this report.

I have, &c.

(For Chief Political Officer),
W. F. STIRLING,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

Enclosure in No. 191.

Report No. 37.

C.P.O., G.H.Q., Cairo.
(Secret.)

THE political situation in Damascus and Syria generally remains somewhat obscure. There are signs that a considerable section of the people, while disliking the idea of a French mandate as much as ever, are nevertheless becoming resigned to it, and the ardent Nationalist and pro-English party are rather despairing.

Some of the notables are already approaching the French with a view to securing their future should the latter come to the country. Amongst them are Mohamed Fauzi Pasha El Azm, Abdul Rahman Pasha El Yusuf, Sheikhs Mithgal and Mashur-ibn-Faiz, while two of the sheikhs of the Aneyeh, near Aleppo, are also reported to have decided to work for the French.

The Nationalist and anti-French movement, in fact, appears to be rather losing its force, and should the French come in with troops, they would be unlikely, I think, to meet with any organised resistance. There is only one factor which might revive the former widespread feeling against them, and that is religion. With the vast majority of Moslems Arab Nationalism and Islamism are synonymous terms. This is now recognised by the Christian supporters of the Nationalist movement, and they are becoming slightly uneasy as to the possible results of their efforts to inculcate national ideas into the people of the country. It is, and always has been, just as clearly recognised by the prominent Moslem leaders of the movement, including Feisal himself, and the Bagdadi party, and the activities of these are turning more and more towards encouraging the Islamic movement. This movement may not take the form of a definite "Jihad," although given favourable conditions this is by no means impossible, and will certainly be attempted by the leaders of the Bagdadi party and other extreme sections. It will, however, inevitably lead to a rapprochement with the Turks and with Mustafa Kemal. It is safe to say that the majority of the Moslems in Aleppo vilayet, and a very large number in the vilayet of Damascus, are in sympathy with Turkish aspirations, and would prefer union with Turkey to being under an unpopular European Power.

Turkish propaganda is increasing in Aleppo and Damascus. I attach translations of two pamphlets which were recently distributed in Aleppo—one from Mustafa Kemal, setting out his aims, and the other addressed to the people of Syria. Also a report of an agent, a Mesopotamian officer, formerly a member of the league.

2. While the report is possibly exaggerated, and too much reliance cannot be placed on the truth of the statements made about particular people, nevertheless, it is confirmation of talk that has been going on for some time in Damascus. The feeling against the Sherifian family has undoubtedly been growing in strength for some time. They have failed to appeal to the classes, who merely desire security owing to the miserable ineptitude of the Administration, and the encouragement, or at least tolerance, extended to the Bedouin, especially men like Nuri Shalaan. On the other hand, they are not sufficiently extreme for the more ardent Nationalists and the irreconcilable anti-French party.

The reports which reach Damascus of the state of affairs in the Hedjaz have not added to the popularity of Sherifian rule. King Hussein's name carries no weight whatever, and there is no question in Syria of accepting him as Caliph.

The request made by Emir Zeid on the 14th to be allowed to return to Mecca, may mean that he realises that his position is becoming difficult. I can think of no other reason for his wishing to leave Syria. His position and that of Feisal is undoubtedly unenviable, since they are mistrusted and disliked by many of the people, and can hope for no active support from us.

3. Various notables, in conversation with the intelligence officer here, stated that all the lower and middle classes were pro-Turk, and trouble might be expected if all European troops were withdrawn, though they stated there would be no organised massacres of Christians, as all the people of Damascus wished for was peace and security. I think, however, the risk is considerable, in view of the state of feeling in the Lebanon and the Islamic movement now on foot.

4. The situation in Aleppo, as observed in a visit there last week, appears much the same as here, though the Turkish factor predominates there.

5. Large numbers of prisoners of war continue to return. There have recently arrived in Damascus amongst them four officers from the Yemen and eighteen from African Tripoli. These are all trying to get north with the Turks. They are professional soldiers, and the only army which can offer them a career is the Turkish army; it would appear, therefore, that if the release of prisoners continued Mustafa Kemal is not likely to suffer from shortage of officers.

6. The commanders of the three brigades of the Arab Army have recently been changed. The General Officer Commanding Aleppo brigade is now Rushdi Safadi, an Arab officer trained in Germany, and on the staff at Constantinople throughout the entire war. He returned from there about two months ago. The General Officer Commanding Damascus brigade and the post commandant Damascus are both Turks, though domiciled in Damascus. They also returned only a month or two ago. The General Officer Commanding Deraa brigade, an Arab from north of Aleppo, was formerly

military attaché at Vienna, and during the war served entirely on the European fronts. He returned to Syria two months ago. These officers are certainly considerably more efficient than those they have replaced, but their politics will require watching.

7. An incident occurred recently at Kuneitra, which has now been amicably settled. A certain Circassian, a relative of Emir Said-el-Jezairly, managed to obtain some twenty-five to thirty recruits for the gendarmerie in O.E.T. West. The Arabs and Bedouin sought to find in this an excuse for a quarrel with the Circassians, and issued an ultimatum to the Circassians demanding the return of these gendarmes. The Arab Government despatched troops to the spot and ordered the Arabs to abandon their attitude, and I am informed that the matter has now been peacefully settled. An armoured car also visited Kuneitra on the 12th, and produced an excellent impression.

J. N. CLAYTON, Major.

Damascus, October 15, 1919.

APPENDIX 1.

Circular (printed in Turkish).

1. We do not want to have a war with foreigners.
2. We do not want to have a foreign Government in our country.
3. We promise security to the public without distinction in religion.
4. We shall defend the rights of our nation until death, in order to avoid its fall into the hands of the foreigners.
5. We wish to join together the parts which belong to Turkey against Wilson's principles.
6. Let everyone keep to his work and business. Our arm is justice.
7. We shall put to death without mercy everyone who stands against what we have already mentioned, whether he be a Moslem or a Christian.
8. The Moslems who love our Sultan. We have the right to the Caliphate.
9. Our nation have taken up arms for this cause, from east to west, from Erzerum to Smyrna.
10. Those who gave right to 300,000 Armenians did not give right to 16,000,000 Turks. In order to live, and no matter what life is worth, we shall defend our right.

APPENDIX 2.

A Letter to the Syrians (in Turkish).

Respected Brethren,

I speak to you with a beseeching voice, emanating from a heart full of sorrows, caused by the oppression, torment, and treachery of the enemy, and the division between the sons of one religion, which was caused and completed by the evil and wrong doers.

Let us put an end to this misunderstanding, and let us stretch our hands to make peace together and point our arms towards the traitors who wish to tear up Islam, otherwise every repentance will be of no use whatever later.

Do not be cheated by their false promises. You have before you the secret agreements between the enemies of religion. There is not one among you who does not know the principle of Gladstone. Wake up, and do not fall asleep again. We do not intend to take possession of the country of the Moslems, but we wish to save it from those who think that it is a very digestible morsel, and those are the enemies of Islam. The victorious Unitarians (Mowahedeen) will attack their enemies who exceed them in number, depending on the divine care and orders.

Konia and Khadawandikar are now connected, and by the liberation of Konia the communication between the Allies from the East have been cut. Our Mujahedin will very soon be the guests of their Arab brothers, and by their union they will conquer and destroy their enemies. Long live our brothers in religion, and may the enemy be conquered!

APPENDIX 3.

Report on Mesopotamian League.

The league is definitely divided into the extremist section, which is a large majority, and the moderate section, led by Kaimakam Subhi Bey Halim, Rais Mahkamat-il-Tanis, Damascus, Bimb Saddar-id-Din Mamu, and Kaimakam Ismail Hakki, Director of Technical Services, Arab army.

The latter have a small following, possibly numbering about thirty officers, and too much importance should not be attached to the movement, as in case of trouble the members might be expected to throw in their lot with the extremists.

At a recent meeting arranged with Miss G. Bell, a political officer from Mesopotamia, passing through Syria, the above leaders of the Moderate Party stated they were willing to accept a British mandate for Mesopotamia, but asked for a measure of self-government by the people. A great deal of time was taken up in talking of the faults of the present Administration, and no very clear suggestions as to the policy desired were put forward. It was fairly apparent that the first requirement of the Moderate Party would be employment for themselves in the new Government.

It is reported that there is now complete understanding between the various Syrian and Mesopotamian societies in this country. These include the Ahad-el-Iraqi, the Ittihad-is-Suri, the Committee of National Defence (Lijnat-id-Difaa-el-Watani), the Syrian Conference (Mu'temmar-is-Suri). The Arab Club is the stronghold of the Palestinians, and is practically controlled by them, and there is stated to be a particularly close union between them and the Iraqis.

Meetings at Damascus.

Apparently the league has called for a conference, and the following leaders are now in Damascus:—

Jaffar Pasha El Askari, Military Governor of Aleppo;
Rushdi Bey Safadi, Divisional Commander, Aleppo;
Rashid Bey El Madfai, Military Governor of Amman;

in addition to Yasin Pasha and Maulud Pasha, the latter acting as adviser to Emir Zeid.

Private meetings between these members of the league are taking place daily, and whether by intention or accident at this moment, the proclamation by Mustafa Pasha Kemal, calling on the Syrians to receive his army as friends and to assist him to drive out the Allied troops from Syria, has been issued simultaneously in Aleppo and Damascus.

It is reported that the object of the present conference is the perfecting of plans for a general rising over the whole of Arabistan, in conjunction with any move made by the army under Mustafa Pasha Kemal. The movement is definitely anti-European, and is directed equally against the British and French. A most important point is that, while the whole plan is Pan-Islamic, and the essence of it is religion, it is strongly anti-Sherifian, and should it materialise the Sherifian family will be denounced as traitors to Islam and will be thrown off. In the latter event the Emire Feisal and Zeid can look for practically no support whatever, either in Syria or in the Hedjaz.

No doubt it is suspected that Feisal will accept an arrangement favourable to the French, and public opinion has veered so strongly in favour of the Turks that he will be accused, not only of selling Syria to the French, but also of having betrayed Islam to the British by siding against Turkey during the war.

On the other hand, there are many of the upper classes in Syria who are secretly approaching, or preparing to approach, the French with a view to gaining their favour. There is also a large body of the middle and lower classes who wish only to settle down under a strong Government and to carry on trade or agriculture, and do not want any more war.

At the same time the position is that a strong and determined body of men, who absolutely control the army, and probably the gendarmerie, is preparing to declare a holy war should circumstances permit.

No. 192.

[163681]

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 2271.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 4, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum by Mr. Ryan recording a conversation with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 19th November.

2. Mr. Ryan engaged in this conversation with a definite object, the nature of which is explained in paragraph 8 of his memorandum, and conducted it on lines which had my previous general approval.

3. It seemed to me the more timely to state frankly the position of His Majesty's Government in regard to the Kurdish question, as there is a considerable tendency in certain circles here to represent His Majesty's Government as being implacably hostile to the national movement, and as wishing actively to support any elements in the country similarly hostile to it.

4. These elements include in the minds of those who imagine His Majesty's Government to be at work on a deep laid intrigue, both the political opponents of the present Government and the Kurdish separatists, whom events have driven into a kind of conjunction.

5. However much I may mistrust the general trend and ultimate objects of the national movement, I have most carefully refrained from any action calculated to identify this High Commission with political opposition to it, or to embarrass the present Government, whose avowed policy is to conciliate without completely surrendering to its organisers.

6. I have been at pains to make this attitude of non-interference in current Turkish politics, and of reserve in regard to the question of the future of Kurdistan, clear to local political circles of every complexion, as well as to my French colleague, who is told of my supposed anti-nationalist activities just as persistently as I am assured that the French are backing the national movement with all their force.

7. The conversation recorded in the enclosed memorandum constitutes one of my efforts to represent matters in a truer light.

8. I venture to draw your Lordship's particular attention to the last three paragraphs of the memorandum, which deal with a matter of more general interest than that of Kurdistan. The delay in dealing with the question of peace with Turkey is a source of daily increasing preoccupation among Turks. The Government feel that the internal situation cannot much longer stand the strain on it, and no opportunity is lost by Turkish Ministers of urging that a solution should be arrived at.

9. Even the organisers of the national movement, who have hitherto gained most by the delay, are, it is said, beginning to be worried by the delay, lest one result of it should be to make it impossible to keep their movement going much longer. This last fact need not of itself trouble us particularly, if a weakening of the national movement necessarily meant the strengthening of a Central Government disposed to bow to the decisions of the Peace Conference. Unfortunately, such a weakening is more likely to mean an increase of pure brigandage, already most dangerously prevalent, and to conduce to the creation of a situation of utter chaos in Asia Minor.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 192.

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.

I HAD a long conversation on the 19th November with the Minister for Foreign Affairs which presented certain points of interest.

2. After speaking of certain current affairs, I told Reshid Pasha that I wished to tell him something regarding our attitude towards the Kurds, as to which there had been some misunderstanding since Major Noel's visit to Malatia. I had intended to give him this explanation when taking exception to an attempt to arrest the Secretary of a Kurdish club, but as he was in hurry to get away that day I had postponed it.

3. Soon after the armistice, I said, the High Commissioner had been approached by all sorts of groups, among them the Kurdish club. Our Government had directed

[1356]

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us to discourage the sending of numerous delegations to Paris and London, but to undertake to transmit any written statements of aims and aspirations. We had followed that rule with everyone. At the same time we had maintained, equally with everyone, an attitude of complete reserve as to what they had to expect in the future.

4. We had, I said, been not less reserved with the Kurds than with other groups. Our view was that they undoubtedly constituted a separate nationality, whether they wished to link their futures with those of the Turks or to part company with them; and that, now that the future of peoples were being settled, they had the same right as other nationalities to express aspirations. As for the probable fate of their aspirations the High Commission knew nothing, and, so far as I know, His Majesty's Government had not themselves formed any final judgment.

5. I said it was true that the Kurdish question was of great interest to His Majesty's Government and was the object of close study. We were interested in it in the present, because the Kurds were an important element on both sides of our military frontier north of Bagdad, and one of the most important, if not the most important, just beyond the territory occupied by us until a few days ago in Syria. We should have a permanent interest in the Kurds in the future also, because, whatever else happened, we had a future in Mesopotamia, in the northern portion of which pure Arab gradually merged into pure Kurd.

6. Major Noel had been sent on a mission of enquiry in certain areas largely inhabited by Kurds. He had made a short preliminary tour, then visited Constantinople, then started on a more extended tour of which the Turkish Government was apprised, and for which they had given him recommendations to provincial authorities. This brought him to Malatia, and by a most unfortunate coincidence he got there at the same time as Ghalib Bey. The Turkish Officer Commanding Diarbekr, who had thrown in his lot with the national movement, ordered the arrest of the Bedrhans, and even of Major Noel himself. Major Noel saw in this something different from the reception which he had been led to expect when the Central Government gave him recommendations, and in all good faith he telegraphed to us to protest. Sivas placed its own interpretation on all this, and leaped to the conclusion that there was some hideous partitioning compact between Ferid Pasha, who wanted to quell the nationalists, and perfidious Albion, which wanted to create a Kurdistan.

7. This idea, I said, was moonshine. Major Noel was a specialist in Kurds, and like other specialists, he had personal sympathies with the people he knew all about. His mission has been, however, as I had already said, one of enquiry, not of propaganda. He had express instructions to be impartial, and had sought to be impartial. The only reason why His Majesty's Government had encouraged the Bedrhans to accompany him was the hope that their influence could be used to promote peace and quietness in a troubled region during the transition period. The project of using such influences in that way had been frequently discussed with Ferid Pasha. The Bedrhans themselves had been told distinctly that that was the only purpose for which His Majesty's Government favoured their going to Kurdistan.

8. My object in making this statement was to make it clear that any action taken by us from time to time on behalf of individual Kurds was not to be taken as meaning that we were running Kurds, either as nationalists or as possible elements in a combine against the present Government or the national movement; also to counteract to some extent the sedulous efforts which are being made to work up feeling against His Majesty's Government by attributing to them as an already settled thing a policy of complete dismemberment of Turkey. I was careful to avoid saying anything which might suggest that His Majesty's Government would decide against Kurdish separatist aspirations, and I distinguished clearly between the present and the future.

9. The Minister said it was true that our attitude has been misrepresented. He thanked me for the information I had given him, and said it would be very useful. He went on to ask me whether we considered the Kurds, who put themselves forward here to voice Kurdish aspirations, as being really representative. I said that this brought us to personalities, and that while what I had hitherto said was a statement of our attitude which he could use as he chose, I could only answer his present question personally and confidentially.

10. Our practice was, I said, to listen to anyone who seemed to represent any serious element of national opinion. We did not, as in a law court, ask people to produce powers of attorney before hearing them. We sized them up and formed our own opinion of their seriousness and representative character. In the case of the Kurds it was a matter of infinite difficulty to appraise the claims of leading personages to stand for the whole of Kurdistan, and my own feeling was that the bulk of the Kurds

were on too mediæval a plane of thought and custom to make it possible to apply modern democratic criteria. I was, however, satisfied that the Kurdish club came within my own definition of people entitled to a hearing, i.e., they were serious and did stand for important elements of the Kurdish race.

11. The Minister said he had asked the question because he had reason to believe that these people did not represent the bulk of Kurdish opinion. I said that if that were so, any other people who did represent it would also be accorded a hearing.

12. Reshid Pasha then said that he was going to ask an indiscreet question. What was the real reason for leaving the Turkish question in abeyance? The opinion was gaining ground, he explained—he would not say in Government circles, but in Turkish circles generally—that the Allies were deferring a settlement of set purpose in order that Turkey might be ruined completely, materially and morally. I said that I was sure that, whatever the reason for the delay, it was not that. So far as I knew, it was due simply to the difficulty of the problem. It was desired to provide a special régime for Armenia and some sort of a régime for Turkey proper, i.e., Asia Minor and Constantinople, which would harmonise all interests. The Conference had looked much to the United States and the attitude of the United States had so far been rather disappointing. The difficulty of finding satisfactory solutions in these circumstances was the genuine explanation of the delay.

13. Reshid Pasha then said that speaking as one private person to another, he would tell me that the English attitude had been a mistaken one from the beginning of the armistice. We had had the sympathy of every element in Turkey and we had done nothing to stimulate it. I said I knew that the sentiments of the major portion of the country were pro-English. If we had lost opportunities thereby, as we had, it was because His Majesty's Government were perfectly determined not to be parted from their Allies. We had subordinated our own particular interests to that principle.

14. Reshid Pasha asked why it was not possible to discuss the future of the country in an informal way with Turkish statesmen, who after all had governed the various elements for centuries and knew them as no one else could. To his remark that the Turks had governed the country for centuries, I could not resist exclaiming, "Mais vous l'avez fait si mal!" and adding that, though I was always talking to him about Greeks and Armenians, I pitied the governed Turks just as much. He admitted the justice of this *boutade*, which brought the interesting portion of the conversation to an end. The Minister went off into a long account of conversations with Colonel Seely in London towards the end of 1912, in which he foretold with approximate accuracy the course of events in the Balkans and Constantinople. The point was that the truth of his forecast was due to his knowledge of the peoples concerned.

A. RYAN.

*British High Commission, Constantinople,
November 27, 1919.*

[163696]

No. 193.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 2286.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, December 4, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the minutes of the 28th meeting between the Armenian-Greek section of this High Commission and representatives of the Greek High Commission and the Armenian and Greek Patriarchates, held on the 26th November.

2. The proceedings were of exceptional interest; the lively anxiety, approximating at times to despair, of the representatives of the two main races of the Ottoman Christians as regards public security and relief is revealed throughout.

3. With respect to security, the situation presented is one of almost unbroken gloom. The prevalent lawlessness is forcing the Greeks and Armenians of the interior and of the villages to take refuge in the large towns in Allied occupation, where they still further tax the already severely strained resources of the Relief Committees.

4. Various suggestions for improving the situation, whether by arming as rural guards a certain proportion of the law-abiding population or by distributing troops or gendarmes, are put forward and discussed. One and all, however, encounter difficulties, whether it be a shortage of effectives or the objection—largely technical and academic

though it would appear—that the distribution of arms is contrary to the terms of the armistice.

5. The reinstatement by the Nationalists, after his hardly-achieved dismissal, of the anti-Christian kaimakam of Boghazlian, in the vilayet of Angora, is significant, and is not the first occasion on which such action has been taken by Mustapha Kemal's organisation in defiance of the Central Government.

6. As regards relief, the situation during the coming winter will be an unfortunate one. In Cilicia it bids fair to be critical, as up to 30,000 destitute Armenian refugees are said to be expected in addition to 8,500 already in receipt of relief. The feeding and clothing of such a large number are utterly beyond the resources of the "Union nationale arménienne," and, although the French authorities are stated to be giving their attention to the matter of accommodation and may be expected to grant some further assistance, there is some justification for the remark of Dr. Tavitian that the refugees are faced with two alternatives—starvation in Cilicia or massacre in Aleppo.

7. Finally, all present agreed that the furnishing of relief during the coming winter can no longer be met by voluntary subscriptions; some form of advance from Allied funds is necessary if many thousands of deaths are to be avoided.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 193.

*Minutes of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting between the Armenian Greek Section
and Armenian and Greek Representatives.*

Present:

Lieut.-Colonel Graves.
Lieut.-Colonel Binns.
Mr. Hurst.
Lieutenant Tucker, R.N.V.R.
M. Pallis, representing the Greek High Commission.
Dr. Theotokas, representing the Greek Patriarchate.
M. Calvocoressi, representing the Greek Patriarchate.
Dr. Tavitian, representing the Armenian Patriarchate.
M. Tchakirian, representing the Armenian Patriarchate.

1. Public Security.

DR. THEOTOKAS said that, as brigandage could visibly be practised with almost complete impunity, the number of bands was increasing daily. At Chatalja the new Mutessarif had guaranteed to restore order in ten days, but since the end of that period there had nevertheless been numerous cases of brigandage. On the 12th November members of a band had entered Chilé and beaten a Greek subject, subsequently carrying him off. A French gendarme who was there had done his best to persuade the commander of the Turkish gendarmerie to pursue the brigands, but this latter had abstained from doing so, saying he had no confidence in his subordinates, who were in league with the bands.

As regards the interior, eight Greek villages near Nigde had been half evacuated by their Christian inhabitants, who had left for Cilicia, Smyrna, and Constantinople.

In reply to a question from Colonel Graves, Dr. Theotokas stated that he had not heard of the Turkish authorities placing any obstacles in the way of Greeks (as opposed to Armenians) travelling in the interior.

Dr. Tavitian had received a long report from Boghazlian. The extremely anti-Christian kaimakam, Avni Bey, had at length been dismissed, but the Nationalists had now reinstated him. In this district Avni Bey was also preventing the Armenians from obtaining their stipulated share of the produce where fields owned by them were being cultivated by Turks. Dr. Tavitian pointed out that ever since the armistice there had been constant complaints from Boghazlian.

At Aintab, he continued, the Turks were well-armed, and waiting for a favourable

moment to attack the Armenians. A large number of Turkish officers were much in evidence in the town.

Dr. Theotokas suggested that, as French gendarmes were already at certain places such as Chilé, it might be practicable to distribute them in small groups, in view of the unusual insecurity everywhere prevalent.

As regards the Adana Plain, where there had recently been some bad cases of attacks by bands, Dr. Tavitian stated that the situation was now normal; the surrender of the tchétés had been demanded.

Colonel Graves pointed out that there were considerable bodies of troops in Cilicia, and energetic action could thus be taken; whereas with a few gendarmes nothing could be done against regular bands.

Dr. Theotokas: They were threatened with a fresh immigration of returned Greek refugees on a large scale, owing to insecurity. Refugees were also leaving the villages and coming into Constantinople, thus placing an additional burden on the funds of the Greek Relief Committee.

If the Las, who were invariably the most dangerous element, knew that there were arms in the villages they would not attack them so readily.

M. Pallis asked whether there were still no chance of rifles being distributed to peaceful villagers for self-protection.

Colonel Graves: The matter was not lost sight of, but it was one of very great difficulty, as, according to the terms of the armistice, all rifles, &c., had to be given up. Nevertheless, as so many of the brigands and malefactors were armed, it was natural that one should wish the law-abiding section of the population to be equally well off in order to be able to protect themselves.

Dr. Theotokas asked whether, if the despatch of gendarmes was out of the question, it would not be possible to distribute small detachments of troops. There were, he added, villages which had been attacked up to four times, and the situation was unendurable.

Dr. Tavitian suggested the possibility of Turkish gendarmes, with Allied officers, and Dr. Theotokas mentioned the idea of a sort of militia recruited amongst the Christians, with European officers.

Colonel Graves pointed out that we were unfortunately not administering the internal affairs of Turkey; we were here to see that the terms of the armistice were duly respected.

Dr. Theotokas: The Turks were arming Moslems to attack Christians; this was contrary to the terms of the armistice.

Dr. Tavitian concurred, and said that if only the terms of the armistice were properly observed they would be quite satisfied.

Dr. Theotokas: In one district of the Marmora region 200 to 300 rifles had been distributed to Christians a few months previously, since when the situation had been quiet round there.

2. Relief.

In reply to Colonel Graves, M. Pallis said that the Greek Patriarchate had prepared a note to the High Commissioners regarding the possibility of obtaining a credit for relief purposes, and this would be sent off in a few days.

Dr. Tavitian stated that confiscated Armenian funds in Turkish hands would constitute a good security for such an advance, as regards the Armenians; such funds were considerable.

The Armenian Patriarchate had approached the Turkish Government as regards financial help for their orphans, and the Turks had offered to give £ T. 1,000 a month.

According to a telegram received the previous day from a member of the American Mission at Harput, they were seriously contemplating the necessity of shutting down the Armenian Orphanage there owing to scarcity of funds.

Colonel Graves: They were all agreed as to one thing. Relief work could no longer be carried on with voluntary subscriptions; people had given all they could by this time. The matter was one of feeding, housing, and clothing hundreds of thousands of people for months—they would have to reckon up to the harvest of next June—and the expenses would run into millions.

A letter had been received from the Director-in-chief of Relief and Repatriation of Refugees at Beirut asking for confirmation of the statement made at a previous meeting that 8,500 Armenian refugees in Cilicia were very badly off. His anxiety was natural, as large numbers of Armenians were being sent from Syria to Cilicia.

Dr. Tavitian said that the periods of greatest difficulty were those immediately succeeding the arrival of large batches of refugees, while their distribution and accommodation were being arranged. The lack of houses had caused difficulty. The French were distributing the new arrivals as far as possible in villages (thus 4,000 of them were to be housed at Shaykh Murad, near Adana), and were proposing to erect temporary sheds.

Dr. Tavitian then gave certain information and statistics regarding refugees at Aleppo and in Syria generally.

The Armenian refugees at Aleppo were of two classes: One was the temporary class, who were placed in barracks, and to whom the British authorities gave money grants. Their number had been 8,000, but now only 2,000 were left, and these also were going to be sent away to Cilicia. The other class was those who were staying in the town. The grant of 2 piastres a day which had previously been made to these was now discontinued. There were 10,000 of them, and they were now more or less able to earn a living.

In the Deir-Zor district there were still at least 50,000 Armenians in the hands of Moslems, of whom 20,000 round Suruj and Urfa alone; they were the last survivors of those deported from the eastern vilayets.

In Cilicia they were expecting 28,000-30,000 refugees. He believed that this estimate included those in Mesopotamia also, who were mostly centred at Bakuba.

Colonel Graves enquired who would now feed these refugees, who had presumably up to the present been looked after by the British military authorities.

No satisfactory reply seemed forthcoming to this question.

Dr. Tavitian expressed his opinion that there were only two alternatives. They must either send the Armenian refugees to Cilicia, where they would be faced with starvation, or leave them behind in Syria, with the resultant risk of their being murdered by the Arabs after the evacuation. At Beirut itself there was no danger, but at Aleppo, for instance, it was quite otherwise.

The "Union arménienne" was doing what it could in the Adana region, but was very short of funds.

3. Islamised Christians.

Dr. Tavitian, continuing, said that they still had 500-600 addresses of Armenian orphans with Moslems in the Constantinople district.

M. Tchakirian suggested that, instead of the present arrangement, two or three Inter-Allied policemen might be reserved particularly for the recovery of such children. They might, for instance, have one British, one French, and one Italian policeman, each for his own zone in Constantinople.

Colonel Graves concurred in the suggestion, and proposed its discussion with the British authorities concerned.

Constantinople, November 26, 1919.

[163719]

No. 194.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 2311.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 9, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, herewith, a report of a conversation which Mr. Hohler had yesterday with the Kurdish chief, Sheikh Said Abdul Kadir Pasha, on Kurdish affairs.

2. I venture to think that the question of Kurdish independence is one which deserves most careful study on the part of His Majesty's Government, as the movement in favour of it appears to be deep and genuine; and whether we wish it or not, the Kurds place their hopes mainly in His Majesty's Government.

3. The fact that the Kurds appear to have arrived at an agreement with the Armenians is one of great interest, and if the agreement is solid it should be of great value in solving many difficulties.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 194.

Memorandum.

I RECEIVED a visit from Abdul Kadir this morning, who stated that at the present time the Kurds found themselves in a very difficult position, and even, in his opinion, in some danger. The *Entente libérale* Party, with Ferid Pasha at their head, were endeavouring to replace the present Government and to come into power, and had made proposals of a very favourable nature to him, promising the Kurds what I understand to amount to complete autonomy under the protectorate of the Turkish Government. Ferid Pasha, however, at the time of his previous accession to power had made fairly large, though far from equally far-reaching promises, but when in power had carried nothing out. On the other hand, the present Government had also been making proposals to him, offering the Kurds administrative autonomy under Kurdish officials, but at the same time they were adopting provocative and unfriendly proceedings towards him and his fellow-countrymen in Constantinople. In the meantime Mustapha Kemal was becoming increasingly dangerous, and he felt great anxiety what this man in combination with the Azerbaijanis, instigated by Halil Pasha and other adherents of Enver, might do. The price he was to pay for the concessions to be given by the *Entente libérale* was to throw the Kurds against Mustapha Kemal. What the present Government under Ali Riza wished was that they should receive the support of the Kurds, and should put up with Mustapha Kemal, whom they would endeavour to restrain from any overt action. He said he wished to form his course absolutely in accord with the Allies, but especially with England, for he considered that the fate of Kurdistan was intimately linked with the policy of Great Britain, much more so than with that of any other of the Allies, and he was anxious to do nothing which would not have our entire assent and approval.

2. He gave me the information, which was very interesting but quite new to me, that the Armenians and the Kurds had come to an agreement both here and at Paris, and handed to me the documents (copies of which are enclosed herewith), giving an account of the results thus achieved, together with a letter to the heads of the Peace delegations at the Peace Conference, signed conjointly by Cherif Pasha and Boghos Nubar Pasha. These papers are presumably already in the hands of the Foreign Office, but copies are enclosed herewith. I expressed the great satisfaction I felt at hearing that the two races had thus come to an harmonious arrangement. I said that the question he laid before me was one of great difficulty. The policy of His Majesty's Government, to which they intended rigorously to adhere, was not to interfere in any way with Turkish internal politics, so that Turkey might be quite free to choose at this critical moment of its existence what Government and whatever leaders she preferred, uninfluenced by any foreign intervention. In the light of the principles of President Wilson, it was impossible not to feel sympathy with the desire of any nationality to assert its independence, but while we were ready to forward any communication to the Peace Conference which the Kurdish people might wish to make, and so to provide them with every facility for giving expression to their aspirations, I warned him most seriously to understand that that implied no kind of promise or undertaking. The information which had reached this High Commission was rather to the effect that Mustapha Kemal's movement was weakening, so that there would be little to fear from him, and I had reason to believe that the British High Commissioner in Transcaucasia had been very successful in promoting tranquil relations between the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians, so that there ought to be no reason to fear what they might do. He had referred to a revival of the Nationalist movement in the spring, but that was three or four months distant, and I could not but believe by that time the Peace Conference would have arrived at certain conclusions, at least in respect to peace with Turkey. His Excellency interrupted me to say that while it was true, and he fully appreciated the fact that it was from the Peace Conference and not from any Turkish Government that the Kurds had to look for the fulfilment of their aspirations, yet, with the progress of time, other things might happen. The Peace Conference would in due course make its decisions, but he was inclined to wonder what measures it would take to enforce them, and he quoted an Arab proverb: "Though your enemy is only an ant, so long as he is an enemy you should not go to sleep." With great tact he insinuated the difficulty which the Kurdish people would have in making good their claim to independence, if the Allies had not sufficient forces to overawe the Turks into a full acceptance of the peace terms.

3. I enquired whether the opposition to Mustapha Kemal desired by the *Entente*

[1356]

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libérale Party entailed the use of force; he said it did. I observed that this seemed unnecessary, owing to the weakening of the movement to which I had already referred, and also that, in view of the fact that His Majesty's Government desired, in the interests of all parties, that peace should be established and maintained.

4. With regard to the vexatious treatment which he said the Kurds were suffering in Constantinople, I remarked that His Majesty's Government had stated that they would not tolerate political oppression of one party by another; all depended on the facts, but in case of an emergency it was very probable that we might be able to use our influence to prevent such conduct as he had described.

5. I was again much impressed by the firm resolution that Sheik Abdul Kadir showed in pursuing his aim of independence for Kurdistan and for separation from the Turks.

T. B. HOHLER.

*British High Commission, Constantinople,
December 8, 1919.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 194.

Kurdistan and Armenian Representatives to M. Clemenceau.

M. le Président,
Paris, le 20 novembre 1919.
NOUS soussignés, représentants des nations arméniennne et kurde, avons l'honneur de faire connaître à la Conférence de la Paix que nos deux nations, aryennes toutes deux, ont les mêmes intérêts et poursuivent le même but, à savoir leur libération et leur indépendance, en particulier pour les Arméniens, leur affranchissement de la domination cruelle des Gouvernements turcs, et, en général, tant pour les Arméniens que les Kurdes, leur délivrance du joug du Comité Union et Progrès, dont les Gouvernements officiels et occultes leur ont été si néfastes, aux uns et aux autres. Nous sommes, donc, en entier accord pour demander ensemble à la Conférence de la Paix la constitution, selon les principes des nationalités, d'une Arménie unifiée indépendante et d'un Kurdistan indépendant, avec l'assistance d'une grande Puissance, désignée, après avoir entendu le vœu de nos nations respectives, pour accorder à nos pays son aide technique et économique pendant la période de reconstruction.

En ce qui concerne l'attribution des territoires contestés, indiqués dans nos mémoires respectifs présentés successivement à la Conférence de la Paix, et la délimitation définitive des frontières des deux futurs États, nous déclarons formellement nous en remettre entièrement aux décisions de la Conférence de la Paix, persuadés d'avance que sa sanction sera déterminée sur la base de la justice et du droit.

Nous confirmons, en outre, notre complet accord de respecter les droits légitimes des minorités dans les deux États.

Veillez agréer, &c.

Pour le Kurdistan :

CHERIF,

*Président de la Délégation kurde à la
Conférence de la Paix.*

OHAN DJIHANNIAN,

*Président de la Délégation de la
République arménienne à la
Conférence de la Paix.*

Pour l'Arménie :

BOGHOS NUBAR,

*Président de la Délégation
nationale arménienne.*

Enclosure 3 in No. 194.

General Cherif Pasha to M. Clemenceau.

M. le Président,

Paris, le 25 novembre 1919.
LE retard mis à la conclusion de la Paix avec l'Empire ottoman a procuré une chance inespérée au Comité Union et Progrès pour s'emparer de nouveau du pouvoir en Turquie, en créant ainsi les plus graves entraves au règlement équitable des affaires d'Orient.

Les Gouvernements qui se sont succédé depuis l'armistice à Constantinople composés des débris du Comité Union et Progrès et de l'Opposition, les principaux chefs de celle-ci ayant été empêchés de rentrer à temps dans leur pays, ont fait à la pauvre Turquie plus de mal encore que ceux qui l'ont amenée devant l'abîme par les demi-mesures qu'ils ont prises.

Toutes les nationalités qui composent l'Empire ottoman étaient en droit d'attendre le même traitement que les autres peuples qui composaient l'Empire austro-hongrois. D'ailleurs, les déclarations des Alliés de faire une paix de justice et de droit laissent espérer en Orient le même droit à faire valoir leurs revendications à toutes les nationalités qui s'y trouvent.

Au nom de la nation kurde, j'ai l'honneur de solliciter du Conseil suprême de la Conférence de la Paix, avec la dernière énergie, que nous puissions dans la légitimité de nos revendications nationales, le soin d'étudier sérieusement la question kurde, laquelle est la base, je puis le dire sans aucune présomption, des conditions essentielles pour assurer la paix et la tranquillité en Asie Mineure.

Ce serait une erreur des plus graves de considérer le Kurdistan comme un terrain de spéculation en essayant de le partager en deux zones d'influences financières et en l'occupant militairement. L'effusion de sang qui s'ensuivrait serait la conséquence fatale d'une nouvelle imprévoyance diplomatique.

Le Kurdistan est indivisible et ne forme qu'un seul État indépendant dans l'organisation technique et économique, pour laquelle on veut le soumettre au mandat d'une grande Puissance que désignera, dans sa sagesse, la Société des Nations avec l'assentiment de la nation kurde.

C'est la solution la plus équitable et la plus digne des vainqueurs qui ont fait les plus grands sacrifices pour la paix de droit et de justice. D'ailleurs, c'est ce que la nation kurde est en droit d'attendre des sentiments d'équité et de sagesse du Conseil suprême de la Conférence de la Paix.

Dans le Kurdistan, se trouve une minorité arménienne. Équitablement parlant, cette question peut se résoudre plus facilement que l'ont n'est tenté de le croire.

Nous autres Kurdes, nous ne voulons en aucun point empiéter sur les droits de qui que ce soit.

Les Arméniens aussi bien que les Turcs, Arabes, Nestoriens et autres, qui resteraient, à cause de leur minorité, incapables de former une agglomération administrative, rencontreraient, dans l'État kurde, l'entente la plus parfaite, et les droits de chacun seraient strictement respectés.

Le moyen le plus sûr et le plus équitable pour solutionner les revendications kurdes et celles des Arméniens consisterait à instituer une commission internationale chargée de délimiter la frontière des contrées où nous formons aujourd'hui, et depuis des siècles, la plus grande majorité de la population.

Nous avons pleine et entière confiance dans la décision que prendra la Commission internationale susmentionnée, persuadés d'avance que sa sanction sera déterminée sur la base des principes de nationalités, de justice et de droit.

Ainsi qu'il appert de la déclaration collective que nous avons adressée à la Conférence de la Paix en date du 20 de ce mois, une entente cordiale c'est heureusement établie, sous les auspices de leurs représentants respectifs à Paris, entre les nations arménienne et kurde. Pour maintenir et raffermir cette harmonie, nous espérons qu'il plaira à la Conférence de la Paix de donner un prompt règlement à nos revendications respectives, conformément aux aspirations légitimes et aux droits de chacun.

Veillez agréer, &c.

Le Président de la Délégation kurde
à la Conférence de la Paix,

CHERIF.

Enclosure 4 in No. 194.

Boghos Nubar to General Cherif Pasha.

Mon cher Président,

Paris, le 20 novembre 1919.
COMME suite à l'accord heureusement intervenu aujourd'hui même entre nous, comme représentants de nos nations respectives, il est entendu que nous nous engageons à ne faire publier, par nos services de propagande, aucun écrit ou brochure nuisible à nos nations respectives. Il va de soi que, pour ceux qui existent déjà, on ne cherchera plus à en tirer parti dans un but d'hostilité.

Il reste bien convenu que, pour les questions territoriales, nous nous en sommes remis à l'arbitrage de la Conférence de la Paix, et que de part et d'autre nous y apporterons un large esprit de réconciliation, d'amitié et de loyauté.

Veillez agréer, &c.

Le Président de la Délégation nationale arménienne
à la Conférence de la Paix,

BOGHOS NUBAR.

Enclosure 5 in No. 194.

General Cherif Pasha and Boghos Nubar to M. Clemenceau.

M. le Président,

Paris, le 20 novembre 1919.

NOUS nous faisons un plaisir de remettre ci-joint à votre Excellence copie d'une lettre adressée à M. le Président de la Conférence de la Paix, signée par nous, représentants de la Délégation de l'Arménie intégrale et de la Délégation kurde à la Conférence de la Paix. Votre Excellence verra que, contrairement aux assertions de nos adversaires, prétendant que les Arméniens et les Kurdes ne pourraient vivre en bonne intelligence, nous avons conclu un accord en vue de la réalisation de nos revendications nationales.

Veillez agréer, &c.

Le Président de la Délégation kurde à la
Conférence de la Paix,

CHERIF.

Le Président de la Délégation nationale
arménienne,

BOGHOS NUBAR.

(Cette lettre a été adressée aux Présidents des Délégations anglaise, américaine, italienne et japonaise auprès de la Conférence de la Paix.)

[165691]

No. 195.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 2317.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 11, 1919.

I HAVE in more than one recent despatch remarked on the extreme eagerness which is now being shown in official Turkish circles for the early conclusion of peace, and the insistence with which the Grand Vizier and other Ministers insist, whenever an opportunity offers, on the necessity for an early solution.

2. About three weeks ago great publicity was given to the fact that the Turkish Government had made a formal representation to the Allies with the same object, and the greatest anxiety was manifested in the press and among the public as to the result. One suggestion which has been put forward to account for this eagerness on the part of the Turkish Government is that Mustapha Kemal has urged them to take such action, feeling that he is uncertain how much longer he can hold the national movement together.

3. I had myself no definite knowledge of such a representation until the 27th November, when my Italian colleague read at the weekly meeting of the High Commissioners a telegram from Rome, stating that a telegram from the Turkish Grand Vizier, dated the 15th November, had been laid before the Supreme Council. My French colleague then explained to us that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had asked him to transmit the Grand Vizier's telegram, and that he had done so, imagining that the same request had been made to the Italian High Commissioner and myself.

4. Your Lordship is no doubt already aware of the contents of the Grand Vizier's telegram, but I enclose, for convenience of reference, a copy received from my French colleague after the meeting mentioned above.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 195.

Grand Vizier to M. Clemenceau.

LE dernier délai accordé à la Délégation bulgare pour la signature du Traité de Paix devant expirer le 15 novembre courant, et prenant en considération la lettre responsive de votre Excellence adressée au chef de la Délégation ottomane en date du 25 juin écoulé, je viens la prier de vouloir bien fixer le jour auquel celle-ci pourrait se trouver en France afin de se mettre finalement en relations avec le Congrès des Puissances alliées.

[165694]

No. 196.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 2321.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 12, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2166 of the 19th November, I have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of a further telegram from Moustapha Kemal Pasha complaining of the proceedings of the French authorities at Adana.

2. The strenuous attitude taken up by the leaders of the Nationalist movement in regard to the new arrangements in Syria and Cilicia goes far to discredit the view widely held in this country, and especially by the advocates of what is called an "English policy," that there is a definite working understanding between the French and the Nationalists.

3. It is probably true that many individual Frenchmen, including persons in official position, sympathise with the national movement, and would for one reason or another welcome a solution of a Turkish question based on what is the main plank in the Nationalists' programme, namely, the maintenance of an undivided Turkey proper.

4. I have no reason to suppose that the highest French authorities here are pushing this policy in anticipation of the decisions of the Conference. If they were doing so, there could be no greater set-back to their efforts than the action of their own Government in choosing this moment to take charge in Syria and Cilicia.

5. Further indications that the French are not really taking too much trouble to soothe Nationalist susceptibilities is afforded by the fact that they filled the columns of certain local French papers with glowing descriptions of the benefits conferred by French administration on the vilayet of Adana.

6. Following upon the enclosed telegram from Moustapha Kemal Pasha, I have received a number of telegrams of the usual type from committees of national defence, &c., at various places in the interior complaining of the alleged action of the French in forcing the people of Adana to fly French flags.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 196.

Telegram despatched from Sivas on November 28 by Moustapha Kemal Pasha in the name of the Representatives of the Association of the Defence of Rights.

(Translation.)

THE French, acting in principle contrary to the clauses of the armistice by remaining in occupation of the Adana district, have recently through police agents and gendarmes distributed French flags among the whole population of the town and have forced the inhabitants to hoist them not only over private houses, imposing a fine of 100L. in case of non-compliance, but also over official buildings.

According to information received from Adana, the whole Mahomedan population in the last degree pained and disgusted at this act, which is contrary to international law. We protest energetically in the name of Ottoman national unity against this act, and we demand redress.

[165708]

No. 197

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 2336.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 13, 1919.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 2311 of the 7th December, relative to a conversation between Mr. Hohler and Sheikh Abdul Kadir on Kurdish affairs, I have the honour to forward herewith for your Lordship's information report of a conversation which Mr. Hohler had on the 9th December with the Armenian Patriarch, concerning an understanding alleged to have been arrived at between the Kurds and the Armenians.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 197.

Memorandum.

I HAD a conversation this afternoon with the Armenian Patriarch to enquire as to the understanding alleged to have been arrived at between the Kurds and the Armenians. His Beatitude said that some time ago there had been negotiations going on between him and the Kurdish club here, but they had rather broken down, as there were divergent sections in the club. The tendency was for the older members to be inclined to continue with the Turks, whereas the younger ones considered that that policy had been tried for too long without the slightest success; also there were differences of opinion among the various tribes. He had, however, now received from Paris the statement to the effect that Boghos Nubar Pasha and Sherif Pasha had signed an agreement, but the details had not yet reached him. As soon as they did it was his intention to recommence negotiations, not only here but also in the provinces, though they were greatly hampered by the action of the Turks, who refused to allow liberty for travelling. His Beatitude said that the Armenians had never suffered from the Kurds, except occasional "Razzais," up to the time of Abdul Hamed, and that then the Kurds had only perpetrated massacres when incited thereto by the Turks. Otherwise they had lived throughout history alongside and amongst the Kurds on perfectly good terms. I suggested that whilst an independent Kurdistan freed, so far as possible, from all traces of Turkeydom would appear to give the most genuine guarantees possible for the lives, the liberty, and the honour of the Armenians, it would seem to be wise not to seek for any undue extension of Armenian sovereignty, especially in places where they were not in very clear majority, and I enquired whether, as a matter of fact, the system prevalent in olden times had not been one of tribal rule and intertribal custom, without any central Government. His Beatitude entirely endorsed this, and said that the Kurds were merely dwellers in the mountains addicted to pastoral pursuits, whilst the Armenians lived in the plains and followed husbandry. He would welcome the re-establishment of such a system. He said that he believed the majority of the Kurds to be desirous of independence, and that only a few tribes, the chief of which was the Milli at Viranshehr, decided in favour of predilection for the Turks. He reiterated the conviction that the Kurds and Armenians could get along perfectly well together if left alone, and if the Turks could be, so far as possible, eliminated from among them. I expressed the personal opinion that the success of the negotiations gave promise to the best hopes of many of the Armenian difficulties, and whilst I was ignorant of the view of His Majesty's Government, I could not but believe that the scheme was one which would meet with their entire approval, especially as they had lately been instrumental in procuring the conclusion of a pact between the Armenians of the Caucasus and the Azerbaijanis. I pointed out, however, to his Beatitude that, according to information which had just reached us from Mr. Wardrop, the Armenians had broken that compact by recent attacks on several villages in the Zangazur district. He said he would use his influence to stop any future infraction of the agreement.

M. Zaven said that, as with the Kurds, so the Armenians had always lived on

tolerable terms with the Azerbaijanis. Hostilities, massacres, and reprisals had only broken out when Azerbaijan had become a kind of succursal of Turkey, full of Young Turk agents.

T. B. HOHLER.

December 9, 1919.

[165712]

No. 198.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 2341.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 15, 1919.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 1822 of the 2nd December, asking for a list of port, railway, mining, and industrial concessions held by foreigners other than British subjects in any part of the late Turkish Empire, I have the honour to forward herewith a list which is believed to be fairly complete.

2. Although many of the companies are described as Ottoman, the capital invested in the concessions named is mainly foreign, of the nationality given in each case.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 198.

List of Port, Railway, Mining, and Industrial Concessions held by Foreigners other than British Subjects in late Turkish Empire.

Company.	Nationality.	Capital.
Brasseries réunies Bomonti Nectar	Swiss	Fr. 6,000,000
Brasserie de la Paix.		
Société générale de Chemin de Fer et Travaux publics ...	French.	
Société du Chemin de Fer ottoman d'Anatolie ...	German	Fr. 135,000,000
Société Impériale ottomane du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad ...	German	Fr. 15,000,000
Société ottomane du Chemin de Fer Damas-Hama ...	French	Fr. 15,000,000
Société du Chemin de Fer Jaffa à Jérusalem ...	French	Fr. 4,000,000
Compagnie du Chemin de Fer Mersine-Tarsous-Adana ...	German	£ stg. 220,325
Société ottomane du Chemin de Fer Moudania-Brousse	French	Fr. 3,825,000
	Belgian	
Compagnie d'Exploitation des Chemins de Fer orientaux	German	Fr. 50,000,000
	Austrian	
Société ottomane du Chemin de Fer Smyrne-Cassaba ...	French	Fr. 16,000,000
"Magic" Société internationale de Films et Cinémas ...	Italian	Fr. 250,000
Compagnie des Eaux de Constantinople	French	Fr. 20,000,000
Compagnie des Eaux de Scutari-Cadiköy	German	£ T. 75,000
	Belgian	
Compagnie ottomane des Eaux de Beyrouth	German	Fr. 4,000,000
Compagnie ottomane des Eaux de Smyrne	French	Fr. 3,750,000
Société anonyme ottomane d'Électricité (Constantinople)	French	Fr. 12,000,000
	Belgian	
Société ottomane d'Électricité de Smyrne	German ?	£ stg. 100,000
Société anonyme ottomane de Tramways et d'Électricité de Damas	Belgian	Fr. 6,000,000
Société anonyme ottomane de Tramways et d'Électricité de Beyrouth	French	Fr. 6,000,000
Société Impériale ottomane d'Éclairage par le Gaz et l'Électricité	French	Fr. 1,221,500
	Belgian	
Société anonyme ottomane du Gaz de Beyrouth	French	Fr. 2,200,000
Société immobilière ottomane de Constantinople	French	£ T. 600,000
Société foncière balkanique	French	Fr. 5,000,000
Société anonyme ottomane du Chemin de Fer métropolitain de Constantinople entre Galata et Péra	German	£ T. 165,000
Société anonyme ottomane des Mines de Balıa-Karadın ...	French	Fr. 8,000,000
Société des Charbonnages de Tchamly	French	Fr. 12,000,000
Société ottomane d'Héraclée	French	Fr. 15,000,000
Société anonyme ottomane des Bateaux de la Corne d'Or	German	£ T. 50,000
Société anonyme ottomane industrielle et maritime...	Local	£ T. 75,000
	Italian	
Compagnie de Remorquage, Pilotage et Sauvetage...	French	Fr. 1,000,000
Société anonyme ottomane des Quais, Docks et Entrepôts de Constantinople	English	Fr. 23,875,000
	French	

Company.	Nationality.	Capital.
Société anonyme ottomane des Docks et Ateliers du Haut-Bosphore ...	French ...	Fr. 264,000
Compagnie ottomane du Port, des Quais et Entrepôts de Beyrouth ...	French ...	Fr. 6,000,000
Société du Port et des Quais d'Alexandrette ...	German ...	Fr. 5,000,000
Société du Port et des Quais de Chio ...	French ...	Fr. 8,000,000
Société du Port de Haidar-Pacha ...	German ...	Fr. 14,500,000
Société des Quais de Smyrne ...	French ...	Fr. 250,000
Société de Publications françaises et étrangères ...	Belgian ...	Fr. 12,500,000
Société des Bains de Koury-Yalova ...	?	Fr. 40,000,000
Société immobilière des Bains de Mer de San-Stefano ...	Austrian ...	Fr. 12,500,000
Régie cointéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman ...	French ...	£ T. 902,851
Société du Tabac (I.O.B.) ...	German ...	£ T. 25,000
Société des Tramways de Constantinople ...	German ...	£ T. 200,000
Société des Tramways Smyrne-Guez Tepe ...	German ...	£ T. 75,000
Société nationale pour le Commerce, l'Industrie et l'Agriculture dans l'Empire ottoman ...	French ...	Fr. 4,000,000
Société ottomane de Commerce, d'Agriculture et d'Industrie ...	German ...	Fr. 4,500,000
Société générale d'Entreprises dans l'Empire ottoman (Roads) (Routes) ...	French ...	£ T. 22,000
Compagnie industrielle du Levant ...	Belgian ...	£ T. 100,000
Société anonyme ottomane de Construction ...	Italian ...	£ T. 10,000
Société commerciale, industrielle et financière ...	?	
Société anonyme du Crédit "Union ottomane" ...	French ...	
Compagnie ottomane du Chemin de Fer Hodeida-Sanaa ...	French ...	
Gaz de Dolma Baghtché (Perrier) ...	French ...	
Société ottomane des Tramways libanais (Nord et Sud de Beyrouth) ...	French ...	

No. 199.

[165715] Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 2344.)

Constantinople, December 16, 1919.

My Lord,
 WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 1807 of the 25th November, relative to an enquiry which is being conducted by the Committee of Greek Claims in Paris into questions concerning the Greek administration at Smyrna, I have the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a joint note on the subject, dated the 10th December, which has been addressed to the Greek High Commissioner by the Allied High Commissioners.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 199.

Joint Note communicated to Greek High Commissioner.

LES Hauts-Commissaires soussignés ont l'honneur de faire savoir à M. le Commissaire hellénique à Constantinople que la Commission des Affaires internationales a été chargée par le Conseil suprême de procéder à l'examen des questions relatives à l'administration hellénique à Smyrne.

Les Hauts-Commissaires soussignés ont, en conséquence, été chargés d'établir certains faits précis relativement à l'ingérence des autorités helléniques dans les affaires administratives et judiciaires qui relèvent soit de services interalliés, soit de l'autorité ottomane.

Dès que les Hauts-Commissaires alliés auront réunis ces documents, ils ne manqueront pas de les soumettre au Commissaire hellénique à Constantinople pour qu'ils soient l'objet d'une étude contradictoire.

Les Hauts-Commissaires sont convaincus que cette enquête aura les plus heureuses conséquences et que, loin de gêner les services helléniques à Smyrne, elle facilitera leur délicate mission en précisant leurs attributions et en définissant leur rôle.

A. DEFRANCE.
 RICHARD WEBB.
 MAISSA.

Constantinople, le 10 décembre 1919.

[165720]

No. 200.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 2353.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 16, 1919.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 2132 of the 9th December, 1919, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of the notes addressed by the Armenian and Greek Patriarchates to the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople, appealing for an advance of funds for relief purposes from the Allied Governments, to be recovered from Turkey in the financial settlement on the conclusion of peace, as the voluntary contributions on which the various relief organisations chiefly depend are quite inadequate to meet the requirements of the distressed Christian populations of Turkey during the present winter.

2. These appeals were the subject of discussion at the High Commissioners' meeting on Friday, the 12th December, when my French and Italian colleagues concurred with me in the opinion that it was incumbent on the High Commissioners to do their utmost to represent the very serious situation disclosed in the notes of the Patriarchates to the Supreme Council, on whom the responsibility for the decision to be taken would then lie. My Italian colleague desired to point out that the sufferings of a portion of the Moslem population also deserved attention, this observation applying more particularly to the Turkish refugees from the Smyrna vilayet, of whom there are reported to be at least 30,000 in a state of extreme destitution in the district lying south of Aidin.

3. The French and Italian High Commissioners, who have already sent home copies of the notes of the Patriarchates, agreed to send telegrams also to Paris and Rome to urge the matter to the attention of their respective Governments, M. Maissa again emphasising the desirability of mentioning in this communication the needs of the Moslem refugees.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 200.

M. Dorotheos to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

Ecumenical Patriarchate,

Constantinople, November 6/19, 1919.

Sir,

THE sympathy and encouragement which the work of relief to the suffering Greek population of Turkey has always received from the British High Commission lead me to submit to your Excellency the following appeal:—

As your Excellency is aware, the number of Greeks deported to the interior of Asia Minor during the European war amounted to about 500,000, of whom only about half are estimated to have survived.

The Central Commission of Relief to the Greek Deportees, appointed by the Patriarchate, in order to carry out the work of repatriation and relief of the sufferers, has spent up to date 613,586L, this sum being derived from private funds subscribed by the Greeks of Constantinople and from a subsidy granted by the Hellenic Government, which has been most generous in its support, in spite of the very heavy calls upon it for relief in Salonica, East Macedonia, and Smyrna. Relief on a generous scale has also been provided by the American Commission of Relief in the Near East, particularly in the northern and north-eastern vilayets of Anatolia.

Unfortunately the resources of our Commission are rapidly becoming exhausted, and we are informed that the American Commission finds itself in a similar position. If there was a near prospect of the armistice coming to an end and the present condition of anarchy in the interior of Asia Minor being terminated, we should have less reason to be anxious about the future. But unfortunately there is every prospect of the present situation continuing over the winter, nor can we look to the Turkish Government for any substantial assistance in repairing the suffering which it has inflicted on its Christian subjects.

[1356]

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Numbers of the deportees have returned to their villages to find their homes either completely demolished or so damaged that they cannot provide sufficient shelter against the cold of the winter.

The population is equally destitute of warm clothing and blankets. Our Commission, owing to its limited funds, has been obliged to confine its activities almost exclusively to Thrace and the shores of the Sea of Marmora, thus neglecting the Black Sea region which is one of those where the Greek population has suffered most. Numberless orphans are still wandering about uncared for in the villages owing to lack of accommodation in the existing orphanages and lack of funds to open new ones.

It is obvious that, without relief measures on a large scale, there is bound to be great mortality this winter among the refugees, and especially among the old, the women, and children. The enormous discrepancy between the requirements and the funds available is shown by the fact that out of an estimate of 4,000,000, which in a statement handed in May last to Lieutenant-Colonel Pears, representative of the Supreme Economic Council here, was estimated as the minimum required for the effective relief of the Greek population in Turkey, only 800,000l. have been available, contributed exclusively by the Hellenic Government.

In view of the impossibility of our being able to obtain any further appreciable assistance either from the Hellenic Government or from private sources, I have the honour to suggest to your Excellency that it might be possible to place the matter before the Allied Governments, with a view to obtaining an advance or a relief grant, similar to those which were granted to various countries at the beginning of this year through the agency of the Supreme Economic Council. A sum of 1,000,000l., though falling far short of the real requirements, would, in my opinion, suffice to tide over the winter. This sum, if not given as a relief grant, might be considered as first charge on any sum which Turkey will be obliged to pay as an indemnity by the Peace Treaty.

I feel sure that the Allied Governments, who by now are all too familiar with the indifference of the Turkish Government towards its Christian subjects and who must realise that the inevitable protraction of the armistice is exposing these Christians to further hardships, which were originally not contemplated, will be prepared to examine this request for assistance in a sympathetic spirit.

I have, &c.

The Locum Tenens of the Ecumenical Throne,
DOROTHEOS, Metropolitan of Brusa.

Enclosure 2 in No. 200.

Armenian Patriarchs to Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

Constantinople, le 3 décembre 1919.

LA prolongation inopinée de l'armistice a créé à la nation arménienne, et particulièrement aux Arméniens de Turquie, une situation des plus alarmantes. Au lendemain de la victoire des Alliés, tous nos nationaux, mus par un élan de solidarité suprême, avaient uni leurs efforts pour secourir, de toute façon, ceux de leurs frères échappés aux horreurs des déportations et des massacres. Ainsi, furent recueillis et hospitalisés environ 12,000 orphelins, en attendant que les circonstances permissent de sauver au fur et à mesure ceux qui erraient à travers l'Empire ou que détenaient les Turcs, et dont le total s'élève, d'après les évaluations les plus mesurées, à plus de 100,000. Nos moyens d'action étant particulièrement restreints, nous avons échelonné nos ressources générales de façon à faire face aux besoins indispensables prévus pour une période maximum de quelques mois. Mais cette période une fois dépassée du double, voire du triple, il ne fut plus possible aux Arméniens de secourir les misères dont l'accumulation, la vérité, le caractère imprévu, allaient au delà des supputations les plus pessimistes. La nation se trouve aujourd'hui réduite à constater l'insuffisance absolue des ressources dont elle dispose pour subvenir aux nécessités les plus immédiates. Au seuil de l'hiver, de nouvelles complications viennent de surgir; les autorités turques empêchent aux Arméniens tout déplacement à travers l'Empire, ce qui ôte aux uns la possibilité de travailler pour vivre, et aux autres les chances d'échapper aux dangers qui menacent par le fait des agissements des nationalistes et de l'attitude hostile et agressive des Turcs fanatisés. De sorte que, si aucun remède n'était apporté à cet état de chose déplorable, des centaines de milliers d'Arméniens des deux sexes et de tout âge seraient voués à une mort certaine.

Dans ces conditions, le Patriarcat arménien avait, à la date du 2 septembre 1919, adressé au Gouvernement ottoman, une note pour lui demander de disposer en faveur de ces orphelins, de la quote-part leur revenant de droit sur la surtaxe perçue, sous diverses formes, par l'administration turque au bénéfice des orphelins. Le Département de l'Intérieur a, par sa note responsive du 18 novembre 1919, fait connaître au Patriarcat arménien "qu'il était conforme à la gloire de l'État d'allouer une somme mensuelle de 1,000 livres turques aux orphelinats arméniens." Le Patriarcat se réserve de répondre, par une note longuement motivée, à cette étrange communication de la Sublime Porte, qui semble ne tenir aucun compte du passé et des écrasantes responsabilités incombant au Gouvernement turc.

D'autre part, les démarches déjà tentées auprès du Conseil suprême économique pour faire attribuer une avance aux Arméniens, n'ont point donné de résultat. Dans ces conditions, nous considérons que le dernier moyen qui s'offre de sauver d'une mort certaine les victimes précitées, consiste à faire un suprême appel aux sentiments de justice et d'équité des Alliés, afin qu'ils veuillent bien consentir au Patriarcat une avance de 2,000,000 de livres sterling, pour compte du Gouvernement turc, à valoir sur les créances en espèce et en nature de ce dernier envers la nation arménienne.

En effet, indépendamment des indemnités dues à la nation du chef des déportations, massacres, pillages, destructions de biens meubles et immeubles, &c., le Gouvernement turc est dépositaire, suivant l'article 16 de la loi ottomane sur les biens abandonnés :

1. Des biens appartenant aux Arméniens et dont les propriétaires restent inconnus (Eshkhassi medjhoulé).
2. Des biens meubles, objets de culte, objets d'art, manuscrits, ex-votos, &c., que seize siècles de généreuse pitié chrétienne avaient entassés dans les 209 couvents et 2,000 églises saccagés par les Turcs.
3. Des immeubles de rapport appartenant à ces institutions et dont les revenus ont été encaissés pendant la durée de la guerre, conformément à la susdite loi.

Le caractère incontestablement légal de ces créances, lesquelles chiffrent par des dizaines de millions, et qui, en tout état de cause, devront être acquises à la nation arménienne, n'échappera point à l'appréciation impartiale des Alliés. Aussi, espérons nous fermement que leur généreuse sollicitude à l'égard de la nation martyre, s'exercera en ces graves circonstances, pour nous aider à remplir les dures et pressantes obligations qui nous incombent.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Chef de la Communauté arménienne-protestante,
ZENOPE BEZDJIAN.
Le Locum-Tenens du Patriarcat arménien-catholique,
A. SAYEGHIAN.
Le Patriarche des Arméniens,
ZAVEN.

[165721]

No. 201.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 2354.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 16, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of the minutes of proceedings at the meeting of the Armenian-Greek Section of this High Commission on the 10th instant.

I have not thought it necessary to forward copies of the reports read by the representatives of the Greek and Armenian Patriarchates at this meeting, as their contents are fully summarised in the enclosed minutes, but I have the honour to bring to your Lordship's notice the following points to which they draw special attention:—

1. The general state of insecurity in the unoccupied provinces of Turkey, and the critical situation prevailing in certain districts of the vilayet of Broussa, where there appears to be a renewed attempt to terrorise and drive out the surviving remnants of Armenian population on the part of the Turkish authorities, supported by the irregular bands of the Nationalist organisation. The inhabitants of a few Armenian villages in the district of Isnik, who had escaped deportation and massacre in 1915, have armed and organised themselves for self-defence since the proclamation of the Armistice, and

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there is no doubt that in some cases they have committed reprisals upon their Turkish assailants, thus affording a pretext for the persecution which they are now undergoing. I regret that the narrow limits now placed by the Treasury upon the expenditure for relief and repatriation will render it difficult, if not impossible, for this High Commission to accede to the Armenian Patriarch's request for the appointment of a British officer to this district, or to give any practical assistance in preventing or alleviating the sufferings complained of.

2. Complaints that the Christians are forced by the local authorities to take part in the elections to the Turkish Parliament, in spite of their almost universal unwillingness to have any share in proceedings which are a mere mockery of genuine Parliamentary representation.

3. Complaints of the levying on returned deportees of taxes alleged to be due for the period of their exile. A joint note has been addressed to the Porte on the subject by the Allied High Commissioners, a copy of which was forwarded to your Lordship with my despatch No. 2285/5035/58, dated the 3rd December, pointing out that a decree was promulgated shortly after the signature of the Armistice exempting returned refugees from such taxation and requesting that the practice should cease.

4. Renewed complaints of Avni Bey, the Kaimakam of Boghazlian, who was dismissed by the Central Government, but reinstated by Mustapha Kemal's Nationalist organisation. The Armenian Patriarchate is now informed that this man has been transferred as Kaimakam to one of the cazas of the Konia vilayet—a characteristic Turkish method of disposing of a bad governor.

5. The increasing need for relief, and the failing resources of the various organisations now endeavouring to afford assistance to the distressed Christian populations of Turkey. Copies of the notes of the Greek and Armenian Patriarchs to the High Commissioners appealing for Allied financial assistance for this purpose are being forwarded to your Lordship under a separate despatch, No. 2353/5046/19 dated the 16th December, and their contents was summarised in my telegram to your Lordship No. 2132 of the 9th December.

I have, &c.

J. M. DE ROBECK, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 201.

BRITISH HIGH COMMISSION, CONSTANTINOPLE.

December 10, 1919, 11.30 A.M.

Minutes of the 29th Meeting between the Armenian-Greek Section and the Armenian and Greek Representatives.

Present:

Lieutenant-Colonel Graves.
Lieutenant-Colonel Binns.
Lieutenant Tucker, R.N.V.R.
Miss Liley, for Mr. Hurst.
Mr. Pallis, representing the Greek High Commission.
Dr. Theotokas, representing the Greek Patriarchate.
Mr. Calvocoressi, representing the Greek Patriarchate.
Dr. Tavitian, representing the Armenian Patriarchate.
Mr. Tehakirian, representing the Armenian Patriarchate.

1. Public Security.

Dr. Tavitian reported that, according to information received from Boghazlian, the Turks there had begun to drive away from their houses Armenian women and children whom they had been retaining since the early days of the deportations. Each day numbers of orphans applied for relief, and out of about 200 widows who sought help it was only possible to provide for half this number owing to shortage of funds.

In this locality also Avni Bey, Kaimakam prior to the Armistice and again reinstated by the Turks, has been making a tour throughout the whole district inciting the Turks against the Christian elements, and atrocities and thefts were numerous as a result.

Dr. Tavitian continued that reports had been received regarding the critical condition at Broussa and the surrounding districts. On the 5th November a large

brigand band had attacked a native village in the district of Isnik, resulting in three men being killed and eleven severely injured. The Turks took advantage of this assault to declare that they had been attacked by Armenians and the gendarmerie arrested eight of the leading young men, submitting them to intense torture, burning the houses of the Armenians, and reducing all Christians throughout the whole district to a state of panic. The condition is most critical, and it was asked whether a British officer, accompanied by an Armenian or Turk, could be appointed to circulate in this region and to endeavour to restore calm. The Armenians fear that the Turks will use these disturbances as an excuse to disarm the Armenians completely, when they would be more than ever at the mercy of the Turks. Massacres or deportations are also feared.

Dr. Tavitian also pointed out that the arrangement made that the harvests were to be equally shared between the Turks and Christians was not being adhered to. According to information from the region of Broussa the Turks were ill-treating the Armenians to the utmost extent and depriving them of the olive harvest; bands were organised for this purpose, and from one village 10,000 to 12,000 kilog. of olives had been taken by the Turks. The terrified Armenians do not dare go out of their houses to protect their property. The Armenians state that as long as the commander of the gendarmerie, Abdul Rezak, retains this position there will be no security for them, and request that he be dismissed.

In continuation he stated that at Balikessir the situation is also most critical. The Nationalist Party is very strong there and are exciting the population against the Christians by publishing articles in a newspaper, "Izmiré Doghrou" ("Towards Smyrna"), one of them being entitled, "The Armenian Savagery."

Similar reports regarding the serious state of insecurity had also been received from Eski Shehir, Tchalgara, Sivas, and other places. At Sivas there was a large brigand band headed by Keurkheloo Bahram; these attacked the Christians, robbing them of their farming implements, and carrying away the corn and flour from eleven mills which belonged to Armenians. This was the second time the millers had been robbed, and they are now without any means of livelihood whatever.

At Ceaserea the Christians were forced to take part in the elections and several Armenians were killed in the disturbances which ensued.

Complaints regarding the unfair division of the harvests had also been received from Broussa, and a state of great insecurity prevailed throughout all that region. The Turks were attacking the villages and pillaging the churches, and taxes were being levied on returned Christians, and on their churches, contrary to agreement.

Dr. Theotokas said that all reports received by the Greek Patriarchate from Christians in the Interior were absolutely of the same nature as those read by Dr. Tavitian. Assassinations were a daily occurrence, attacks against whole villages were frequent, villages and churches were sacked, brigandage was rife and Christians lived in terror of their lives. Insecurity was specially great round Konia and that district, owing to organised Nationalist bands; also at Ordou, Kerassoude, and elsewhere. At Ordou, as elsewhere, the Christians were forced to take part in the elections, being led by gendarmes who administered heavy blows to any who objected.

As an example of the atrocities perpetrated on the Christians, Dr. Theotokas related an attack made by the order of the Mudir at Haimana, in the Sandjak of Angora, by the Turkish night watchmen on the houses of the Christian notables, who were absent from home, when the doors were broken in, the women and children turned into the street in the middle of the night and their belongings searched.

Another case was quoted from which it appeared that the head of a leading Greek family, named Doxaki Lefteri, of Silivri, had been in prison for three months on a totally false charge of being responsible for the disappearance of a certain Sheikh Talaat. In the same week as Talaat disappeared two Christians were assassinated near Tsando by the gendarmes of Chorlou. The authorities took no notice of this double assassination, which they knew to have been committed, but imprisoned Doxaki for the disappearance of Talaat, for which he was not responsible, but after three months of imprisonment the local authorities pronounced him innocent, and ordered him to be released. The matter, however, was brought up to the Hiyeti-Ittihatî ("Chambre des mises en accusation"), which ordered that Doxaki should still be detained. His health is suffering severely, and fear is entertained on his behalf if he is not soon released.

Similar reports of outrage and ill-treatment are being received constantly from Pasha-Keuy and other places in the Sandjak of Scutari, as well as from Gallipoli, Balikessir, Rodosto, and elsewhere. It would appear that the leaders of the

Nationalist organisations met in the latter half of November at Balikessir to confer together on the systematic recruitment of Moslems and the measures to be taken against the Christians.

Dr. Theotokas further drew attention to the fact that in spite of the agreement which had been made that returned refugees should not be taxed, taxes were levied on them in numbers of places. Colonel Graves said that a letter had been addressed to the Porte on this subject, which he trusted would have the desired effect and that these taxes would be remitted, for while certain towns and villagers had been mentioned the measure applied to all.

Dr. Theotokas stated that a further difficulty encountered, especially round Rodosto, by repatriated Christians was that on their return they found that Turks had taken possession of their houses, and were even pulling down their churches to build barracks with the material. Thus returning Christians were forbidden by the Turks to enter their own houses.

2. Relief.

Colonel Graves said that a letter had been received both from the Greek and Armenian Patriarchate, addressed to the three Allied High Commissioners, on the matter of the urgent need for help in obtaining funds for relief purposes, and that the question was to be considered at the approaching High Commissioners' meeting. He added that in the meantime the attention of the British Government had been drawn to the urgent need and critical situation, and that it was hoped that some help would be forthcoming.

Dr. Theotokas said that the censor prevented Armenian articles appearing in the press, which had been written in the hope of gaining sympathy and help for the destitute Christians, and asked Colonel Graves if he could do anything in the matter.

Dr. Tavitian stated that as regards funds they were living from day to day, and if money was not forthcoming from Europe or America they would be obliged to dispose of church property and valuables to raise funds; the most valuable property, however, had been removed by the Turks, who had sacked the convents where the objects of greatest value had been kept. The question of the dépôt which had been discovered in Stamboul, where valuables belonging to Armenians had been deposited by the Turks, was referred to, and Colonel Graves stated that the matter was being taken up and the Turkish Government held responsible to return these goods to the Armenian community. The question of the large sums which the Ottoman Government must have acquired from rents of Armenian property was also noted.

M. Pallis reported that the work of his Commission in distributing relief in the form of agricultural implements, seed, and animals to returned refugees, had nearly come to an end, as the money was almost exhausted and a small portion was being retained in order to afford help to cases of urgent need.

3. Islamised Christians.

M. Tchakirian asked whether any answer had been received from the inter-Allied Police, with regard to the measure proposed at the previous meeting, for specially appointing two or three picked men of the inter-Allied Police to recover children from Turkish houses. Colonel Binns replied that he had taken the question up, and that though the number of policemen was greatly reduced he thought that some such arrangement would be made.

4. Transport.

Dr. Theotokas raised the question of the transport difficulty, as formerly the Turkish Government paid for returning refugees up till the 15th September, but this was now forbidden by the Central Government, in addition to which the Anatolian Railway now offered no reduced fares whatsoever. He stated that there were a large number of refugees at present at Konia, who really belonged to the Constantinople district, but who were prevented from returning to their homes on account of lack of funds for their transport.

Meeting ended at 12:30.

(Next meeting, 24th December.)

[165674]

No. 202.

The Earl of Derby to Earl Curzon.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 1235.)

My Lord,

Paris, December 27, 1919.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 1241 of to-day's date, copy of the note which I have received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the boundary between the French and British spheres in Syria.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador).

NEVILLE M. HENDERSON.

Enclosure in No. 202.

Note respecting Boundary between French and British Spheres in Syria.

PAR une note du 20 décembre courant, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a bien voulu entretenir le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la question des limites entre les sphères d'occupation militaire française et anglaise respectivement en Syrie et Palestine, et exprimer le sentiment que le Gouvernement français serait d'accord sur le maintien de l'occupation anglaise au nord de la Palestine dans une partie de la zone bleue, contrairement aux demandes du Général Gouraud.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères par intérim, a l'honneur d'informer Lord Derby qu'il insiste de la manière la plus pressante pour que satisfaction soit donnée au Général Gouraud, qui, s'appuyant sur la décision de la Conférence de la Paix en date du 15 septembre 1919, ainsi que sur les instructions qu'il a reçues, estime indispensable que l'occupation militaire française s'étende sur la zone bleue entière. Si l'on se reporte à la décision précitée du Conseil suprême, on voit que toute autre solution serait une violation de la résolution des Alliés.

Le mémorandum du Premier Ministre britannique exprimait les vues de Mr. Lloyd George, mais il n'a pas été accepté par M. Clemenceau (qui a exprimé, à son tour, ses vues dans un mémoire responsif du 13 octobre). La seule décision à laquelle on puisse référer est celle de la Conférence de la Paix.

Il y a lieu de remarquer, d'autre part, que si les limites des zones d'administration déterminées par le Maréchal Allenby ne concordaient pas avec les zones fixées par les accords franco-anglais de 1916, après une étude minutieuse des régions syriennes, cette modification a été faite arbitrairement et malgré les protestations formelles du Haut-Commissaire français, M. Picot.

Quant à la décision française de retarder l'occupation de la Béka, elle a été inspirée uniquement par le désir de donner une satisfaction à l'Émir Feysal et de faciliter l'accord avec lui conformément aux demandes du Gouvernement britannique. Ce n'est nullement le cas pour le caza de Safed, car l'Émir Feysal, loin de désirer le maintien de l'occupation anglaise sur ce point, souhaite vivement que les troupes anglaises d'occupation se retirent non seulement de cette région, mais des parties de la Transjordanie occupées.

Il y a lieu d'ajouter qu'en se conformant à la résolution du Conseil suprême du 15 septembre dernier, qui prescrit le remplacement des troupes anglaises par des troupes françaises dans toute la zone bleue, les Gouvernements français et anglais ne préjugent nullement la solution définitive des frontières, qui est du ressort de la Conférence de la Paix.

Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris,
le 26 décembre 1919.